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1  Introduction 
 
Come now, I will tell you − and bring away my story safely when you have heard it − the only ways of 
inquiry there are to think:  
the one, that it is and that it is not possible for it not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon 
Truth),  
the other, that it is not and that it is necessary for it not to be, 
this I point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable, 
for neither may you know that which is not (for it is not to be accomplished) 
nor may you declare it.1  
 
Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the 
stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.2 
 
<3< %+$(/
Change and permanence, evasive presence and stable notions, a drama of epistemological 
questions staged throughout the history of philosophy whose germ is already witnessed in 
intriguing fragments surviving from Parmenides and Heracleitus − the epistemological 
problem of change and the experience of a river that is never the same.  
 
Plato’s cave of sense impressions; the form-matter unification of Aristotle’s philosophy; the 
rationality of Descartes contrasted by the empiricism of British philosophers and Kant’s 
reconciliation. Though a thesis within musicology, the questions that have inspired my work 
have had this story, this big narrative of various solutions to the epistemological question of 
change and permanence, the logic of thinking and the necessity of sense impression, as a 
reverberating background to aesthetic questions. The questioning of the musical work-concept 
and the event of performance have in this respect been sited within a broader context, an 
epistemological framework where the schism between spirituality and materiality, subject and 
object, mind and body, enlightened thought and deceitful sensualism has played a distinctive 
role.   
 
The line of demarcation between permanency and evasive change has traversed the Western 
landscape of theories that have explained our abilities to know the Truth − to reflect Being − 
at the same time as this boundary zone has both troubled (in its danger of leaving sense 
impressions in a trap of illusion, secluding the knowing subject in a solipsistic state, or 
                                                 
1 Parmenides, fragment 2. McKirahan 1994, p. 152.   
2 Plato, Cratylus, p. 61. 
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presenting a gap between mind and body difficult to bridge) and acted as a principle of re-
unification.  
 
The teasing question for me has in this respect been connected to the schism itself and the 
need for a dividing line to foster epistemological possibilities, because connected to the 
marker of difference there are questions of value − the is does not pop up at an equal base, but 
Truth is loaded with valuations. This is of course a territory already outlined by Nietzsche and 
explicitly followed up by Post-Structural thought. The Truth is not a novice but shows a will 
to power, and behind recognized knowledge there are structures of exclusion and 
concealment.  
 
The artistic project of the American composer John Cage could in this respect be seen as a 
very optimistic business that aims to view a possibility of knowledge − an experience of 
Being − not based in the operative difference but the presence of an abundance of diverse 
qualities. The necessary “violence” of Truth that can be felt in the Nietzschean approach, or 
the Foucauldian account, is countered by Cage’s belief in the affirmative experience of 
complexity and the possibility to create an anarchic harmony of different positions, a 
peaceful existential and experiential opportunity in a flat structured co-existential frame. 
 
We might find Cage “naïve” in this respect, or that his approach would leave us with an 
unfavourable devaluation, a paralysing indifference. But his positive approach is also 
interesting in the challenge it represents to the position of the line of demarcation, the 
inclusive/exclusive boundary, as the hub of epistemological horizons. The meaning-giving 
function of difference is effectively questioned through his methodological use of chance, 
indeterminacy and an abundance of non-coordinated simultaneous activities (musicircus as a 
technique of performance).  Dualism, and contrarily, non-dualistic approaches have therefore 
been important problems for discussion in this thesis.  
 
<3= (#$+*("
There lies within the artistic realm a freedom to pursue the limits of comprehensibility, twist 
and turn what is familiar, even to the point of being chaotic, and yet being experienced as 
meaningful. Cage’s experimental music does this to the full extent. As texts, Cage’s musical 
works render the hermeneutic tool of meaning formation senseless. Cage’s compositional 
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strategies of chance and indeterminacy challenge the foothold of the hermeneutic circle’s 
productivity. He puts musical koans3 up against the inclination to interpret the musical 
material in light of projected meaningful coherences. For instance, does it make sense to 
interpret the musical constellation in light of a meaning-giving totality (a whole meaning) 
when the music has come about by the tossing of coins?  Or, what about the compositional 
strategies that invite multiple things to happen simultaneously without a master plan for the 
offerings? These techniques shatter unifying frames of reference. Chance operations interrupt 
intentional connections that might have organized the material and thereby given it intentional 
meanings, and the abundance of non-coordinated simultaneity bewilders the establishment of 
a single superior frame of reference. Cage provokes complex situations to appear that 
question the relevance of the dialectic between what underlies structuring principles (whole-
meaning, musical idea, vision) and the handling of the material in order to create aesthetic 
meaning.  
 
Cage’s artistic project can be seen as a radical attempt at creating situations of aesthetic 
anarchism where all the sonic and aesthetic elements that appear have the same existential 
value and the same right to be there. They are not differentiated in value with reference to a 
superior, or underlying organisation governed by a unifying, centralised perspective − a 
certain meaning, idea, or intention. He does this by letting the relation between the totality 
and parts be randomly defined.   
 
But is it possible to think such an anarchic project in epistemological terms? Would we not at 
least need some provisional totalities through which details get their prominence, and would 
not that mean that even though we could dream about the utopian equality of existential 
adequacy, to be heard, seen and voiced will never be an innocent business? 
 
My initial entry to this complex of problems was prompted by an encounter between the 
philosophic hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and Cage’s artistic practice. Thought 
provoking issues arose out of the seeming closeness, yet disagreement between Heidegger’s 
philosophic account and Cage’s extensive use of ‘chance’ and ‘indeterminacy’ as 
                                                 
3 Koan is a technique in Zen Buddhism. It is a puzzling, often paradoxical, statement or story that cannot be 
understood or answered in conventional terms. These puzzles are used to challenge the Zen students’ reliance on 
ordinary ways of understanding − framed in a dualistic manner and influenced by egoistic desires − in order to 
make the students susceptible to a spiritual awakening − enlightenment.  
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compositional methods. While Heidegger’s theory could explain epistemology in terms of 
process and change so emphatically stressed by Cage’s aesthetics and artistic practice, 
Heidegger’s dynamic approach presupposed the need for hierarchic principles of organisation. 
The meaning-giving difference was at the core of his epistemology; the sense of the is arouse 
from centre-periphery, whole-part dialectics, where phenomena could be seen, heard, acted 
upon, and included in a life world through a grid of differentiating valuations. 
 
Heidegger’s position seemed convincing. He had managed to place the knowing subject 
within the experienced historical world, avoid the problem of solipsism and still present a 
foundation for epistemology within the conditional character of our lives. His a priori 
structures of knowledge were not based upon the Kantian subject of consciousness opposed to 
things in themselves, but a unified phenomenon of being-in-the-world, where knowledge was 
not based in the opposition between subject and object, but the involvement with, and 
attachment to the things of the world already present. In addition, the apparently groundless, 
non-fixed quality of our lives was in Heidegger’s theory not secured through the installation 
of an essentialist superstructure, but, by elaborating the logic of the hermeneutic circle into 
existential conditions for the human way of existing in the world, he outlined horizons of 
persistence within the experienced state of never-ending alteration.   
 
Cage, though, within an artistic practice could cut the moorings of hermeneutic logic without 
leaving us in a vacuum of no sense, no meaning, no world. Instead the scattered circle could 
function as an invitation for an altered approach to presence.  This, however, I found easier to 
understand in view of personal experiences, than through philosophical explanation. The 
initial problem for discussion was therefore:  How to think meaning formation, or even an 
epistemological horizon, when there is a collapse of a meaning-giving dialectic between 
underlying/overlying structural principles and the handling of materials.  
 
As we are going to see throughout the thesis, this is also a question addressed to a certain 
work-concept, because we could argue that the hermeneutic circle of whole meanings and 
worked out details exactly describes the logic of meaning production that we associate with 
the organic work of music, an unfolded drama, which however is neatly composed to a 
coherent unity.     
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I started this work with a concept of meaning that was not clearly defined but included that sense 
of meaning we experience, for example in the presence of an artwork, which is difficult to account 
for through a linguistic explanation. Adorno, for example, presents musical meaning as 
inseparably connected to the musical presentation itself − its specific constellation and handling of 
the musical material.4 This ‘meaning’ incorporates the ambiguous and complex that cannot be 
reduced to the delimited content associated with a linguistic definition of meaning. But while he 
sees the aspect of sense in music as differing at important points from linguistic systems, he finds 
that music also resembles language: It is through a form of articulation, a specific organisation of 
the musical material, that its meaningful presentation is created. It could perhaps be argued that 
Adorno points at the need of some form of hermeneutic logic, a coherence between the 
understanding of the grand form/intention/idea and the presented details, to get a sense of musical 
meaning. However, Adorno’s clarification can also function as an example of ‘meaning’ sited 
within a different landscape, or more correctly, a broader scope where ‘meaning’ has the capacity 
to include the ambiguous, complex and embodied quality that transgresses the logic of linguistic 
concepts.  
 
In other words, I had in mind a broad concept of meaning, included in ordinary speech, which 
embraces the experience of meaningfulness that exceeds a linguistic definition of meaning but 
expresses that something is felt to be relevant, that it affects me, or is found worthy of being 
held on to and included in my life’s horizons.  
 
Through working with this thesis I have been presented with more narrow definitions that 
contrast ‘meaning’ with ‘presence’ and differentiate between ‘meaning effects’ and ‘presence 
effects’ in connection with the impact of artistic activity and aesthetic experience.5 However, 
in the end I have kept my broad definition that partly overlaps a conception of presence and 
shares with Adorno a view on meaning that cannot be split from the embodied presentation 
itself, but at the same time can be associated with aspects of prolongation, continued 
relevance and possible re-actualisations. 
 
                                                 
4 Adorno, “Music and Language: A Fragment”, pp. 1-6 in Adorno 1998. 
5 Gumbrecht 2004. 
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The experience of meaning referred to above is also easily associated with an experience of 
presence. Martin Seel, for example, understands works of art as presentations in the medium 
of appearing that “produce a special presence and present a special presence.”6 Art’s potential 
to bring about a distinctive experience of presentness is further connected by Seel to a 
perceptive ability that is characterized by a constitutive openness: “Aesthetic perception is 
open to the simultaneous and momentary play of appearances on its objects; it is open to the 
specific phenomenal particularity of its objects and therefore to what remains 
underdetermined in any determination (and in any number of determinations) of an object of 
perception. ”7 This openness also includes the possibility of extending the sensuous 
appearances by imaginative implementation, continuation, and expansion, “a sensuous 
imagining that loads the presence of the real and present objects of intuition with a making 
present of relations that are more general, or more irreal, or spatially and temporally more 
unreachable (and through this loading enriches the presence).”8 
 
‘Presence’ can thereby represent an alternative entry to the impact that aesthetic situations can 
bring about. As will be presented in the thesis, the aesthetics of performativity elaborates 
through the notion of presence, a sense of aesthetic importance that does not work strictly 
through the logic of interpretation, but the urgency of actuality. The quality of presence 
presents a phenomenon that is intimately connected to us as embodied beings, with a reality 
that is immediate in the sense that we cannot avoid being marked by it. This reality confines 
our existential possibilities, but also unfolds opportunities to be seized upon. We are here 
presented with a kind of sense that matters through its actuality, by creating opportunities and 
restrictions for our embodied life.  
 
The aesthetic category of presence connects in this respect the relevance of art to conceptions 
of embodiment and reality. Art is not just about mirroring the realities of life. It also creates a 
playground for exploring alternative realities through the mode of doing. The urgent aspect of 
presence becomes, in this respect, also tied to the conditional dynamics that characterise 
action, and aesthetic awareness as an object of study becomes not secluded in a domain of 
disinterested contemplation, but can be approached in the intertwined mode of execution. 
                                                 
6 Seel 2005, p. 97. 
7 Ibid. p. 88. 
8 Ibid. p. 89. 
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My use of ‘presence’ has been informed by this embodied conception, and in that respect, 
connected to an almost touchable sense that reverberates in its full-blooded actuality. Like the 
concept of meaning, my discussions have not been guided by a clear-cut notion, but the 
concept of presence has highlighted qualities bounded to an experience of locality and 
actuality that is rich in sensuous character. As Seel explains, this rich experience is not limited 
to the sensuous quality of what is physically present, but includes, in its sensuousness, 
imaginative abilities that extend the particularity of the experience both temporarily and 
spatially, specific and general, bounded and transferred − to engage both memories, 
imaginings, and general reflections. Meaning and presence denote in this respect not 
distinctively different phenomena, but overlapping areas, or a range of processes, that make 
art and artistic situations matter. However, the terms are not used as identical categories. 
While ‘meaning’ and ‘presence’ do not exclude each other, the sense of ‘meaning’ highlights 
the operative quality of prolongation − an extendable sense − while ‘presence’ accentuates a 
sense of locality, the irreducible quality associated to being here at this site where exactly this 
happens and occurs, a focal point of diverse axes − temporal, spatial, concrete and 
imaginative − where the effect matters not least by making marks on bodies. 
 
<3@ (%))
We could argue that a collapse of a meaning-giving dialectic between totality and parts leave 
us within a process, in its middle, but with hegemonic schemes of interpretation afloat. This 
aesthetic situation of disintegration, of bewildered orientational directives, can easily be 
associated to postmodern problematics of bursting the belief in homogeneous frames of 
reference, while having the problem of replacing the sense of rootlessness that this 
fragmented worldview creates. How are we to think the creation of a common sphere of 
action, meaning and presence when general referential frames loose sense, when a 
homogenous totality is out of reach? Would we not end in another form of solipsism, not the 
potential lonely consciousness of the subject, but the lonely, non-communicative, experience?  
 
Cage invokes Buddhist rhetoric and presents Buddhist influenced conceptions, in this respect, 
on which to base, ontologically and epistemologically, his flat structured artistic aspiration.  
The seemingly solipsistic trap is countered by a worldview of interdependence, whose 
complexity is possible to experience in the cracks of conceptual thought through the potential 
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of the personal experience. 
 
Cage’s pronounced flat structured aesthetics underpinned by Buddhist flavoured aspirations 
could perhaps site our aesthetic project within an epistemological horizon of spiritual 
mysticism; there is a ground of reunion informing the perplexity of Cage’s disintegration, the 
mystic experience of connectedness in touch with the all-encompassing flow of Being, the is 
that pervades all that exists equally. Another path, guided by Cage’s insistence on sounds’ 
aesthetic character as vouchsafed by their own unique existence, could perhaps point to a 
foundation of sense that is created as part of the phenomenal reality itself, independent of 
interpretations, but significant with respect to the outlining of our common physical 
environment. This could be seen as a shift from the ideality of notions to the resistance of 
physical phenomena − their unquestionable significance for states of affairs. But this given, 
though non-interpreted solidity of a fluidity, would so to speak only give a view of a 
deterministic blind process with no regard to anticipation and envisioned choices.  
 
I have taken neither of these paths, but approach the post-modern problem from a middle 
position. The concept of performativity here enters the epistemological discussion in line with 
the Heideggerian projecting gesture of understanding that gives a view of a collected 
phenomenon of past, presence and future, though with an accentuated emphasis on the 
embodied constitution that we could argue is missed in the Heideggerian account. Therefore, 
through the concepts of performativity and embodiment the question of the flat structured 
Cagean model does not become a pure surface, but rolls up significant moments in complex 
structures both physically and imaginatively. I have therefore not totally left the hermeneutic 
perspective, but through readings of Cage’s Buddhist inspired conceptions paired with 
theories of performativity and embodiment, the pivot of the perspective has been displaced, 
giving view of a radicalised version that leaves a place for an heterogeneous view of 
orientation and a transformed logic of sense-making processes that alter the function of the 
dividing line from demarcation to a zone of exchange. 
 
<3A %(!1%()*,$*
From the broad philosophic landscape of epistemological issues, the problem at hand is 
transferred to a more specific aesthetic and musicological field through aesthetic questions 
surrounding ‘work’ and ‘event,’ the objectified expression and communal happening, lasting 
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artefacts and elusive occasions, universal form (model) and local boundedness. Cage’s 
challenge to the work as an intentionally organised totality also challenges the established 
conception of the musical work within Western music that, in its ontological foundation, can 
be seen as intertwined in a dualistic framework of epistemological conditions, a two-world 
perspective where we find, at one side of the spectrum, the spiritual, ideal and exemplary, and 
at the other side, the physical, impure and imperfect. 
 
My research has in this respect been guided by the artistic example set by Cage’s Musicircus, 
presented in the next chapter, and the thesis is shaped as a constellation that enters the 
theoretic scene by approaching this Cagean circus from different angles.  
 
<3B %+()%*)*))
Chapter two presents Musicircus and we are introduced to the ambiguities that the Cagean 
circus presents in terms of musicology and aesthetics. Chapter three approaches this complex 
through the musical work-concept. Lydia Goehr’s famous analysis from 1992 has, in this 
respect, a double function. Through her presented work-concept a politicized landscape of 
artistic practices is drawn up where Musicircus can be seen as an anti-work that actively 
opposes the regime of the established practice that it is part of. And, through its artistic form it 
directs the attention to this regime’s blind spots and non-questioned subjections, the 
Foucauldian mechanisms of exclusion. Secondly, through Goehr’s analysis we are presented 
with a notion that intimately connects the musical work to a dualistic framework of 
epistemological conditions. The meaning and teleological purpose of ephemeral performances 
rely in the creation of ideal norms, a stable ontological platform of abstract models, that such 
perishable performances strives to materialize. The aesthetic question about the work 
becomes thereby intimately connected to the general epistemological question of dualism.  
 
The forth chapter alters the approach from the work-critical activity of Cage’s practice to the 
positive side of his artistic “arguments”. Through Erika Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetic theory of 
performativity the attention is directed towards what is posed more than what is criticised.  
But this implies also the exploration of a transformed and altered aesthetic language. How are 
we to conceptualize the Cagean circus in positive terms and elaborate appropriate theoretic 
notions? As in chapter three, this is not only a narrow aesthetic question, but includes an 
epistemological framework. Through a changed focus from the stable ‘work’ to the event of 
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performance, a concept of performativity and a re-interpreted notion of embodiment, the 
epistemological split between the spiritual qualities and physical manifestation is also 
questioned and a non-dual framework of body and mind is suggested. Chapter five mirrors the 
fourth in its approach but extends this to a more specifically analytical application of this 
performative turn. This implies also an extension that introduces us to an ecological 
perspective for the performative logic.  
 
Chapter six enters this thesis’s landscape of outlined questions from a Cagean point of view, 
with his expressed non-dualistic aesthetics through his notions of interpenetration and non-
obstruction. Though this entry is a little altered from chapter four, it continues discussions 
presented in that chapter and develops a reading of the performative perspective coloured by 
ecological thinking9 and a post-humanist concept of performativity presented by Karen Barad.  
 
Chapter seven concludes this thesis by discussing the Musicircus we did in 2006. The 
presentation of the historical circus in 1967 (chapter two) is in this respect contrasted with 
(confronted by) a contemporary version that represents a re-realisation. Through this practical 
example of doing a Cagean circus today, the theoretical discussions of the former chapters 
also become animated by the challenges, the specificity, practicalities, et cetera, that the 
concrete resistance of doing art represents.  
 
<3C %+()$#*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The aim of this research project has not only been to analyze Cage’s music and his 
compositional strategies, but to use his aesthetics and artistic practice as contributing to 
arguments and discussions, bringing up themes within a broader aesthetic-epistemological 
debate that the more narrow discussion of work and staged event is brought into. I have in this 
respect combined theoretical discussion with the execution of fieldwork. I organized a 
production of Musicircus in 2006, and the experience of doing this production and being part 
of the process of realisation has been brought into my theoretical discussions and used as a 
case to reflect upon. 
 
Musicircus does not have a published score. I have therefore not had specified text as the 
authorized source for the composition, or what we could call the production design. Instead 
                                                 
9 See for example Code 2006.   
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my main sources have been descriptions and instructions to be found in Cage’s archived 
correspondence at Northwestern University,10 a rudimentary sketch in the collection of 
musical manuscripts at New York Public Library,11 commentaries in interviews, such as the 
series carried out by Daniel Charles,12 and Cage’s own published writings, a film from the 
first Musicircus made by Ronald Nameth,13 presentations and a review of the first Musicircus 
to be found in local newspapers and magazines,14 also archived at Northwestern University, 
and other studies, especially Steve Husarik’s article “John Cage and LeJaren Hiller: 
HPSCHD, 1969”15 and Johanne Rivest’s study of Cage’s stay at the University of Illinois 
from 1967-1969.16 Because there is no score, the historic events themselves − the productions 
− become even more significant as sources for the work, than if this had not been the case. I 
have in this respect focused my attention to the first realization in 1967 and contrasted this 
with our own production in 2006.  
 
Besides published sources, the historic material that has mainly informed my study is, as 
mentioned, to be found at Northwestern University and New York Public Library.17 There is 
also a third Cage collection at Wesleyan University that I have not visited, which houses the 
literary manuscripts by Cage.18 I have also interviewed Ronald Nameth who took part in the 
first Musicircus,19 contributing with films and visuals, and who has also made a 20 minutes 
film with recorded material from the event in 1967 supplemented by written information. But 
otherwise I have not interviewed the participants of the first realization. If this had mainly 
been a historic study, more could have been done to track down sources, both with respect to 
the first event in 1967 and not least with respect to different realizations of this Cagean design 
for an evening of music, theatre, dance and art. 
 
                                                 
10 John Cage Collection, Northwestern University.  
11 [Realization of Musicircus], JPB 95-3 Folder 344 in John Cage Music Manuscript Collection, New York 
Public Library. 
12 Cage and Charles, For the Birds.  
13 Nameth, 1967/2006.  
14 Sibbert, Yahn, Zumstein and Converse (author of three items).  
15 Husarik 1983.  
16 Rivest 1999. 
17 For one month I surveyed material archived at NYPL and for three weeks material housed at Northwestern 
University. The archive at Northwestern has a lot of material. The correspondence that mentions Musicircus is, 
though, scarce. In searching through the material I was helped by earlier research carried out by David Patterson 
that I was lucky to be informed about.  
18 John Cage Papers, a collection of Cage’s literary manuscripts at Wesleyan University see 
http://www.wesleyan.edu/libr/schome/FAs/ca1000-72.html for more information. 
19 Interview done in 2006. 
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Besides Musicircus, other compositions by Cage − with published scores − have been used as 
analytical sources to discuss similar phenomena to those we find in the Cagean circus from 
1967. In this respect the series of Variations have been important, composed in the period 
from 1958 to 1978, as has the multi-media work HPSCHD (1967-69). 
 
Since the 1980s a growing amount of Cage studies have been presented. Of this literature I 
will here briefly mention some contributors that have been important in my approach to Cage. 
James Pritchett’s overview of Cage’s music and his reconstruction of Cage’s chance 
compositions in the dissertation from 1988 have been decisive in furnishing an understanding 
of the compositional design of Cage’s indeterminate music.20 William Fetterman’s  John 
Cage’s Theatre Piece : notations and performances21 has been priceless as a source of 
information and for the contextualisation of Cage’s theatricalised music. David Patterson, Sor 
Ching Low and Magnus Andersson have been important sources with regard to Cage’s 
Buddhist appropriations converted to the aesthetics of avant-garde music.22 Leta Miller has 
made me especially aware of the collaborate aspects of Cage’s artistic practice through her 
articles,23 and Christopher Shultis has coined the term ‘coexistent artistic self ‘ for the role of 
creator in Cage’s approach.24 The composer is a participant, and the works emerge as 
collective results of intertwined contributions and factors. Joan Retallack accentuates, not 
meaninglessness, but the plural quality of meaning that the Cagean project illuminates.25 
Katherine Hayles presents a reading of Cagean chance operations that emphasises their 
decisive character.26 Brendon Joseph made me aware of a link between Cage and Deleuze in a 
conversation in 1999. He saw Cage’s project more in line with the post-structuralist thought 
of Deleuze than the de-construction of Derrida. Even though I have not followed this path and 
Delueze is hardly mentioned in my thesis, this approach to the Cagean project, where the 
empirical and material is not lost sight of, has directed me to theories of performativity and 
“fleshy” approaches to ontology.  Jonathan Katz has sited Cage research in the context of 
queer studies.27 Though I have not explicitly adopted his approach, Katz demonstrations of 
the issues of exclusion and categorisation in an existential sense have inspired my approach. 
                                                 
20 Pritchett 1993 and 1988. 
21 Fetterman 1996. 
22 Patterson 1996, 2002a and 2002/2009b, Low 2006 and 2007, Andersson 2009. 
23 L. Miller 2001 and 2002 (two items). 
24 Shultis 1998. 
25 See especially Retallack 1994. 
26 Hayles 1994. 
27 Roth and Katz 1998, and Katz 2001. 
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I must also mention Richard Kostelanetz whose collections of Cage texts and interviews have 
become important sources of Cage research, also for me,28 though sometimes his editorial 
stamp makes source references scant. Included in the first collection of Cage texts edited by 
Kostelanetz, John Cage from 1970, is also a one page long description of the first Musicircus 
that later appears in Kostelanetz’s Scenarios. The last entry, in fact, invites the reader to see 
the text as a script.29 It can therefore be understood as a score. As an art critic, Kostelanetz has 
also, together with Michael Kirby and Richard Schechner, from the beginning sited Cage 
within the performance art scene − the theatre of mixed means − and communicated his 
impact in that respect.30 Besides those briefly mentioned here I will present other 
contributions as the discussions proceed. These include studies of a more recent date, such as 
Mia Göran’s thesis from 2009 and Hans-Friedrich Bormann’s study from 2005, whose 
findings and theoretical elaborations I have found very helpful in outlining my own 
argumentation. 
 
This thesis has been informed theoretically through an interdisciplinary approach that has 
combined musicological questions with aesthetic-epistemological problematics and has 
approached the field by combining selected readings from different areas of study, such as the 
tradition of hermeneutic philosophy, phenomenology and post-structuralism, theories of 
performance and performativity and the discussion of the musical work. All of these areas 
have a broad range and a great variety of approaches. I have concentrated my reading on 
selected contributors, aspects and concepts that will be presented as the discussions proceed. 
My approach could in this respect probably be called eclectic. I have found it thought-
provoking to bring ideas from different fields together, but still felt the need to probe deeper 
into some arguments. My selection has of course also been guided by my agenda, and by the 
coincidences, suggestions and encounters that a research projects offers, and I have 
appropriated these sources more as resources for thinking − as tools for my reflections − than 
purely as projects of interpretation. However, without these readings I would not have arrived 
at the reflections that are presented in this thesis.   
 
 
                                                 
28 Especially, Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage, and Kostelanetz 2003. 
29 This will be discussed in length in chapter two. 
30 Kostelanetz 1968, and Cage and Kirby and Schechner 1995. 
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2  Musicircus, 1967 
 
 
The noise of the musicircus could be heard in the parking lot near Mamford Hall and the participants in 
this Centennial event were greeted by crescendoes of screeches, thunderclaps of sound, and flashes of 
multi-colored light as they entered the Stock Pavilion. 31 
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Abundance; flashes of lights, images projected on weather balloons, sounds all over the place 
produced by several groups playing different music simultaneously, a film showing over and 
over again a man smiling, frowning and laughing, balloons, balloons, dancers making 
dramatic movements projected as silhouettes on screens, popcorn, cider, the audience’s own 
blackboard drawing glowing in rays of black light; a circus of activity, intermingling and 
interpenetrating into an anarchic nexus to be experienced through all the senses; no composer, 
no score; the performers audience, the audience performers; the musical work, something to 
walk inside where beginning, middle and end are everywhere, nowhere, following in the steps 
of an explorer – a multitude of possible routes, perspectives, impressions/expressions.  
 
The first Musicircus took place on the 17th of November 1967, at the University of Illinois, 
Urbana Campus (UIUC). Presented as a “stand-up, eat-in, music-out, freak-down” 32, this 
avant-garde public-minded celebration of abundance and multiplicity was initiated by John 
Cage during his stay at UIUC, appointed there as Associate Member of the Center for 
Advanced Study and Visiting Professor of Music for the academic years 1967/1968 and 
1968/1969. 
 
Even though Cage did not himself graduate from college or university,33 creative 
communities at such places played an important role in his career. Colleges and universities 
throughout the U.S. offered opportunities for workshops, concerts and performances that were 
important for the dissemination of Cage’s music and artistic enterprise, not least as part of his 
                                                 
31  From the review “Musicircus Rocks Stock Pavilion” by Bruce Zumstein. The Daily Illini, Nov.18, 1967. 
32 “ ‘A stand-up, eat-in, music-out, freak-down’ is how John Cage describes the ‘Music Circus’ he will direct at 
8 p.m. Friday in the Stock Pavillion.” Converse, “Cage Plans Music Circus”. The Daily Illini, Nov. 11, 1967. 
33 Cage ended his studies at college before graduation and often referred to himself as a “dropout”. (E.g. 
Kostelanetz 2003, p. 4, 6 and 257.) However, Cage was not untaught. He studied composition with prominent 
composers in the years 1932-37. Starting with the pianist Richard Bühling (1932-34/35), these included Adolph 
Weiss (1934), the American Pioneer Henry Cowell (1933-34) and not least Arnold Schönberg (1935-37).  (See 
for example, Cage: “An Autobiographical Statement” (1989) in Cage and Kostelanetz 1993 p. 237, and 
Emmerik, A John Cage Compendium, 1912-1971, for the dates.) 
 20 
joint projects with the dancer and chorographer Merce Cunningham.34 Further, Cage had 
several long term appointments at different educational institutions, several of which are part 
of the pioneering history of American establishments of higher learning: The Cornish School 
in Seattle (1938-40),35 Mills College (Summer Sessions, 1939-1941),36 the School of Design 
in Chicago (1941-42),37 the notorious Black Mountain College (Summer Session, 1948 and 
1952),38 the New School of Social Research (1956-1961),39 Wesleyan University (1960-
1961),40 and the University of Cincinnati (Spring 1967). The first Musicircus is part of this 
story. It happened in the context of the Centennial Celebration at UIUC and involved the 
creative communities at the campus.  
 
Though Johanne Rivest informs us that the Centennial Celebration was an occasion that 
contributed to Cage’s appointment at the University,41 the circus project appears to have been 
a rapidly organized event not sketched as one of his main projects.42 The main purpose for 
Cage’s stay was to work with computer music. This resulted in the multimedia-work 
HPSCHD, composed in collaboration with Lejaren Hiller (1924−1994), premiered in May 
1969 and in its style of performance, having many similarities with the Musicircus done two 
years earlier.43 Cage’s artistic activity moved in the 1960s into directions that can be 
characterized by keywords such as: Music being explored as theatre, and theatre explored as 
music, abundance, multiplicity, crossing of art forms (mixing media) and experimentations 
with the situation of performance. Both Musicircus and HPSCHD are examples of artistic 
extravagances that put these ingredients into play on a large scale.  
 
Cage’s career really took off in the 1960s. At last his music had been published through an 
exclusive contract with C.P. Peters in 1960,44 some recordings were available, and in 1961 
                                                 
34 Cage met Merce Cunningham during his stay at the Cornish School, Seattle (1938-40). They collaborated 
extensively from 1942. Cunningham established the Merce Cunningham Dance Company in 1953. Cage was 
associated to the company from its inception until his death. 
35 Cage taught “Creative composition”, “Percussion instrument” and accompanied classes in modern dance. 
(Emmerik, A John Cage Compendium, 1912-1971.) For Cage and Cornish School, see Miller 2002b. 
36 Cage was appointed as composer and accompanist for dance sessions. (Emmerik, A John Cage Compendium, 
1912-1971.) 
37 Established by László Moholy-Nagy in 1937 in line with the ideals of Bauhaus. Cage gave classes in “Sound 
Experiments”. (Emmerik, A John Cage Compendium, 1912-1971.) 
38 For Black Mountain College, see Duberman 1974. For Black Mountain and American music, see Brody 2003. 
39 Cage taught classes in experimental composition. Several of Cage’s students, such as Allan Kaprow, George 
Brecht, Al Hansen and Dick Higgins, became leading figures at the scene of mixed media and performance art 
that emerged in the 1960 and 1970s. 
40 Silence was compiled and edited while Cage was at Wesleyan and published by the Wesleyan University 
Press, which he continued to collaborate with. See Silverman 2010, p. 174-176. Wesleyan houses now the 
Collection of Cage Papers. 
41 Rivest 1999, part one. 
42 The archived correspondence from this period, bears witness to Cage’s plans for HPSCHD and an unrealized 
project. Musicircus is barely mentioned. Further discussion of this source material at p. 40.  
43 HPSCHD is further described and discussed in chapter five, p. 190 ff.  
44 Cage was given a 25-year retrospective concert in 1958 but still his musical works were unpublished. Cage 
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Silence was published − a collection of Cage’s lectures and writings dated from the late 1930s 
to 1961, which was as important, if not more important, than his published music in helping 
popularize his work and ideas.45 Cage became not only famous, he became notorious and very 
busy.46 Besides, he was very much engaged in The Merce Cunningham Dance Company as 
musical director, composer and at times organizer. The company toured extensively but this 
was not a luxurious business. Correspondences from the period witness Cage’s efforts to 
collect money for the continued existence of the company and for new projects. He was at the 
time president of the Cunningham Dance Foundation.47 Privately, Cage had economic 
responsibility for his mother who needed help and was at a nursing home. The possibility of 
taking up an appointment as artist in residence seemed therefore attractive, both economically 
and creatively for the spare time it could give him to compose, and in the case of UIUC, to 
experiment with computer music. 
 
UIUC was in the forefront in this field. Lejaren Hiller, a composer and former chemistry 
professor, had established an Experimental Music Studio there in 1958 – the first of its kind in 
the West.48 Besides this, the university hosted from 1948 to 1971 a festival dedicated 
contemporary art with the aim “to show current developments in the various fields of art, and 
the relationship of contemporary art forms to each other and to our times”.49  
 
Cage appeared at this festival for the first time in 1952. The next year he met Hiller there, and 
they presented together one of the first American concerts of electronic music. Cage was at 
the festival again in 1965. In the mean time, his presence at the program had been maintained 
through performances by David Tudor.50  
 
The members of the music faculty therefore knew Cage’s work and aesthetics. Cage, 
likewise, had contacts there and knew the place’s possibilities. A pro-Cage faction at the 
                                                 
had problem getting a publisher not least because of the graphic challenges involved. This changed with Cage’s 
contract with the Henmar Press of C. F. Peters Corporation. Peters took Cage on published his work: “Cage 
would receive an advance for each of his compositions the company printed […] and a 10 percent royalty on 
sales. The agreement covered future works as well: the company would publish two of his works a year for ten 
years.” (Silverman 2010, p. 173.) The contract secured wide distribution. Peters had firms in Frankfurt, Zurich 
and London and also worked through outlets in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and Japan. Peters could 
thus make Cage’s music easily available internationally. (Ibid. pp. 172-174.)  
45 Patterson 2002, “Words and writings”.  
46 Pritchett, for example, uses this change in Cage life to partly explain the different direction Cage’s music took 
in the 1960s. From composing by applying meticulous procedures involving chance, musical performances were 
created by more rapid techniques that had music-theatrical qualities. (Pritchett 1993, pp. 140-146.) 
47 A large amount of the archived correspondence at the time is devoted to the task of getting donations to the 
Merce Cunningham Foundation. Cage was its president from 1965-1968. (Emmerik, A John Cage Compendium, 
1912-1971.) 
48 Hiller had become known as a composer and pioneer of computer music with works as ILLIAC Suite (String 
Quartet no. 4) from 1957. 
49 Rivest 1999, part one.  
50 Loc. cit. 
 22 
music faculty tried after Cage’s visit in 1965 “to obtain a George A. Miller Professorship in 
order to have Cage on the faculty for the next year.”51 This failed, but for the academic year 
of 1967-68 Cage became an Associate Member of the Center for Advanced Study, an 
appointment free of professorial duties, and a Visiting Professor of Music at the Graduate 
College,52 an appointment that later was extended by a year. 
 
The University of Illinois was, in 1967, 100 years old. The Graduate College and the Center 
for Advanced Study organised a “Centennial Year Series” including a Creative and 
Performing Arts Symposia, called “University in Motion: Matrix for the Arts”. The 
Musicircus took place within the context of this symposium, presented at the Stock Pavilion, 
a campus building used for showing cattle.  
 
Quite a vivid description of the chosen venue is given in the one review kept in the John Cage 
Collection at Northwestern University:  
 
The musicircus began at 8 p.m. Friday and was to last until 1 a.m., when the floor would be cleared for 
livestock to return the next morning. At the Happening only one dog – sleeping in fits of paroxysm – 
was able to make the scene. An hour earlier a sheep exhibit cleared the pavilion.53  
 
The event is further described as “the night not so much for blowing your mind as it was for 
blowing an eardrum [...] it was a real Happening”.54  
 
This “real happening” of a generally loud character was generated by a mix of different 
music, sounds, visuals, varieties of light arrangements and dramatic movements created by 
residential artists and visitors to the symposium. The performers and contributions included:55 
David Tudor and Gordon Mumma who amplified the ventilation system and made the hall 
into an instrument for live electronics; James Cuomo and Tony Zamora with respective jazz 
bands; a Baroque orchestra that among other things played Bach’s Fifth Brandenburg 
Concerto; the composers Salvatore Martirano and Hiller who both gave a program of their 
own music that also included electronics; pianist Jocy di Olivera who gave a recital including 
Ben Johnston’s Knocking Piece together with percussionist Richard O’Donnell; Michael 
Udow, a percussionist, who played Morton Feldman’s The King of Denmark at pianissimo, so 
                                                 
51 Rivest 1999, part one. 
52 Loc. cit. Later Cage’s appointment was extended by a year. 
53 Zumstein 1967. 
54 Loc. cit. 
55 This information is collected from: Husarik 1983, pp. 4-5, Rivest 1999, part one, Nameth, John Cage − The 
1st Musicircus (film), Cage in Kostelanetz 1980 (this text is quoted in its entirety at p. 31), and Emmerik, A John 
Cage Compendium. In addition, see transcribed sketch of the performance site at p. 184 in this thesis. (Part of the 
sketch that is archived in the John Cage Music Manuscript Collection.)  
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quietly that nearly just his movements could be seen, and it was hardly possible to hear what 
he played; and Norma Marder who sang Aria by Cage as many times as she had wished.  
 
Barney Childs had designed a percussion platform where percussion students improvised and 
the audience was invited “to beat with anything they had, as loudly and violently as the 
inclination might carry them.”56 The audience was also invited to draw on a blackboard with 
special chalk so their drawings glowed under the rays of black light. Claude Kipnis, the 
mime-artist, did “a pantomime of a person struggling against a wall of sound,”57 and Ronald 
Nameth arranged a presentation of his films and slides. These visuals were projected 
simultaneously on multiple screens placed around the entire periphery of the giant hall.  
 
Balloons floated. Some large weather balloons were used as screens for projected rotating 
spirals and other variegations made by Nameth. Dancers were also present: Members of the 
Merce Cunningham Dance Company improvised “dramatic movements that appeared as 
silhouettes on screens across the pavilion.”58 Cage himself turned on and off the amplified 
light switchboard thereby altering both the lighting arrangement and producing new sonic 
feeds for his electronic set up. Not only the eye and ear were stimulated, there was also 
something to eat: At each end of the hall were places to buy apple cider, doughnuts, and 
popcorn, etc. 
 
The audience, about 5000 visitors, could walk freely around, and according to the review 
quite a multifarious group of people attended the event from little boys fascinated by floating 
balloons to university students dressed in bed sheets: 
 
It was a highly heterogeneous audience. Little boys caught freely flying balloons and carried them off. 
Their parents sat in the stands and tried to believe they were not really going through this mish-mash of 
sight and sound. University students walked through the performance. […] Persons dressed in bed 
sheets tried to avoid drafts from the open stock doors, and girls on dates climbed on boy’s shoulders to 
see who was there and doing what.59  
 
                                                 
56 Husarik 1983, p. 5. Rivest informs that there was a sculpture made by pieces of metal hanging from a 
scaffolding in the center of the Pavilion, that people could strike (Rivest, part one).  
57 Husarik 1983, p. 4. 
58 Ibid. p. 5. 
59 Zumstein 1967. 
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The experience, writes Nameth, “was one in which each participant created their own 
‘composition’ − their own unique experience by being free to move at any time into any 
space.”60 
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What is Musicircus? Does it just name this single historic event in 1967? In fact, several 
Musicircuses have been done, for example in Minneapolis (1970), Paris (1970), London 
(1972 and 1982), Bonn (1979), California (1980), Turin (Musicircus for children, 1984), Los 
Angeles (1987), Amsterdam (1988), East-Berlin (1990), Standford University (1992),61 New 
York (1992), and more recently at the Barbican, London (2004),62 Chicago (2005), 
Ludwigshafen (2005),63 Melbourne (2007), and Trondheim (2006),64 among others.65 The 
1967 event has also taken a place in Cage’s oeuvre. Kostelanetz’s collected catalogue of 
compositions from 1970, organised according to instrument and chronology, lists Musicircus 
under the heading “Audio-visual,”66 and Revill’s chronological list (1992) in his full length 
biography − the sole one until recently − includes it as “Musicircus: for diverse performers.”67 
And Grove Music Online does not exclude it from their account of works. The lexical entry 
is: “Musicircus, mixed-media event, 1967, unpubd.”68 
 
An elaborate entry is to be found at the easily accessible Internet resource, John Cage 
database.69 At this last site Musicircus is described as: 
 
Musicircus 
Category:    Musical composition 
Dated:     1967 
Instrumentation:    For any number of musicians, being prepared to perform in  
    the same place (event) 
Duration:    Indeterminate 
                                                 
60 Nameth, John Cage − The 1st Musicircus, film. 
61 This production is discussed by Junkerman 1994. His analysis of the event will be presented in chapter five. 
62 More info about this production at pp. 273-274. 
63 I attended this production. More information at p. 214. 
64 This production which I initiated is discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
65 Several of these productions can be found by a search on the Internet. This gives also an idea of the felt 
relevance of this Cagean circus still today. 
66 Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage, p. 214. 
67 Revill 1992, p. 361. 
68 Pritchett and Kuhn, “Cage, John”, Grove Music Online.  
69 Chaudron, John Cage database. The information to be found in the presented catalogue is said to be collected 
from various sources: Paul van Emmerik's "Thema's en Variaties" (Amsterdam, 1996), works by James Pritchett, 
Richard Kostelanetz, David Revill, Larry Solomon and many others, such as several online library catalogues 
and liner notes from CD/LP recordings. 
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Premiere and performer(s):  November 17, 1967 in the University Stock    
    Pavillion at the University of Illinois 
Dedicated to:   
Choreography:    --- 
Published:    --- 
Manuscript:    Realisation (holograph, signed, in black and blue ink - 4 p.)  
    in the New York Public Library. 
 
The idea of this composition is nothing more than an invitation to a number of musicians, who perform 
simultaneously anything or in any way they desire. The manuscript is a list of musicians with various 
pieces of music by Cage and Satie and some non-musical works, also including a diagram for positions 
of various individuals.70  
 
But how relevant is it in discussing Musicircus to speak about a musical work, or a 
composition? Cage describes Musicircus as one of his initiated performances that do not 
involve notations, in the foreword of M, Cage’s book from 1973:  
 
While I was writing the texts in this book, I was also writing music [...] And I initiated a number of 
performances which have not involved notations: Musicircus (bringing together under one roof as much 
of the music of the surrounding community as one practicably can) [...]71  
 
William Fetterman, in his book John Cage’s Theatre pieces (1996), uses the name not just to 
denote specific art events called Musicircus, but also as a broader label for a Cagean genre 
that consists of works and initiated events, which are variations on this large-group 
simultaneity.72 Briefly, this genre is characterized by an abundance of simultaneous and 
independent performances, presented often in non-traditional performance spaces, with a 
large number of participants, and lasting longer than concerts usually do. In addition, these 
circuses most often unfold as multimedia events: 
 
The musicircus is a multi-media event of simultaneous and independent performances, often presented 
in non-traditional performance spaces, with a large number of participants, and lasting for several 
hours. The first performance designated as a musicircus was in 1967, however the development of this 
genre may be said to begin with the untitled event at Black Mountain College in 1952 and Theatre 
Piece in 1960.73  
 
We could therefore, from Fetterman’s outline, presume that we have two usages to take 
account of: Firstly, the name of a kind of work; and secondly, the term for a Cagean genre. 
The distinction though, even here, is not straightforward. What really denotes Musicircus as a 
                                                 
70 Chaudron, “Musicircus”, John Cage database. The manuscript referred to is a rudimentary sketch to be found 
in the John Cage Music Manuscript Collection at New York Public Library, JPB 95-3 Folder 344.  
71 Cage, M: writings, '67-'72, p. xiii. In addition Cage lines up here:  “Reunion, 33 1/3, Demonstration of the 
Sounds of the Environment (three hundred people silently following an I Ching determined path through 
Milwaukee’s University of Wisconsin campus), and Mureau not vocalized by myself alone but together with 
others (Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).”  
72 Fetterman calls the chapter where Musicircus is discusses: “The Musicircus: Variations on large-group 
simultaneities” (Fetterman 1996, pp. 125-148.) 
73 Fetterman 1996, p. 125. My italics. 
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work?  Would the similarities between different realizations not be more alike similarities of 
genre than those of performances of the same work?  
 
Indeed, Musicircus challenges established understandings of what characterizes a musical 
work. Who is the composer? What was intended with this specific constellation of sounds? 
Where does this musical work start and end? What is the aesthetic difference between 
attending a concert of serious music and being at a market in the city, or a carnival?  
 
Even Cage finds it doubtful that Musicircus can be called his composition: 
 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether my work in connection with that piece [Musicircus] is as integral a 
part of it as the work of all the actual performers of it.74  
 
The puzzles of naming and categorization become apparent even in typographic 
considerations. Fetterman distinguishes typographically between those events called 
Musicircus and ‘musicircus’ used as a genre designation. The interview collection For the 
Birds uses “a Musicircus” (singular) becoming “Musicircuses” (plural) when Cage and 
Charles speak about several realizations.75 This is a usage that differs from the ordinary 
practice of denoting performances of works. It would be strange to say “a Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony” about one certain performance, or “Beethoven’s Fifth Symphonies” about a 
collection of different performances even though we would think of them as being different 
interpretations. This may seem like conceptual quibbling, but behind this uncertainty of how 
to name, denote and typographically represent (uncertainties that I myself have felt when 
working on my dissertation theme) is hidden an instability in how to categorize this/these 
Cagean circuses, that even includes the oscillation between different categories, such as the 
art work, event, technique of performance, genre, et cetera. 
 
In the continuation of this thesis, I am going to differentiate my designation of the discussed 
Cagean circus in three ways: In singular and italics Musicircus denotes both the proper name 
(the title) of a design for staging − a work − and specific productions (realisations). 
Musicircuses in plural refers to several productions, while the plain written ‘musicircus’ 
designates a general technique/method of performance/arrangement.  
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Fetterman’s genre description includes a certain applied method for organizing a 
performance. I will in fact single out this element. As I see it, ‘musicircus’ can also be 
                                                 
74 John Cage, letter dated May 1, 1973. 
75 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, 1981. 
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understood as a concept that denotes a technique of performance. We can even call it a 
performative strategy. The basic elements of this method are simultaneity and abundance 
added to by space. Seen as a technique musicircus can be understood as a continuation of 
Cage’s compositional methods of chance operations and indeterminacy.  
 
‘Chance operation’ and ‘indeterminacy’ represent two different techniques of composition 
within Cage’s terminology. ‘Chance operation’ denotes a worked out method where the 
element of chance has been given a decisive function. It determines the detailed elaboration of 
events, note by note, in the composition. One can in this respect bring to mind Cage’s 
definition of ‘method’ that appears in “Forerunners in modern music” written in 1949: 
“Method is the means of controlling the continuity from note to note.”76 According to this 
definition ‘chance operation’ denotes a method where the element of chance has been put into 
operation to determine the “continuity from note-to-note” in a composition. 
 
In his chance-determined pieces, Cage creates frames for the musical setting before the 
compositional process of putting sounds and silences together begins. He selects the material 
and formulates procedures for the execution of chance. It is as if he has created a board game 
and the rules for how to play it. When Cage has done this, he begins to play the formulated 
compositional game; he begins to compose. But the composing is done by chance. It is not the 
composer’s vision, his image of what the piece should sound like “note by note” that 
stipulates what is going to happen and how the material is organized. It is instead by, for 
example, tossing coins that the note-to-note arrangement is worked out.77  
 
Cage’s indeterminate pieces are similar in design to the “board game” of the chance-
determined compositions, but in these pieces the composer has, so to speak, left it to the 
performers to play the game and make a distinct version of the given general directions. An 
indeterminate piece is therefore an open-ended work that has to be complemented by the 
performers’ contributions. Artists who want to perform one of Cage’s indeterminate pieces 
have to contribute to the compositional process themselves, often by undertaking chance 
                                                 
76 Cage, Silence, p. 62. 
77 Cage developed a method based on the ancient Chinese text Book of Changes (I Ching). This book presents 64 
hexagrams that can be found by tossing coins. Cage transferred the consulting method of I Ching to a 
compositional method where his chance-derived hexagrams led him to preformed charts of worked out material. 
Chance thereby determined, from the outlined material possibilities, what would be actualized in the worked out 
composition.  
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operations. An example of such an indeterminate piece, Variatons II will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
 
‘Indeterminacy’, therefore, denotes a compositional strategy where the procedure of deciding 
the detailed course of musical events, note-to-note, has to a greater or lesser degree been 
handed over to the performers, or the specific situation of a performance. A specific 
realisation would be dependent upon the contribution of the performers before arriving at a 
specific “note-to-note” execution.  
 
Musicircus as a technique of performance can be understood to take the exploration of chance 
and indeterminacy a step further to the live site of performance and include the audience in 
these processes. The play of chance and indeterminacy are here methodically invoked and 
explored through the non-coordination of simultaneous performances and the freedom of 
performers to choose their own program in addition to the audience’s freedom to walk about 
and choose their own routes of exploration.  
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Cage writes in a letter from 1973:  
 
I have not made detailed directions for Musicircus.  You simply bring together under one roof as much 
music (as many musical groups and soloists) as practical under the circumstances.  It should last longer 
than ordinary concerts, starting at 7 or 8 in the evening, and continuing, say, to midnight.  Arrange 
performers on platforms or within roped-off areas.  There must be plenty of space for the audience to 
walk around.  If you have more groups than places, make a schedule: Group 1 in Place A from 7-9:30; 
Group 23 in Place A from 9:45-midnight.  Etc.  There should be food on sale and drinks (as at a circus). 
Dancers and acrobats.78  
 
Basically, Musicircus is an event that consists of simultaneous performances: “Musicircus 
(bringing together under one roof as much of the music of the surrounding community as one 
practicably can.”79 This simultaneity is also presented in the previews of the first Musicircus:  
 
The Music Circus will be an artistic happening, an interpretation of the arts, featuring Cage’s long-time 
friend, David Tudor, electronically transforming the ventilator sounds, a poetry reading by Michael 
Holloway, a jazz band, numerous electronic recordings, Norma Marder singing, and a piece so silent 
that nobody can hear it. All these sounds and many more will be produced simultaneously.80 
 
                                                 
78 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
79 Cage, M: writings, '67-'72, p. xiii. 
80 Yahn 1967. 
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The simultaneity outlined by Cage’s descriptions, comments and practical advice has certain 
characteristics. Cage says in a conversation with Daniel Charles: “In a Musicircus, you have 
the right to bring together all kinds of music which are ordinarily separated. We’re no longer 
worried about what there is to be heard, so to speak. It’s no longer a question of aesthetics.”81 
“It’s no longer a question of aesthetics”. This is a radical statement. All types of music can 
be part of a Musicircus! And, not just music, all kinds of artistry are welcome: “There should 
be food on sale and drinks (as at a circus). Dancers and acrobats.”82  
 
Neither does Cage express an ideal for coordinating performances in any way. On the 
contrary, he advises the participants to perform independently of each other.83 These 
performative preferences can be connected to conceptions of ‘continuity’ and ‘no-continuity’ 
that Cage brings up in lectures in the 1950s. He writes for example in “Lecture on 
Something” (1951): 
 
The idea, consequences, suggests the musical term continuity and that produced a discussion last week 
for Feldman spoke of no-continuity, whereas it was argued from a rational point of view that no matter 
what there is continuity. […] No-continuity simply means accepting that continuity that happens. 
Continuity means the opposite: making that particular continuity that excludes all others.84  
 
‘No-continuity’, in the context given above, represents a break from narrative structures. Thus 
we are presented with musical situations without a clear beginning, middle, and end. Nicholls 
in the article “Getting Rid of the Glue” (2002) emphasizes how the group of composers, later 
labelled the New York School of composers,85 intensely explored different compositional 
methods in the early fifties, including methods to get rid of “the glue” − of habitual ways of 
binding sonic material together into coherent units. One result was the evolvement of the 
graphic notation pioneered by Morton Feldman. Behind these glue-less compositions were 
efforts to explore the physical character, per se, of the musical material. Cage expresses this 
effort in his emphasis on sounds as sonic phenomena freed from symbolic functions: 
 
Where people had felt the necessity to stick sounds together to make a continuity, we four [Cage, 
Feldman, Wolff, Brown] felt the opposite necessity to get rid of the glue so that sounds would be 
themselves.86  
 
‘No-continuity’ does not only refer to conditions that highlight the concrete qualities of 
sounds, but alludes also to an inclusive notion of presence: 
                                                 
81 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p. 52. 
82 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
83 See quote at p. 37: “Let each thing…” 
84 Cage, Silence, 132. 
85 Besides Cage, this group consisted of Morton Feldman, Christian Wolff, Earl Brown, and David Tudor as 
their important performer.  
86 Cage, Silence, p. 71. 
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This is what is meant when one says: No-continuity. No sounds. No harmony. No melody. No 
counterpoint. No rhythm. That is to say there is not one of the somethings that is not acceptable. When 
this is meant one is in accord with life.87  
 
Following this argument, the continuity of the discontinuous denotes an inclusive 
phenomenon of time where a multiplicity of life lines appear, interact, add to each other’s 
conditions, break apart and form new units. This complex situation expands linear 
conceptions of time and extends the temporal dimension spatially. In line with this 
understanding of continuity,88 we can argue that the performative strategy of the Cagean 
circus explicitly explores this spatial extension of time and the potentiality of co-presence that 
this creates.89  
 
Even though neither the content nor the articulation of time is sought to be coordinated, Cage 
sketches a spatial organization of the simultaneous performances:  
 
Arrange performers on platforms or within roped-off areas.  There must be plenty of space for the 
audience to walk around.  If you have more groups than places, make a schedule: Group 1 in Place A 
from 7-9:30; Group 23 in Place A from 9:45-midnight.90  
 
We could remark in this respect that though the temporal articulation is freed from singular 
continuities and made highly conditioned by a plurality of voices, the space is not in the same 
degree exposed to these chance ridden strategies. That is, while the simultaneity of this circus 
in a temporal sense is left to chance by the organisers, the spatial organisation is not in the 
same degree accidental.91 In fact, Cage’s concept of ‘no-continuity’, as pronounced in the 
1950s, approves of a certain deliberate organisation of space. A spacious distribution of 
performers makes it easier to free the performance from the habitual glue of conventions: 
 
In connection with the physical space of the performance, where that performance involves several 
players (two or more), it is advisable for several reasons to separate the performers one from the other, 
as much as is convenient and in accord with the action and the architectural situation. This separation 
allows the sounds to issue from their own centers and to interpenetrate in a way which is not obstructed 
by the conventions of European harmony and theory about relationships and interferences of sounds.92  
 
                                                 
87 Cage, Silence, p.132. 
88 “The continuity that is no continuity is going on forever; and there is no problem about accepting whatever.” 
(Cage, Silence, p. 140.) 
89 This argument is discussed in length in chapter six. 
90 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
91 We could of course argue that the spatial character would, in any case, be dependent upon the sonic activity 
(the temporal articulation). See presentation under the heading “Performative space” in chapter four.  
92 Cage, Silence, p. 39. 
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The most comprehensive description given by Cage of the first Musicircus appears in John 
Cage.93 The same text appears also in Scenarios – Scripts to perform, an anthology edited by 
Kostelanez and published in 1980:  
 
The Stock Pavilion, not “Stockyards Pavilion,” is a building used for showing cattle. The arena floor is 
covered with a soft earth and a carpetlike material − a kind of amplified sawdust, but of a dark red-and-
black color. The bleachers are cement. The structure itself is reminiscent of the turn-of-the-century 
exhibition buildings or, say, those in Paris of that time. (Metal structural mebers visible, plus glass.) 
Musicircus was done on November 17, I believe, in 1967. It consisted simply in inviting those who 
were willing to perform at once (in the same place and time). There were: the composer Salvatore 
Martirano, who, like the others, used a group of performers and gave a program of his own; Jocy de 
Oliveira (Carvalho) who gave a piano recital including Ben Johnston’s Knocking Piece, music by 
Morton Feldman, etc.; Lejaren Hiller; Herbert Brün; James Cuomo and his band; another jazz band; 
David Tudor and Gordon Mumma; Norma Marder giving a voice recital sometimes accompanying a 
dancer, Ruth Emerson; the mime Claude Kipnis, who responded with a whole sound environment; 
perhaps others I don’t remember − and my notes and papers regarding it are packed now. In the center 
of the floor was a metallic construction upon which the audience could make sounds. (This is actually 
someone’s composition − but I don’t now remember whose.) No directions were given anyone. I 
connected contact mikes to the light switchboard, changing the lights and, at the same time, producing 
sounds of the switches. At either end of the Pavilion but beyond screens, were places to buy apple cider 
and doughnuts, popcorn, etc. (A reference to Ives.) Ronald Nameth arranged the play of films and 
slides. And also obtained dark light and large balloons. We advertised it with the remark: You won’t 
hear a thing; you’ll hear everything. No admission was charged. Jack McKenzie, who was coordinator, 
estimated that five thousand people attended. The various musics each had a stage or platform near the 
bleachers so that the floor was free for use by the audience. The general sound was of a high volume, 
though not everything was amplified. Loudspeakers were high up around the perimeter. The general 
shape of the building is rectangular but with rounded ends.94 
 
The context for this last appearance opens a puzzle; it implies that the text does not need to be 
understood purely as a description of a past event. Cage’s sketched record appears in an 
anthology of scripts to perform. The editorial assumptions behind the anthology are that 
“innovations in theatrical art in part depend upon scripting so radically alternative it insures 
that a performance cannot be realized in conventional ways [...] an alternative script [...] 
offers other kinds of text, to induce radically different kinds of performance.”95 The anthology 
is collected and published with an eye to the performing artist and to the delivery of 
“scenarios for live performance”,96 conducive to alternative performances. The fact that these 
scripts are collected with view to being performed is even specified in the preface:  
 
                                                 
93 Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage. 
94 Kostelanetz 1980, p. 194. I have here quoted the text in its entirety.  
95 Ibid. p. 9. 
96 Ibid. p. 18. 
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- “A secondary requirement was that all these extra texts could be performed by 
someone other than the author.”97  
 
And: 
 
- “it is expected that anyone performing any of these scripts publicly (and, especially, 
commercially) will obtain performance rights from the authors or publishers at 
addresses listed in the acknowledgements to this book.”98 
 
To understand Cage’s text as a contribution to an anthology of theatrical scripts opens other 
interpretational possibilities than a reading of the text as descriptive of a past event. It changes 
the status of the text from a view of the past, into one directed towards the future – towards 
realizations to come.  
 
The text is one page long. No title is given. It begins with a description of a building, a 
description written in the present tense. This building, the stock pavilion, appears to be, by 
reading the rest of the text, the venue for a performance – the Musicircus. A supplementary 
description of this site appears also at the end of the text. This is also written in the present 
tense. The rest of the text is written in the past tense. It is descriptive in its form and shows 
signs of being written down by memory alone: 
 
- “Musicircus was done on November 17, I believe, in 1967.”  
- “perhaps others I don’t remember—and my notes and papers regarding it are packed 
now.”  
- “(This is actually someone’s composition—but I don’t now remember whose.)” 
 
The event referred to is Musicircus done in 1967 − what it consisted of, who performed, what 
they performed, and remarks about how it was organized. The descriptive form is 
rudimentary, but informative. Fetterman, for example, quotes from this text to describe the 
event in 1967 and calls it the most concise performance description.99  
 
The text invites a descriptive reading. In fact, the remarks that introduce this text in its 1970 
appearance (John Cage, ed. Richard Kostelanetz) enforce such an interpretation:  
 
Cage’s major recent pieces have been environmental extravaganzas, where many unexpected events 
occur within a delimited space. A letter written in 1969 to the book’s editor describes Musicircus 
                                                 
97 Ibid, p. 10. 
98 Loc. cit. 
99 Fetterman 1996, p. 139. 
 33 
(1967), done at the University of Illinois.100  
 
The puzzles begin when we in Scenarios are confronted by the text as a script to perform. 
Transferring the descriptions in the text to instructions or a map,101 demands a creative 
response from the reader and those who might want to use the text as the script for a 
performance. Should we try to reconstruct the past event as closely to the description as 
possible? This would of course be impossible and absurd. It would depend upon getting hold 
of all the people Cage mentions, making them do what they did, and getting a stock pavilion 
like the one in Urbana for the realization among other things. As well being impracticable this 
would also contradict other information given in the text: 
 
- “It consisted simply in inviting those who were willing to perform at once (in the same 
place and time).” 
- “No directions were given anyone.”  
 
The text is made ambivalent and open-ended by being written in a style of description and of 
remembrance, but put in the context of a possible script. The text does not map how we 
should proceed from the past event to new realizations. However, some of the information 
given is more easily transferred to instructions:  
 
- You simply invite those who were willing to perform at once (in the same place and 
time). 
- Give no directions to anyone. 
- Charge no admission. 
- Leave free space in the middle to be used by the audience. 
 
Straightforward, though, it is not. For example it is not apparent whether we should amplify 
sounds and aim for a general sound level of high volume, or should we interpret this part of 
the text as an example of how it turned out in 1967.  
 
Kostelanetz’s anthology was published in 1980. However it had actually been conceived in 
1973 and had resided in the editor’s cabinet before enough funding had been raised for it to be 
published.102 As shown in the quote above, the same editor had received Cage’s description of 
Musicircus in 1969, which in Scenarios can be read as a score. It is not apparent who decided 
to use the Musicircus-text from John Cage in an anthology of scripts to perform – whether it 
                                                 
100 Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage, p. 171. 
101 “A script is the playwright’s road map for the performers, telling them how to proceed.” (Kostelanetz 1980, p. 
17.) 
102 Kostelanetz 1980, p. 9. 
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was the editor or Cage himself – but several of Cage’s scores use a descriptive style within 
the instructive frame of a score and thereby provoke forms of interpretational ambivalence, as 
in the reference to the first performance in the published score of 4’33’’ from 1960,103 the a 
priori score of Variations V (1965) discussed later, and the sketchy reminiscence of a 
performance making up the score of Variations VIII (1978). In this way, Cage’s text in 
Scenarios is not extraordinary, sharing the character of other published scores by Cage. 
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As we have seen, Cage categorizes Musicircus as one of his initiated performances that does 
not involve notation. The text, the script, we have just discussed can be understood as a score, 
and even a published one, though not through Cage’s ordinary channel, his publisher Henmar 
Press of C. F. Peters Corporation (New York).104 However, as a project that had been dormant 
for several years, the anthology does not seem to be a reliable way of getting a work 
published, especially in view of the fact that Cage had a contract with Peters that enabled him 
to publish very unconventional and at times rudimentary scores.105  
 
In a letter (April 13, 1973) directed to Henmar Press, Charles Hamm asks about the published 
status of some of Cage’s works, among them Musicircus. The answer Cage’s publisher gives 
is that “the remaining five titles (MUSIC FOR XENIA, SOUND ANONYMOUSLY 
RECEIVED, MUSICIRCUS, NEWPORT MIX, and REUNION) are improvisations which do 
not exist in print and, therefore, do not appear in the attached list of all the works by John 
Cage.”106 
 
A lot of music starts life without being written down and goes on living without having a 
score as its transmitting point of circulation. Cage however began his artistic career as a 
composer by writing music. He took part in the Western practice of art music, concerned with 
constructing music through the technique of notation. At the same time, Cage explored the 
tools of writing to the point where notation as a form of fixed prescription was made 
ambiguous and was destabilized.  
 
                                                 
103 “NOTE: The title of this work is the total length in minutes and seconds of its performance. At Woodstock, 
N.Y., August 29, 1952, the title was 4’ 33’’ and the three parts were 33’’, 2’ 40’’, and 1’ 20’’. It was performed 
by the pianist David Tudor, who indicated the beginnings of parts by closing, and endings by opening the 
keyboard lid. However, the work may be performed by any instrumentalist or combination of instrumentalists 
and last any length of time.” (4’33’’, 1960.)  
104 Named only Peters hereafter.  
105 See footnote no. 44. 
106 Letter from C.F. Peters Corporation, dated April 17, 1973. 
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Initially I had not been so concerned about the theme of a published score, or what a non-
score could mean. My main interest had been in Musicircus’s abundance of simultaneous 
activity, and how this excess, combined with the performers’ freedom to choose their own 
program and the mobility of the audience, took Cage’s concept of indeterminacy to its utmost 
form. In fact I had viewed the non-score as an indication of the ultimate application of this 
concept.107  
 
Over a coffee table in Berlin I was confronted with the question of the non-score: Why didn’t 
Cage make a score for Musicircus? He wrote a lot of rudimentary scores, why not one in this 
case? The score of Variations V (1965), for example, was written after the first performance 
and Cage used the first performance as a reference for his “thirty-seven remarks re an audio-
visual performance”108 which constitutes the score. It is an “a posteriori score”109.  Another 
example is Rozart Mix (1965) that consists of a collection of correspondence between Cage 
and Alvin Lucier.  Could it be that Cage didn’t publish a score for Musicircus because he 
didn’t want anybody else to realise such an event? The non-score, or the non-publication of a 
score, could be seen as a strategy to protect authenticity and ownership in an alternative way 
to the enforcement of copyright of published scores. By not publishing a score, nothing is 
formally given away. I mention this, because the practice of writing music can be viewed with 
a dual perspective. On the one hand, unlike in oral traditions where origins are often 
unknown, the tradition of written music has made the originator − the composer − prominent. 
Who would consider playing a written work without telling the audience who had composed 
it? Indeed, a body of laws supports and protects this respect for ownership. On the other hand, 
when music is published the composition enters into a process of distribution − it is imparted 
to those interested and lives its own life detached from the composer’s sheltering wings.  
 
A discussion of the genesis of Variations V will highlight these questions. Variations V, an 
audio-visual performance, was first staged in 1965. It was a multi media event with dance, 
music and visual images, and a specially designed technological system had a defining role in 
the formation of the event. By using photoelectric cells, capacitive antennas and contact 
microphones, information from the dancers’ movements was converted to sound information. 
The technical devices made it possible “to ‘brush information against information’, to cross 
one art with another, and thus to generate a complex experience.”110 This interaction between 
the dance and sound produced a complex situation where the origins of the output were 
impossible to detect. What emerged did not have one single cause but was a result of a 
complex of interpenetrating factors and actions. “While the musicians were constantly mixing 
                                                 
107 Fetterman expresses similar views. (Fetterman 1996, p. 139.) 
108 Score, Variations V. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Pritchett 1993, p. 153. 
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and routing their sound sources to the loudspeakers in the hall, these sources were gated 
(switched on and off) by various devices controlled by the dancers”.111 Beside the dance and 
music there were also visuals – distorted television images by Nam June Paik and film by 
Stan VanDerBeek – and Beverly Emmons designed the lighting.  
 
A reference to the first performance figures already in the title page of the score:  
 
VARIATIONS V 
Thirty-seven remarks re an audio-visual performance 
(Foot-notes refer to performance at Philharmonic Hall,  
July 23, 1965, Lincoln Center, New York City.) 
 
For Mary Sisler 
 
John Cage [signature] 
Stony Point, September-October 1965 
 
The score does not hide the fact that Variations V resulted from collaboration. Cage informs 
us in his remarks who made the different devices for the event at Philharmonic Hall and who 
was responsible for what. For example, the sound-system was designed by David Tudor, the 
oscillators, electronic percussion devices and capacitive antennas were devised by Robert 
Moog, Billy Klüver had devised the photoelectric cells, the mixer was designed by Max 
Mathews, the choreography was by Merce Cunningham, film by Stan VanDerBeek and so on.  
 
Already here, two distinct characteristics of what a score is are questioned:  
 
- The score as a notation and prescription of a specific sonic art object.  
- The role of the composer as the work’s originator.  
 
Why did Cage write a score? Cage gives an answer at a discussion panel112 where this theme 
is brought up. David Tudor, Gordon Mumma and Cage discuss their performances of 
Variations V and the piece’s character of interactivity where no one could control the final 
result of their actions. The theme of the score also comes up. After the interviewer comments 
that conceptually, Variations V lacked a controlling composer’s mind that said “this is the 
way the piece is going to sound”, Gumma remarks that the piece does have a published score 
written by Cage, and Cage explains that it is not a traditional score, but “remarks following 
the performance”. Gumma comments further, that anyway Cage gets royalties for the piece. 
Cage laughs and says “Right”, but continues by saying something that offers an explanation 
for why he wrote the score. He says that he was endeavouring to write remarks that “suggest 
                                                 
111 Loc. cit. 
112 A kind of anarchy: Merce Cunningham and music, videotaped panel discussion. Merce Cunningham Dance 
Foundation Collection, New York Public Library. 
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the possibility of making a similar performance”. The score, in other words, makes it easier 
for the further distribution of re-realisations of something similar to what was done on July 
23, 1965 at Lincoln Center, New York City – anyone interested can go to the publisher, 
obtain the score and produce their own realisation without Cage, Tudor, Cunningham et 
cetera being present. The score is a readily available invitation to anyone interested in a re-
realization of Variations V. 
 
Cage could have done the same thing with Musicircus. Perhaps the score could have looked 
like my list here:  
 
Musicircus 
 
You simply invite those who are willing to perform at once (in the same place and time).113  
 
Bring together under one roof as much music (as many musical groups and soloists) as practical under 
the circumstances.114  
 
There should at all times be many people performing simultaneously.115  
 
Let each thing that happens happen from its own centre, whether it is music or dance.  Don’t go in the 
direction of one thing ‘using’ another.  Then they will all go together beautifully (as birds, aeroplanes, 
trucks, radios, etc. do).116 
 
Arrange performers on platforms or within roped-off areas.117  
 
Exercise no aesthetic bias.118 Give no directions to anyone.119  
 
There must be plenty of space for the audience to walk around.120  
 
There should be food on sale and drinks (as at a circus).  Dancers and acrobats.121  
 
It should last longer than ordinary concerts, starting at 7 or 8 in the evening, and continuing, say, to 
midnight.122  
 
Since none of the musicians are being paid, there being too many of them, the entire event must be free 
to the public.123  
 
                                                 
113 Cage, text in Scenarios quoted at p. 31. 
114 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
115 John Cage, letter dated December 23, 1979. 
116 John Cage, letter dated February 17, 1979. 
117 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
118 John Cage, letter dated February 17, 1979. 
119 Cage, text in Scenarios. 
120 John Cage, letter dated June 6, 1973. 
121 Loc. cit. 
122 Loc. cit. 
123 John Cage, letter dated December 23, 1979. 
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Writing and publishing a score can be understood as a gesture of invitation to anybody 
interested in realising the work. The published score thus represents a gesture, giving the 
work to the public, and is not merely to be understood as somebody’s property. From this 
perspective – that of the non-score, existing within a practice dominated by the written score 
and a distribution system connected with published scores – not to write a score can be 
understood as a strategy to protect artistic endowment from being separated from its 
originator. In other words: It was not meant that others should do Musicircus. An authentic 
realisation of Musicircus needs the presence of Cage.  However, this is not the impression I 
get from source material. Cage elaborates on the answer given by his publisher to Hamm, 
formerly quoted:  
 
A number of pieces recently are not given to Peters because I wish to keep them free of copyright 
restrictions e.g. Musicircus. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether my work in connection with that piece 
is as integral a part of it as the work of all the actual performers of it.124 
 
The non-published score of Musicircus seems to have a deliberate reason: to keep it free of 
copyright restrictions. A reason that is further elaborated in another letter: 
 
In harmony with the separation of this work [Musicircus] from conventional economics, I have not 
made a score nor have I published one of course.125 
 
Cage does not find it problematic either that other people organise a Musicircus. Cage tells us, 
in fact, that he himself didn’t organise the first production. He was “happy to just throw out 
an idea:”126 
 
Daniel Charles: In the Musicircus, can there be an organizer? 
 
John Cage: Yes, but it is better if there are several! 
 
D.C.: And you didn’t organize anything. Someone else organizes, but the essential thing is the 
collecting together, which you have only suggested. 
 
J.C.: Yes. 
 
D.C.: Is the fact that there is someone else who organizes without importance? 
 
J.C.: No, why? 
 
D.C.: Don’t you run the risk of creating a new centering, as in the happenings, other than your own? 
 
J.C.: No, in music, there can be much organization or a lot of disorganization − everything is possible. 
In the same way, the forest includes trees, mushrooms, birds, anything you wish. Although we can still 
organize a lot and even multiply organizations, in any case, the whole will make a disorganization!127 
                                                 
124 John Cage, letter to Charles Hamm, dated May 1, 1973. 
125 John Cage, letter dated December 23, 1979. 
126 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p. 196. 
127 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 
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The reason for the non-score is not to protect his idea of an arrangement from misuse. The 
motivation is rather to keep this event-design free from a distributive system infiltrated by 
conventional economics and give the ownership freely to the participants. 
 
=3? 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I have raised the question of how to identify Musicircus, pointing to its ambiguous status. 
What does the title indicate? Fetterman’s designation of musicircus as a Cagean genre labels a 
whole string of works and initiated performances that share certain common features of 
musical and performative character. Genre indications, however, can function more broadly 
than just as a signification of conditions inherent in the artwork alone. Jeffrey Kallberg 
emphasizes their communicative and persuasive capacities – their rhetorical potential – and 
what this means for the perceptions of audiences.128 Genre, he argues, is a social 
phenomenon. By indicating the genre of a composition, the composer communicates 
something to the audience; the suggestion actively informs the experience of a musical work 
and exerts a suggestive force: “It guides the responses of listeners […] The choice of genre by 
a composer and its identification by the listener establish the framework for the 
communication of meaning.”129 The genre establishes, by this, “a code of social behavior”130 
and “a horizon of expectation”131.  
 
The title Musicircus plays with the terms music and circus, giving rise to a wide variety of 
associations and expectational horizons. The generic term music (itself extended in Cage’s 
aesthetics to include all types of sounds and theatrical activity by his equation of music to 
theatre)132 is combined with circus, a term that both denotes the art form of circus, the venue 
where it is performed, and the type of company that offers such entertainment. Its associations 
therefore can vary from a public-minded entertainment including anything from trained 
animal acts, exhibitions of human skills and daring to clowning, companies having a variety 
                                                 
128 Kallberg 1988.  
129 Ibid. p. 243. 
130 E. D. Hirsch is stated as the source of the term, ibid. p. 243. 
131 The term is said to be Hans Robert Jauss’ expression, derived from Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, 
ibid. p. 243. 
132 This theme is briefly brought up and discussed later in this chapter under the heading “Circus and 
happening.” 
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of employees from different countries and continents, and circus, having the same root as 
circle and circumference, bringing to mind the distinctive environment in which such 
entertainment is presented − the ring, a circular performance arena − and that gave the circus 
its name.  
 
The genre indication, or what we in this instance could call an indication of a cross-art-form, 
is even more striking in the working title of the event at UIUC: Music Circus. The event has 
this title, or is called the musical circus, in the previews I have had access to.133 It is firstly in 
the review “Musicircus Rocks Stock Pavilion”134 that the final title Musicircus appears. And 
the few letters by Cage from the time that mention the coming event reveal that the final title 
came up late in the planning process: 
 
It’s not yet certain whether that “music circus” will take place at Lincoln Sq. Perhaps not take place. 
Perhaps some place else. At any rate Ben Johnston is the person to get in touch with regarding making a 
film of it.135  
     
I have no objections to a press conference but I will be quite occupied, being necessary for rehearsals 
and performances of the Merce Cunningham Dance Company and that of the Musical Circus, the 
former in the Assembly Hall, the latter in the Stock Pavilion.136  
 
After Redlands/TV get me back to Urbana. 16th is concert here. 17th is going to be a glorious music 
circus arranged by yrs. truly 18th in the morning is the panel I’m on.137   
 
The working title of the event in 1967 was not exceptional. The actor and ex-carnival 
showman St. John Terrell established in 1949 a summer-theatre scene called Music Circus in 
Lambertville, New Jersey. Here, during the summer season, light operas and operettas were 
staged ‘in the round’, within a circus-style big top.138 Edward M. Greenberg and Joel E. 
                                                 
133 I have found three items on presentations from local newspapers collected in the John Cage Archive at 
Northwestern University, Evanston. (Sibbert, Converse (three items) and Yahn.) The first article is from Sep. 29, 
1967, the others appeared just before the event Nov. 11th and Nov 17th. The context for the earliest article is to 
present Cage as one of the new faculty members, a visiting one, of the Centre for Advanced Study. The other 
previews are written in the context of the upcoming event – Musicircus − and the symposium "University in 
Motion: Matrix for the Arts" that Musicircus was part of. All the articles have broad presentations of the 
composer John Cage, including his challenging aesthetic and musical philosophy. 
134 The review “Musicircus Rocks Stock Pavilion” by Zumstein provides my first source where Musicircus is 
used as the title of the event. I must though add that I have not had any access to posters, program notes or other 
such items, which we can assume used the name Musicircus. Such sources are not represented in the Cage 
archive at Northwestern University. According to existing source material at Cage archives, Ronald Nameth 
informed me in an interview I did in 2006, that because of the presence at the campus of those involved in the 
event, there was little need for written correspondence. This explains partly the scarcity of sources and existing 
notes about the planning process of the event.  
135 Cage, letter dated Oct. 2, 1967. 
136 Cage, letter dated Oct. 26, 1967. 
137 Cage, letter dated Oct. 29, 1967. 
138 See for example Case, “Lambertwille Music Circus − Show, Casts and Playbills” (Web Page).  
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Rubin report in 1952: 
 
Something new has been added to the American summer-theatre scene: a type of theatre which bids fair 
to become one of the most popular of summer entertainments, the Music Circus. In 1949, in 
Lambertville, New Jersey, a young actor and ex-carnival showman, St. John Terrell, opened a season of 
operetta favorites played on a center stage to audiences of nine hundred seated in fourteen graded rows 
of canvas chairs, all enclosed within a large canvas circus tent. 139  
 
The name Music Circus, associated to Terrell’s establishment, sits easily within the worlds of 
popular culture and “light entertainment”. We could remark that terms such as “public-
minded”, “popular” and “commercial” could also easily be associated to traditional circuses. 
And these associations further nourish questions about the Cagean Music Circus in relation to 
popular culture and the schism between “light entertainment” and “serious art”. This schism 
has been used to distinguish so called fine arts from those of utility and pure entertainment 
and to justify the fine arts’ autonomous and elevated position. And, as we will see in the next 
chapter, the music philosopher Lydia Goehr emphasizes the connection between what has 
been regarded as serious and valuable in music, and the work-concept that has come to 
dominate Western art music. 
 
Furthermore we could note that Terrell’s Music Circus designates nothing like a work or a 
specific performance. We are here considering an establishment and productions that use the 
design of the circus to present their repertoire. The new setting though opened new 
possibilities for productions. Greenberg and Rubin quoted above write: “The Music Circus 
provides excellent opportunities for experimentation in staging, design, and lightening not 
elsewhere available in the theatre today.”140  
 
Having the discussion of the character of the work in mind, or its loss as previously 
introduced, the term Music Circus above designates nothing like a work, but rather, a form of 
presentation. Cage’s circus can also be understood in this way. It denotes a way of organising 
and evening of music, dance, theatre and art − a type of music theatrical production in Cage’s 
terminology − and not a single piece. The discussion of work, non-work, or even anti-work, a 
                                                 
139 Greenberg and Rubin, p. 26. St. John Terrell’s summer shows were an instant success, and it inspired the 
launch of several other Music Circuses. About 40 "tune tents" became scattered around the country. St. John 
Terrell’s Music Circus went on until 1970. Today three of the other establishments still exist: Sacramento Music 
Circus, South Shore Music Circus (Cohasset, MA), and the Melody Tent (Hyannis, MA, on Cape Cod) . See 
Case, “Music circus” in Wikipedia, “Music Circus” in California Musical Theatre (home page), South Shore 
Music Circus (home page). 
140 Greenberg and Rubin, p. 26. 
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discussion I will come back to in the next chapter, can accordingly seem irrelevant and beside 
the point. Instead it is the means of organization, staging and the significance of the physical 
design of the venue itself that indicate the aesthetic nature of these kinds of arrangement.141 
The continuation (re-realizations/new productions) of the first Musicircus, as an idea to re-
organize the norm of performance, could in this respect be seen as a type of music-theatrical 
production, a technique of performance extended to a means for arranging alternative 
“concerts.”  
 
However, the seeming irrelevance of the work category becomes less tenable when 
confronted by the task of doing a Musicircus today. How would we present it? What 
rhetorical means would we rely on? In considering these questions I believe the work related 
discourse is found close at hand, including the emphasis on composer, the intention of the 
work, what characterizes it, and so on. In the next chapter I am going to present Lydia 
Goehr’s argument that the musical work-concept, consolidated in the 19th century, still has a 
strong influence on how music is practiced and presented, including the experimentations of 
composers such as Cage.142  
 
The presentation of the Music Circus, or musical circus at UIUC, in local newspapers and 
university magazines opens several avenues of interpretation in response to these questions. 
From one point of view, Cage is presented as helping to organize the event. He is not at all 
mentioned as its composer. The article “Presenting John Cage’s Electric Music Machine”143 
informs us that Cage will “participate in the Centennial Musical Circus”. His role is later 
expanded on to indicate an active role as initiator and organizer: “I hope to involve the public 
in this. I want the performers to be the public. My job is to facilitate their performance.”144 
Later presentations also express Cage’s role as a kind of initiator and organizer. However, his 
role is presented somewhat ambiguously: 
 
The “Music Circus” which he [Cage] is helping to engineer Friday in the Stock Pavilion is a 
development of this theme [the happening at Black Mountain College in 1952].145  
 
                                                 
141 The significance of staging in this respect points to aspects that we are going to discuss in chapter four and 
five under the headings “A performative turn, theory” and “Musicircus as a staged event”. 
142 Later in this thesis these questions become relevant when we are going to discuss the realization of 
Musicircus in Trondheim in 2006. 
143 Sibbert 1967. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Converse 1967b. My italics. 
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Cage will present what he calls a Music Circus tonight in the University Stock Pavilion from 8 to 1. 
[…] Cage’s organization of the Music Circus tonight illustrates his essentially anarchic view of the 
world as a global village.146   
 
There is an announcement in the same magazine, from which the last quote is taken, wherein 
the circus is presented as Cage’s Music Circus: 
 
JOHN CAGE’S MUSIC CIRCUS. 8 pm to 1 am, Stock Pavilion. No charge.147 
 
Even when Cage is not presented as the composer of the coming circus, and though his role is 
presented in a slightly ambiguous way, Cage’s views and thoughts about art, music, life and 
society are emphasized to contextualize the upcoming event. From another point of view, 
therefore, the previews play on work related discourses to explain the event and outline a 
horizon of expectation. The forthcoming Music Circus is basically explained in terms of 
Cage’s aesthetic thinking and his former activity as composer and organizer of happenings:  
 
The arts will interpenetrate and people will become involved within a work of art. An example of this is 
the “happening”, which Cage pioneered while teaching at Black Mountain College. Several forms of art 
− films, paintings, poetry, music and dance − are performed at the same time, relevant to each other 
only in that they are concurrent, yet by this very fact closely related. The “Music Circus” which he is 
helping to engineer Friday in the Stock Pavilion is a development of this theme.148  
 
 
Therefore we could argue that the first Musicircus was also presented in the mould of the 
work discourse. We are presented with a Cagean Music Circus where the term ‘circus’ is 
explained by referring to Cage’s former artistic experimentations and his current aesthetic 
view which is not least inspired by social considerations. 
 
=3?3= (+)8)("
The term circus has the same root as circle and circumference, and this aspect is accentuated 
by Cage’s usage of the word.149 Dan G. Hoffman, in a comment from 1951 upon new words 
from the Music Circus, connects Terrell’s Music Circus to inventions of the theatre-in-the-
round, the “staging of a dramatic presentation upon a platform completely surrounded by 
                                                 
146 Yahn 1967. My italics. 
147 “Focus on the Week Ahead”, Focus on the Arts at Illinois, Nov. 17, 1967. 
148 Converse 1967b. 
149 An aesthetic-philosophical discussion of the concept of circle in Cage’s aesthetics will be taken up in chapter 
6.  
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specta-action – like that in the prize ring or the circus.”150 The circus term’s association to a 
circular form, extended to the-theatre-in-the-round, is played on symbolically in the 
presentations of the first Musicircus: 
 
The audience will be in the round, with performers going in between them, around them, maybe even 
over them, because, says Cage, “The audience must be in the round because we live in the round. Art 
and life as an individual experience surround the audience with activity rather than vice versa. Art, if it 
has any use, must teach us to live in the round.”151 
 
Arena-style theatres with the stage in the middle and audiences placed around were not 
uncommon in the USA in the 1960s. After the Second World War theatre-in-the-round 
became quite common as an alternative to the proscenium theatre, not least in the rapidly 
expanding world of American university drama, both for economical reasons − 
entailing relatively low costs, though still great flexibility – and for its capacity to 
evoke intimacy.152 Cage plays with the image of the circular arrangement when he adopts 
the term circus. He indicates a performance situation where the audience moves in the middle 
and between performers.153 Kallberg, already referred to, accentuates how the rhetorical 
function of genre adoption includes choices where the norms of a specific genre are not 
followed − their fulfilment delayed, broken or even contradicted. The Cagean Music Circus 
turns the usual situation on its head. In a Musicircus it is the audience that is in the middle 
with the performers around.  
 
“To live in the round” is, in the formerly quoted preview, an elaboration of Cage’s “anarchic 
view of the world as a global village”.154 This condition is associated with a multiplicity of 
living that represents a “both/and” view of the world rather than an “either/or” perception and 
includes a view that makes value judgments irrelevant: “Beauty is everywhere; we must stop 
distinguishing between beauty and ugliness. Cage explains that in the present era of the global 
                                                 
150 Hoffman 1951, pp. 75-76.  
151 Yahn 1967.  
152 Grove 1989, Aronson 1996, Barnes 2003, Aronson 1996,“Theatre-in-the-Round” in The Concise Oxford 
Companion to the Theatre, and “Arena-Style Theatre” in The Oxford Companion to American Theatre.  
153 Cage and theatre: Cage did not only know about modern dance, but knew also explorations within the current 
avant-garde scene of theatre such as those made by the Living Theatre in New York, and he knew Antonin 
Artaud’s “The theatre and its double”, translated from French by M. C. Richards, a friend of Cage and one of the 
residential artists who performed in the untitled event at Black Mountain. Artaud’s book was a formative source 
of inspiration for the happening organized at Black Mountain College in 1952. For Cage and the Living Theatre, 
see for example Silverman 2010, pp. 94-99, Cage and theatre, see Deufert 2001, Cage and Kirby and Schechner 
1995, Kostelanetz 1968, Meyer 1998. 
154 Yahn 1967. 
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village we need a both/and view of the world, rather than an either/or perception.”155  
 
It could be interesting to introduce the big three-ring American circuses here, such as the 
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus that had their hey-days around the turn of the 
20th century. They are not included in the previews of Musicircus, but as a part of American 
culture and history it is natural to think of them, both when the event at UIUC is linked to 
diversity, quantity of offerings for the senses, and a community embracing the multiplicity of 
living having an international character that in the previews is expressed with reference to 
Marshall McLuhan’s term, the ‘global village’.156  
 
The big American circuses at the turn of the century criss-crossed the continent by train and 
offered a remarkable spectacle when coming to town.  Barnum and Bailey’s circus had by 
1890 a vast big top that contained three rings, two stages, a peripheral hippodrome track, and 
a space for ten thousand spectators. This expansion of the classic one-ring circus redefined 
this type of entertainment. Displays could go on simultaneously, although they were 
organized so the most promoted acts took place in the centre ring. Even though seating was 
differentiated with the best view reserved for those in high-priced seats, no spectator could 
take in everything at once, leaving a sensation of unfathomable excitement and a reason to 
visit the show again. These circuses did not only include an abundance of offerings under the 
big top. Adjacent to the main tent there could also be freak shows, exotic animals, carnival 
performers, and animal menageries.157  
 
The golden age of the big travelling circuses was definitely over by the mid 20th century.158 
New media of popular entertainment like cinema and television made their presence less 
                                                 
155 Yahn 1967. 
156 Cage credits McLuhan with the term ‘global village’ that describes the modern world as “electronically 
contracted, the globe is no more than a village. Electric speed in bringing all social and political functions 
together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree.” 
(McLuhan 2001, p. 5) Furthermore, Cage adopts McLuhan’s argument that the new technologies of 
communication and transport systems reduce not only literally the distance between people but also transform 
our mode of being through extending our faculties to impart and know: “ Today, after more than a century of 
electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both 
space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of 
man—the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively 
and corporately extended to the whole of human society, much as we have already extended our senses and our 
nerves by the various media.” (Ibid. pp. 3-4.) 
157 Davis 2001 and 2002, Stoddart 2000, Weitz.  
158 The period from 1871 to 1915 forms the Golden Age of the big North American circuses. See Stoddart 2000, 
p. 23. 
 46 
significant, but still the circus flourished and three-ring shows were put on, though the leading 
company Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus159 had abandoned using the tent in 
1956 in favour of permanent exhibition halls and sports arenas.160 
 
The historic three-ring circus, like the Musicircus at UIUC, represents an excessive 
abundance − a crazy mix (not least when side shows of freaks, exotic animals et cetera are 
included) − a multitude of offerings to stimulate the senses, a simultaneous way of presenting 
all its offerings and an institution of global and international colouring. Still, even though the 
big American circuses could easily be associated with plurality and the multiplicity of life, 
Janet M. Davis (2002) emphasizes how these big travelling circuses also mirrored the norms 
operating in a society that compartmentalize people into segregated categories:  
 
The railroad circus represented a ‘‘human menagerie’’ (a term popularized by P. T. Barnum) of racial 
diversity, gender difference, bodily variety, animalized human beings, and humanized animals that 
audiences were unlikely to see anywhere else. But the circus’s celebration of diversity was often 
illusionary, because the circus used normative ideologies of gender, racial hierarchy, and individual 
mobility to explain social transformations and human difference. At first glance, this is a problematic 
claim because the nomadic circus travelled on the fringes of community life— in fact, as subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate, its workers consciously felt that they were a breed apart from the rest of 
society. Indeed, performers themselves embraced cultural diversity within this international, multiracial 
‘‘travelling town.’’ Still, the circus clearly promulgated the major social currents of the day.161  
 
From one point of view, the Cagean circus plays along with expectations of the genre by 
magnifying the term circus’ association to a celebration of diversity. From another point of 
view, and taking note of Davis’ remarks quoted above, Cage also in this instance questions 
norms by giving a twist to the “codes of social behaviour” and “horizons of expectation”. The 
Cagean circus exaggerates the simultaneous character of what is offered, placing the audience 
in the middle, multiplying the “rings” infinitely so the space designed for performance versus 
viewing becomes ambiguous – fluctuating and overlapping – and it all comes about without 
payment, thereby de-commercializing the highly commercialized image of the ordinary 
circus.  
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Following the event in 1967 the ‘circus’ begins to appear and recur in Cage’s oeuvre and 
                                                 
159 Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, two leading companies on the American continent at the turn of 
the 20th century, merged in 1919. 
160 Parkinson and more, “circus” in Encyclopædia Britannica.  
161 Davis 2002, pp. 10-11. 
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aesthetic vocabulary. Besides the mentioned productions called Musicircus, scores appear like 
__, __ __ circus on __, (1979), realized as the radio play Roaratorio, an Irish Circus on 
Finnegans Wake (1979), and Scottish Circus (1990) based on Scottish traditional Music, in 
addition to all those compositions and productions that include musicircus as a technique for 
performance.162 The crazy mix of the three-ring circus is by Cage transferred to a method of 
generating a performative collage of a multi-focal quality that de-centralizes the situation of 
performance:163 
 
By “circus” I mean many pieces going on at once, rather than one alone. Because seen from a particular 
point of view, music is simply the art of focusing attention on one thing at a time. In my recent works, 
since about ’68, I have tried not to focus the attention on one thing at a time, and have used this 
principle that I call “musicircus” − of having many things going on at once.164 
 
However, the practice of letting unrelated material be performed simultaneously was not new. 
The untitled event at Black Mountain College is the most famous example, but Cage had 
before that event in 1952 explored the possibilities of teamwork within a mix of independent 
solutions for more than a decade through his work with dancers, and in the 1940s Cage and 
Cunningham had developed methods for putting dance and music together based on neutral 
time structures filled independently and put together as a joint performance. In the 1950s 
series of works were composed, such as the time length pieces,165 which could be performed 
in portions or complete, and alone or together with other pieces in the series.  And Cage’s 
Concert for Piano and Orchestra from 1958 has no master plan but a collection of parts that 
operate as independent units in an orchestral play of interpenetrations.166  
 
But while Cage explored the simultaneity of non-coordinated acts in the 1950s mainly within 
a paradigm of modernism − judged by Clement Greenberg to be a highly self-critical 
business, questioning the limits of a field of competence by addressing the specificity of an 
art form and exploring this art form’s possibilities through media specific methods −167 
Cage’s adopted term ‘circus’ reflects a post-modernistic orientation of mixed means and a 
                                                 
162 Some examples of compositions and events besides HPSCHD (1969): Renga (1975-76) and Apartment 
House 1776 (1976), Thirty pieces for five orchestras (1981), Dance / 4 Orchestras (1982), Mewantemooseicday 
(1969), Silent Environment (1979), A house full of music (1982), Rolywholyover: A Circus for Museum 
(posthumous exhibition, 1993, planned before Cage died). 
163 Musicircus as a live generated collage is discussed in chapter five. 
164 Cage (interview, 1975) in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 88. 
165 31’57.9864’’ For a Pianist (1954), 34’46.776’’ For a Pianist (1954), 26’1.1499’’ For a String Player (1955), 
27’10.554’’ For a Percussionist (1956).  
166 The concept ‘interpenetration’ is presented and discussed in chapter six.  
167 Greenberg 2004, p. 141. 
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hybridity that becomes clearly present in his oeuvre from the 1960s. When Daniel Charles 
asked in 197O: “What do you consider a ‘circus situation’?”, and Cage answered:  
 
The process opens up to include things which have no emotive properties, but also to reinclude objects 
charged with significance and intention. These objects are carried along in the process, they no longer 
dominate it and turn it into an object.168  
 
‘Circus’, as a method involving “simultaneity of unrelated intentions”169 includes the ready-
mades of socially encoded sounds in the play of surprises, chance and indeterminacy.170 The 
aura of a referential atmosphere, though, is juxtaposed with other fragments; meta-narratives 
are broken down, a fluidity of non-exclusive positions is enforced so any collective frame of 
reference is dismantled − there is not a unified story to tell. ‘Circus’ denotes an abundance of 
simultaneity where “there is not one center, but […] plurality of centers”.171 It characterizes 
situations of plurality and diversity that quantitatively shatter unified schemas for making 
differences.  
 
This method of de-centring a situation that includes material loaded with intention and coded 
objects is, though, underpinned by aesthetic formulations moulded in the 1950s. The 
aesthetics of decentralization, of undermining the relevance of a superior point of view, 
enforced by chance operations and indeterminacy, is in the 1950s elaborated by an adoption 
of Buddhist ideas, such as the notion of unique though interpenetrating centres of being.172 
The issue then is not to present a certain idea, but to provide situations that open our 
experiential openness for the is of the aesthetic situation, a presence fashioned not by a dual 
construct of the ideal versus the implemented but a non-dualistic experience of the spirituality 
of matter and the matter of spirituality.  
                                                 
168 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, pp. 146-147. 
169 Cage (interview, 1983), in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 64. 
170 Marcel Duchamp had presented the ‘ready-made’, an ordinary object transferred from the sphere of use and 
everyday life to the contemplative atmosphere of an art exhibition, already in 1913 (The Bicycle Wheel). Firstly 
in the 1960s its significance was felt in the art world. Milan’s Schwartz Gallery exhibited recreations of lost 
readymade works by Duchamp in 1964 and the ‘ready-made’ was embraced in a drive to generic art expressed in 
minimalism, conceptual art, land art and performance art. Cage had, though, worked with kinds of ready-mades 
already in the 1930s and ‘40s with his “found sounds” of percussion music. Cage met Duchamp personally for 
the first time in 1942, and he expresses a high esteem for Duchamp’s work.  Later, from about 1965, he met 
Duchamp on a regularly basis with the excuse of playing chess. 
171 Cage quoted by Junkerman 1994, p. 63, in a footnote. The full quote is: ”The world ’circus’ means to me that 
there is not one center, but that life itself is a plurality of centers. This is a Buddhist idea.” (Loc. cit.) Junkerman 
refers to Conversing with Cage, ed. R. Kostelanetz, (New York: Limelight Press, 1979), p. 232, as the source, 
but as I know the first edition is from 1987. I have not found this quote in Kostelanetz 2003, neither in the 
edition from 1987.   
172 Cage adopted term interpenetration will be discussed in chapter six.  
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Compositionally, this is expressed by a non-dualistic approach to structure and material, form 
and content.173 While Cage still in the 1940s sees the necessity of organizing material,174 in 
the 1950s it is enough to stage it. The material does not need deliberate structuring to effect 
aesthetic impact; sonic phenomena have already an agential structure with both form and 
content. What matters is to release actional potentialities within a delimited field and provide 
opportunities for creative interactions.175 The circus concept employed by Cage continues 
with this non-dualistic shift in his aesthetics, and accentuates its social bearings:  
 
The question is: Is my thought changing? It is and it isn’t. One evening after dinner I was telling friends 
that I was now concerned with improving the world. One of them said: I thought you always were. I 
then explained that I believe – and am acting upon – Marshall McLuhan’s statement that we have 
through electronic technology produced an extension of our brains to the world formerly outside of us. 
To me that means that the disciplines, gradual and sudden (principally Oriental), formerly practiced by 
individuals to pacify their minds, bringing them into accord with ultimate reality, must now be 
practiced socially.176  
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All the previews connect the upcoming Musicircus with Cage’s former experimentation with 
happenings, especially the happening at Black Mountain College which took place during the 
summer of 1952: 
 
Cage organized a show there [Black Mountain College] in which all the resident artists performed at the 
same time. He drew his inspiration for the original happening from two sources: his own work with 
chance operations in structuring musical compositions and from the idea that each thing that can be 
experienced […] is a strength in itself; each single unity does not have to lead to another thing or be an 
interconnected part of some larger composition.177  
 
This untitled event, created collaboratively, but without a unifying plot or directions for the 
contributive content provided by each of the participants other than a shared frame of real 
time and the specificity of a place, has retrospectively been called the first happening − an 
event that heralded the performative turn of the 1960s that explicitly found expression in the 
emergence of performance art. 
 
                                                 
173 The transformation is described in the lecture “Composition as process” (1958), where Cage presents his 
current stance to composition to being a non-dualistic approach to structure and material, form and content. 
Cage, Silence, pp. 18-34. 
174 See for example Cage, Silence, pp. 3-6 and 89-93. 
175 The material as having its own agential structure will be discussed later and especially brought up as an 
argument in chapter six.  
176 From Cage’s foreword to A Year from Monday, p. ix. 
177 Yahn 1967. My underlining. 
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Connected to the presentation of the event as a happening, the event is presented as an art 
event where different art forms interpenetrate each other and where the interpenetrations 
reflect an anarchistic form of organization. Michael Kirby, in an article from 1965, compares 
developments within the new theatre with the American three-ring circus:  
 
If a circus were a work of art, it would be an excellent example of a Happening. Except for the clowns 
[…], the performances are non-matrixed. The acrobats, jugglers, and animal trainers are “merely” 
carrying out their activities. The grips or stagehands become performers, too, as they dismantle and rig 
the equipment – demonstrating that non-matrixed performing exists at all levels of difficulty. The 
structure of a three-ring circus makes use of simultaneous as well as sequential compartments. There is 
no information structure: the acts do not add meaning to one another, and one can be fully “understood” 
without any of the others. At the same time the circus is a total performance and not just the sum of its 
parts. The flow of processions alternates with focused activity in the rings. Animal acts or acrobatic acts 
are presented at the same time. Sometimes all but one of the simultaneous acts end at the same moment, 
concentrating the spectators’ previously scattered attention on a single image. Perhaps tumblers and 
riders are presented early in the program, and a spatial progression is achieved by ending the program 
with the high wire and trapeze artists. And the circus, even without its traditional tent, has strong 
environmental aspects. The exhibits of the side show, the menagerie, and the uniformed vendors in the 
aisles are all part of the show. Sometimes small flashlights with cords attached are hawked to the 
children: whenever the lights are dimmed, the whole space is filled with hundreds of tiny lights being 
swung in circles.178         
 
Kirby points here to several moments that are not only relevant for the Cagean ‘circus’ but 
generally for Cage’s aesthetics and his understanding of music as theatre:179 
 
- the performances are non-matrixed; activities are “merely” carried out, 
- the grips or stagehands becomes performers too; non-matrixed performing exists at all 
levels of difficulty; everybody is a performer, 
- there is no information structure: the acts do not add meaning to one another, and any 
one can be fully “understood” without any of the others, 
- there is a strong environmental aspect. 
 
It is not the epic drama that Cage uses as model for his theatricalised music. Music as theatre 
emphasises the multi-sensory quality of musical performances. The musical experience is not 
only related to one sense – hearing – but the whole of our sensory apparatus: We see as well 
as hear somebody perform a piece of music.  
 
                                                 
178 Kirby 1965, pp. 30-31.  
179 The aspects pointed out by Kirby are also important for the German theatre scholar Erika Fischer-Lichte’s 
historical reading of the arts from the 1960s and 1970s. She argues that a performative turn appears that calls for 
other ways of thinking about art than those expressed by the dominant approach that focuses upon the artistic 
artefact – the work of art – its creator and reception, and less upon the live situation of performance.  Chapter 
four and five will draw attention to a performative shift in perspective where the aspect of doing and the how is 
highlighted together with the art event’s environmental and social belonging (embeddedness). 
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We could think that by defining music as theatre Cage has in fact stressed the fictional aspect 
of art: Art operates on a different level than the courses of actual facts. This though is not the 
case. It is not the fictional aspect that is accentuated by Cage, but theatre as an art form that 
includes all the senses, involves all types of media and emphatically displays the character of 
process: “Relevant action is theatrical (music /imaginary separation of hearing from the other 
senses/ does not exist), inclusive and intentionally purposeless. Theatre is continually 
becoming that it is becoming; each human being is at the best point of reception.”180  
 
This accentuation of the performative that Cage had already explicitly advanced in the fifties 
is from a broader historic view an indication of a performative turn that fully blossomed in the 
new art forms of performance art and in the happenings that really began to flourish in the 
1960s and 1970s.181 As Kirby emphasises, these performances transform ordinary 
conceptions of theatre by accentuating purely performative qualities independent of plot, 
fictitious characters and narrative structures. The live situation of the performance is 
highlighted; this unique quality that evades duplication and commodification. The work 
concept becomes thereby also questioned. We have now, in a sense, jumped over the next 
chapter and begun to introduce chapter four, because the elements pointed to by Kirby are 
also important for the historical reading of the German theatre scholar Erika Fischer-Lichte. 
This reading informs Fischer-Lichte’s development of the aesthetics of performativity that we 
will rely on heavily when our approach takes a performative turn. However, I am still not 
ready to leave the work concept. In the next chapter we are going to scrutinize this concept 
further and discuss its relevance/irrelevance for the Cagean circus and its connected 
aesthetics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 Cage, Silence, p. 14. 
181 Kostelanetz calls this movement “the Theatre of Mixed Means” in 1968. (Kostelanetz 1968, p. xi.)   
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3  WORK − ANTI-WORK?  
 
 
What, precisely, does this, this beautiful profound object, this masterpiece, have to do with Life?182  
>3< 
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Musicircus evades easy classification. It does not have a composer in the ordinarily 
understood sense, the status of a score is ambiguous if we can indeed say there is a score, it 
wasn’t composed in the way that activity would ordinarily be understood and when staged, 
the performance will vary every time. In other words, Musicircus completely breaks with the 
paradigmatic notion of a musical work.  
 
I have already here alluded to a knot of concepts (composer, score, composition, 
performance) making up a network of meanings attributed to the musical artwork without 
scrutinizing the conceptual bearings any further. Most often this is the case. We do not need 
to describe and define what a work is to proceed, for example, with a musicological 
argument. Its meaning is somehow taken for granted even if its ontological status has been 
found troublesome by many music philosophers.183 The status of the work has not become 
less troublesome through musical studies of ethnomusicologists and scholars of popular 
music: How adequate is it to conceptualise music according to works of art when confronted 
by types and practices where the emphasis appears to be put somewhere else, for example on 
improvisational skills?  
 
The challenge is not just brought about from outside the field of Western art music. Striking 
in this respect is the experimental music pioneered by Cage, Morton Feldman, Christian 
Wolff and Earle Brown in the early fifties, and developments within the new music of post-
war Europe. And at the other end of the historical spectrum, there has been a growing interest 
in early music and its reconstructions with a quest to reveal how it was originally presented 
                                                 
182 Cage, Silence, p.130. 
183 Treitler (“History and the Ontology of the Musical Work”, 1993) illustrates this situation by quoting several 
philosophers who have questioned the ontological status of the work (Kendall L. Walton, Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
Jerrold Levinson, Roman Ingarden) and goes on by quoting Karl Popper: “ ‘A musical composition has a very 
strange sort of existence’ […] which ‘is neither the score [Mozart] wrote … nor is it the sum total of the 
imagined acoustic experiences Mozart had while writing the symphony. Nor is it any of the performances. Nor is 
it all performances together, nor […] the class of all performances.’ ” (p. 483.) 
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and played. Implied in this pursuit of authentic rendering, established practices of presenting 
works from the early repertoire of Western music have been reconsidered.  The work as a 
legitimate pathway into the world of music has therefore come under attack from different 
sides.  
 
In view of Musicircus’ genesis and its realisation in 1967, it may in fact seem awkward to 
categorize it as a musical work at all and therefore to discuss it according to a work concept. 
Would it not be more adequate to speak about it in other terms? I have already mentioned, in 
the last chapter, reasons why the work concept is still relevant: Musicircus appears in 
compiled lists of Cage’s work, and when realised today it would seem unthinkable not to 
acknowledge Cage as a kind of originator.  
 
These reasons are connected to the prominent position the work has within Western art music. 
Cage is situated within this tradition, and is located there by his audience. He started his 
compositional career by writing music; he composed works. He did not enter the musical art 
scene as a folk or jazz musician. And, as we have seen, even though Cage categorises 
Musicircus as one of the un-notated performances he has initiated and doubts his relevance to 
it as an author (from which we could conclude it belongs to a category of non-works), the 
event traverses Cage’s compositional practice. Cage initiated the event during the time he 
spent as resident composer at UIUC. Cage, the avant-garde composer, is given a prominent 
position in the presentations of the happening, and his compositional experiments are referred 
to as a background for how the event was organised. Further, the experience seems to have 
inspired Cage to include ‘musicircus’ on a broad scale as a performative technique and way to 
create decentralized collages.184 Musicircus re-realised emphasises this location within the 
Western tradition of art music, even though this is within a strain that emphatically questions 
hegemonic features of this very same practice.  
 
It is precisely this questioning I am interested in and within which context I think the work-
concept can be appropriately discussed. However, my interest is not in simple classification, 
but in what the uneasiness of classification can tell us about a broader climate of aesthetic 
negotiations, of musical-political activity. The work-concept appears in this view not as a 
neutral concept, but a concept that has bearings on normative principles that operate within a 
                                                 
184 See former chapter, p. 43 ff. 
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practice − a social practice with a certain history and tradition that Cage is part of.  
 
The discussion I introduce here is not new. Lydia Goehr's critical analysis of the work-
concept from 1992,185 on which I will heavily rely, is well known within musicological 
circles. Further, from the beginning on, Cage have stirred audiences and critics by his 
questioning of the art of music, like the “noise” of his percussion music and the non-intention 
of his chance derived compositions. Therefore, some of the arguments appearing in this 
chapter will probably merely kick in open doors for the reader. However, through the 
discussion I am going to present, I hope to both clarify my reading of some basic positions in 
Cage’s aesthetics, such as his non-dualistic world view, and prepare a terrain for discussions 
to come. Cage, through compositional methods, mixing of media and initiation of non-notated 
performances, challenges and criticises the ordinary understanding of what a musical work is. 
This critique is followed up by a performative turn in our theoretic approach in the next 
chapter. Nevertheless, we could still ask: Do his “anti-works” really transform a practice 
focused upon creating lasting artefacts, and do they provide alternative views to an aesthetic-
epistemological field called music? Further, how are these questions dealt with when 
confronted by the task of doing a Musicircus today? Goehr, for example, argues that 
composers like Cage have not managed to transform the work-concept profoundly, an 
argument that will be presented more fully later in this chapter.   
 
A discussion of Musicircus in terms of the work-concept can therefore be clarifying in two 
ways. Firstly, it can shed light on what is attacked by the questioning activity performed by 
the Cagean circus, and secondly, it can illuminate the complex state of artistic explorations 
that in any case are bound to some form of established practice to execute their 
interrogations.186 
 
Connected aesthetic arguments expressed by Cage become thereby read as part of a discourse 
− as part of negotiations that goes on within an art practice. Later in this chapter I am going to 
present Douglas Kahn’s argument that Cage’s aesthetics represent a continuation of a 
                                                 
185 Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. 
186 I mainly discuss Musicircus according to the practice of Western art music in this chapter. We could of 
course argue that it is not only this practice with its tradition that the Cagean circus alludes to, but also several 
other art practices, as well as to popular entertainment like the circus (as mentioned in the last chapter), and in 
fact argue that it is through the displacement of norms/customs from one practice to another (e.g. the walking 
contemplator (gallery), the allusion to circus (popular entertainment)) that effectuates the questionings of norms.  
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modernistic approach that a-politicizes sounds − sounds are treated merely as aesthetic 
phenomena. The sounds’ social and political references are thereby repressed.187 Many 
examples could be given to support such a reading. I would however argue that even 
modernist pronouncements, such as Cage’s accentuation of the aesthetic qualities of sounds as 
“pure” sounds (and not signs), are best read as polemics, for instance, against a dual world-
view that the aesthetics of the masterwork is seen as representing, where the spiritual, ideal 
and abstract form the superior meaningful reference for physical manifestations. In this sense, 
his argumentation does not leave the politics of living practices and beings, but addresses 
questions that have social and political bearings.  
 
I use ‘politics’ in this respect as a general and broad term that reflects the will to influence 
and change (or conserve) the ruling structure of a social field. In this sense my use of the term 
goes beyond the ordinary definition restricted to “that part of ethics which has to do with the 
regulation and government of a nation or state”, and “the management of a political party; the 
conduct and contests of parties with reference to political measures or the administration of 
public affairs.”188 The term ‘politics’, in this chapter, therefore is characterised by an activity 
that intentionally aims to influence and shape the normative guidelines and framework of a 
social practice, the practice of Western art music. This activity is in Cage’s case not restricted 
to music alone. His aesthetic argumentation includes spheres of social life in a general way; 
the questioning are expressed as a general criticism, a form of structural criticism of 
hierarchical structures and rules that organize our daily lives and indicate mechanisms of 
exclusion, rather than as a criticism of individual issues. In speaking of his music, Cage 
compares the musical field with the organization of our existence at large, and the criticism he 
presents is grounded in reasoning concerning existence and togetherness in general. Put rather 
pompously perhaps, one can see an ambition to challenge the scopes of cognition and 
assessment themselves which structure and organize our lives existentially, culturally and 
societal in Cage’s artistic project.189  
 
                                                 
187 Kahn 1999, pp. 161-199. 
188 “Politics”, Webster’s 1913 Dictionary. My broad application of the term is not at all in line with Cage’s 
restricted use (reflecting the definition above), denoting an activity that he in fact disliked and did not find 
necessary: “I am interested in social ends, but not in political ends, because politics deals with power, and 
society deals with numbers of individuals; and I’m interested in both single individuals and large numbers or 
medium numbers or any kinds or numbers of individuals. In other words, I’m interested in society, not for 
purposes of power, but for purposes of cooperation and enjoyment.” (Cage (1969) in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 274.) 
189 Kösterke presents a similar approach to Cage’s artistic project in her study Kunst als Zeitkritik und 
Lebensmodell (1996). 
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In the context of artistic negotiations within artistic practices, Musicircus can even be seen as 
an anti-work, drawing on Cage’s criticism of a masterwork-centred practice understood as a 
practice devoted to the creation of elevated artefacts. If we see the Cagean circus as an anti-
work challenging a dominant work-concept, such a perspective would reflect a fundamentally 
non-neutral approach to the ‘work’ as a genuine musical category. Artistic strategies are thus 
seen as working actively with or against certain frames and conditions that are understood as 
governing and organizing music, what I have called a kind of musical-political work, and 
these structures are seen to be intimately connected to the work conception.  
 
To cite Musicircus in an area between ‘work’ and ‘anti-work’ is close to considering the 
normative activity surrounding the musical work and how this contributes to structuring how 
we hear, practice and talk about music. In such a context, Cage’s positions, seen as 
negotiating operating norms, can more clearly come forward as precisely coloured by being 
part of certain artistic practices, even if some of his aesthetic statements express a view that 
we can make a perspectival leap beyond the constrains of traditional thinking and doing. 
These questions become even more urgent when one decides to do a Musicircus. The ‘anti-
work’ redone stresses the impact of established norms and the difficulties involved in 
breaking off from these. The redone fashion also questions the prefix ‘anti’ in another way, 
for is it not the character of the ‘work’ that is reinforced by staging similar events?  
 
I am going to present a work-concept in this chapter through a reading of Goehr’s study 
presented in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 1992, and use this conception to 
discuss an imagined realisation of Musicircus.  As music working within the dominant 
guidelines of Western art music, how does Musicircus question these frames for doing and 
understanding music, and what does this questioning indicate?  
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Goehr’s study of the work-concept focuses on the normative activity implicit in theoretical 
dealings with the musical work-concept and implicit in the treatment of musical works within 
the practice of Western classical music. She approaches the concept from the field of 
philosophy by combining analytical and historical methods. The project has as a backdrop the 
dominant position analytical theory has had within the Anglo-American philosophy of music. 
According to Goehr, the main problem with analytical theory as it is applied here is its a-
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historical treatment of the work concept. Analytical theory has tried to trace the concept’s 
ontological status – its essential being and function – without looking at its practical and 
historical context. A chasm has formed between theory and practice, which the analytical way 
of theorising has not managed to overcome. Goehr sees this situation and the theories it 
produces as unfruitful in giving good answers to the questions: What characterizes the work-
concept, how does it function and why is it so central both in musical theory and practice? 
The concept’s history and the practices the concept operates within have to be taken into 
consideration for an appropriate exploration of these questions. 
 
Her position has not gone unnoticed. Critical musicological voices have been raised, 
especially in regard to the watershed theory she outlines, in which the work-concept in its 
contemporary form is dated from around 1800 and not the Renaissance. Reinhard Strohm, for 
example, finds the conception revealed by her analysis too narrow, too normative in its 
conceptual content and being in danger of building a reductive history of ”one-line 
developmental models and philosophical categorisations.”190 Through Goehr’s chosen 
methodology, Strohm argues, the history of classical music becomes the meta-narrative of an 
epoch before and after the concept of the musical work. Strohm criticises this and emphasises 
the importance of being aware of the complexity of historical phenomena and how 
complicated and intricate their lines of development may be. Other historians agree to a great 
extent with the conclusions Goehr arrives at, but argue about her dating. The consolidation of 
the work-concept, which Goehr refers to, appears from other historical studies to have 
occurred later, during the last half of the 19th century, when conservatoires of music were 
well established and concert halls built. Others again argue for a changed accentuation where 
it is an emerging culture of composer-centeredness that creates the way for the work’s 
prominence and not the other way round.  
 
The exact dating of a watershed is less important for my discussion than the analysis’s 
articulation of a normative work-concept, including its aesthetic and artistic bearings on a 
musical practice, which can illuminate and articulate what Cage so eagerly polemicizes 
against, and thereby, make Cage’s positions clearer as standpoints working with and within 
the constrains of an established practice. That is, the dominant work concept Goehr arrives at 
may be found too narrow according to certain historical examples and genres, or, as I am 
                                                 
190 Strohm 2000, p. 150. 
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going to sketch in the next chapter, criticised through a work conception philosophically 
differently approached. I will however argue that the dominant concept Goehr outlines, with 
its implied norms, to the greatest extent articulates what Cage targets, caricatures and at times 
shadow boxes with: Music handled as secreted and elevated objects, the prominence of the 
artist as the creator of these unique objects, a separation off of art from ordinary life practices, 
and the musical language and grammar used to accommodate these ideals. For example, 
Goehr refers to how works by Beethoven have become paradigmatic examples of what a 
musical work is. Cage attacks Beethoven’s emblematic position. An early example of this 
appears in a lecture from 1948, Defence of Satie, delivered during the Black Mountain 
College Satie Festival:  
 
In the field of structure, the field of the definition of parts and their relation to a whole, there has been 
only one new idea since Beethoven. And that new idea can be perceived in the work of Anton Webern 
and Erik Satie. With Beethoven the parts of a composition were defined by means of harmony. With 
Satie and Webern they are defined by means of time lengths. The question of structure is so basic, and 
it is so important to be in agreement about it, that one must now ask: Was Beethoven right or are 
Webern and Satie right? 
 I answer immediately and unequivocally, Beethoven was in error, and his influence, which has 
been as extensive as it is lamentable, has been deadening to the art of music.191 
 
 
The critique in this lecture is not directed to Beethoven’s music as being badly composed. It is 
what underpins the activity of composing in the model of Beethoven, its guidelines, that Cage 
criticizes. That is, he polemicizes against the position tonality and harmony have had in 
structuring the art music of the West. Beethoven represents a tradition that, Cage argues, has 
forgotten the significance of silence: 
 
If you consider that sound is characterized by its pitch, its loudness, its timbre, and its duration, and that 
silence, which is the opposite and, therefore, the necessary partner of sound, is characterized only by its 
duration, you will be drawn to the conclusion that of the four characteristics of the material of music, 
duration, that is, time length, is the most fundamental. Silence cannot be heard in terms of pitch or 
harmony: It is heard in terms of time length.192  
 
Cage speaks out against the example set by Beethoven by referring to operating principles 
that blind us to what Cage sees as basic features of our sonic reality. We could here draw a 
parallel to the organizing of a Musicircus. Cage, as we have seen, expresses the point of view 
that the organizing of such an event in aesthetic terms should be as non-exclusive as possible 
(“no aesthetic bias”).  
                                                 
191 Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage, p. 81. 
192 Ibid. p. 81. 
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The aim to develop and explore structuring principles that function as non-exclusively as 
possible appears as a characteristic argument in Cage’s aesthetic texts, though articulated and 
underpinned somewhat differently in various periods of his career.  In the lecture referred to 
above Cage still regards sound and silence as opposite characteristics and he looks at structure 
as a necessary aspect of composition. These views are transformed in the fifties to articulate a 
more non-dualistic view, where silence is not seen as the opposite of sound, but as sounds 
perceived differently, and structure not an aspect that a composer needs to add, but that would 
in any case be operating in the material, or happen as a result of the initiating of events. 
 
This quest for inclusion is founded in an understanding of the material as already having its 
own life and dynamics before being “staged” by a composition.193 To let this life have a space 
to act of itself becomes a guiding motive. In Cage’s aesthetic rhetoric this motive also 
becomes an element of his two-sided criticism of art as a practice separated from the courses 
and themes of ordinary life. On the one hand, the criticism is directed to mechanisms of 
exclusion that diminish the significance of aspects of the sonic environment we dwell in on a 
daily basis.194 On the other hand, the critique is directed, also in Cage’s rhetoric, to a kind of 
escapism where the world nearest to us is rejected in favour of glories that art can envision by 
guiding the attention elsewhere than over our “doomed” reality.195 With these comments in 
mind let me briefly present Goehr’s analysis as a preparation for further discussion.  
 
                                                 
193 Cage recurrently throughout his career referred to the filmmaker Fischinger as source for a remark, uttered 
during their collaboration in the late 1930s, that had had a great impact on him: “Fischinger told me that 
everything in the world has a spirit that can be released through its sound. I was not inclined towards 
spiritualism, but I began to tap everything I saw. I explored everything through its sound. This led to my first 
percussion orchestra.” (Cage (1976) in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 43.)  
194 “When a com-poser feels a responsibility to make, rather  
than accept, / he eliminates from the / area of possibility /all those events that do not suggest the at that point in 
time vogue of profundity.” (Cage, “Lecture on something”, Silence, p. 130.) 
195 Cage adopts in this respect the attack on the “escapism” of bourgeois art performed by the avant-garde at turn 
of 20th century: “And what, precisely, / does this, this / beautiful profound object, this masterpiece, / have to do / 
with Life? / It has this to do with Life: / that it is 
separate from it. / Now we see it / and now we don’t. When we see it / we feel better, and when we are away 
from it, we don’t feel so good. / Life seem shabby and chaotic, disordered, ugly / in contrast.” (Cage, “Lecture 
on something”, Silence, p. 130.) 
“Formerly, one was accustomed to thinking of art as something better organized than life that could be used as 
an escape from life. The changes that have taken place in this century, however, are such that art is not an escape 
from life, but rather an introduction to it.” (Cage (1966) in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 226.) 
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Goehr does not question what kind of object the musical work is. The question is directed to 
the musical work as a concept: What kind of concept is the ‘work’, and what kind of musical 
conception does it represent? The guiding understanding is that music does not need to be 
perceived as works and that the work-concept represents a limited and historically 
conditioned way of apprehending music. However, the work category has had a dominant 
position within Western music during the last centuries. Goehr points at how the world of 
classical music encircles the work, the original musical objet d’art as written down in a score. 
To compose is to construct a musical work. To perform is to interpret works and as far as 
possible deliver nothing less than the work’s inherent intentions. The audience arrive at the 
concert hall to listen to the presented compositions – “today Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is 
on the programme” – and it is a work or its interpretation on which the critics comment. 
Concert halls are built with an eye to arranging the optimal conditions for an undisturbed 
presentation of musical artefacts. Conservatoires and academies hold as their main task the 
production of students highly competent in performing canonized works as well as being 
flexible enough to appropriate new original items, and every week symphonic orchestras all 
over the world present programs of well-known as well as more obscure compositions of the 
tradition of Western art music, a treasure-house filled with unique musical objects. In Goehr’s 
opinion, the concept of a musical work controls the production, performance and experience 
of music.  
 
Pre-critically Goehr points at understandings widespread within musical practice, where the 
musical work is viewed as an original product manufactured through a particular creative 
activity by a composer; an artefact where tonal, rhythmic and instrumental properties 
constitute a structured and integrated whole that is symbolically represented in a score by 
notational signs.196  
 
From a critical standpoint, Goehr approaches the topic of the work-concept through 
combining analytical and historical methods. The background to this lies in an understanding 
of concepts influenced by Wittgenstein’s late theory of language where he abandons an 
essentialist understanding of what constitutes linguistic meaning.197 The meanings of 
                                                 
196 Goehr 1992, p. 2.  
197 Wittgenstein’s early theory (Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus, 1921) represents a form of essentialist theory 
of language. Words, expressions, concepts and sentences get their meanings by depicting essential structures of 
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linguistic utterances are generated through their part in a practice, in a language game, where 
the purposes defining this practice and thereby its language can differ from one language 
game to another.198  Goehr adopts a Wittgensteinian position where a concept cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the social practice the concept is part of. Notions 
are set, consolidated and defined through their use and function within particular contexts; 
their meaning is fundamentally based on conventions (not essences) and the way these are 
handled.  
 
Further, Goehr adopts the view that even though concepts thus can be seen as constructions 
formed within social practices, we are not talking here about volatile and elusive – now this, 
now that – constructions. The concepts are consolidated in and by such practices; they are 
interwoven into linguistic traditions that maintain over time the worked out significances and 
functions of the concepts. Thus categories by which we orientate ourselves are shaped, 
categories that join in organizing the practice they are a part of and contribute to the 
continuity and sustainability of that very same practice.  
 
Concepts are chiselled out that function within non-neutral social practices. All practices have 
rules and ordinances that indicate norms for how the practice works and how meanings are 
constructed − for example, what is acceptable or not, what is deemed as relevant, what one 
should strive for, criteria for evaluation of good and bad and so on. These rules and 
regulations are neither natural nor God-given a-historic units of measurement. They are 
historic and contingent but can function as an a-priori given framework in practice. I see here 
a parallel between Goehr’s understanding of concepts and Foucault’s emphasis on the 
ordinances of the discourse as a prerequisite for meaningful use of concepts. In Foucault’s 
view, ‘discourse’ is first and foremost a system based on forms of practices that designate the 
conditions for the possibilities for meaningful speech and action. These conditions do not 
                                                 
reality.  
198 Within one language game, for example a scientific language concerned with classifications of animals, the 
language can function, as described by Wittgenstein’s early theory of language, as a collection of proper names 
where the concepts receive their meaning and significance primarily by reference (their functions as 
signs/symbols) to an entity presupposed to have real existence, here represented by groups of animals 
demarcated by such and such characteristics. This is however not a template for all language games. Within a 
different game, for example when one is learning a musical piece by heart, if we follow Goehr’s train of thought, 
a concept receives its meaning and function by stating what is worth pursuing, it is defined according to 
teleological means: ‘I play Beethoven’s violin concerto’ means that I strive to reach the ideal materialization of 
this concerto – that is my project. Even though I miss some notes, we can judge the project successful or not. In 
fact, Goehr uses this condition to criticise N. Goodman’s nominalism and his use of compliance conditions to 
account for the shared identity between performances. (Goehr 1992, pp. 21-43.) 
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arise neutrally: “In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its 
powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality.”199 The unspoken as well as the acknowledged norms within a 
discourse provide that something can be given a hearing (that it can be heard and that it can 
be articulated), they are necessary and inevitable, but these norms also indicate mechanisms 
of exclusion and procedures for expulsion in relation to what is allowable and to be included 
according to the framework of the discourse.  
 
Goehr has a similar approach. Concepts are formed, crystallized and brought into play in 
value-loaded processes, in societal and institutionally based practices. It is a short way from 
such an understanding to an analytical method that also entails historical examination.  
 
To trace the history of the work concept − its emergence, consolidation, stabilization and 
dominance − Goehr uses serious music as an indicator, that is, she uses music which has been 
considered serious and examines the kind of reasoning that has been given for this.  This 
strategy is chosen because, she argues, from the earliest days theoreticians have distinguished 
between respectable and valuable activities, and activities deemed as entertaining and 
pleasant.200 Around 1800 serious music broke its bond to the church and the court. Instead, 
public concert halls, sites dedicated to performance art, gained prominence. Serious music 
became tied to what we today call classical music and its main embodiment became the 
musical work – organised sound made into art.201  
 
By tracing what has been considered serious, Goehr ends up identifying a paradigmatic 
change within musical practice and theory around 1800. The guidelines for how to view and 
judge music are changed and with that, the objects of the musical discourse are altered.202 
From being principally a discipline of skills and knowledge connected to the performance of 
suitable music to specific occasions and venues, music changes into a discipline of production 
                                                 
199 Foucault 1981, p. 52. 
200 Goehr 1992, p. 120. 
201 Ibid. p. 121. 
202 ‘Discourse’ in terms of Foucault’s thinking establishes and orders a domain of knowledge and creates objects 
of knowledge that belong to this domain. The rest of this chapter will use this understanding of ‘discourse’ and 
play upon its productivity of a field of objects for aesthetic experience and knowledge.  
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that creates and recreates a special type of artefact − musical works.203 Though the work 
concept is by 1800 in circulation, Goehr argues that it is not until early Romanticism that it is 
standardized into its contemporary function and meaning as a designation of a unique, created 
work of art with lasting existence beyond its own performances and copies of scores. The 
musical work appears as a category that designates a musical product with its own 
independent value, and it is handled as a musical objet d’art along the same lines as the work 
of art in painting and sculpture.  
  
I want here, firstly, to draw attention especially to two points in the paradigmatic changes 
outlined above: 
 
1) The work concept as conceptualising music as a collection of musical art objects; 
2) These objects’ lasting existence beyond their performances and copies of scores.  
 
That is, the work category signifies an objectification of music and this objectification 
requires a lasting existence. The two aspects emphasized here are eagerly attacked by Cage, 
both as part of his aesthetic rhetoric and through his compositional practice, firstly through a 
focus on processes and secondly through his criticism of a form of idealism that is associated 
with a dualistic world-view.   
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What does the objectification of music represent according to Goehr’s analysis? To get an 
idea, let us sketch Goehr’s argument for not seeing the music of the period up to 1800 as part 
of the work paradigm. 
 
The idea that a musical work existed as a completed work of art, independent of the infinite 
number of potential presentations, had no governing force within a practice that demanded 
adaptable and functional music and that allowed an unconcealed exchange of musical 
material amongst musicians. This constitutes in fact the main point in Goehr's argument for 
regarding music of the 17th and 18th centuries within a different frame of understanding than 
                                                 
203 Goehr does not cite an abrupt break with the past; the question is about consolidation and regulation – what 
are the dominant and regulative conceptions of a musical discourse, how can these be historically traced and 
what are the consequences. 
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that regulated by the musical work-concept. Musicians did not so much look at the musical 
work as at individual performances as the object of their composing. Only during early 
Romanticism did the notion of the musical work become standardized and consolidated with a 
regulating meaning within classical music. This is illustrated in the ideal of Werktreue. The 
ideal for the practice of music became to yield to the work’s prescriptions, to deliver a work 
in accordance with its intentions – the musical work functioned as an ideal to strive for. 
Musical practice circled around the work, almost as if it were a transcendental ideal.  
 
Goehr summarizes the transformation around 1800 by emphasizing how music acquired a 
need, as it developed into an autonomous art form on a level with painting and sculpture, to 
manifest itself into an object dissociated from an everyday context, and to be a part of a 
collection of objets d’art and thus contemplated in a purely aesthetic way. 
 
Through hypostatisation Romanticism found an object that it called work. Music was 
beginning to be thought of as a collection of works wherein each item materialized and 
revealed the eternal, universal and glorious. Each individual work contained something 
valuable, worth contemplating aesthetically, or in a metaphysical manner. Musical works 
began to be dealt with on a par with other art objects, and in an aesthetic sense they were seen 
as permanent. Music could not however, unlike paintings and sculpture, be placed in a 
museum. The setting became therefore a metaphorical museum – ‘an imaginary museum of 
musical works’ − where the musical work was exhibited to be contemplated purely in an 
aesthetic manner emancipated from worldly and ordinary ties.204  
 
The paradigmatic shift at around 1800 that Goehr outlines is therefore essentially linked to an 
objectification of music through the work-concept’s status; music as an art form manifests 
itself through certain kinds of objects: musical works. What does this objectification really 
imply? As indicated above, this objectification is partly founded upon certain principles of 
separation, partly upon a projective move where a correlated entity to the performed work, 
representing the composed work in its abstract and ideal form, is hypostatized. This 
hypostatization guarantees the work an ontological lasting existence beyond performances 
and score copies. We could say, that the objectification of music through the work 
conception, translates the transitory and intangible quality of music into something capable of 
                                                 
204 Goehr 1992, pp.174-175. 
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being conceptualised in lasting and repeatable terms – like being ‘seen’ again and again as a 
painting. It is not difficult to see that Cage’s aesthetics is sharpened by arguments against 
music treated as delimited and lasting objects, not least exemplified by explicitly designing 
site- and occasion-dependent realisations of compositions. Contrary to Cage’s situation-
dependent realisations, the paradigm emerging at the beginning of the 19th century 
conceptualises works' independence of a specific site and occasion for performance, a notion 
that Goehr argues hardly existed before around 1800.205 
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Contrary to a musical practice oriented around specific occasions and sites for performances, 
we can say briefly that the objectification of music into works represents the separation out of 
an independent product from the situation where it is performed. Music represented by these 
products exists and has an identity autonomous of a specific place and occasion for its 
creation and performance. Further, the notion that the work has a lasting existence beyond 
performances – that it is a distinct durable object beyond the confines of temporary 
presentations – implies certain principles of fixedness, for example the possibility of 
performing comparatively similar manifestations of a work. Relatively similar repetitions 
sustain a concept of a permanent art object as the origin for what shows itself in temporary 
garments. 
 
An axiom of Cage’s aesthetic argumentation is precisely that we do not need to envision art 
as a place undisturbed by the racket of everyday life. Instead art can open us up to this racket, 
not just as something to endure, but as an opportunity. The ruling aesthetics of the 
masterwork is attacked by Cage precisely for its maintenance of art as a separated domain 
from our ordinary activities.  
 
An adoption of the historic avant-garde’s attack on the separation of art from life plays an 
important role in Cage’s aesthetic argumentation.206 He extends it though to a general critique 
                                                 
205 The argument is based in how serious music before the end of the 18th century mainly was tied to extra-
musical functions such as the mass or some merry gathering at a court. The presentations were thus shaped 
keeping in mind the particular occasion and requirements – not to mention tastes – of the persons and institutions 
by whom the musicians and composers were hired. Listeners were not, either, so concerned about the composers 
of the music; the important thing was that the music should fit the occasion.  
206 See Kösterke 1996, pp. 25-38. 
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addressed to the hegemony of a two-world perspective where we at one side of the spectrum 
have the spiritual, ideal and exemplary, and at the other side the physical, impure and 
imperfect.  
 
Cage’s expressed positions, I will argue, form a kind of criticism of idealism, perhaps even an 
extreme form of materialism – nothing really exists beyond what you see; sounds are just 
sounds (not signs).207 By taking into account his adoption of Buddhist rhetoric, this materialist 
position, though, may be softened. We are not in any way referring here to a materialist 
position that regards all perceivable phenomena as reducible to quantitative qualities of 
underlying matter. Instead there is a focus upon the irreducible quality of perceivable 
phenomena that exceeds conceptual logic; that exceeds in variety, plurality and 
transformation any form of ideal representation.208   
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As mentioned, Goehr turns the question from what kind of object the musical work is to what 
conception of music the musical work represents. Through this Goehr both argues against a 
form of essentialism and reveals a conception that through hypostatization operates with 
workhood in practice as having an essential and real existence. That is, through a certain 
understanding of concepts, following Wittgenstein’s theory of language games, an essentialist 
understanding of what founds the ontological status of musical works is undermined. 
However, through an analysis of how the concept is mainly used, this essentialist 
understanding is regained. The work-concept’s meaning and function is linked to the 
projection of a type of object that is treated as having a real existence independent of being 
performed.209  
                                                 
207 ” I have insisted upon the physicality of sound and the activity of listening.” (Cage (1973) in Kostelanetz 
2003, p. 248.) ”It is thus possible to make a musical composition the continuity of which is free of individual 
taste and memory (psychology) and also of the literature and “traditions” of the art. The sounds enter the time-
space centered within themselves, unimpeded by service to any abstraction, their 360 degrees of circumference 
free for an infinite play of interpenetration.” (Cage, Silence, p. 59.) “I try to approach each sound as itself. Now I 
find I can do that better with sounds that aren’t music than sounds that are music; but I try to make my own 
music, and I notice that more and more people are making music that is like the environment. 
[Interviewer:]Is this a kind of ultimate abstractness? 
No, I would say rather an ultimate reality. Wouldn’t you?” (Cage, 1969, p. 16.) 
208 These questions and Cage’s positions will be discussed in length in chapter six.  
209 Goehr introductory outlines and criticises different schools of analytic thought, among them the modified 
Platonism of J. Levinson. (Goehr 1992, pp. 44-68.) However, when she turns back after her historic survey 
Levinson’s views are re-established. His definitions of the work are those closest to describe how the musical 
artefact is handled and which ontological status it has got in the discussed historic epoch.  
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Briefly then, the ontological status given to the work can be sketched as: 
 
1) Something that exists independent of performances and score copies; 
2) Having a lasting existence beyond performances and score copies; 
3) Including 1) and 2) through the projection and hypostatization of an object with an 
abstract, idealized existence; 
4) Operating as the model to be interpreted and manifested in performances (the ideal of 
Werktreue). 
 
I have already connected the work’s lasting existence to some kind of fixedness. The lecture 
Composition as process delivered in Darmstadt, 1958,210 provides an explicit example of how 
Cage emphasises the processual quality of both composition, performing and listening, a 
quality he sees as having been concealed through a kind of objectification of music, 
essentially through techniques directed towards achieving fixedness. Cage, in contrast 
employs compositional techniques that can open the notational drive to fix a result and 
instead make notational techniques open-ended, non-fixed and processual in character. Cage’s 
definition of experimental music demonstrates this emphasis on process and non-fixed 
qualities:  
 
This is a lecture on composition which is indeterminate with respect to its performance. That 
composition is necessarily experimental. An experimental action is one the outcome of which is not 
forseen. Being unforeseen, this action is not concerned with its excuse. Like the land, like the air, it 
needs none. A performance of a composition which is indeterminate of its performance is necessarily 
unique. It cannot be repeated. When performed for a second time, the outcome is other than it was. 
Nothing therefore is accomplished by such a performance, since that performance cannot be grasped as 
an object in time. A recording of such a work has no more value than a postcard; it provides a 
knowledge of something that happened, whereas the action was a non-knowledge of something that had 
not yet happened.211  
 
We could ask why Cage criticises an aim to fix and of course argue that, especially when 
considering written music, there will inevitably be many open-ended processes involved in 
transferring a piece of music from score to performance. This open-endedness is an essential 
part of what we enjoy in performances, knowing that they constitute particular 
interpretations.212 
                                                 
210 Published in Silence, pp. 18-56. 
211 Cage, Silence, p. 39. 
212 See for example Boorman 1999, Eco 1989, and Cook 2007b. 
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In fact, from one point of view, Cage argues according to these lines, though he exaggerates 
the point that because the transfer from score to performance eludes being fixed anyway, and 
this situation is extended to reality in general, efforts to fix an end result are deemed to be 
futile:  
 
When I first placed objects between piano strings, it was with the desire to possess sounds (to be able to 
repeat them). But, as the music left my home and went from piano to piano and from pianist to pianist, 
it became clear that not only are two pianist essentially different from one another, but two pianos are 
not the same either. Instead of the possibility of repetition, we are faced in life with the unique qualities 
and characteristics of each occasion.213  
 
The argument can be seen both as ontologically based − basically everything is transitory and 
changeable, nothing exists for ever − and it can be understood as existentially founded, in the 
sense that its argumentation is based upon our active relation to our own existence in the 
world: In what way can we, by the way we relate to our own existence, be happy? 
 
The kind of criticism of idealism I mentioned previously I connect to the argument above, 
both as based in an ontological understanding and not least an existential interpretation. An 
idealist position, we could argue, exemplified by the work conception I sketched above, 
would require a two-world perspective where the ideals in a spiritual and abstract form 
resided at the one side and their material implementation at the other. Even if this Platonic 
model is modified in an Aristotelian way where the significance of the material aspect can not 
be totally discarded, one could argue that still the focus would be upon the spiritual plan as 
that which would give the present materialisation its telos and meaning. The material qualities 
would so to speak be of a second rate, needing to be shaped in the image of the ideal form 
(the abstract and superior order) to appear as something − to have a purposeful presence. The 
problem would probably best be seen or felt when the material qualities, which were seen as 
trying to form an ideal, failed, and the resulting presence would be interpreted as deficient, 
leaving a feeling of incompleteness.  
 
To illuminate my Cage reading I would in fact like to introduce the function of lack (absence) 
found in Aristotle’s ontology. Lack becomes a conceptual (logical) bridge between the 
unchangeable and eternal quality of abstract concepts and the transitory quality of individual 
                                                 
213 Cage, Empty Words, p. 8 (from “How the Piano Came to be Prepared,” 1972). 
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appearances (materialisations of general forms). The individual materialises, so to speak, the 
eternal features of a general form in a sequential way. The unripe fruit has the quality of the 
ripe one as an immanent potentiality – as a lack that later will be redeemed and by that 
contribute to the accomplishment of the fruit’s ontological form.214  
 
I would therefore first remark that the Aristotelian lack does not just denote a deficiency, but 
as a condition for change and transformation that is not of a random character but 
purposefully governed, it is also connected to potentiality. It represents, so to speak, the 
potential future in the state of the present, or the past as reverberation of qualities that have 
been present but faded away. However, even if we connect lack to the dimension of 
potentiality, transformation and change, lack represents a perspective where what is present in 
its transformative quality cannot be accounted for as present in a fully ontological sense. As 
transformative it will necessarily exist in a lack-full mode.  
 
Secondly, the perspective dependant aspect of ‘lack’ means also that what is perceived has to 
be compared to an ideal, an abstract form, that gives a standard according to which what is 
perceived can be apprehended (read) as a certain (purposeful) materialisation. The third 
instance I would like to draw attention to, includes those appearances that do not fall within 
the standard, what we could call the outcast. Would we find their presence dignified with 
purpose at all, or would they appear as a kind of ontological noise that really represented the 
¨lackful” mode of existence in the highest degree? This instance embraces questions about 
plurality, otherness, and what can be seen, heard and voiced by our perspectival approaches. 
The reading of this instance can be of an ontological and epistemological character, but I will 
emphasise an existential reading that expands on Cage’s rhetoric of inclusion that I have 
mentioned previously. To sketch this in a simplistic way we could point to two instances in 
this respect. Firstly, what would be given the opportunity to be seen, heard and voiced by the 
ideals in mind - what would be evaluated “good enough”, “representative enough”, “sufficient 
enough” to be counted on – to be ontologically justified and not just seen as disturbing. 
Secondly, we could emphasise the existential pain and unhappiness associated to the feeling 
of inadequacy. Cage, so to speak, uses this unhappiness as an argument for changing the 
perspective,215 because the question remains about whether we need to approach the transient 
                                                 
214 Aristotle, Chap. 7-9, Book I, Physics. 
215 “clinging / or trying to force / life into one’s own / idea of it, of what it should be, / is only absurd. / The 
absurdity comes from the artificiality of it, of not living, / but of / having to have / first an idea about how one / 
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presence through an established associative category of lack. Do we need the ideal referent?  
 
This leads to Cage’s non-dualistic aesthetics. Cage’s adoption of Buddhist rhetoric can be 
seen in the light of this criticism of a two-world perspective; a criticism that further is used to 
formulate a different foundation for aesthetic praxis and thinking. It is tempting in this respect 
to quote a poetic text that Cage wrote for an exhibition Rauschenberg had in 1953 where 
Rauschenberg’s white paintings were shown: 
 
To whom 
 
 No subject 
 No image 
 No taste 
 No object 
 No beauty 
 No message 
 No talent 
 No technique  (no why) 
 No idea 
 No intention 
 No art 
 No feeling 
 No black 
 No white (no and) 
 
After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in these paintings that 
could not be changed, that they can be seen in any light and are not destroyed by the action of shadows. 
 
Hallelujah! The blind can see again; the water’s fine.216 
  
The questions that I have touched on here will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter six 
dedicated to Cage’s non-dualistic aesthetics. For the moment, let me again go back to Goehr’s 
analysis. Goehr, as stated earlier, does not treat the musical work concept as a static notion. 
She treats it as an open concept where meanings and functions are changeable. What has 
happened to the musical work concept during the 20th century? Is it still the Romantic 
chiselling out of the work notion that indicates its meaning and function, and does this 
chiselled out conception still have a regulating power? 
 
                                                 
should do it and then / stumblingly / trying. / Falling down on some one of the various banana peels / is what we 
have been calling tragedy. Ideas of separateness artificially elevated.” (Cage, Silence, p. 134.)  
216 Cage and Kostelanetz, John Cage, pp. 111-112. 
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Goehr argues that the avant-garde’s challenge to the work conception has neither succeeded 
in altering the work paradigm, nor neutralized the concept's normative function and Romantic 
meaning. Her argument is interesting because it points to the difficulties involved in seeking 
to change basic conditions of a musical practice from within. Composers who attack the 
notion of a work remain, in a manner, in a paradoxical situation: They criticize what upholds 
their own activity as composers. Goehr, for example, refers to Cage's project of undoing the 
composer’s significance. The “death of the composer” becomes an impossible project if Cage 
at the same time considers himself to be a composer as such.  
 
Goehr refers among other things to the use of chance and indeterminacy in composition. For 
example, Cage through his compositional methods challenges the notion of the repeatable 
worked out composition with a fixed instrumentation. Goehr however claims that these 
characteristics of randomness and unfixed quality are only applicable for performances and 
not the work as such. These methods do not rule out the ideal of Werktreue and the image of a 
consistent work (delivered from the composer’s hand) at the base of its performances.217  
 
Goehr through her argumentation accentuates the paradox many composers face when they 
seek to initiate or provoke revolutionary changes within their own institutions. Stated 
cynically, as soon as composers and musicians are accepted as participants within a specific 
practice of music, the tendency would not be to see the radicalism of the challenges presented, 
but to adjust the revolutionary content and characteristics to something known, or just 
disregard it:  “More often, the mainstream will interpret and then accommodate the music to 
suit themselves; more often, they will simply pretend that the music does not exist.”218  
 
A tremendous expansion has appeared in the 20th century in the understanding of what can be 
called music and what can be deemed as musical material. Goehr, however, questions 
whether this has indeed brought about essential changes in how music is treated and referred 
to. Has the immense increase in musical material brought along an equivalent expansion and 
implicit change on the formal level? Goehr's answer is that actually it has not. She argues that 
material changes can appear without implying formal alteration. The practice of today − 
                                                 
217 Goehr 1992, p. 263. 
218 Ibid. p. 265. 
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whirling around notation, performance, crediting, autonomy, repeatability, ingenuity, and 
product − shows how the musical work still has a regulating power, even if great changes 
have occurred at the material level. 
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Goehr cites Cage as a composer who has challenged the work-concept and the practice 
implied by it, but she also emphasises how difficult it is to transform a tradition essentially, 
especially from within the system’s established constraints. To be included at all − to be taken 
seriously − radical critique very easily is captured and modulated by the conservative 
tendencies of the practice. Goehr concludes that the work-concept still has a regulative 
function within Western art music, a conclusion she believes is valid also for the avant-garde 
of the 20th century and a composer like Cage. 
 
I want to dwell for a while on this conclusion and reflect upon Cage’s aesthetic and artistic 
negotiations within the context of the problem Goehr here outlines. There are three elements I 
especially want to emphasise:  
 
1) The musical work understood as an abstract object that exists beyond performances 
and score copies − a mode of an ideal existence that operates as the model (ideal) to 
strive for in performances.  
2) Principles of separation, especially the separation between art and ordinary life.  
3) Role division (division of labour) between composer, musician/performer, conductor, 
audience and the institutions of the musical establishment. 
 
The work-concept, through Goehr’s exploration, is revealed as connected to regulative forces 
of musical practice from about 1800. In other words:  
 
a) The work-concept becomes part of the paradigmatic criteria for aesthetic evaluation 
and justification. As a paradigmatic criterion, the work-concept has an unquestioned 
function whereby it operates as a premise and a transcendental condition (a condition 
which is taken for granted and used as criteria for further elaborations) for what can 
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constitute music. Music becomes inconceivable without the notion of works.  
b) Within the paradigm supporting concepts and criteria are developed which sustain the 
paradigm’s given concepts (transcendental conditions). The ideal of the Werktreue is 
one of these.  
c) A changed paradigm brings along an alteration of its ‘fields of objects.’219 For instance, 
if we understand Goehr’s historic argument as an argument about a shift of paradigm, 
the new paradigm that breaks through around 1800 opens up a new domain of 
knowledge (artistic practice) where music is understood as a collection of musical art 
objects (artefacts). The preceding paradigm consisted of a collection of skills, genres 
and styles bound up to site-specific and occasion-dependent performances. 
 
By drawing up this model of paradigms, it is possible to clarify a musical-political dynamic at 
play in happenings like Musicircus. By challenging the work-category with its associations 
with a delimited autonomous and abstract artefact, musical practice’s own framework and 
self-understanding are put into question together with its ‘objects of knowledge’ – what we 
count as music, how the experience of music is structured, what constitutes the formation of 
meaning within the field of music.  
 
It is now possible to imagine a Cagean circus in the light of the three aforementioned points: 
The musical work understood as an abstract object with a hypostasized existence as an ideal 
type, the work understood as something else than the unorganised sounds/noise of everyday 
life and within the context of the division of roles (labour) between composer, 
musician/performer, conductor, audience and the institutions of the musical establishment. 
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Our imagined Musicircus is a hypothetical realisation, a mode in which we anticipate its 
potential. To approach Musicircus like this is akin to treating it as a work that exists 
independently of its actual realisations. What should we rely on to actually perform this 
hypothetical realisation? Should we use the example set by former events, or rather aim for 
the genuine concept/idea, thought of as the work’s essence? From a practical point of view, 
such a mode of anticipation is often present in the preparatory state of new productions. The 
                                                 
219 ‘Object’ refers here to an ‘object of knowledge’ in the terminology of Foucault. See former footnote at p. 62. 
 74 
imagined Musicircus operates then at an intermediary position between historical realisations, 
specific and singular in their nature, and the possibility of being re-done, re-realised, and re-
initiated. Questions about Werktreue here become apparent − is it not a work in its beyond-
existence that we are directing our investigations towards, with a view to implementing our 
findings in an imagined realisation?220 
 
We could imagine that a lot of performers have been invited to participate in our envisioned 
Cagean circus. What they choose to do/perform has been left to the performers to decide, but 
the organisers have given some guidelines: The performers know that they are going to 
perform simultaneously and that the audience will be free to walk around. This is a situation 
the participants have to cope with and respect. Another condition concerns money. No money 
will change hands.221 No payment will be offered to the performers and no admission fee will 
be collected from the audience.  
 
We can now imagine that about 300 performers participate, and that the event happens at a 
venue big enough to house both performers spaciously spread about and a wandering 
audience. The performers, however, are placed close enough to provide a collage of 
audiovisual offerings. They are under the same roof, and will automatically infiltrate each 
other’s performances. We can therefore expect an abundance of perceptible impressions and a 
mix of different superimpositions.  
 
We now probably have an idea of the setting of this imagined Musicircus. But in forming 
such ideas what do we rely on? Do we have an idea about an abstract musical object, 
hypostatized, as a reference for our imagined performance? And do we in that respect perform 
a kind of silent reading of that work as indicated in a supposed “score”, such as the list 
presented in the former chapter?222 That is, would we base our thought realisation upon the 
ideal of Werktreue presented by Goehr? 
 
I have already, in the former chapter, discussed the status of a score for Musicircus, or the 
                                                 
220 The prominence of work-based discourses becomes even more striking when we progress from the 
hypothetical and become confronted the realities of organising an event like Musicircus. Then Goehr’s argument 
about the work-concept’s strong influence can be felt for example in our inevitable adoption of the most 
accepted strategies for presenting the event and so on. The last point will be discussed in chapter seven.  
221 This is not entirely correct. We can imagine that there might be food and drink for sale as at the first 
Musicircus. 
222 See list at p. 37. 
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lack of an authoritative text that can function as a tool to delimit what it is essential to try to 
maintain and what is of a more periphery character. A traditional score would of course also 
have a lot of interpretational openness, but in the Cagean circus these questions are raised in 
the extreme.223 If we for the moment think of Musicircus as a traditional work compatible 
with the dominant work-concept outlined by Goehr, we could ask: What would indicate this 
work status? A singled out text with Cage’s authorizing signature does not exist. No score has 
been published at Peters. If we were lucky, we would find the text in Scenarios, amongst a 
huge collection of contributions by a wide variety of artists, that invites a reading as a script 
(though in its character it is very ambiguous).224 Therefore, if we were to consider the idea, or 
the genuine concept, as Cage's creation, and that it is exactly this expressed idea that 
represents the musical work in this case, we would not be presented an easy task of detection. 
Where do we find the concept in its genuine and authoritative form? That is, what belongs to 
it genuinely and what is of a more peripheral character? We could use the short description 
given in the foreword of M and interpret Musicircus basically to be an invitation to perform 
simultaneously under the same roof.225 Or, we could add several other conditions as being 
essential and use, for example, my list collected from different sources to express our 
authoritative idea.226 Another possibility would be to use the text published in Scenarios 
notwithstanding all its interpretative ambiguities. One more possibility would be to settle 
upon using a kind of oral transmission − the knowledge of how such events were initiated and 
organized by Cage, for example by having first-hand knowledge by partaking in the 
realisation of such events. This orally transmitted knowledge would constitute the idea behind 
realisations and guide other performances to come.227  
 
The idea to be realised could therefore go from simply the bringing together of a lot of people 
to perform simultaneously, to a performance where besides the simultaneity of performances 
several other conditions would be considered normative, such as the idea of “no aesthetic 
bias”, the independent execution of performances, plenty of space for the audience to walk 
around, no entrance fees or fees to the performers (the event being as far as possible kept 
away from ordinary economic considerations), and lasting longer than ordinary concerts.  
                                                 
223 The problem of Urtext shows that the question of the primary authoritative text also is relevant for 
paradigmatic examples of works. See Boorman 1999.  
224 This text is discussed and commented in the former chapter at p. 31 ff.  
225 See quote at p. 25 in the former chapter. 
226 See same list as referred to above. 
227 A sense of oral transmission was in fact in operation in Trondheim, 2006. See p. 304, chapter seven.  
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Further, are we here speaking of a similar relationship between concept and realisation 
(performance) as the one presented by Goehr between the hypostatized work and its 
performance? Do we have a work that functions as the ideal model the performers strive to 
implement, or is it better to understand the relationship differently? We could understand the 
relationship between idea and performance not as one between a norm and its 
implementation, but as a relationship between an initiative − an impetus, a challenge − and 
the response that brings about new situations on which to act. In the last case, the significance 
of what happens is less dependent upon a referent − the supposed existence of an already 
worked out composition.228  
 
However, in marketing this event, I can imagine that we would emphasise Cage’s role as the 
originator of Musicircus. We would probably use established practice and present the event as 
a realisation of one of Cage’s works. His name is known, so the audience would have 
something on which to rest their expectations, for example, that they would go to an avant-
garde experimental event with a design that has become a part of music history in the 20th 
century. We probably would have chosen such a strategy, a strategy that supports Goehr’s 
emphasis on how present the work-concept, with its associated emphasis on the importance of 
the composer, still is within Western art music and its institutions. 
 
If we had chosen another strategy for marketing the event, for example colourful posters with 
the inscription Musicircus at the mall today!!! the public’s associations might quickly have 
changed from an event presenting avant-garde experimental music to a public-minded 
gathering for children and their parents. We would not have asked for a clarification of who 
came up with the original idea in the last example. The envisioned experience would be 
enough. In that case, we would have moved away from the discourse on “serious” music with 
which Cage is, in any case, associated.  
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I have pointed to the difficulties involved in delimiting a certain bulk of sources as the 
authoritative text, and questioned the perspective of a work that functions as the teleological 
                                                 
228 This approach will be discussed at length in the following chapters. 
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norm performances strive to realise. However, if, for the sake of argument, we look at the 
relationship between idea and realisation as one between a model and its actualisation, would 
the materialisation of Musicircus not exhaust the work-concept’s relevance and make a de-
coding of the event difficult according to established interpretational schema preconditioned 
by the idea of a delimited musical artefact? A composition, a specific sound structure, 
elaborated out through the creative power of a composer and fixed in a symbolic form, the 
score, does not exist here. In that respect it breaks absolutely with paradigmatic features of a 
classical work of music. Our model does not prescribe any specific sound structures.  
 
On the other hand, the strategy of simultaneous performances could be seen as its prescriptive 
content, i.e. a performative strategy where a large number of performers perform 
simultaneously “under the same roof” without being organised by unifying musical 
principles. This prescription realised, what would such a situation imply? Would we not 
likely have to deal with an event where many independent lines of causality would appear, 
mix and interweave, but where the lines themselves and their mixture would be out of the 
control of the idea? The idea, in this instance the work in its hypostatized abstract version, 
would be, as a normative model – according to which the actualisation would be judged and 
thereby made meaningful – without content. 
 
We could now place ourselves in the position of being a wandering member of the audience. 
Would we not be as though “swimming” within the art event itself? Where is the object to be 
listened to, to be contemplated? We walk in the middle of it. Do we hear the artwork? Do we 
see it? Where does it begin, where does it end? Or, is the artwork, this cherished object, 
dissolved into a processual event where the musical meaning can hardly be detected through 
the interpretative tools moulded by the handed-down work-concept?  
 
The aesthetic object to be experienced would be dependent upon the route we chose. We 
could, for example, choose to stop close by a flute player who softly intonates long sustained 
tones at pianissimo, and stay for a while. We could give these subtle variances of pitch and 
timbre a prominent position by our heightened awareness before we moved on to explore a 
noisy film projector.  
 
Therefore, the strategy of simultaneous performances could be seen as a musical-political 
means to decentralise the musical meaning production. Obviously the event cannot be pinned 
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down to one unique source, musical idea or plot (Where does the work reside?). The 
multitude of contributions is striking. The conditions imposed by idea/concept, organisers, 
performers and audience are woven into each other in fluctuating structures.  
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What about the division of roles in our imagined circus? Cage indicates in previews to the 
event in 1967 that he wants to make the audience performers and the performers audience.229 
And at the first Musicircus the performers where placed at the sides of the auditorium with 
free space for the audience in the middle.230 The performers were somehow placed off their 
pedestal, having a role more equal to the visitors. Visitors were also invited to take an active 
part as performers. Therefore, the established division between the producers of music, the 
composer and performers, and those who receive the “product”, the audience, was 
destabilized and became unclear and fluctuating.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the difference between performers and audience becomes more 
ambiguous, would not the role of those who have said yes to perform in our imagined circus, 
to a certain degree be defined by the ideal of Werktreue? The answer to this has two sides. 
The performers are on the one hand invited to choose and prepare themselves according to 
their own preferences, but on the other hand, there will be some framework given by the 
organizers and this framework will contribute to shaping the event. The performers will also 
know that they participate in an event where Cage is seen as a form of "author", both through 
his initiation of the event in 1967 and by several other realisations linked to his name. I 
imagine that most of the performers would relate their contributions, their performances, as if 
the whole was a predefined work they were realizing, especially today when Cage is 
canonized as one of the prominent composers of the 20th century. Still, even if the performers 
define their role according to the ideal of Werktreue, they have to prepare their own musical 
material; there is no written-out musical text to interpret. In that instance, they at least have to 
be willing to go beyond the musicians’ traditional interpretative role and take on the role of a 
kind of co-composer. 
  
What about the other roles associated to the work-concept’s regime − the roles of composer 
                                                 
229 See former chapter p. 43-45. 
230 See transcribed sketch at p. 184. 
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and conductor? We do not see anyone conduct the event in its entirety − we do not hear a 
musical organism carefully conducted through its epic movements. We might, though, see an 
indication of a transformed role where the conductor has become a curator, like curators of 
exhibitions within the visual arts. A degree of organizing of a Musicircus is necessary, and to 
operate with a curator, or a curator-group, would be possible in a realisation. The curator 
would prepare the happening, function as a coordinator and to a greater or lesser extent give 
guidelines for what should happen. We could ask: In which way does this role differ from the 
traditional role at the podium in front of an orchestra? Quite obviously the leading figure 
guiding an army of performers is lost, and thereby the visual image of a clearly hierarchically 
structured organisation, but the curator of our imagined event would probably share with the 
traditional conductor’s role the task of interpretation, associated to the ideal of Werktreue, and 
implement this task in the role as organiser and leader.231  
 
Nevertheless, while we might think about the conductor’s role as one that through leadership 
secures a unified interpretation of a work, our curator would not lead the materialization from 
one sonic sequence to another, but prepare an arena where sonic activity can appear and be 
mixed. This would be in line with setups of games where one realization is the result of many 
possibilities. The role of the curator would thereby be one that initiates something, makes it 
happen, but does not have the capacity to control the result in detail − like a game where the 
outcome intentionally is not fixed. The parallel could be drawn to sports events that are 
minutely planned and prepared though the thrill is connected precisely to the openness of the 
game − the unfixed result.  
 
We could question if it is meaningful to speak about a composer in relation to Musicircus and 
see this as an instance where the role of the composer has lost relevance and been erased. 
This, though, is questionable from the perspective of Cage-reception: Musicircus appears in 
compiled lists of his work, is done several times, and it is nearly unthinkable to perform such 
events without accrediting Cage a kind of authorship. Historically, Cage himself has 
questioned his role as composer of circus events and points to the performers as those who 
really should have that type of credit.232  
 
                                                 
231 The curator’s role is also discussed in chapter seven in relation to the production we did in Trondheim. 
232 See p. 38 in this thesis. 
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However, if not erased, the composer’s role resembles the aforementioned role of curator who 
initiates and organises an arena for something to happen, simply that the composer was the 
first curator. If we follow this trail of thought, it is in the continuations, the re-realizations so 
to speak, that the idea of the “composer” is born and becomes something else than a curator. 
And yet even the situation that I sketch here is too simple when taking the history of the event 
into account. It would in fact not be accurate to name Cage as the single curator of the first 
Musicircus. Cage informs us that he just came up with an idea, presented it to a creative 
community, and this community responded positively and “took up the gauntlet”.233 The 
circus event happened as the result of a common effort.  
 
We are then left with the presentation of an idea (the composer’s role?) that a community 
responds to and acts upon. We could imagine dealing with the Cagean circus, not as the 
conception of a composer, but as a new type of performative practice that emerged, à la rave 
parties. In the last case, in practice, we would not feel obliged to credit a first originator 
before organizing one ourselves. That is, we are surrounded by a multitude of social practices 
that operate without authors. Why should we feel the need to plant a composer’s stamp on our 
imagined event?  
 
Cage’s anarchic sympathies are well known, and his aesthetics and compositional activity can 
be described as eagerly questioning and attacking hierarchic relations within the practice of 
music. An important move here is to destabilize the established distribution of roles between 
composer, conductor, performer and audience. Through methods of chance and 
indeterminacy the composer is challenged to give away control, to be open for unforeseen 
eventualities and the contributions of other subjects. Likewise, the performer is challenged to 
be a kind of co-composer which often means to include the unforeseen (chance). Through the 
use of chance, indeterminacy and simultaneity as compositional and performative strategies, 
established role divisions are perforated and the hierarchic structure connected to the work 
aesthetics’ meaning production is destabilized. However, even though Musicircus is an 
example where this perforation is taken furthest, the different roles can vaguely be seen, or, 
because of our tradition and established practice, the known roles are easy to attribute. We 
could however argue that we have to transform the content of these roles within a circus 
realisation. Changed tasks and challenges appear and the different roles’ functions overlap 
                                                 
233 See former chapter p. 38. 
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and fuse: The performer is also composer, the audience are performers and also composers in 
a way (choosing their own route of exploration), the conductor is not really there, but 
somebody organises the event, perhaps as a kind of curator, and this curator would probably 
walk around amongst the audience or participate as a performer. 
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What about the event as something unique lifted high above the ordinary? Cage polemicizes 
in many of his texts against an understanding of art as something separated from ordinary life. 
We can listen as attentively to the sounds emerging in everyday life as to a performance of 
Brahms's Fourth Symphony. To bring art and life together can be seen as a cornerstone of 
Cage's musical politics. An early example of Cage’s rhetoric in this respect is found in the 
talk The Future of Music: Credo234 where Cage proclaims the inclusion of noise in the 
exclusive party of musical material:  
 
Whereas, in the past, the point of disagreement has been between dissonance and consonance, it will be, 
in the immediate future, between noise and so-called musical sounds. […] Percussion music is a 
contemporary transition from keyboard-influenced music to the all-sound music of the future. Any 
sound is acceptable to the composer of percussion music; he explores the academically forbidden “non-
musical” field of sound insofar as is manually possible.235  
  
I would like to introduce Kahn’s discussion of Cage's aesthetics here. Kahn’s argument 
appears in his book Noise Water Meat. A History of Sound in The Arts, and the discussion of 
Cage’s aesthetic position has its own chapter: “John Cage: Silence and silencing.”236 Kahn’s 
argument follows from an understanding of Cage’s position as a “battle” to extend what can 
be listened to as music, to convert all types of sounds to musical sound. Kahn argues that 
Cage’s rhetoric that all sounds are music represses the sounds’ cultural character as sounds 
(and not music). Cage’s “liberation” of sounds as significant in themselves is interpreted by 
Kahn as a project of colonization. The phenomenon of sound is colonized into a paradigm of 
late modernism where the sounds cultural codes and associations are distilled away; one 
listens to the sounds as pure aesthetic phenomena. According to Kahn’s interpretation, 
therefore, Cage’s aesthetic position does not challenge the continuation of the Romantic 
understanding of music into late modernism profoundly; Cage transfers the modernist 
                                                 
234 This text is dated to 1937 in Silence. Leta Miller shows how this cannot be true, but that the text probably is 
written later, early in 1940. (See L. Miller 2002b, pp. 54-56.) 
235 Cage, Silence, pp. 4–5. 
236 Kahn 1999, pp. 161-199. 
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understanding to all sonic phenomena. The result, Kahn argues, is that Cage's aesthetic 
becomes one of absolute music.  
 
Cage’s emphasis on the sounds’ own qualities, their intrinsic value and significance in 
themselves, can be seen as part of a musical politics which aims at renouncing the separation 
of art from life, and challenges a division between the sounds of everyday life and musical 
solemnity. In the wake of this emphasis, Cage argues for a handling of sounds as sounds and 
not as signs, or what we more moderately could say, not just as material for a musical 
arrangement. Taken to the extreme, it follows from this view that sounds are music in 
themselves; sounds are not just material, understood in terms of their potential, and which 
have to be given a specific form before becoming music.  
 
It is therefore interesting when Kahn criticizes Cage’s aesthetics from this perspective of 
sound, and finds Cage’s position as one that colonizes sounds into a musical paradigm. 
Kahn’s critique is directed to a form of aestheticizing of our sonic landscapes; a strategy 
which silences the sonic reality’s cultural and political aspects. Kahn connects this to Cage’s 
aesthetic strategies aimed at cancelling out and surpassing the sounds’ representational 
character – their symbolic character – strategies which can be connected to Cage’s project to 
erase the relevancy of the abstract work as a reference of meaning.  
 
Two elements in particular tease my curiosity in Kahn’s argument. First, the difference 
between a musical perspective and a perspective drawn from the phenomenon of sound:  
Sound dealt with artistically does not need to be equivalent with music. This division is in 
fact already established in artistic practices through a differentiation between music and 
sound art. We could ask if these different practices have developed because of dominant 
discourses and the need for alternative conceptions. Quite clearly Kahn expresses the need for 
other guidelines, other tools, than those traditional musicology has handed down to us in 
order to understand the sonic dimension of our time. In other words, the artistic exploration of 
our sonic dimension from the perspective of sound, not music, indicates another discourse 
than the musical one, and by that, other discursive possibilities – the objects of aesthetic 
experience sound different. Let us go back to our former discussion: Cage and the concept of 
a musical work. From Goehr’s perspective, a musicological one, Cage’s aesthetics and 
compositional practice challenge the work-concept. However, from being a challenge to the 
established practice, the challenge becomes, to put it bluntly, assimilated by that practice and 
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the music continues to exist as a purely aesthetic object (artefact) where the initial political 
power survives only as a teasing ornament: “Cage’s ‘real’ and ‘random’ sounds have not 
stayed real and random. The ‘real’ sounds of ‘his’ ’work’ have been made subject to all the 
traditional, temporal, presentational, organizational constraints associated with any concert 
hall performance.”237  
 
Kahn, however, from the viewpoint of the phenomenon of sound, does not find Cage’s 
aesthetic position at all challenging.238 Cage, as a musical-political activist, works on 
transferring the musical discourse to the world at large. When Cage challenges a divide 
between life and art, he does not turn art into life, but life into art wherein the unmusical sides 
of life are repressed. Thus, the second element that provokes my curiosity is Kahn’s keeping 
the banner high for the “non-musical” sound − noise; that it could be deemed to be noise (not 
a discord that necessarily must be included in the good society of music in order to gain 
significance); noise that is actually there, that you do not need to enjoy, that can even be 
unpleasant and harmful, and that you at times may even want to remove. 
 
Kahn criticizes Cage for separating the phenomenon of sound from its cultural and social 
basis. However, if we treat Cage’s statement about sound’s musical value in itself, and his 
argumentation for “naturalizing” the art situation as pointed polemic assertions,239 and in 
addition explore the musical practice involved in performing his compositions, will Cage’s 
agenda still appear as a project aimed at aesthetic segregation with solipsistic “transcendence” 
as a goal?  
 
Cage’s aesthetic project, if we follow Kahn’s train of thought, is to include all sound – almost 
to turn everything into sound − in the domain of musical entities. According to Kahn’s 
argumentation, this leads to an a-politicizing of sound; the cultural and social references of 
sounds are abstracted into pure aesthetic sound. Seen like this, Cage does not significantly 
break with the work paradigm and its association with an aesthetic wherein the work is being 
judged by purely aesthetic criteria independent of morality and truth. The disinterested yet 
                                                 
237 Goehr 1992, p. 265. 
238 The comparison between Kahn and Goehr is possibly a little contrived because they discuss Cage from two 
different standpoints: One of them with the musical work as a starting point, the other from how art forms have 
treated sound. 
239 Many of Cage's writings and comments give the impression of an aesthetic project that aims to naturalize the 
art situation and revoke its created aspect, so that the art event appears as natural and without bias. For example: 
“There are, demonstrably, sounds to be heard and forever, given ears to hear. Where these ears are in connection 
with a mind that has nothing to do, that mind is free to enter into the act of listening, hearing each sound just as it 
is, not as a phenomenon more or less approximating a preconception.” (Cage, “Composition as Process” (1958) 
in Silence, p. 23.) However, as I am going to argue later, Cage assertions can also be interpreted as accentuating 
a different voicing: the ecological situation of our lives included the activity of making art. 
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attentive listening ideal is transferred to all aspects of life, not just the concert hall. Thwork 
paradigm’s fundamental aesthetic attitude of giving approval to the independent aesthetic 
value of perceptible qualities begets a totalistic orientation – it embraces everything, includes 
everything, is everywhere. This approach, diverted from the barbarity of life, becomes 
universal. Life is made into art, and everything that exists can be heard as a work of music.  
 
Kahn does not however dwell on what one needs to do in order to realize a piece by Cage; he 
does not reflect upon the performative aspects in Cage’s project. These, I will argue, point to 
different interpretations. The performative strategies show a kind of duplicity: They call on 
discipline – to limit the boundless, anchor it through a commitment to choose and follow up 
on your choices, an attitude with an ethical aspect intertwined with the aesthetical – and 
challenge the performer, through the procedures of disciplining (which is not tied to creating 
a particular material outcome), to reach beyond his/her own standpoint, remaining receptive 
to the meeting of the different lifelines and to exist in these complex zones of interplay. 
Thereby an artistic approach is revealed, characterized by strategies that seek to thematize 
how our existence is marked by interaction between a number of independent yet co-existing 
elements. That is, from the point of view of realization, aesthetic awareness includes dealing 
with the harsh realities of life, and we could argue that Cage’s prescribed performative 
methods in fact force us to let these realities perforate and shape the aesthetic worlds that we 
aim at in our performances.  
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As we have seen, Musicircus challenges the musical work understood as a composed 
(composed before performance) musical object consisting of distinct courses of sonic events 
that are thought repeatable again and again in new performances. The work-concept’s 
ontological condition of endurance (lasting quality) beyond the moment of performance is 
thereby questioned and undermined. In this respect, Musicircus also challenges the thought of 
the work, as an ideal reference for how the concrete staging should unfold − a specific sonic 
content is not prescribed. If we imagine a composition as a uniquely created work of art 
where the dissimilar sonic material is integrated in a well balanced and restricted unity, 
Musicircus also defies this, by, amongst other things, its simultaneity of many different 
activities that do not have a common musical point of reference. Institutionally this “circus” 
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challenges the established divisions of roles between the organizers, composer, conductor, 
performers and the audience.  
 
When the musical work, as seen in Goehr’s analysis and inquiry, so evidently is connected to 
the organizing of musical practice, the denotation anti-work carries with it a musical political 
meaning giving a context to why composers such as Cage choose their strategies and why 
involvement and the concurrent temperature become raised to such heights: “Percussion 
music is revolution. Sound and rhythm have too long been submissive to the restrictions of 
nineteenth-century music. Today we are fighting for their emancipation. Tomorrow, with 
electronic music in our ears, we will hear freedom”240  
 
Nevertheless, the challenges that Cage puts forth are also based on established norms. It is in 
the play between utilizing established decrees and defying them that the musical political 
character of Cage’s circus emerges. For example, because we associate Musicircus with a 
composer and with Western art music (and not to a children’s arrangement at the mall) we 
can speak about Musicircus as an anti-work. If we follow the train of thought outlined in the 
discourse notion of Foucault, an anti-work must after all appear within an established practice 
in order to have a meaningful and comprehensive musical sting.  
 
We noticed in the passage about our imagined Cagean circus how a realisation tends to utilize 
established forms of practice, both for reaching out to the audience and to simplify for the 
performers how to relate to what is happening. This can be interpreted as the conservative 
tendency of the practice, something Goehr for instance points to, but the play between 
utilizing the established and criticizing the norms of an institutionalized discourse, indicates 
also the dynamics which lay the terms for the anti-works’ influence and aesthetic impact.  
These dynamics are also present for new realizations. How are we to stage a performance in 
the area between the well-known and unfamiliar that both can “ease” the availability and 
prepare a happening of radical potential? This question is tied to the musical-political 
character of Musicircus today. Does it still have any relevance as an anti-work and does the 
anti-work still have any musical-political sting?   From Goehr's point of view the musical 
work still has a regulating position within the art of music. Seen in this light the anti-work is 
still radical. A relevant question in connection with realisations of happenings such as 
                                                 
240 From the article “Goal: New Music, New Dance”, published in 1939. Cage, Silence, p.87. 
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Musicircus is therefore:  How can one find a balance between the disposition to follow 
established patterns of practice and at the same time, prepare for the radical aspects of the 
anti-work? 
 
If one views Cage as a musical-political composer working on the external conditions of the 
activity within which he operates, one could say that he, with his compositional strategies, 
tries to erase the abstract musical object (musical work) as a category for comprehending the 
musical events that are being put in motion. The musical events become to a certain degree 
incomprehensible as presented musical objects. To compose music by the method of chance 
operations, for example, contributes to making an abstract reference of meaning (musical 
idea, vision) absurd – the meaning reference becomes meaningless − in the sense that it 
becomes emptied of meaning − because the musical material has been put together, so to 
speak, by accident. Another challenge to the musical work, understood as a specifically 
shaped work of art that can be played again and again, is the use of indeterminacy – to leave 
choice to the performer – where the composer only sketches a framework for bringing about a 
musical event: The work has no particular course to characterize it, but the score sketches 
procedures for staging a musical situation. The score-less Musicircus adds to these work-
reference undermining techniques simply by the contribution of many participants and their 
non-coordinated simultaneous activity that exceeds demarcation lines of where the work 
starts and ends, what is included, or not, who is the originator, et cetera. The image of an 
object, distinct from us, opposite us, that we can contemplate, becomes difficult to sustain. 
We swim within the staged event. We could possibly say that the musical object as the 
subject of music is sought to be dissolved for the benefit of music understood as a happening 
constituted by the interaction between several participants, a dynamic field populated by 
processual and transitory elements where performer and audience are being challenged to 
explore situations distinguished by complex forms of being together: 
 
For this music is not concerned with harmoniousness as generally understood, where the quality of 
harmony results from a blending of several elements. Here we are concerned with the coexistence of 
dissimilars, and the central points where fusion occurs are many: the ears of the listeners wherever they 
are. This disharmony, to paraphrase Bergson’s statement about disorder, is simply a harmony to which 
many are unaccustomed.241  
 
This leads us to our next approach: Musicircus as a staged event. In this chapter we have 
                                                 
241 Cage, Silence, p. 12. 
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looked at Musicircus in terms of the work concept, and alternatively with an anti-work 
perspective that in a sense has focussed on aspects of Cage’s artistic practice and aesthetics in 
terms of negation and resistance. By changing our perspective we will try to reflect upon and 
theorize on what is exhibited − what is presented and produced − what I will call the positive 
characteristics of such events/works. Do we need to change our aesthetic vocabulary to do 
this?  
>3@ $)**)%&(%(#*,*/
The aesthetic theory of performativity, presented by Erika Fischer-Lichte, introduces 
alternative perspectives to our subject. From the point of view of theatre science and a 
striking drift to performance and performativity generally in the arts, she argues for a new 
orientation for aesthetics from the ‘work’ as the central category to the ‘event’.  
 
Though Fischer-Lichte and Goehr share a similar work concept,242 their theorizing and 
arguments are initiated by different questions and done within different contexts. Goehr 
discusses Cage according to the dominant practices of Western art music. In this context, 
Cage appears as an enfant terrible challenging important concepts but does not manage to 
change the practice itself, remarkably. He appears as a minor revolutionary, doomed to be 
swallowed by the powerful conceptualisations already established, well rooted and nurtured 
by the practice. Fischer-Lichte operates within other strains of art history – theatre and the 
development of action- and performance art – and here Cage is given a prominent place, not 
just as a revolutionary, but as one of the artists that early articulates the turn to performance 
and performativity that has had an immense impact on the art world since 1960. This turn is 
among other things characterized by blurred borders between different artistic disciplines and 
new art forms that tend towards initiating experiences instead of presenting works of art. 
Focus is directed towards the event and its quality of process and transitions. 
 
As I have argued, a discussion of Musicircus as an anti-work can shed light on important 
                                                 
242 Both Goehr and Fischer-Lichte operates with a concept that designates an objectified (produced and 
“finished”) product of artistic creativity (imagination) that in correlated work aesthetics is treated as an 
autonomous instance of aesthetic meaning beyond the confines of its enactment. This product, this object, 
becomes at the centre of artistic activity and aesthetic experience. Fischer-Lichte refers in this respect to the 
position the dramatic text has had in theatre productions and the emergence of literary theatre in the second half 
of the eighteenth century.  
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polemical aspects of Cage’s aesthetics, but such a discussion does not succeed in describing 
in positive terms the alternatives that Cage presents. The aesthetics of performativity worked 
out by Fischer-Lichte in fact aims at theorizing the alternatives demonstrated by artists since 
the 1960s, for example to discuss Cage’s ‘anti-work’, not in a climate prescribed by the prefix 
‘anti’, but by developing new concepts and theories to conceptualize its positive 
characteristics. Therefore, in the next chapter we are going to discuss this aesthetic theory 
more thoroughly and use it to approach our case of study from another angle than the one 
presented in this chapter. First though, let me present a preliminary reflection upon a shift of 
perspective from the category of an object to the concept of event. 
>3A (%#7% *8*%7,$*8
Through my reading of Goehr, a work concept has been presented that represents an 
objectification of music: The transient and intangible quality of sounds is solidified into a 
lasting and re-listenable entity. However, when we now turn the perspective from object to 
event, what does it really imply? Do we really gain access to areas that otherwise are not seen, 
or doomed to silence by the work conception?  
 
Firstly, I would simply like to reflect upon the way we use the word in colloquial speech. An 
event does not denote a lasting condition, but something that comes and goes; something that 
happens. It is intimately connected to temporary conditions, to transitory and changeable 
circumstances.  Further, we connect it to a certain outcome; an event is something that has 
become real. This reality is bound to the course of time, to chains of cause and effect, and 
happens at a certain place. To adapt Albert Einstein’s definition of event from his famous 
theory of relativity:  “the fundamental entity of observed physical reality represented by a 
point designated by three coordinates of place and one of time in the space-time continuum 
postulated by the theory of relativity.”243  
 
I have here connected the concept of event to: 
1) Process and change; 
                                                 
243 “event”, Merriam-Webster.com. ”an occurrence, phenomenon, or complex of processes occupying a 
restricted portion of four-dimensional space-time : a happening represented by a point designated by x, y, and z 
as coordinates of place and t as time in the space-time continuum, it being a fundamental assumption of the 
theory of relativity that all physical measurements reduce to observations of relations between happenings.” 
(“event”, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged.)  
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2) Reality − a certain outcome; 
3) Being bound to a given place and time. 
 
Whitehead’s concept of event found in his process philosophy illustrates these three points 
expressed in a philosophic concept and in addition stresses the aspects of experience and 
involvement associated to the concept:244 
 
The ‘constants of externality’ are those characteristics of a perpetual experience which it 
possesses…when we apprehend it. A fact which possesses these characteristics, namely these constants 
of externality, is what we call an ‘event’245 
 
Here we have an example of how the concept of event is used to alter a philosophic focus. 
Instead of stressing being, permanence, and uniformity, the emphasis is put on the elements of 
becoming, change, and novelty in experienced reality.246 
 
The concept of the event has here been connected to the character of process in a general and 
indiscriminate sense: All that exist appear and manifest themselves as events. However, we 
do not use the word only in this sense. ‘Event’ is in addition used to denote special and 
noteworthy happenings: “In modern use chiefly restricted to occurrences of some importance; 
hence colloquial uses such as quite an event. (Cf. Fr. un véritable événement.)”247 This usage 
highlights the unique, irreducible and unrepeatable quality correlated to the concept. This 
sense of the word links ‘event’ to a kind of rupture, a break with ordinary routines and state of 
things: The ‘event’ stands out and heralds the exceptional and new − a state that has not 
existed before. In this sense, ‘event’ is also in a fundamental way connected to change, the 
                                                 
244 ‘Event’ not only denotes the dynamic character of nature crystallised into single determinate occasions in a 
grid of four-dimensional space-time, but includes also the point of experience and being configured by the event: 
Events are disclosed in sense-experience and potentially acted upon. Whitehead neither adopts an idealist 
position of epistemological conditions nor a purely empiricist’s approach. Instead he develops a theory of a 
single system of multiple relations that includes both logical constructions and perceived qualities. (Bradley 
1998, Lucas 2005.)  
245 “event, n.”, Oxford English Dictionary online. This is a quote from Whitehead’s book, An enquiry concerning 
the principles of natural knowledge, from 1919. 
246 “The shift towards the term ‘occasion’ and away from ‘entity’ […] suggests that those actualities are not 
entitative, substantive, or material in the traditional sense, but are episodes or occasions of pure activity or 
‘process.’ ‘Actual occasions’ designate the fundamental quanta, units, or building blocks (‘monads’) of which, 
according to Whitehead’s Ontological Principle, all entities of whatever sort are composed. The Ontological 
Principle establishes the claim that, at the core, change and becoming are the primary characteristics of ‘true 
things,’ while being conceived as unchanging substance (Aristotle, Locke) or inert matter (Newton, Descartes) is 
either the product or the appearance of episodes or ‘occasions’ of creative, generative activity.” Lucas 2005, p. 
2576. 
247 “event, n.”, Oxford English Dictionary online.  
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emergence of totally new situations.  
 
The concept of event, therefore, is also used to denote something that stands out and breaks 
with the current flow of time; a certain incident, a certain moment, a certain span of time. 
Something is singled out when we speak about an object too, but in a different way. What 
does this difference consist of, and what can it tell us about different perspectives for thinking 
about a given phenomenon?  
 
>3A3<  *$,$*%$&*)
By chance I came over Xiang Chen’s article “Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive 
Mechanism of Incommensurability”248 when I was trying to refine and explicate the event 
concept that appears in this thesis. I found the article very interesting and elucidating in 
articulating the main differences between how we think about something seen as an object 
contrary to when we see it as an event. Based on findings within cognitive sciences, Chen 
sketches how these differences are connected to basically different ways of cognizing 
phenomena. They are not only different linguistic categories; they describe different cognitive 
mechanisms involved in approaching, tracking down and recalling phenomena. Object 
concepts represent a different way to structure sense information and experiences than event 
concepts.249  
 
The prototype used for ‘object’ is those entities that can be classified under the first definition 
of ‘object’ given in Oxford Dictionaries: “1.a material thing that can be seen and touched.”250 
These concepts, like bird, car, xylophone, et cetera, represent something that has volume and 
mass, is containable and storable − they occupy a certain space. In contrast, event concepts, 
like “doing the laundry”, denote something that have neither of these characteristics, but have 
a beginning and an end, and always vary with time.  
 
It is precisely this difference between spatial and temporal character that Chen accentuates 
when he explains how these concepts represent different processes of cognition. While the 
conceptualization of an object concept involves a process of spatialization, event concepts are 
                                                 
248 Chen 2002. 
249 Ibid. pp. 963-969. 
250 “object”, Oxford Dictionaries. 
 91 
connected to temporal sequences. Chen refers to Lakoff who suggests that “image-schema lie 
at the core of object concepts.”251 These schemas are used to “map metaphorically the spatial 
structures of physical space into a conceptual space.”252 In contrast, event concepts are built 
primarily upon a routine series of incidents, or some kind of temporal relations that are 
dimensionally organized in memory according to increasing or decreasing values on some 
dimension.253  
 
Therefore, while representing object concepts involves “a process of conceptual partitioning, 
in which the mind extends a boundary around a portion of what would otherwise be a 
continuum of space, and ascribes to the contents within the boundary the property of being a 
single-unit entity,”254 representing event concepts involves “a process of conceptual 
partitioning, in which the mind extends a boundary around a portion of what would otherwise 
be a continuum of time.”255 But while object concepts circumscribe the partitioned space by 
properties (attributes), event concepts represent the ascribed time by an event sequence 
organized by cause/effect/goal and part/whole relations.256  
 
Consequently, Chen sketches basically different ways of handling a given phenomenon 
according to whether it is considered as an object or an event. While objects are seen as 
entities identified by certain properties that they have or have not, event concepts in addition 
are identified by what is in operation, when it takes place, and the components’ (or 
participants’) mutual relationship, for example, the definition of an ‘engine’ (object concept) 
versus ‘engine cycle’ (event concept).) Therefore, returning to my own reflections, object 
concepts give way to a static perspective where something has or has not certain properties 
and exhibits a principle of “no-overlap”. For example, both swan and sparrow are birds, but a 
swan is not also a sparrow. Object concepts intra-conceptual relations make up a taxonomy 
where superordinate concepts denote a class of objects with certain attributes. The 
subordinate groups thereby embraced show essentially attributes that make them examples of 
                                                 
251 “Image-schema are schematic, spatial images that constantly recur either in our everyday bodily experience 
or in various orientations and relations. Examples of image-schema include 'container,' 'paths,' 'forces,' 'up-
down,' 'front-back,' part-whole,' and 'center-periphery,' all of which are directly derived from perceptual 
experiences of spatial structures.” (Chen 2002, p. 965 with reference to George Lakoff, 1987: Women, Fire, and 
Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind.) 
252 Chen 2002, p. 965. 
253 Ibid. pp. 966-967. 
254 Ibid. p. 965. 
255 Ibid. p. 968. 
256 Ibid. p. 968. 
 92 
their superordinate concept, but contrast according to the specific design (or value) of these 
attributes and denote thereby distinctly different entities within the domain of the 
superordinate concept. These subgroups cannot overlap; they conceptually occupy a certain 
amount of conceptual space that is not shared by the other subgroups − e.g. ‘swan’ and 
‘sparrow’ occupy different districts, but they share the conceptual country of ‘bird’. There is 
in fact no other direct relationship between these subordinate groups than their inclusion in 
the superordinate concept of which they are examples, otherwise they are defined by their 
internal differences. We thereby arrive at an intra-conceptual system built upon inclusive and 
contrasting relations that makes up a *.%$%#/7257 
 
Event concepts, bound to the temporal dimension, operate in a dynamic way: Cause and 
effect, the transfer from one state to another, either something is in operation or not. We have 
to deal with characteristics bound to movement and co-operation. The intraconceptual 
relations characteristic of the event concept do not make up a taxonomy, but a partonomy 
based on part-of relations, and they are directly related by causal links.258 I would also add 
that the perspective of ‘event’ to a greater extent arises out from a centre, or a goal/effect, 
than pronounced outer borders, like the spread of ripples in water after a stone’s encounter 
with the liquid surface.  Contrary, the ‘object’ perspective can be thought of as drawing 
boundaries in an imagined spatial landscape and defining, by this conceptual activity, what is, 
or is not within the marked out areas. 
 
Of course, according to the described division between object and event concepts, the musical 
work becomes of a complex type. Viewed as an independent object it encapsulates a 
composed event that is performed and memorized as courses of events. These sequences of 
events however are thought able to be repeated again and again. Through this capacity for 
repetition, the sequences take on the character of properties − an artwork’s properties that 
define the work’s identity and make it possible to classify a performance as a faithful 
performance of a given piece and not a different work.259  
 
We could perhaps say, with this model in mind, that according to actual performances we 
could think about the presented musical work as an event, but ontologically the work would 
                                                 
257 Chen 2002, pp. 963-965. 
258 Ibid. pp. 965-969. 
259 This reading is in fact close to N. Goodman’s nominalism that Goehr criticises. See former footnote at p. 61.  
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be seen as an object with such and such attributes that it has or has not – a static perspective 
on what defines its identity and unique character.  
 
In this sense the work, thought of as an object, becomes like a package that wraps up an 
event. But this wrapped up event is not identical with the actual world surrounding the 
performance. Like a play that stages a fictive world with fictive characters and plots, the 
wrapped up musical event creates its own musical world, characters and plots − it creates its 
own musical drama260 − that as an event follows its own logic (cause/effect/goal, part/whole 
relations) independently of what happens in the concert hall at the same time. In this way, the 
composed musical event creates its own musical space, time and agents that act autonomously 
of the specific place and time of performance.  
 
We could argue that it is exactly the notion of the possibility of revisiting this “fictive world” 
and experiencing it again and again that forms the object-ness of the musical work, and we 
could link the object package to basically three aspects: 
 
1) The creation of its own musical space and time, a “fictive world”; 
2) The notion of the opportunity to revisit this fictive world again and again; 
3) Point 1) and 2) create the foundation for a changeless perspective, even if the 
“wrapped up” music in itself is very eventful: The work has such and such properties, 
though its properties are sequences of musical incidents.  
 
Cage, though, through his methods of composition and performative techniques bursts the 
object-wrapping: There is a collapse of a musical language that upholds this separate world 
(“fictive world”) detached from what is going on in the concert hall at the same time, and this 
collapse makes the notion of the possibility for re-visitation difficult to sustain. It becomes 
difficult to identify an art object with certain properties, independently of the specific 
situation where it is performed/created. The wrapping paper of changeless identity tears; we 
are presented only with the event. 
 
                                                 
260 The work concept Goehr describes emerges at the same time as the sonata form gets a prominent posistion 
within the ”high” art of instrumental music. Though objectified into a re-listenable item, the word-less music 
adopts driving dramatic forms and means to present an evocative narrative of fateful events where characters are 
presented, plots elaborated and in the end a reconciliation of the dramatic ingredients into a recapitulatory 
section. The music is in this sense highly eventful and works through a logic of cause and effect, part and whole.  
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I have here moved in the direction of a different conclusion than that which Goehr arrives at. 
She argues that the expansion of musical material in the 20th century has not brought along a 
change on the formal level, and argues that the composer can do very little (giving the 
example of indeterminate compositions) while holding onto control over the work (whereby 
the ideal of Werktreue is still intact). The train of reflection, I have presented, nevertheless 
keeps the assumption that the musical work is associated to some kind of repeatable sonic 
structure, and if the notion about the ability to repeat is lost, then the work’s object-ness is 
undermined.261  
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If we think about ‘event’ in the ordinary sense as an extraordinary happening, then what 
happens is intimately connected to those who are involved in it and stricken by its effects. The 
view of the distinct object at a distance is difficult to translate to the dynamics of events. 
What act and what are affected are intertwined and define together the event’s character and 
outcome. In this sense, the concept of event lends itself to an inclusive view of the formation 
of music and art. 
 
Fischer-Lichte’s concept of event links up to this inclusive perspective. Her point of departure 
is the theatrical performance. The event − the performance, which is a certain constitution of 
reality, is the outcome of a particular interaction, namely the interplay between actors and 
spectators. The ‘event’ emerges in the meeting between performers and audience, by what is 
generated through their encounter. She stresses in this respect the impact of the bodily co-
existence: Actors and spectators are actually at the same place at the same time. The event 
character of performances becomes intimately connected to the live situation and the 
performance’s progress in real time. This is emphasised by her accentuation of performances’ 
character of being singular and not repeatable. The performance as event cannot in its 
aesthetic character and effect be detached from its enactment. Thereby it can neither be fixed 
                                                 
261 Maybe there is another option: To think about the work in term of conceptual art. Not the repeatable sonic 
structure would be of interest but the artistic production’s ability to create a climate for reflection. We could 
think about an intellectual idea as the assumed repeatable entity (even if such a goal seems a bit farfetched also 
in a conceptual frame). Then, however, our attention would be upon abstract pretensions and not the plethora of 
sensuous affirmations created by the artistic event. This seems at odds with Cage’s accentuation of the 
perceptible qualities of experience and his brand of idealism-critique. His aesthetics and artistic practice does not 
undermine the value of sensuous features. The physicality of artistic productions is instead accentuated. I find 
therefore not the label of conceptual art so appropriate though Cage shares the conceptualists gesture of 
questioning. It signals the precedence of the idea, the abstract pretence, and less the actuality of a performance. 
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nor passed on. It is elusive and transitory, evades re-visitation and duplication.262  
 
Inspired by the new type of theatre and performative art that appear in the 1960s and 1970s, 
this event concept becomes also linked to a focus upon the fact that something happens more 
than what happens; there is a focus upon the actual reality that is created in the theatre hall.  
 
To a certain degree, the event concept used by Fischer-Lichte denotes extraordinary 
happenings that break with the courses of everyday life, unsettle habitual points of view and 
clear the way for the appearance of new understandings and realities. For example, she 
emphasises, and uses as examples, performances that consciously stage habitual expectations 
and categories, though do not meet these standards and make them thereby ambiguous. 
Through this play with and against ordinary conceptions − making way for a state of 
unsettledness − the event character is highlighted and intensified and a liminal space is 
created that creates the opportunity for transformative knowledge and experiences to emerge. 
The ‘event’, thereby, as an aesthetic category not only denotes the character of process 
exhibited by its cases, but signifies also what stands out and is fateful. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 326. 
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4  A PERFORMATIVE TURN, theory  
 
?3< 
$*(%+*%$
Our imagined Musicircus, which figures in the last chapter, oozes so to speak beyond the 
delimitations set by a work concept into other musical spheres: Situations and happenings 
created by complex forms of co-existence and interplay. However, through the discussion of 
our envisioned realisation, we can also imagine how we would rely heavily on work-based 
discourses and practises, for example in presenting the idea to performers, marketing the 
event, preparing the contributions (individual performances) and so on. We would probably 
have dealt with the idea of a Musicircus, what we could call its concept, as a recognised work 
that we were to give a performance of, and quite likely our approach would have been 
coloured by the spirit of Werktreue. Goehr’s argument that the work concept, emerging 
around 1800, is still going strong and has a regulative position within Western art music thus 
seems convincing. John Cage and composers like him have not managed to change the 
concept profoundly, and they have not provided a changed paradigm for how music is talked 
about, produced and consumed. Pushing Goehr’s argument to extremes, the music of the 
vanguard appears, in new canons of 20th century music, to be handled almost in the same 
manner as Beethoven’s and Brahms's contributions to the “imaginary museum’s” section of 
19th century works. That which once appeared as radical and work critical, circulates securely 
within known frames.  
 
Fischer-Lichte gives Cage’s artistic challenges to the work concept quite a different historical 
prominence. In her article “Performance Art and the Ritual: Bodies in Performance”,263 the 
untitled event Cage organized at Black Mountain College in 1952 is referred to as “a 
remarkable event in the history of theatre in Western culture”,264 its historical relevance seen 
as no less than “founded on its discovery of the performative”.265  
 
We have seen in the last chapter how Cage’s artistic enterprise can be understood as opposing 
music heard as a thing, especially a given and exclusive thing. Even consideration of the 
                                                 
263 Fischer-Lichte 1997.  
264 Fischer-Lichte 1997, p. 22.   
265 Ibid. p. 23. 
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sound in itself, in its materiality, points to domains of processes and unforeseen events. The 
character of the event is accentuated amongst other things through the label “experimental 
music”, where the experiment aims not to settle matters, but to provide a situation to be 
explored and experienced (not necessarily to be understood).266 The aesthetic rhetoric of the 
‘here and now’ emphasizes this further, stressing the quality of being present and the temporal 
qualities of change and transition.267 Simplified, therefore, it is tempting to “cage” Cage’s 
aesthetics and artistic practice as accentuating music as events, as opposed to objects.  
 
However, as indicated in our former discussions, such a strict opposition may be difficult to 
maintain, both when confronted with the task of doing a work by Cage, and even as Nicholas 
Cook has argued, in a performance of a classic stalwart like Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. In 
the article “Making music together, or improvisation and its other” (2004) Cook points to the 
under-theorized dimension of performance within musicology which lies behind distinctions 
jazz scholars have draw between jazz and the music of the Western art tradition. Cook quotes 
Ingrid Monson: “meaningful theorizing about jazz improvisation at the level of the ensemble 
must take the interactive, collaborative context of musical invention as a point of departure. 
This context has no parallel in the musical practice of Western classical composers of the 
common practice period”.268 Cook argues that the lack of correspondence Monson refers to 
does not truly reflect the practice of classical music, but rather reflects the way music has 
been talked about. The performer's role, as present and embodied − prepared and alert to 
engage with other musicians − is no less important in classical music than in jazz.  
 
We could therefore argue that the character of event, as distinctive in the performance of 
music, is as crucial for 19th century classics as it is for Cage's music, and as mentioned above, 
that the concept of the self-contained work as a delimited continuous entity surviving and 
informing different performances is not at all outmoded by Cage’s enterprise. Fischer-Lichte, 
however, emphasizes a genuine change, though her expression “discovery of the 
performative” is modified in a further elaboration. Western culture, she argues, has been 
predominantly performative − for instance from the Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth 
century − but until the 1950s Western scholars understood culture mainly as “produced and 
                                                 
266 See for example quote at p. 67. 
267 For example: “It is quite / useless / in this situation / for anyone to say / Feldman’s work / is good or not 
good. / Because / we are in the direct / situation: / it is.” (Cage, “Lecture on something” in Silence, p. 133.) 
268 Cook 2007b, p. 321. 
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manifested in artefacts (texts and monuments), which accordingly have been taken as the 
proper objects of study in the humanities”.269 It is this dominance of the artefact that the 
untitled event, so to speak, undoes. The happening “dissolved the artefact into performance” 
and the “artefact became actions”. Thus, “the borders between the different arts shifted. 
Poetry, music, and the fine arts ceased to function merely as poetry, music, or fine arts – they 
were simultaneously realized as performance art.”270  
 
Fischer-Lichte sees this change of focus from the artefact to performed actions not only 
emerging in the arts. Within anthropology the American Milton Singer coined the term 
cultural performance in the 1950s to describe instances of cultural organization such as 
weddings, temple festivals, plays, dances, concerts and so on, and he understood these 
cultural performances to articulate a culture’s self-understanding and self-image.271 John L. 
Austin coined the term performative within the philosophy of ordinary language to 
distinguish utterances whose significance was linked to their being performed within social 
contexts, and not as a statement or description of something. Fischer-Lichte, therefore, places 
the Black Mountain happening historically as one of the events that heralded a performative 
turn in Western culture where performance and performative aspects have again been put on 
the agenda: 
 
The trend towards performativity which has gradually grown since the 1960s in theatre, the other arts 
and in culture in general, was unmistakably articulated and uncompromisingly realized in the ‘untitled 
event’. One could state that Cage’s ‘untitled event’ and Austin’s speech act theory heralded the era of a 
new performative culture and were its first momentous manifestations.272  
 
Following in the steps indicated above, we will make a performative turn in our study.273 We 
will twist our perspective from a delimited hypostatized object and its aesthetic 
characteristics, to the staged event as the focal point for theoretical reflection. The aim with 
this turn is firstly to employ: 
 
a) A perspective centred on process;  
                                                 
269 Fischer-Lichte 1997, p. 23. 
270 Ibid. p. 25. 
271 Carlson 2004, pp. 13-14.  
272 Fischer-Lichte 1997, p. 26. 
273 Our performative turn would mainly consist in a perspectival alteration of our theoretical and analytical 
approach regarding the topic we discuss, Cage’s circus. I leave more or less for others to judge the adequacy of 
the performative turn used as a big narrative of western culture. Such a historical scope would not be the theme 
for my discussion here. 
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b) A perspective that approaches aesthetic character as intrinsically connected to the 
specific place and time of production.  
 
Secondly, as part of this move from object to process, from universality to locality, the schism 
described in the former chapter, between an ideal referent (an ideal conception of the work − 
the work in its abstract and ideal form) and its physical appearance (the individual 
performance of the work), will be called into question and alternative understandings will be 
presented. That is, to a certain extent we will address Cage’s non-dualistic pretensions, 
though, in this chapter this will mainly be done from the perspective of an aesthetic theory of 
performativity.274  
 
The main part of this chapter is devoted to a general theoretical presentation and reflection. I 
will present the concepts of performance and performativity, bring up questions arising with 
reference to these concepts and thereby discuss their applicability to our topic of research. As 
part of this discussion a new reading of the work concept will also be presented − this time 
with the help of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of art. In this 
respect a conception will be presented that sees the work of art as an event that incorporates 
the performative gesture within its character of workhood. Through these discussions, 
concepts and analytical approaches (mainly elaborated by Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetic theory of 
performativity) will also be presented that attempt to come to grips with the analytical case as 
a conditional process − a staged event − and not as a lasting and autonomous entity.   
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I have already indicated an intimate relationship between the character of the event and the 
modality of performance. However, it will be interesting, in introducing the concept of 
performativity here, to explore this relationship a bit further. Fischer-Lichte, for example, sees 
the performative nature of the untitled event at Black Mountain College as something that 
demands other theoretical approaches than those available in the worked out 
conceptualizations handed down through dominant viewpoints of the 20th century such as 
                                                 
274 The ‘aesthetic theory of performativity’ means in this respect the theory worked out by Fischer-Lichte.  
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hermeneutics and semiotics. Basically she concludes that these perspectives approach art in 
terms of entities made up of a specific constellation of signs. The staged event at Black 
Mountain evades being handled like that.275  
 
What happened at the dining hall of the college was not only that the performative quality of 
different art forms was made central, producing performance art. Fischer-Lichte sees what 
happened as a turn to theatre, but not to the traditional theatre. Theatre, like the other involved 
arts, is redefined. The event’s sequence of non-causal, non-linear, discrete actions elevated 
the performative function by radically reducing the referential function and stressing the real 
dimension of actions. For instance, the referential function was reduced by “the unrelatedness 
of actions, which could not be connected into a story or a meaningful ‘symbolic’ 
configuration, [and] by the refusal to give the ‘untitled’ event a title.”276 The venue of the 
performance, the dining hall, was not transformed to signify another fictional (imagined) 
landscape, and real time was the performance’s time dimension: “real people performed real 
actions in a real space in a real time.”277 Fictional characters, their histories, actions, or 
psychological motivations were not at all at stake. What was emphasized “was the 
performance of actions – not the relation of actions to a fictional character in a fictional story 
in a fictional world, or to one another, so that a ‘meaningful whole’ might come into 
existence.”278  
 
The performance stressed its performative quality by making it difficult to decode the 
presented acts according to unifying and meaning-giving references − to an underlying, 
coherent work. The what of the performance, as a composition, a drama, an opera and so on, 
became somehow empty and the audience stood there with the simple acts - the how.  
 
To describe this how Fischer-Lichte presents, in Ästhetik des Performativen (2004), an 
aesthetic theory of performativity that aims to outline an alternative to aesthetics centred on 
the work − the what. Here, the character of event is highlighted. Strikingly, the art scene in the 
1960s begins to focus on the art event by heightening awareness of the non-repeated, 
processual and unforeseen qualities of artistic productions.  With a changed focus from the 
                                                 
275 The approach of handling the artefact as a sign, or a constellation of signs will be further described later in 
this chapter under the heading “Art as sign, art as event.” 
276 Fischer-Lichte 1997, p.23. 
277 Ibid. p. 25. 
278 Loc. cit. 
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work (which we could call objectified artistic expressions) to the character of event, 
something happens also with connected understandings and concepts. Fischer-Lichte 
identifies a tripod − work, production and reception − characterising aesthetic theories that 
have the work concept at the centre of their aesthetic reflection. In contrast, her aesthetic 
theory of performativity operates with event (Ereignis), staging/production (Inszenierung) 
and aesthetic experience (Erfahrung), where the aesthetic experience is as much understood 
as a threshold experience as an interpretative activity.  
 
The aesthetic theory of performativity, therefore, places the character of event at the centre of 
aesthetic reflection, and does this by building on the concept of performance and 
performativity, concepts whose rise in popularity during recent decades can be felt in a 
diverse field of disciplines from cultural studies to business, economics and technology, and 
which “reflects a major shift in many cultural fields from the what of culture to the how, from 
the accumulation of social, cultural, psychological, political or linguistic data to a 
consideration of how this material is created, valorized, and changed, to how it lives and 
operates within the culture, by its actions. Its real meaning is now sought in its praxis, its 
performance.”279 However, both the concept of performance and performativity have given 
rise to a wide range of usages, which in certain instances have pointed to quite different 
aspects, such as the significance of conventions, or the potentiality of change and creation of 
new situations.  
 
?3=3= (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When ‘performance’ is presented as a concept with the capacity to reflect a shift of attention 
from the what to the how, and also by this shift to be able to include the body as part of this 
picture, it is amongst other things because of the concept’s linkage to the character of event 
and action. Therefore we could say that ‘performance’ is used to illuminate the event 
character of phenomena intimately linked to human activity. However, as we ordinary use the 
words, we do not mean the same by ‘performance’ and ‘event’, and I think, with respect to 
Cage’s aesthetics and praxis, that it is interesting to discuss these differences, even though 
theoreticians like Fischer-Lichte seem to incorporate parts of their difference as a dynamic 
force within the concept of ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’ itself.  
                                                 
279 Carlson 2004, p. ix. 
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Ordinarily, ‘to perform’ and ‘performance’ have a wide field of uses: “In business, sports, and 
sex, ‘to perform’ is to do something up to a standard – to succeed, to excel. In the arts, ‘to 
perform’ is to put on a show, a play, a dance, a concert. In everyday life, ‘to perform’ is to 
show off, to go to extremes, to underline an action for those who are watching. In the twenty-
first century, people as never before live by means of performance.”280  
 
Briefly, Schechner, defines to perform as “showing doing”: “pointing to, underlining, and 
displaying doing.”281 This “showing” emphasizes a reflective quality characterizing 
performances. Marvin Carlson further explains this with reference to the ethnolinguist 
Richard Bauman:  
 
According to Bauman, all performance involves a consciousness of doubleness, according to which the 
actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered 
original model of that action. Normally this comparison is made by an observer of the action – the 
theatre public, the school’s teacher, the scientist – but the double consciousness, not the external 
observation, is what is most central.282  
 
Carlson emphasizes that ‘performance’ always is “performance for someone, some audience 
that recognizes and validates it as performance even when, as is occasionally the case, that 
audience is the self.”283  
 
This reflective quality of performing, its double consciousness including the doing (showing) 
for someone and incorporating some kind of standard, or model, “the elusive other that 
performance is not but which it constantly struggles in vain to embody”284 is highlighted in 
the way we speak about performances of music, dance and theatre. Performances have an 
audience (if not actual, then at least an imagined one, or oneself as the for somebody), and 
something is performed. However, this relationship to the something performed has been 
questioned by the performance art which developed from the 1950s/1960s and onwards. We 
can use traditional theatre to illustrate this. The “other”, which Carlson denotes as that which 
“performance is not but which it constantly struggles in vain to embody” is in traditional 
theatre mostly regarded as a character in a presented play which an actor aims to embody and 
make present for the audience through his or her performance. In much performance art, 
                                                 
280 Schechner 2006, p.28. 
281 Loc. cit. 
282 Carlson 2004, p. 5. 
283 Loc. cit. 
284 Loc. cit. 
 103 
though, focus is not directed there: “Its practitioners, almost by definition, do not base their 
work upon characters previously created by other artists, but upon their own bodies, their own 
autobiographies, their own specific experiences in a culture or in the world, made 
performative by their consciousness of them and the process of displaying them for 
audiences.”285 The emphasis is put on the performance itself and “how the body or self is 
articulated through performance”.286 The performer’s individual body is not here transformed 
to represent a character in a play but remains as the performer’s own body, own existence, at 
the centre of such presentations.287  
 
However, the reflexivity referred to above is no less present in performance art, Carlson 
remarks. In fact performance art has become an art form which almost emblematically 
reflects a contemporary world that is “highly self-conscious, reflexive, obsessed with 
simulations and theatricalizations in every aspect of its social awareness.”288  
 
Included in this aspect of reflexivity is the consciousness of the possible effects a 
performance can give rise to. An intentional dynamic is in operation equal to a kind of 
rhetorical gesture. We perform for somebody to achieve certain effects, for example to be 
respected, found interesting, experience a kind of community, convince somebody of a certain 
political view, and so on, though we could say that the consciousness of these potential effects 
also incorporates an awareness of vulnerability − a willingness to be exposed by these effects, 
or their failure.  
 
It could be of interest to compare these characteristics of reflexivity with the connotations the 
event has with the unforeseen, not prepared, chance-driven and abrupt. As we know, these 
qualities are explicitly played with through Cage’s methods of chance operations, 
indeterminacy and simultaneity. In this respect it might be relevant to question the 
relationship between the definition of ‘performance’ as “showing doing” (as the (self-) 
conscious carrying out of intentional actions) and the concept’s association with the character 
of the event, where the quality of chance-driven and unpredictable elements are accentuated. 
Does Cage, for example, by his methods, try to override these reflexive qualities involved in 
                                                 
285 Carlson 2004, p. 5. 
286 Ibid, p. 6. 
287 Loc. cit. 
288 Loc. cit. 
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performing and draw attention to the character of event beyond performative “rhetoric”?  
 
I especially have two questions in mind in this respect. The first one circles around the impact 
of those factors which break away from reflexive and intentional structures, bringing up 
questions about the significance of the non-conventional and unexpected in the definition of 
‘performance’. The second question concerns the schism of man versus nature and asks 
whether the use of ‘performance’ as a prism for aesthetic reflection in any case inherits an 
anthropocentric orientation that Cage’s aesthetics problematizes with its pronounced non-
dualism.  
 
I emphasised in the previous chapter that ‘event’ besides being nailed in a general and 
indiscriminate sense to the dimension of time and reality, is often used to designate special 
and noteworthy happenings.289 The concept, in this usage, is connected to change in a 
fundamental way; it is connected to the emergence of totally new situations. Considering the 
event of the happening, and specifically in the uncertainty in its state of becoming − how is 
this condition reflected in the concept of performance? Until now I have emphasised a 
reflexive structure. What about the intertwined factors beyond the control of the self-
conscious action?  
 
The concept of event covers phenomena beyond those structured by the reflexivity outlined 
above, and includes in its conception the interaction of factors far beyond the matrix of 
human agency and intentionality.  We could argue that the concept of performance readily 
restricts the view of aesthetic events as structured by human intentionality.290 Cage, however, 
draws attention to that which appears in the conjunction of many life lines, which is not 
limited to human agency alone, and he includes this broad scope of activity (organic and 
inorganic alike, intentional and non-intentional) as part of the interacting factors that create 
the event.291 In this way he draws attention to the limitations of human intentionality. We are 
brought to the messy condition of reality. 
                                                 
289 See p. 89-90. 
290 Such understood, we might risk inheriting an anthropocentric orientation that splits man from nature and use 
the categorically difference to define the mode of event that we here speak about. We could therefore ask the 
question: In which degree (to which extent) does the concept of performance still reflect an anthropocentric 
orientation that Cage’s aesthetics problematizes? This question will continue to traverse my presentations and 
readings of the concept of performance and performativity throughout the thesis.  
291 E.g., see Hayle’s article: “Chance Operations: Cagean Paradox and Contemporary Science” (1994). Hayles 
interpretation of Cage’s methodological use of chance will be further presented in chapter six. 
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Gade and Jerslev write in the introduction to Performative Realism: “Most apparent is the 
reference in both concepts [performance and performativity] to real actions taking place 
between several persons.”292 The reality of a performance – “real actions taking place” – links 
the performative to the dimension of reality in an immediate sense. The performed actions 
actually take place by physically transforming the situations of our embodied existence. But 
they do not do so alone. Gade and Jerslev point to the impact of a kind of community. Actions 
take place between people. They are in fact interactions. The actions appear in a milieu of 
many contributive factors. As actions, appearing as events, the mode of doing entails a whole 
string of encounters (from experiencing the pure qualities of physical substances to engaging 
with other peoples’ feedback and interaction) that by their concurrence brings about the event 
as it is, as it becomes. The presence of many factors, agencies and forces that we in sum could 
hardly hope to foresee opens up the performative to the unpredictable and indeterminate. 
Therefore, we can argue that a performance unavoidably operates in the gap between chance 
and known elements in its enactment. This condition is reflected in a variety of theory 
formulations that either give weight to the reflexive structure involved in performance, or the 
eventful character resulting from the interactive condition and the conglomeration of 
contributors.293  
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Performativity, linked to the philosopher Austin’s term ‘performative’ which he coined to 
elaborate his analysis of ordinary language, is a new concept.  However, it has both exhibited 
a capacity to expand beyond its original territory and to inspire new ways of theorizing and 
new contexts within which to be employed, as in for example Judith Butler’s gender theory. 
Naturally due to the connotations of the term itself, the concept of performativity has become 
a prominent feature of performance studies, a young academic discipline growing out of 
theatre studies (at New York University) and oral interpretation (at Northwestern University) 
in the 1980s. However, as Loxley remarks, its use within the theoretical vocabulary of 
performance studies is not necessarily borrowed from Austin, or the intertwined traditions 
developed in response to Austin’s work. It can simply be used as an adjective denoting the 
                                                 
292 Gade and Jerslev 2005, p. 10.  
293 Carlson, for example, shows how ‘performance’ both has been used to illuminate conservative features of a 
society and the opposite, to theorize conditions that undermine the constraints of traditional conceptions. (See 
e.g. Carlson 2004, pp. 12-18.)   
 106
aspect of performance of any object or practice under consideration.294  
 
Austin’s term ‘performative’ was baptized within the field of the philosophy of language in 
an aim to scrutinize parts of ordinary language he found were inadequately handled by the 
tradition of logical positivism and analytic philosophy. He saw what he called a “descriptive 
fallacy” dominating the scene. Language at large was handled as a system of statements, 
which could be judged true or false, or possibly meaningless. The basic function of language 
was to report facts or states of affairs, e.g. “Christopher’s car is blue”, “the sun is shining”, 
“the dog is in the kitchen”, “Mars is the fourth planet from the Sun in the Solar System”, and 
so on. Other usages (questions, orders and so on) could in principle be traced back to some 
kind of statement, or a definition whose consistency could be judged by conceptual analysis 
alone. This descriptive norm was contested by Austin in the series of lectures entitled “How 
to do things with words” given at Harvard University in 1955 and first published 
posthumously in 1962. Linguistic utterances could function as actions where their meaning 
was connected to the effect of being said and not to any correspondence to established facts or 
states of affairs. To denote this class of utterance, Austin derived the term ‘performative’ 
from the verb ‘to perform’ − to execute actions. The newly-coined term was used to 
differentiate between ‘performative’ and ‘constative’ utterances. ‘Constative’ utterances, 
which follow the structure of the statement presented above, can be judged true or false, 
whereas ‘performative’ utterances, Austin’s topic in “How to do things with words”, rather, 
do something. They function as actions within a certain social context and can be judged to 
be felicitous or not, but not true or false.295 
 
Modes of action and a shift to the actional potential of language are thereby emphasized by 
Austin’s concept of the performative. A telling example used by Austin is the act of saying “I 
do”296 during a wedding ceremony. It is meaningless to judge such an utterance as true or 
false. Within the ceremony it does not operate as a description, a report, or more specifically 
as a ‘constative’; it does not have any meaning according to such a function. Furthermore, if 
the conditions are sufficient, the uttering of “I do” takes part in actions that transform and 
                                                 
294 Loxley 2007, p. 140. My use of ‘performative’ in this thesis will reflect this varied use where it is not 
restricted to ‘performativity’ alone but is also used as an adjectival derivative of ‘performance.’  
295 Towards the end of the lecture series called “How to do things with words”. Austin moves in the direction of 
understanding all utterances as speech acts, and he abandons a clear division between the ’constative’ and the 
’performative.’ Utterances can though as speech acts succeeds or fails, be true or false. 
296 Example presented and discussed by Austin in Lecture I, p. 1-11. (Austin 1962.)  
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constitute a new reality for the bride and the bridegroom. The couple does not really know 
what the future will bring, but they constitute a new reality for that coming future by the vow 
performed in the ceremony. In contrast, a ‘constative’ utterance functions as a statement that 
can be judged true or false by comparing the utterance to the issue to which it refers.  
 
Fischer-Lichte in her reading of Austin’s concept of the ‘performative’ emphasizes these 
aspects of being self-referential and reality-constitutive. It is not through reference to 
something else – facts, states of affairs, and their like – that meaning resides, but through the 
effects of being done. These aspects are of utmost importance in the concept of performativity 
she adopts for her aesthetic theory of performativity.  
 
Austin, however, elaborates the conditions for a ‘performative’ utterance to be successful or 
not. The significance of conventions is prominent here, and this aspect of the conventional 
points beyond what can be studied by linguistic analysis alone. One has to consider the social 
situation where the utterance is made. For example, to be successful, the “I do” said in a 
wedding ceremony has to be done in a certain way and in the right setting. A couple who say 
“I do” to each other at the top of a mountain without any witnesses, priest or ceremony 
master, are not really married. To be married they have to utter their confirmation in a social 
setting which fulfils certain conditions. Only within the right context can the performative 
speech act be sanctioned as valid and binding. The existence of adequate social codes and 
conventions is therefore a premise for the ‘performative’ to function in the sense of being 
effective and felicitous.  
 
The contextual and conventional dependency revealed in ‘performative’ utterances, shows 
“conservative” traits in the concept of ‘performativity’. However, by denoting speech acts 
that actually function within social situations and are in this respect dependent upon 
conditional processes that are difficult to delimit, the linguistic analysis of performative 
utterances opens up a view of elements and dynamics that destabilize systems of meaning 
production based upon established conceptual schema of dichotomies. Fischer-Lichte finds 
here a reservoir for the concept’s usefulness in an aesthetic context that aims to answer 
challenges raised by artistic performances in the 20th century.  
 
Austin emphasizes the mode of action in his conception, and a mode that cannot escape its 
context. This is also incorporated in the concept Judith Butler uses to theorize issues of 
 108
gender and identity. However, in being used to stress the constructed nature of identity and 
gender the concept is radicalized. It becomes a theoretical tool to reflect an alternative to 
expressive models of identity formation. Butler’s aims here, and the transfer from the 
philosophy of language to cultural theory, add new connotations, especially in Butler’s 
emphasis on the body – how we are embodied beings and how we become these through 
performative acts.  
 
Briefly, Butler uses ‘performativity’ to stress the constructed character of our identity and 
gender. There is nothing really to express. No biological or ontological gender is given: 
“[G]ender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; 
rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through a stylized 
repetition of acts.”297  
 
The concept of performativity is used by Butler to turn our perspective upside down.  The 
issue is what is created through repetitive stylized acts and the repertoire we can choose from, 
not a biological or ontological given entity expressed by these actions. Superficially, this shift 
of perspective from expressions to performance has parallels in Cage’s aesthetic rhetoric, in 
statements such as: “We are not, in these dances and music, saying something. […] We are 
rather doing something.”298 But as we are going to see later, such a comparison can also be 
problematic. 
 
Butler calls the stylized repeated acts referred to above ‘performative’, “where ‘performative’ 
itself carries the double-meaning of ‘dramatic’ and ‘non-referential’.”299 The concept is used 
to describe bodily acts and is not limited to acts of speech. Performative acts as bodily actions 
are understood as non-referential insofar as they do not refer to anything predetermined, an 
inner core, a substance, or just an essence of some sort, of which the actions are expressions. 
There is no stable identity to express. The bodily actions, which are described as 
performative, do not bring any antecedent given identity to its manifestation. Identity, as the 
meaning of these actions, is for the first time brought forth through these same actions. 
Further, Butler says: “By dramatic I mean only that the body is not merely matter but a 
continual and incessant materializing of possibilities. One is not simply a body, but, in some 
                                                 
297 Butler 1988, p. 519. 
298 Cage, Silence, p. 94. 
299 Butler 1988, p.522. 
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very key sense, one does one’s body.”300 This also means that the body in its special 
materiality has been what it is, and is what it is through the repetition of definite gestures and 
movements. It is through these actions that the body appears as a discrete, sexual, ethnically 
and culturally marked individual. Identity, as bodily and social reality, is therefore constituted 
through performative acts.  
 
The performative generation of identity is understood as a process of embodiment. This 
process of embodiment is understood as “a manner of doing, dramatizing and reproducing a 
historical situation”.301 Through the styled re-enactment of performative actions, certain 
historical and cultural possibilities become embodied, and the body becomes historically and 
culturally marked as identity is expressed. Butler aligns the conditions for embodiment to 
those of a theatre performance. Within a theatre performance, actions are performed which 
clearly are not just the act of a lone individual. Such a performance is identified by shared 
experience and collective actions. The performative action of the individual is an action that 
in a certain sense has already begun before that individual agent appears on the scene. The 
individual re-enacts and re-experiences from a repertoire of meanings that already have been 
established socially.  
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Butler compares the constitution of identity through embodiment to the process of staging a 
written play. In a dramatic performance the given text can be staged in different ways. An 
actor has a certain freedom within the frames given by the textual specifications. Thus, a 
character in a play, for example the well-known figure of Hamlet, can be realized in new and 
unexpected ways. But there are guidelines to be observed.  Likewise, a person acts in a 
specific bodily space that appears possible and realizable through directions which in some 
way or other are drawn up by society.    
 
The importance of conventions and possible repertoires is therefore an essential part of the 
concept of performativity both for Austin and Butler. We could ask if this weighting hinders 
consideration of the character of chance and new formations (as was brought up in connection 
with the event concept). Fischer-Lichte finds Austin and Butler’s conception of performance too 
                                                 
300 Butler 1988, p. 521. 
301 Ibid. p. 521. 
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limited and not properly scrutinized. She refers to the German concept Aufführung (performance) 
outlined by Max Herrmann early in the 20th century in refining a definition. Herrmann, a 
Germanist, used this concept to argue for the establishment of theatre studies as a discrete 
discipline at university: The theatre had to be understood in terms of staging and performance. 
Fischer-Lichte reconstructs Herrmann’s concept to clear the ground for her own concept of 
performativity. The notion she constructs is grounded in an understanding of the theatre as social 
play – “ein Spiel Aller für Alle”.302 Like play, the theatre also has rules − like the rules of a game. 
The social play which takes place in the theatre is made possible by the co-presence of actors and 
viewers − by their corporal co-presence.303 Hermann redefines the relationship between actors 
and audience.  Spectators are to be understood as active partakers, not just “passive” receivers 
who only take part in the unfolding of a dramatic production through empathy and interpretation. 
The relationship between actors and viewers is a relationship between co-subjects. The viewer is 
a participant, a co-player, and a performance unfolds (happens) through the participation of both 
actors and viewers – through their presence, their awareness, actions and reactions. The 
performance emerges between the actors and spectators. Together these two groups contribute to 
what happens.304  
 
Fischer-Lichte by building her concept of performativity upon the conception of performance 
outlined by Herrmann, accentuates the dynamics that appear through co-presence and interplay. 
The “for somebody” − the recipients − become co-players and the performance emerges in an 
interplay, and thus cannot be fixed specifically as one or another thing. It is ephemeral and 
changeable; it is an aesthetic event.305 
 
Both Austin’s and Butler’s concepts of performativity have the capacity to elucidate the 
aspect of action and thereby the interlinked character of event. Nevertheless, the aspect of 
action that is illuminated incorporates a reflexive structure which is directed both backwards 
and forwards − towards the aspect of standards, or norms (certain social conventions, or a 
behavioural repertoire), and the potential effects of the acts. We associate some kind of 
                                                 
302 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 47. F.-L. quotes Herrmann. 
303 “Es ist die leibliche Ko-Präsenz von Akteuren und Zuschauern, welche die Aufführung allererst ermöglicht, 
welche die Aufführung konstituiert.” (Loc. cit.) 
304 Loc. cit. 
305 Fischer-Lichte, therefore, emphasizes how Herrmann’s concept of performance implicates a move from the 
‘work’ to an aesthetic concept of event as the central aesthetic category for performances: “Der Aufführung 
kommt ihr Kunstcharakter - ihre Ästhetizität - nicht aufgrund eines Werkes zu, das sie schaffen würde, sondern 
aufgrund des Ereignisses, als das sie sich vollzieht.” (Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 53.)   
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intentionality with performed actions. 
 
In contrast, I mentioned how ‘event’ conceptualizes aspects that go beyond the reflexive 
structure of performance, beyond the dynamics of intentionality, in for example the 
significance of coincidences, the unplanned and indeterminate. Things and events happen. We 
can deduce plausible reasons why they occurred as they did afterwards, or with the 
knowledge we have about regularities and how different factors operate, we make our 
predictions, but the exact concurrence of factors from an immense amount of possible routes 
and coincidences can not be fully forecasted and planned. We as human beings must 
nonetheless deal with such unplanned coincidences, fortunately or not.  
 
We could say that what we here are pointing to are dynamics operating in the field between 
reflexive and non-reflexive processes where the event is seen as something emerging from 
this middle position. We are perhaps closer here to Fischer-Lichte’s position than was at first 
apparent. By accentuating Herrman’s conception of performance (Aufführung) she modifies 
the concepts of performativity derived from Austin and Butler. Contrary to the emphasis on 
conventions and segmented repertoire as conditions to empower a performance, Fischer-
Lichte accentuates the actual meeting between people; how a performance is a social occasion 
dependant on the co-presence – real, alive and physical – of the participants. There is an 
emphasis on the for, as in for somebody, but this for becomes not a unidirectional for. The for 
incorporates already in its directionality a structural turn, a response, and by that it includes in 
its structure a handing over of intentionality, leaving its direction open, to be conditioned by 
other agents and factors. We have to do with an interplay − a for that is multidirectional and 
coil-like in its structure. Fischer-Lichte in this respect refers to die autopoietische feedback-
Schleife (the auto-poietic feedback coil)306 that emerges in such situations.  
 
Not only is Austin and Butler’s concept of performance reworked through the notion of an 
auto-poietic feedback system, by working out this coil-like model of inter-affection Fischer-
Lichte draws up an alternative understanding of what is going on during a performance to that 
outlined by the linear communication model of producer/sender (artist), work/message and 
recipient (audience). The accentuated interplay alters the roles of sender (creator) and 
                                                 
306 The English translation of Ästhetik des Performativen from 2008 has translated Schleife to ‘loop.’ I have 
though kept my own translation to ‘coil’ to emphasise the changes the alternations bring along.  
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recipient, not leaving the element of “message” (the work) untouched either.  
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Put briefly, the auto-poietic feedback coil (die autopoietische feedback-Schleife) describes the 
character of the relational dynamic that arises between actors and their audience. The audience 
reacts to what the actors do, who again react on the spectators’ behaviour and vice versa over and 
over again in coils of feedback. The performance emerges in this environment of alternating 
acting-reacting, and a performance’s medial character cannot be thought of as existing apart from 
this conditional dynamic created by the interplay between actors and spectators.  
 
This coil-like model of initiation and effect in ever-changing loops of actualizations appears again 
and again in Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetic theory of performativity and runs like a thread through her 
theorizing.  We can see it as a theorization of the internal processes involved in the turn of the for, 
presented under the last heading. The feedback coil is essentially used to think the medial 
situation of a performance, but not only that. All the aesthetic aspects are in fact affected by this 
condition of feedback, both the meaning production and the aspect of materiality, showing how 
this perspective makes it difficult to uphold clear distinctions between producers and receivers, 
originators and interpreters, handing us a conception of the product (the event) as fundamentally 
inseparable from its medium which implies its dependence on the interplay between actors and 
spectators and thereby the emergence of processes that take on an auto-poietic character.307   
 
In pointing out these processes − the coils of feedback − we are guided to a reflective model that 
thinks the aesthetic cases from the point of view of involvement and conditional processes, 
questioning the principles of separation informing the work concept.308 The view of a distinct and 
accomplished work positioned opposite our aesthetic capacities for contemplation is somehow 
lost. This “separated work” would in a performance become conditioned by the co-presence (live 
and embodied) of performers and audience, and intertwined with their common contributions. We 
                                                 
307 The role divisions associated with the work concept (presented in the former chapter) become in this 
conception fluctuating and alternating where one unique source is untraceable.  
308 For these principles of separation, see former chapter. The implied theoretical shift even questions Fischer-
Lichte’s own presentation, which is well-structured and pedagogical in its systematized divisions (medial nature, 
materiality, semiotic and aesthetic character) with worked out categories placed within and under these headings, 
and makes this well-structured system for holding apart different phenomena constituting the issue under 
discussion ambiguous and at times on the edge of collapse, because the question of how we can actually operate 
with a division between medial character and materiality and even meaning arises. 
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are also moved from a primarily one-directional model − originator (source), product (work), and 
interpretation (reception) − to a situation of all at once. That is, the implementation of a source 
(the outcome or product of an idea, the intention, the element of a work) through specific action309 
is responded to (the moment of interpretation/reception in the one-directional model), and this 
response, which does not only purely represent interpretation but genuine and individual reaction 
(action), is in its implementation mixed with sources (one's own experiences, perceptions and so 
on) beyond the control of the performers. This response, in any case, contributes to what happens 
at the site of the performance, which the performers again respond to, and so on. The response 
does in this sense contribute directly to the “product aspect” (of the linear model) in a form of co-
creation of the performance-event.310 Fischer-Lichte refers to performances where this dynamic is 
explicitly magnified through different techniques of role alternation. For example, members of the 
audience can explicitly be invited to take over the actors’ role and decide (act out) what is going 
to happen next. Barney Childs’ percussion sculpture at the first Musicircus can be seen as an 
example of such an explicit invitation for role alternation.311 The performance evolves thereby 
clearly through the shifting of roles.  
 
Fischer-Lichte uses the prefix auto in combination with poietische (poietic) to describe the 
character that this relational dynamic acquires. The adjective poietic is an inflected form of 
poiesis − the Greek word meaning creation.312 Combined with auto313 we get an adjective that 
signals that the feedback to which we are referring is characterized by self-generation 
(Selbsterzeugung); when first initiated, it takes on auto-creative and auto-formative power.  
 
A performance is dependent upon a form of response structure, and the auto-poietic potential 
resides precisely in this medial condition. The participants, actors and audience alike, take active 
part in bringing the performance forth without any of them having complete control over how the 
other participants and factors will react. By that, no one − no distinct author/artist, source or idea 
                                                 
309 By ‘action’ I also includes those actions that are characterised of conscious standstill and “doing nothing” − 
what we otherwise maybe would call conscious non-action. 
310 The course of the action-reaction is not as simplistically linear as it may seem by my sketch here. Reactions 
and new actions can emerge at the same time, or a reaction appears as a new action to react on, and the different 
participants, actors and members of the audience, contribute through different actions and reactions. The 
situation is characterised of a conglomeration of contributions − intertwined chains of causes and effects, 
initiations and responses. 
311 See p. 23 in this thesis. 
312 “poiesis.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged.  
313 “2 : automatic : self-acting : self-regulating.” (“aut-.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged.)  
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− can fully predict how the performance will proceed (unfold). We are presented with a situation 
where this co-presence initiates processes that go beyond the control of each participant 
individually, but includes him or her, anyway, as responsible for his/her contributions. We are 
confronted with a situation of overflow, of auto-poiesis, and constant transformation − not a 
circular structure that loops exactly in the same way over and over again, but coils of feedback 
that at each turn bring about something new. We never return to the exact same place. The 
reactions add something new to the situation that inspire and influence a new situation to appear 
and new action/reactions to emerge.  
 
The coils of feedback do not only secure a situation in constant transformation. They also have 
the character of being self-referential. Like Austin’s example of the “I do” uttered in a wedding 
ceremony, the coil of feedback acquires its operative meaning and power by creating and 
transforming the performance’s (and the participants’) reality of its own volition – by what 
happens through the responding and “feeding” dynamic at a specific performance. It is through 
reference to its own dynamic and what happens through the working of this process that the 
performance’s reality and the possibility for transformation are created.  
 
It is not difficult to see that the sketched mutual dependency and the overflow in the feedback 
system secure important aspects of openness and chance. Therefore, by theorizing the auto-poietic 
feedback coil, a conception is outlined that includes and stresses an inherent indeterminacy at 
play in performances. This is also stressed by the factor of liveness.314  
 
Fischer-Lichte designates a performance, by definition, to be an event that happens in real time. 
This factor of liveness is a condition for performance as a medium, and consequently as a 
medium, a performance inherently involves the live situation’s unpredictability in its character of 
heading into an unknown future.  
 
Because a performance happens in real time, is situated at a certain place and is conditioned by 
the presence of those involved (actors and spectators/listeners), in other words, because a 
performance after all, even though it may be planned and rehearsed, happens live, the 
unpredictable is always present. Liveness, therefore, as a medial factor of a performance, 
incorporates both indeterminate and unforeseen (unpredictable) possibilities. This is not least 
                                                 
314 Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 114-129. 
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connected to the open situation of a conglomeration of factors and actors that interact and by that 
consecutively shape the live situation. The auto-poietic feedback coil is, in this sense, intimately 
connected to a temporary mode of presence in a materialised form (bringing about concrete 
situations) that continuously head into new states.  
 
The auto-poietic feedback coil (autopoietishe feedback-Schleife) is present at any performance, 
even if this presence actualizes itself in barely noticeable processes. It is the embodied presence 
of actors and spectators that irrevocably starts this process. Whenever people meet they react with 
each other. We cannot restrain ourselves from this, even if our reactions cannot so obviously be 
seen or heard. There will in any case be some form of energy that arises and affects the 
situation.315 However, through different strategies this dynamic can be magnified, explored in 
different ways, or its impact on for example the performed play, minimised − “silencing” the 
audience and putting them in the dark.  
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The corporal co-presence of actors and spectators (audience) inevitably implies the presence 
of auto-poietic feedback coils. These coils of feedback represent a mutual dependency that 
cannot be fully determined. The turn of the for implies a situation of overflow and a reservoir 
from which the event may take new directions. The handing over of directionality entails a 
structural openness in performative intentionality that we can regard as identifying a 
destabilizing potential within the intentional act itself.   
 
Through the presentation of Austin and Butler’s concept of performativity, we were 
introduced to the question of the relationship between certain conventions and the individual 
performative act/utterance. These conventions represent a measure − a unifying aspect − 
according to which the individual act/utterance in its interplay with such norms acquires its 
performative definition. The relationship is not unproblematic however, as Fischer-Lichte 
shows in her adoption of the concept of performativity for aesthetic purposes. With respect to 
the conventional aspect, she stresses how performances since the 1960s do not follow the 
reciprocal logic that Austin and Butler draw up between performative acts and social 
directives. She emphasises the ambiguous quality of these performances, questioning, more 
                                                 
315 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 67. 
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than settling matters. Her emphasis on destabilization, liminality and transformation 
represents an alternative weighting. By making it difficult to pin down the presented material 
according to established conventions, or in making these norms ambiguous, a performance 
can destabilize such conventions and introduce a liminal state. She refers here to ritual 
theories that operate with the concept liminal, derived from Latin limen, meaning threshold 
(Schwelle).316 This concept is used to describe an unstable state introduced in many rituals 
where the participants experience being in a state of “betwixt and between the positions 
assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremonial”.317  
 
The aesthetic experience, emphasised by the aesthetics of performativity, is based precisely in the 
aspect of destabilization that makes a liminal situation possible and thereby initiates an occasion 
where other kinds of experiences emerge than those upheld by a non-questioning application of 
agreed upon standards. Fischer-Lichte, therefore, emphasises the destabilizing potential of 
performative intentionality and uses this potential to define her concept of performativity. The 
fact that we are embodied beings must not be underplayed in this respect. We have to include the 
significance of our bodily presence in the aesthetic picture, not only our mental capacity. This 
implies sensitivity to physiological, energetic, affective and motor conditions as part of the 
aesthetic experience.318  
 
By accentuating the aspects of destabilization and liminality, Fischer-Lichte connects the concept 
of performativity in its directionality and efficacy not to the enactments of established standards 
but to the initiation of possible transformative experiences that in their character and outcome are 
not fixed. The effect, we could say, that marks the significance of the performative, is in this case 
by definition not defined, but linked to the introduction of conditions that make change and 
alteration possible.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that the work could represent a conception of 
continuity between different performances. The work represents then an overarching perspective 
through which different elements (performances) can be gathered together. The same could be 
said generally about standards and conventions. They exceed the individual action, secure a non-
solipsistic position and link the individual intimately to a social and historical sphere. We could 
                                                 
316 Fischer-Lichre 2004, p. 305. 
317 Ibid. pp. 305-306. Fischer-Lichte quotes Victor Turner. 
318 Ibid. pp. 309-310.  
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ask how this is conceived of when the conventional aspect is played down, accentuating the live 
situation of a meeting, stressing the dynamics of auto-poiesis, feedback and emergent qualities, 
and emphasising the significance of liminal states: How is the logic of the performative then 
thought?   
 
As we have seen, Fischer-Lichte uses concepts developed within the studies of rituals to consider 
the performative aesthetic from a different angle than that which supposes convention-
dependency to be a condition for performative success. That does not imply that conventions are 
not of relevance for the position she presents. We could use the same argument as Kallberg does 
for his understanding of genre within the frame of rhetoric:319 Even if genre norms are not 
followed, that does not mean that a genre indication looses its function. It is within the play 
between what an indication implies with regard to expectations and what is fulfilled by the 
presented music − or not − that the rhetorical function of genre delineation resides. Likewise we 
could say that even if the conventional aspect as a measure for performative significance is 
diminished, that does not mean that the play with and against established schemas of expectation 
loose importance. In line with this understanding, we could also argue that it is because of this 
negotiation with conventional aspects (that cannot be avoided) that the performative in an 
aesthetic sense is intimately connected to social, political and ethical concerns. Still, Fischer-
Lichte does not only point to the destabilizing potential of playing with expectations. She defines 
the performative according to a profound open-endedness in the performative power that has the 
capacity to unsettle established standards and alter the way we perceive the world.  
 
The open-endedness is even more characteristic of an art situation than a ritual. Through a ritual 
an irreversible transformation is performed that is socially sanctioned and acknowledged and 
thereby established and sealed. We could say that the ritual takes the participants from one order, 
through a liminal state where the original order is nullified, and subsequently re-establishes a new 
order for the participants to enter. In contrast, the threshold-experiences initiated by art 
performances do not have a standardised outcome that is socially sanctioned. Art performances, 
compared to rituals, show an essential open-endedness in their result. They do not operate with 
prescribed routes out of their initiated liminal states; the participants are, so to speak, left with the 
transformative experience. 
 
                                                 
319 Kallberg 1988. See former presentation of his argument at p. 39 in this thesis.  
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We could therefore argue that Fischer-Lichte founds the significance of the aesthetic 
performative in its power to break conventions open. Would not this position, however, be in 
danger of ending in a kind of solipsism? I have previously indicated a play between 
overarching aspects − conventions or standards − and the individual action as the condition 
for performative efficacy (Austin and Butler’s concepts of performativity). However, through 
Fischer-Lichte’s revision of Austin’s and Butler’s concept of performance and her emphasis 
on unconventional productions, she points to the problem of thinking the impact of the non-
standardized from this point of view. In contrast, Fischer-Lichte connects the productivity of 
the performative act to the point where conventions crack. However  we could go on to ask 
what in these instances function as our shared ground (our measures, standards) according to 
which we can connect our individual experiences.  
 
Against this we could argue that the outlined auto-poietic feedback coil and the emphasis on 
our embodied presence indicate a different way of thinking the common ground founded in a 
shared and sharing reality that, not insignificantly, has physical implications. We as embodied 
beings do not exist on isolated islands. We are in constant exchange, affecting and 
transforming each other’s actual reality by our presence and unavoidable states of co-action. 
We are not only united through semiotic systems but also joined by our reverberating bodies. 
Therefore we could argue that even if shared norms (standards/ conventions) are in modes of 
collapse, loosing sense, this situation of meaninglessness does not take away the actuality of 
the situation and its impact on our existence.320 Still, though, we could raise the question, 
placing the importance on the rupture of conventions: On which ground, in this ruined 
condition, do bridges prevail that can overarch the ongoing “isolated” moments of becoming 
and bring about a space for reflection?  Even if this state would not alter the fact of our actual 
existence and the unquestionable actuality of the presence of a shared and alterable 
(vulnerable) reality, we could question the possibility of going beyond their singular and 
momentary quality.  
 
This question is linked to a long tradition of epistemological discussions from Descartes’ 
rationalism and Kant’s inter-subjective categories, to Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea 
of a private language. The immediate fact of (belief in) our sense impressions and individual 
                                                 
320 We could even say that Fischer-Lichte tries to write her theory out of the tradition that has fostered the 
question of solipsism. That is, she criticise the mind/body divide and elaborates instead on the notion of 
‘embodied mind.’ 
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experiences is not enough to built a foundation for knowledge. We need inter-subjective 
faculties, or shared languages. According to Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ even 
the individual experience needs the tools of common notions to make sense for us as 
individuals. 
  
I will here in fact introduce a detour from our presentation of the aesthetics of performativity 
and approach the question of conventions, their rupture, and the significance of the creative 
act from a slightly altered angle. At first, this may seem like an awkward step, because we are 
once more going back to the concept of an artwork and philosophers whose theories predate 
the aesthetics of performativity. I will however present a reading that places them within a 
theoretical framework of performativity.   
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The work-concept presented in the last chapter denotes so to speak an artistic work that has 
the aura of a metaphysical foundation. Its ontological base relies on a kind of idealism that is 
maintained by a two-world-perspective of spiritual meaning versus physical manifestation. 
The work of Martin Heidegger and later Hans-Georg Gadamer represents a bringing down of 
the work from this aura of metaphysics to a more earthly perspective. In a manner of speaking 
the performative dynamic is in this respect seen as operating in the work as work 
incorporating the performative initiative and response as part of what defines workhood. 
Though we can see here a work-concept determined by the performative quest (the movement 
towards something for someone) the work represents also a kind of transcendence from this 
quest’s momentary and local quality. The work enables a gathering and unifying force. It is 
the dual determination of the work as creative intervention and visionary overview that 
characterizes its nature. We are presented with a conception where the performative initiative 
− the creative initiative − is correlated to an ability to go beyond the momentary and keep 
firm a vision through which the performative for-structure gets its force and becomes 
effective.  
 
In fact, the re-reading of the work-concept that I will present, represents a conception that 
does not base the work in the ontology of a distinct thing with certain attributes. Instead it 
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sees the work − in its work character − as based in being eventful and effective.321 The 
objectifying view is, though, not fully abandoned. A kind of fixing process is at work through 
which the artwork stands out and confronts the activity that creates it: The work incorporates 
the feature of ‘figuration’ (Gestaltung) that in fact sustains and enables its performative 
capacity. The work as event and figuration condition each other. Through considering this 
doubleness and how it is thought I hope to prepare an answer to the questions previously 
raised about the performative logic in a state of destabilisation. 
 
The re-reading presented here will mainly use elements from Heidegger's philosophy of art 
and language, supplemented by Gadamer’s understanding of art as play, symbol and 
festival.322 I have already associated Heidegger’s conception of the creative projection, which 
he presents as one of the basic structural elements of art,323 to a concept of performativity 
even though Heidegger himself does not use this last notion. The reason is that I find a 
striking affinity between his focus on the gesture of intervention and initiation and the 
concept of performativity formerly presented. Therefore, the reading presented here will place 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s positions of philosophical hermeneutics within a conceptual 
frame of performativity.  
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The work concept, both within Fischer-Lichte’s presentation and Goehr’s analysis is associated 
with an objectifying move granting a persistent quality contrary to the ephemeral character of 
events. Heidegger’s thinking represents a questioning of this objectified understanding of the 
work’s ontological character. Workhood is re-thought by Heidegger and dissociated from the 
model of the substance with certain attributes, criticized by Heidegger as the dominant and 
misleading schema for understanding Being within Western thought. Even to approach the object 
character of art through the Aristotelian form-matter-unification guided by a purpose and 
                                                 
321 In this way, we could argue, that this conception deconstructs the opposition informing Fischer-Lichte’s 
theory between the ‘work’ operating at the one side as an aesthetic category that represents an objectified view 
on aesthetic matters, and at the other side the concept of performativity as enabling an aesthetic reflection upon 
the eventful qualities of art situations. 
322 Heidegger 1971 and 1982, and Gadamer 1986. I have studied The Origin of the Work of Art in a Danish 
translation, Heidegger 1994. My main focus is in this respect Heidegger’s theory of art, and important aspects of 
Gadamer’s aesthetics, such as his notion of presentation (Darstellung) as an alternative to the Heideggerian 
‘figure’ (Gestalt) and ‘figuration’, will not be discussed. 
323 Heidegger 1971, p. 73 ff. (Heidegger 1994, p. 83 ff). 
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emphatically exemplified by things made for use is left as unsatisfactory.324 Truth happens in art 
based on the projective gesture of creation. From this point of view, Heidegger comes close to an 
aesthetic theory of performativity that bases the nature of art in the character of event, and not just 
any event, but the staged event. This happening though, according to Heidegger, needs also the 
aspect of figuration, of some kind of endurance of a mapped/mapping out condition. The artwork 
represents a double movement: The dynamic gesture of initiation and intervention, and the 
enduring ‘figure’ (Gestalt). It is the logic of this double movement that makes truth possible as 
the setting-into-work of Truth.  
 
Heidegger makes the case in The Origin of the Work of Art against the concept of art based on 
beauty. As mentioned, he situates the nature of art in truth – the happening of truth. In that 
way, his aesthetics also become ontological and epistemological: “The nature of art, which 
both the art work and the artist depend, is the setting-itself-into-work of truth.”325 The work 
becomes in this respect examined as a site where something happens, included the conditions 
for this happening to arise. Two main aspects are emphasized: A disclosing force – the 
‘world’ – making clearings for the play of being to be revealed, against which ‘earth’ is the 
closing force, “that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed 
up.”326 
 
The concept of truth presented in this context represents a dynamic conception derived from 
an interpretation of the Greek word alétheia: “Truth means the nature of the true. We think 
this nature in recollecting the Greek word aletheia, the unconcealedness of beings.”327 
Contrary to a static notion based on judgments of accordance, alétheia means to discover and 
reveal. Activity and process are involved. It is through the interplay between an overarching 
activity (the ‘world’) – which gives way to an overview, a context and a whole – and reality’s 
closed and bounded nature (the ‘earth’) − which anchors Being and makes it specific − that 
the knowledge of Being is made possible.328 
 
This dynamic conception of truth is further made possible by applying the logic of the 
                                                 
324 Heidegger 1971, pp. 22-28. (Heidegger 1994, pp. 27-33). 
325 Ibid. p. 72. 
326 Ibid. p. 47. 
327 Ibid. p. 51. 
328 Ibid. pp. 48-49 (Heidegger 1994, p. 56). The ‘world’ as the “self-disclosing openness” and ‘earth’ as the 
closing counterpart is a pair of concepts that denotes two different aspects, or forces, of the discovering 
dynamics of Being. They do not denote world and earth as such. 
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hermeneutic circle to the primordial condition of knowledge (Erkenntnis). That is, even 
though we are presented with a conception that bears witness to relativism and no fixed 
position for the true, the hermeneutic principle of interdependence between whole-meanings 
and part-meanings makes it possible to arrive at stable positions, because the drive of the 
hermeneutic circle is to establish coherent (non-arbitrary) relationships between the 
understanding of a unity (a whole) and its details (parts).329 Transferred to a prerequisite 
condition for ontology, the interdependence between overview (‘world’) and singularity 
(‘earth’) does not, therefore, bring about a situation of randomness but bound to the logic of 
interdependence settles matters and anchors the dynamic condition of truth.  
 
In Being and Time330 the hermeneutical method of interpretation331 becomes the method of 
ontology.332 It is by already being in the world, by already having a relationship to what is, 
that we human beings have access to Being in its most primordial ontological sense. The 
human being’s manner of existing in the world – being-there-in-its-world – is presented as the 
founding phenomenon that makes knowledge possible.  Humans respond actively to their own 
factual and limited existence by consciously relating themselves to non-settled possibilities of 
the future. The doubleness of being settled in a limited context and at the same time 
transcending the given by actively relating the continuance of our existence to the world of 
possibilities, constitutes the foundation for the hermeneutic circle’s efficacy. The projective 
gesture of transcendence makes an overview possible according to which singular parts can 
be met as participants/constituents of a disclosed nexus that can be understood, accounted for 
and incorporated in our life projects. The process by which truth happens and is revealed is 
therefore not a neutral process. The truth as a category is brought about because what is 
(being) concerns us; it is linked to our wellbeing and possibility for continued existence. 
 
In The Origin of The Work of Art, the work of art in itself, by its creation-being, makes a 
clearing for the hermeneutic333 play of being to take place: “Thus in the work it is truth, not 
only something true, that is at work. [The works of art] do not just make manifest what this 
                                                 
329 An exemplary description of this logic is to be found in Gadamer 2003, pp. 33-44.  
330 Original title: Sein und Zeit, a major work by Heidegger published in 1927. English translation, 1962. 
331 I use hermeneutics here about the method of interpretation that Schleiermacher worked out and Dilthey 
developed further. 
332 Ontology means in this instance the study of Being in its most primordial meaning. That is, a study of the 
conditions for having a knowing relationship to existence at all.  
333 In my presentation of Heidegger’s work concept I am going to use hermeneutics and the adjective 
‘hermeneutic’ in reference to the primordial position given to the hermeneutic circle where the basic logic is 
created by the play between whole conceptions and part appearances.  
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isolated being as such is […] rather, they make unconcealedness as such happen in regard to 
what is as a whole.”334 The ontological preconditions are in Being and Time connected to the 
temporal-existential structure of Dasein where the anticipatory mode of this structure is 
organised by an intentional aim (for-the-sake-of-which) that points back to the Dasein as the 
self-referential explanatory life project. In his aesthetics this temporal-existential structure of 
being becomes connected to an aspect of production that produces something that is neither 
ready-to-hand (zuhanden) nor present-at-hand (vorhanden).335 The artwork takes on its own 
reality in a public sphere beyond the initiating Dasein. However, in its manifestation the 
artwork plays up against this locality of being-here (Dasein) creating a scope for reflection in 
which the artwork itself appears as co-player. Through the interplay between Dasein and a 
productivity that is installed into and installs a shared world, the transcendence within the 
temporary-historic structure of Dasein is extended beyond the individual life and marks the 
workings within a sphere of shared perspectives, histories and communities. 
 
I would like to use Gadamer to help in this respect in a further elaboration of the above 
presented reading. Art belongs, according to Gadamer, “in the realm of what Aristotle called 
poietike episteme, the knowledge and facility appropriate to production. [Reference to 
Methaphysics by Aristotle] What is common to the craftsman’s producing and the artist’s 
creating, and what distinguishes such knowing from theory or from practical knowing and 
deciding is that a work becomes separated from the activity.”336 The work of art is here 
distinguished from its production; it stands out on its own accord and gets its own life. The 
aspect of an “own life” is emphasised by Gadamer by using the phenomenon of play to 
conceptualise art and its mode of operation.  
 
Play represents a phenomenon of excess where movement for its own sake is put in motion: 
“Play appears as a self-movement that does not pursue any particular end or purpose so much 
as movement as movement, exhibiting so to speak a phenomenon of excess, of living self-
representation.”337 This self-movement that represents itself is further linked to a fundamental 
                                                 
334 Heidegger 1971, p. 56. 
335 Heidegger distinguishes between the mode of ready-to-hand “zuhanden” and present-at-hand “vorhanden” in 
Being and Time. ’Present-at-hand’ denotes the mode of being things get when they are regarded independently 
of their initial context of serviceability, as ’ready-to-hand.’ As ’present-at-hand’ they get the status of objects 
that has become the hegemonic way to look at things in the West: A separated object, a distinct substance with 
certain attributes.  
336 Gadamer 1986, p.12. 
337 Ibid. p. 23. 
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characteristic of living being with a reference to Aristotle: “This freedom of movement is 
such that it must have the form of self-movement. Expressing the thought of the Greeks in 
general, Aristotle had already described self-movement as the most fundamental characteristic 
of living beings.”338 
 
With the perspective in mind of a work brought down to earth from the aura of a metaphysical 
foundation, we could read from what I have presented that the work can be understood as a 
kind of agent that in its own right organises a field of being for us, though not independently 
of our contributions. The work cannot be aligned a ‘self’ standing alone in solipsism. The 
work, as a site that takes on auto-poietic power, operates within a network of co-playing and 
feedback. Again Gadamer’s presentation of play as a describable phenomenon of art can be 
useful. Play represents also a phenomenon where the spectator is included as part of the play. 
The spectators play along: “Another important aspect of play as a communicative activity, so 
it seems to me, is that it does not really acknowledge the distance separating the one who 
plays and the one who watches the play. The spectator is manifestly more than just an 
observer who sees what is happening in front of him, but rather one who is a part of it insofar 
as he literally ‘takes part’.”339 Art as play, therefore, in Gadamer’s context emphasises the 
spectator’s active role in constituting the art event, as Hermann does in his understanding of 
performance: The audience are co-players. 
 
We can now transfer our reflections about art as play to the reading of Heidegger’s work 
conception. The work as a site for the hermeneutic play of ontology opens a ‘world’ for us 
and lets the ‘earth’ be seen by being an agentive arrangement that affect us, acts according to 
us and through this, in its invitation to be interacted with, shows us something.  
 
How is the arising of this playful site for meetings thought in more specific terms according 
to Heidegger: How does the work of art set up a ‘world’ and let the ‘earth’ be seen, how does 
the work of art hold up and set forth the hermeneutic play of Being that we can be drawn into, 
and with which we play along and interact?  
 
‘Earth’ and ‘world’ are in this respect presented as opposed dynamic aspects of the process 
that reveals and constitutes being. This is not a clear-cut opposition, however: 
                                                 
338 Loc. cit. 
339 Ibid. p. 24. 
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World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world 
grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world. But the relation between world and earth does 
not wither away into empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting 
upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, 
however, as sheltering and concealing, tends aways to draw the world into itself and keep it there.340 
 
The truth happens as strife between ‘world’ and ‘earth’ – between disclosing and closing, to 
uncover and cover, to display and refuse. The work of art sets up a world and lets the earth be 
seen by keeping up the tension between being, nonbeing and that which resists being 
revealed, holding this strife fast in the figure – a unifying scaffold that joins, keeps the 
elements together and settles them.341 By this sustained tension the work of art creates an 
opportunity to experience truth as an event of unconcealedness in its mode of happening, 
where neither ‘world’ nor ‘earth’ is reduced to each other’s domain.342  
 
The artwork as a figuration of being, gathers the phenomenon components of world and earth 
and holds them firm in their strife. In this sense the work cannot be thought apart from either 
the capacity for transcending, overarching the momentary, nor the harshness of the actual 
moment bringing rootedness to our lives. It is through the sustenance of this friction; it is 
through the sustenance of the creative potential in the intersection between unity and 
individual divergences. Therefore, we could say that truth as being set-into-work incorporates 
the movement of the moment in its sustenance, the doubleness of initiation and determination 
− sparking off unknown possibilities and settling matters − and the non-reduced presence of 
‘world’ and ‘earth’ as structural counterparts. The logic in operation put the strife in the 
middle of its production − of the setting-into-work of truth. To get a better view of how this 
logic works, I would like to look at the significance of differentiation, of boundaries, borders 
and frames by examining the conception that the ‘rift’ represents.  
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The ‘rift’ marks a fundamental element of Heidegger’s epistemology and aesthetics. It 
illustrates the primordial role the act of differentiation has within his theory: 
                                                 
340 Heidegger 1971, pp. 48-49. 
341 Heidegger 1971, p. 64. (Heidegger 1994, p. 73). 
342  See former quote: “Thus in the work it is truth, not only something true, that is at work. [The works of art] do 
not just make manifest what this isolated being as such is […] rather, they make unconcealedness as such happen 
in regard to what is as a whole.” (Heidegger 1971, p. 56.) 
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The conflict is not a rift (Riss) as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which 
opponents belong to each other. This rift carries the opponents into the source of their unity by virtue of 
their common ground. It is a basic design, an outline sketch, that draws the basic features of the rise of 
the lighting of beings. This rift does not let the opponents break apart; it brings the opposition of 
measure and boundary into their common outline.343 
 
I will now present some images of possible meanings and functions of the ‘rift’ in the setting-
into-work of truth. Hopefully this will be helpful in outlining how the character of event and 
figuration condition each other in the presented work concept: 
 
1) The ’rift’ refers to a fundamental mark, a fundamental contrast, which divides something 
from something else, makes them different and situates them with different belongings. It 
is only by going through a differentiating process that phenomena disclose themselves. 
This concept also includes the act of making differences – to draw up and outline the 
possibilities of what can be.   
 
2)  The ‘rift’ refers to a fracture zone with a lot of tension – a meeting line, line of friction 
and a dividing line – where the parts both are held together and kept apart. The ‘rift’ is 
right in the middle where the tension is highest in the strife between ‘world’ and ‘earth’. 
Through the tension in the strife, the ‘world’ discloses horizons/contexts, the ‘earth’ juts 
up the specific in the world that is seen/understood by the horizon/context, and this play of 
opening up and closing is kept together not in a arbitrary fashion, but organized by the 
tension in the strife. We could perhaps use the construction of bridges, or a Gothic arch as 
an image of how this tensional force keeps a structure together and even makes it stronger.  
   
3) The ‘rift’ is a sign of abyssal void – the breach that unveils the abyssal non-existence in 
the midst of existence. 
 
Anxiety, in Being and Time, functions as a phenomenon that uncovers the real authentic 
existence of human beings.344 Anxiety disrupts the ordinary way of interpreting oneself 
and shows how these ordinary characterisations –“31 years old, student, plays the violin 
….” – do not cover what it really means to be a human being who lives exactly this life 
which is mine. What makes our life a unity, a totality according to which we act, is mostly 
                                                 
343 Heidegger 1971, p.63. 
344 Heidegger 1962, pp. 228-235. 
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covered up in everyday understanding. We try to forget our mortality and the finite nature 
of our lives. But confronted with anxiety, our authentic existence shows up; there are no 
positive characterisations that cover the essence of “who I am”. It is by the phenomenon 
of ‘death’ – the absolute otherness, the non-existence – that the unity of human existence 
is defined; it is the possibility of non-possibility that breaks the human existence apart 
from infinite interpretive possibilities and roots it in a life that is mine and concerns me. 
That which unifies my life and makes this life a horizon for my existence, is that I know it 
will end some day. The consciousness of death is the fundamental rift in life that maps it 
out.  
 
‘Anxiety’ and ‘death’ are not mentioned in The Origin of the Work of Art, but the work of 
art reminds us of the way anxiety works; the art disrupts the ordinary and clears the 
ground for authentic understanding to arise: “In the midst of what is, art breaks open an 
open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual […] everything ordinary and 
hitherto existing becomes an unbeing. This unbeing has lost the capacity to give and keep 
being as measure.”345 Heidegger, like Fischer-Lichte, emphasises, through this, art’s 
capacity to question conventions and introduce new perspectives. 
  
4) What happens if we see the ‘rift’ as a form of path or way – ways that make marks in the 
landscape, divide it up, but also become the routes for experiences? Heidegger writes in 
”The Nature of Language”: ”Experience means, eundo assequi, to obtain something along 
the way, to attain something by going on a way.”346  
 
The path lies in a landscape. Walking makes the path, or somebody has made the road for 
us. We can look at the way-making movement as a form of interpreting activity.347 The 
landscape is a desert before someone has made ways, paths and roads by their activity of 
exploration. By walking alongside a road, or making our own path, we orient ourselves in 
the landscape, our world. The way is the dynamic mark that functions as a focus, a centre, 
for our movements and our view of the surroundings. Through this focus we meet others 
and interact with our environment. It is by this interpretative activity (primordially 
                                                 
345 Heidegger 1971, p. 72. 
346 Heidegger 1982, p. 66. 
347 “Interpreting activity” refers in this respect to a primordial hermeneutic situation where the circle dynamics of 
part and whole is in operation.  
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expressed in our involved and interactive mode of being in the world) that we live, take 
decisions, attain knowledge, do art, orient ourselves in our world; it is by walking on a 
way and making paths that what is concerns and confronts us. 
 
The fundamental role that ‘the way’ and ‘to experience by going on a way’ have in 
Heidegger’s epistemology, is quite clearly expressed in “The Nature of Language”:  
 
The Tao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, 
meaning, logos properly mean to say – properly, by their proper nature. […] Perhaps the enigmatic 
power of today’s reign of method also […] are after all merely the runoff of a great hidden stream 
which moves all things along and makes way for everything. All is way.348  
 
The “fundamental mark”, the “fracture zone”, the “abyssal void” (the no-ground) and the 
“way” – can we put the different images of the ‘rift’ together? The “fundamental mark” refers 
to the differentiating process that operates in the setting-into-work of truth. This process is 
fuelled by the strife and tension in the “the fracture zone” that both keeps the elements 
together and apart. In the image of “the abyssal void”, we see how the presence of no-ground 
– un-being, the fundamental other – brings the is together, joins it and holds it up by being 
present in the strife. The “way” shows how this process is dynamic – historical – rooted in 
‘the way’ that gives us a focus, “by going on a way”, for the hermeneutical views of the 
historical landscape. 
 
The ‘rift’ shows a doubleness in Heidegger’s thinking. He tries to transcend a dualism of 
subject versus object, which he finds has dominated Western philosophy. Instead, he gives 
thinking another foundation and offspring where both subject and object are derivatives of a 
united phenomenon of being-in-the-world. At the same time he operates with a fundamental 
difference – an a priori other; death – that defines this being-in-the-world, the play of being 
and its scope. In this process, the being of things is valued differently according to its place, 
organized by the centre and the “routes”, borders and frames that the centre outlines. The 
Greek temple in The Origin of the Work of Art can function as a visualization of this and 
shows also how the figure, in the work of art, outlines different values for what is set forth:  
  
 
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft 
                                                 
348 Heidegger 1982, p. 92. My emphasis. 
 129 
valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the 
holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This 
presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The 
temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first 
fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which 
birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of 
destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this 
historical people.349  
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In a basic manner Heidegger connects the nature of art to creation. I especially have in mind 
the movement of creation that combine projection with production. The creative projection is 
an intervention in the world that incorporates in its movement both the transcending move of 
pre-understanding, bringing about a vision of coherence and unity (a whole), and the aspect of 
production. Without the creative projection nothing could be revealed − nothing would be 
true. I will in this instance emphasise my performative reading of Heidegger. The creative 
projection, like the performative act, heads beyond its momentary constraints towards new 
states of reality − towards new visions of reality. The performative efficacy thereby created 
belongs in Heidegger’s theory to the creativity involved in opening up a ‘world’ and letting 
the ‘earth’ be seen and not principally to the implementation of standards. This creativity is in 
a fundamental way the condition for humans’ experience of their own existence and it 
grounds the condition for the self-aware being-there in a world of possibilities. This creative 
condition is further linked to the human ability of being ahead of itself coming back to its 
factual being-there. Or, we could put it the other way around: The condition of being ahead of 
itself is made possible because of the human capacity for being visionary and creative.   
 
The creative projection though is not only a stretch of the mind. The creative projection is 
already ahead of itself coming back to itself through a production, by being involved in the 
world and producing something “out there”. We could therefore in this instance emphasise 
the performative accentuating of doing that includes the significance of interaction within the 
realm of reality. But not only that, this doing makes something that stands out from the act 
that initiates it. A product/event is produced that takes on auto-poietic power. Gadamer’s 
definition of the work as a kind of product could again be brought to mind, and elaborated by 
introducing his conception of art as symbol.  
 
                                                 
349 Heidegger 1971, pp. 41-42. 
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Gadamer presents an understanding of the symbol that stresses the aspect of actual presence of 
the concrete and physical as part of the symbol’s self-representation: “In the case of the symbol 
[…] and for our experience of the symbolic in general, the particular represents itself as a 
fragment of being that promises to complete and make whole whatever corresponds to it.”350 This 
is elaborated by Gadamer’s emphasis of the idealist aesthetics’ weakness:  
 
The weakness of idealist aesthetics lay in its failure to appreciate that we typically encounter art as a 
unique manifestation of truth whose particularity cannot be surpassed. The significance of the symbol 
and the symbolic lay in this paradoxical kind of reference that embodies and even vouchsafes its 
meaning.351  
 
The meaning of the symbol cannot be wrested from its physical presence: “Thus the essence of 
the symbolic lies precisely in the fact that it is not related to an ultimate meaning that could be 
recuperated in intellectual terms. The symbol preserves its meaning within itself.”352 Gadamer 
speaks here about a reference that represents itself like someone who represents themselves in a 
court would do.353 The symbol does not refer to anything other than itself; it is its own 
representative. However, it is directed beyond its own being to the being of something else. 
Gadamer refers to the Greek meaning of symbol that denoted a token for remembrance. The 
symbol was the half of an object that guests got from their hosts after the host, having broken an 
object in two, gave one part to his guest and kept the other for himself. When coming back the 
guest could bring with him this symbol as token of remembrance from last time, and again the 
two halves could be joined.354 As a half, the symbol has a direction beyond its own existence to 
something to which it corresponds. We can here indirectly see the for-structure that I have 
emphasized in connection with the directionality of the performative urge.  
 
There are especially three points that I want to emphasize in this reading of Gadamer’s symbol:  
 
1) The embodied meaning. The meaning of the symbol is incorporated in the symbol’s 
physical presence and does not operate apart from this embodied condition. 
2) The symbol maintains a remembrance and makes this memory present. We could transfer 
this to the temporal structure that keeps a horizon open by connecting future and past to 
the engaging now. The art work functions in this sense as a site that keeps a horizon open 
                                                 
350 Gadamer 1986, p. 32. 
351 Ibid, p. 37. 
352 Ibid. p. 37. 
353 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
354 Ibid, p. 31. 
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by its capacity to engage the environment of the present by embodied reverberations of 
past experiences, by keeping memories alive and installing discoveries into the future. As 
a token of remembrance, the symbol addresses its impact beyond its own configuration. 
Through this open invitation for being activated again, bringing about a presence of a 
memory that can be further elaborated in the new meeting, the different tenses are linked 
together and a horizon for relevance is created. 
3) The meeting as the productive point that generates meanings. We could argue that 
Gadamer, in his reading of the symbolic, presents a dimension of meaning that does not 
arise by decoding, but by a form of coming together that makes a reverberation. The 
symbol has a directionality beyond itself, but not by representing something else than 
itself, but by seeking to be complemented, to be responded to. This points to the open area 
of feedback. Meanings arise from the fracture zones of interplay, from the productivity of 
the turn, of the feedback.  
 
Now, if we go back to Heidegger’s creative projection and understand it as a movement directed 
beyond, ahead of, but brought back by a production, this product (event) functions both as a 
gathering of the visionary view and confronts the vision in its difference (through its materialized 
condition). It takes on its own mode of being and becomes a symbol in Gadamer’s sense through 
which we can meet ourselves (at a distance, in our difference). A product stands there beyond the 
initiating force though in the confirmation of shared reality and creates the condition for the 
double view of being inside of/outside, the alternation between being subject and object, ahead 
of/coming back, split off in individuality / united within a social sphere.  
 
The creative projection makes a difference and creates a provisional whole (context) − a 
frame of reference − through its production of something that both organises a field of being, 
and keeps, sustains and holds firm the creative vision. In this way, the event of the creative 
projection, both in the sense of being historical (bound to a given place and time) and 
momentous355 is correlated to the ability to make figurations. Read like this, the productivity 
of the creative projection, the products and events it creates, as something beyond the 
individual quest, becomes a prerequisite for the formation of a conscious encounter with our 
own existent being-there in the world: the primordial condition for ontology. 
 
                                                 
355 See my presentation of the event concept at p. 89-90. 
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On one hand, the artwork appears to be a kind of delineation that organises a field of being and 
thereby provides us with an overview from which we can enter a territory in an informed manner. 
We are shown something, though not in a static way. We are provoked into a reflective encounter 
with what is presented − with what emerges from the reciprocal engagement.  This reflective 
mode that creates the possibility for knowledge is founded in a circular logic − the hermeneutic 
circle. Being, in this sense, is revealed as meaningful. That which presents itself makes sense 
according to its world, and it is in this sense that it approaches us in its presence as something we 
are connected to and can actively relate ourselves to, and not least, are concerned about.  
 
The artwork, though, stands in a special position. It does not only uncover something for us. It 
also confronts us with dimensions resisting our hermeneutic grasp − resisting making sense − by 
allowing us to be confronted and included in the conflict between ‘world’ and ‘earth’ where the 
‘earth’ is not reduced to the purely serviceable (in the sense of a tool), dead material or hidden in 
the transcendence of the pure “worldly” statement.356 The work of art therefore does not only 
make Being present, but also makes us aware of its shadows and our non-knowledge. We could 
say, that we are reminded of our limitedness − our physical, historic and situated being.  
 
From this brief summary, we can go back to the questions I asked before presenting this re-
read version of the work concept. I asked about the significance of conventions, or standards 
in the consideration of a definition of performative efficacy. Fischer-Lichte does not define 
the performative effect according to an implementation of conventions, or said differently, 
collectively shared scripts. The performative effect is connected to the experiential side of the 
capacity of the performative act to create a liminal state. However, when these conventions 
are shattered, would this effect not easily end up in a kind of solipsistic trap?  
 
If we read Heidegger in a performative way as I have done, we could say that he, like Fischer-
Lichte, connects performative efficacy to an intervention that can split open a closed world 
(ruled by habits and non-questioned conventions) resulting in new and unique experiences. It 
is not the implementation of shared standards that defines performative efficacy, but the 
                                                 
356 Briefly Heidegger sketches other modes in which truth disclosed itself and arranges a field of Being at p. 62 
(1971). For example, the act that founds a political state, the nearness of “that which is not simply a being, but 
the being that is most of all,” the essential sacrifice and the thinker’s questioning. Science is understood to be a 
cultivation of a domain of truth already opened. 
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creative force behind the establishment of collectively shared references. This creativity is 
both the source of gestalt figuration, making standards possible, and the source of the possible 
rupture of their regime. However this cannot be thought without the correlated capacity for 
making figures (Gestalt) − for producing shared entities of reference. We can in this respect 
recall the image of the path. The path-making process of performative acts makes it possible 
to map a landscape that otherwise would be inaccessible − unknown − in its indifferent, non- 
differentiated state. We could interpret the establishment of conventional norms as being in 
continuance with this process of map-making. By citing this activity with the artwork, this 
path-making process, mapping out a territory, is released from individual domains and can be 
thought of as being shaped within public and social spheres. These roads and maps are not 
just for the individual traveller − they are maps for communities.357 
 
From another point of view, drawing a parallel between the phenomenon of anxiety 
(presented in Being and Time) and the artwork’s mode of presence (as I have done in one of 
my images of the ‘rift’), we could also say that art strips conventions of their comfortable 
domestic qualities. Conventions are, so to speak, undressed as inadequate in accounting for 
the mode of being experienced in the presence of the artwork. Our interpretation could in this 
instance be twofold. On one side we encounter the “abyss” of our conventions. That is, the 
“no ground” – like the fact of my perishable state revealed by the phenomenon of anxiety − 
uncovers the historicity of conventions, and how the norms expressed by them do not have a 
firm ground beyond being what we could call historically and socially conditioned 
constructions. Though, as with the emphasis on our thrown mode of being in Being and Time, 
having to cope with the fact that we are born into a particular historical context, this “no 
ground” also provides an opportunity that we have to seize upon: Our world is historic and we 
have to act according to that; we have to make use of the conventions handed over to deal 
with the world in the middle of which we find ourselves.  
 
On the other side, we could interpret the disruption of the conventional as not pointing to a 
                                                 
357 Heidegger formulates a theory of language that we could interpret to belong to the linguistic turn in the 20th 
century where our genuine access to knowledge goes through our linguistic abilities: “we may never say of the 
word that it is, but rather that it gives − not in the sense that words are given by ‘it,’ but that the word itself 
gives. The word itself is the giver. What does it give? […] the word gives Being.” (Heidegger 1982, p. 88.) But 
as my performative reading has accentuated, Heidegger’s theory of art can also be seen as presenting a theory 
where the artwork presents a domain of knowledge constitution that vibrates at the threshold between the self-
referential and reality-constitutive gesture of the performative act and the creation of semiotic referentiality.   
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“no ground” in a material sense, but in fact highlighting a “ground” − an earthly aspect − that 
grounds our existence though resists being arrested conceptually. Thereby the “no ground” of 
our conventions could acquire a kind of foundation beyond pure construction by being 
connected to the “ground” of the ‘earth’, to life lines that underpin our lives, though resisting 
being abstractedly arrested.358 
 
Through the re-read version of the work concept I have tried to present an understanding that can 
explain the relationship between the individual performative act and conventional norms which 
also accounts for the significance of the unconventional and the ruined state of known notions. 
That is, in Heidegger’s aesthetics the performative act as a creative intervention is understood as a 
basic structural element and prerequisite for our capacity to orientate ourselves in the world, 
thereby being a prerequisite both for a reflection of truth that happens in art as well as in 
knowledge in a general sense. Nothing is revealed without the creative projection. This is the 
condition both for the establishment of conventional norms and for their rupture, putting the 
directionality of performative involvement in the middle of presence and meaning production. 
This directionality is further made possible by the capacity to transgress the singular moment of 
becoming − to have an active relationship both to the future and the past. This capacity, its 
temporal structure that joins future and past in the flowing moment of the now, is fundamental 
both for the individual performative act and the creation of overarching notions, and it is 
correlated to the ability for creating figures (Gestalt), for making products. The ability to make 
differences and to create provisional frames of reference is of immense importance in this 
process. In fact, we could add one more image of the ‘rift’ to those we have already produced: 
The act of the creative projection itself. Through its intervention in the world, a rift is made with 
which the other presented images could be joined to fill its conceptual content: The creative 
intervention as the initiation of a “fundamental mark” that establishes a separation and thereby 
provokes a difference to occur and a process of differentiation to be fostered; as the act that opens 
an energetic “fracture zone” of co-production, interactive unsettlements and re-negotiations that 
both keeps the elements together and apart; the creativity as connected to the presence of death − 
“the abyssal void” − that makes the continuance of life so urgent, the need for new/renewed 
solutions imperative and brings about the perspective of provisional wholes − my life − that 
cannot be reduced nor transferred; and the creative mobility as a “way” that shows how this 
                                                 
358 This is a question we will come back to later in this chapter under the heading “The performative generation 
of materiality.”  
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inventive involvement is dynamic – historical – always on its way, always heading into unknown 
territories.  
 
We could say that it is exactly the conception of the rift in combination with the provisional 
wholes that keeps the individual and the general unified, while not reducing them to identical 
positions. Through this “glued” situation a non-solipsistic conception is secured even though 
the performative effect is not defined in the light of standard implementation but basically 
founded in a creative intervention and response to a world situation.359 
 
However, Cage problematizes this position of the rift, and I will now present a reflection upon 
Cage’s Variations II (1961) that will illustrate this. The focus will be upon the significance/non-
significance of differentiations by looking especially at the function the act of drawing boundaries 
and of giving frames has in this piece. Hopefully this will bring us back to Fischer-Lichte’s 
aesthetic theory of performativity and her focus upon the phenomenon of emergence highlighted 
by many performances since the 1960. Because even though our re-read version of the ‘work’ can 
explain the efficacy of the performative initiative from the point of view of creative pioneering − 
clearing ground for new encounters and experiences without bringing the performative logic in 
solipsism − it does not take us far enough to account for the de-semantic qualities Fischer-Lichte 
observes in the performances she discusses, for example the untitled event at Black Mountain 
College. Cage’s Variations II (1961) can be illuminating in this respect. It problematizes the re-
read version of the work concept just presented and questions in a radical way the hermeneutic 
situation. 
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Cage, like Heidegger, situates art within “the happening of truth” – within an ontological-
epistemological dimension. He uses art as an opportunity to “clear an open space” for the 
magnificent diversity of what is to be experienced and appreciated: “Our intention is to affirm 
this life, not to bring order out of chaos nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply 
to wake up to the very life we’re living, which is so excellent once one gets one’s mind and 
                                                 
359 We could object to such a reading by accentuating that it is within the points of intersection between creative 
intervention and standard formation that art creates a space for an intimate encounter with the workings of 
Being. 
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one’s desires out of its way and lets it act of its own accord.”360 But where Heidegger sees the 
happening of truth as a struggle that wrestles the truth forth and is disclosed by being captured 
in the ‘figure’ (Gestalt) − a unified whole where the truth takes up its positions and attains 
constancy, it seems that Cage is trying to scatter the whole Heideggerian ‘figure’ with his 
compositional tools. That is, the non-arbitrary unification that the figure represents becomes 
perforated by Cage’s use of chance operations, indeterminacy, open-ended pieces, and the 
simultaneous presentation of non-coordinated material. The roles of boundaries and frames 
are thereby also questioned, and I will argue that they acquire other functions and values than 
those found in Heidegger’s conception of art.  
 
However, that does not mean that the functioning of borders and frames in Cage’s 
compositional strategies is not without problems; framing and delimiting aspects are certainly 
present, but do they function as givers of meaning and even presence as they do within 
Heidegger’s system of thought?  
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The score of Variations 2 consist of eleven transparent sheets, six having a single straight line 
and five having a point. Besides this, there is an instruction on how to use these transparent 
sheets. Which frames and borders does the score presuppose, and which frames and borders 
does it introduce? How do these borders and frames function? 
 
Let us take a look at the information given in the score:  
 
1) The work is “for any number of players and any sound producing means”. 361  In other 
words, the work constitutes the production of an audible piece of art: This is also 
apparent in the definitions of the six lines: “1) frequency, 2) amplitude, 3) timbre, 4) 
duration, 5) point of occurrence in an established period of time, 6) structure of event 
(number of sounds making up an aggregate or constellation)”. 
 
2) How do we use these transparent sheets? According to Cage’s instructions, “the sheets 
are to be superimposed partially or wholly separated on a suitable surface.” The 
                                                 
360 Cage, Silence, p. 95. 
361 This quote and those that follow are all taken from the instruction to the score of Variations II.  
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instructions tell us to “drop perpendiculars from points to the lines […]” to decide 
musical events, and to “measure the perpendiculars by means of any rule, obtaining 
readings thereby for 1) frequency, 2) amplitude, 3) timbre, 4) duration, 5) point of 
occurrence in an established period of time, 6) structure of event (number of sounds 
making up an aggregate or constellation).” The score does not tell us by which rules 
we should measure and read the dropped perpendiculars, but it says that some form of 
regulation should organize our reading. What does this tell us about borders and 
frames? 
 
3) The score does not set a period for the duration of the piece: “Any number of readings 
may be used to provide a program of any length.” 
 
The score sets a frame for the work’s material and medium. The medium is a sound producing 
source, and the focus is upon the audible aspects (both sounds and silences) this source 
produces. That does not mean that a realisation of the piece excludes for example a theatrical 
realisation, but decisions (made by chance operations) have to be carried out according to 
audible phenomena and not visual or dramatic ones. 
 
The score does not set any outer limits for the piece’s length, how it should be organized in 
space, how many musicians there should be, what instruments or sound producing means 
should be used or how many readings of the score one can do, but it invokes disciplined 
actions in the realisation of the piece. Why this appeal for discipline? Is that not a way to 
introduce borders and frames?  
 
The score can be described as a virtual musical space defined by the parameters given – 
frequency, amplitude, timbre, duration, point of occurrence in an established period of time 
and structure of the event – but this space does not have any fixed walls. Cage’s use of 
separate transparent sheets that can be put together in endlessly different ways shows this 
visually. The six lines – the tools that define musical occurrences in the event – do not make 
up a fixed “room”, the “walls” do not have a fastened position nor stand in a fixed relation to 
each other; in some way the score gives a visual view of an infinite musical space (the lines) 
with an infinity of possible musical occurrences (the points). Because of this – the infinity of 
possibilities and unfixed musical borders – the score shows only a view of a musical field 
where everything is undifferentiated and has the possibility to be voiced and nothing is 
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discriminated against from the beginning. We can draw a parallel to Heidegger’s philosophy 
here and say that Cage with this score tries to make a tool, sketching a landscape, where 
Heidegger’s “plough” has not made its “furrows”. Heidegger presents a picture in “The 
Nature of Language” of the movement of thinking that cuts “furrows into the soil of 
Being.”362 To see, understand, orient yourself within a landscape, and to live, presupposes 
actions of “cutting furrows into the soil of Being”. It is in and by this “cutting” that that which 
is concerns, confronts and faces us. Of course we can say that Cage, when he draws lines on 
transparent sheets, makes virtual “furrows” – he makes a difference, he makes a “rift” in the 
void blank sheet and gives a virtual framework for what can happen. But at the same time 
there is something about the unfixed character of the lines – the indeterminate way the lines 
can be used and related to each other – that gives another impression than that of “ploughed 
furrows in the soil of musical being”. It is not a rooted and solid earth in slow motion that gets 
its marks, but free floating transparent sheets with endless possibilities of combinations. 
 
I leave these thoughts now for a moment to look at other aspects of the score: The instruction 
for how to use the score to generate a musical event. As presented in the score, Variations 2 is 
not a work where any sonic course is described/prescribed. The score, we could say, does not 
function as a musical text, but rather as a tool for making musical events, while not 
prescribing how these events should sound. The score, rather, presents an indeterminate and 
infinite musical landscape and provides a tool to actualize musical happenings from this 
undifferentiated field. Nevertheless, it requires a realisation involving rules and a disciplined 
approach, and in practice frames and borders must be introduced in order to perform it. 
Because of this, I would like to take a closer look at the process of realisation. What is 
presupposed in the process of realisation and what kinds of concerns are raised by the score?  
Such a perspective should give us the best approach by which to view the function of borders 
and frames in this piece.  
 
The score can be seen as an attempt to provide an undifferentiated and infinite field of 
musical possibilities, and to be as democratic as possible with regard to which sounds – which 
musical events – can form a realisation of Variations 2. In this respect the score does not set 
any borders and frames for what can happen – what is allowed to sound during a performance 
and thereby be “voiced”. Yet, to produce a musical event framing and limiting elements must 
                                                 
362 Heidegger 1982, p. 70. The theme of undergoing an experience with the nature of language is the context for 
the presented image.  
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be introduced.  
 
Let us now imagine that we are musicians and shall produce a realisation of Variations 2. 
What must we do? Variation 2 is “for any number of players and any sound producing 
means”. The score does not define the musical setting, which sound producing means we can 
use and so on. But if we are going to actualize Variations 2 from this abstract 
“undifferentiated landscape” we also have to make decisions and limit the infinity of 
possibilities given in the score: We must treat the score as a tool to produce a concrete 
musical situation, and to do that we must in some way make the score realizable, transform its 
directives into something we can do in practice. For example, no matter what, it is impossible 
to use all possible sound producing means − we have to make some choices. Of course, we 
can use chance operations to help us, but in any case we would also need to make some 
intentional choices, and these choices would contribute to the framing of the realisation.  
 
We begin now to use the score; we throw the transparent sheets on a table, let them 
superimpose each other, and let them form a mixture that is produced by chance. We decide 
which line is frequency, which is amplitude, duration and so on. Then we make 
perpendiculars from the points to the line. All of this is described in the instructions in the 
score. However, to translate the abstract points to descriptions of musical events, we have to 
make the rules that can function as means for translating the drawn perpendiculars into a 
description of what we are going to do to produce musical occurrences. The score does not 
tell us the rules. It just says “any rule”. We have to formulate them. And if the rules shall have 
a proper function, we must make them in such a way that the decisions can be carried out in 
practice. Therefore we will probably make them with consideration to what we have chosen 
as sound producing means together with other practical considerations. 
 
But do these framing elements organize and “set-into-work” the aesthetic “truth” as an 
exposed field of being, through a certain configuration? Is it by these aspects of framing that 
the aesthetic meanings of the piece are produced? As we have seen, to do a realisation of 
Variation 2 we have to make decisions that frame the realisation. Nevertheless, I will argue 
that to frame and make boundaries does not have that fundamental role in producing aesthetic 
significance in Variation 2 as Heidegger describes these aspects in The Origin of the Work of 
Art. Why? 
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To realize Variations 2 means, in practice, to introduce borders and frames into the open 
undifferentiated “landscape” of the score. This is presupposed in order that the score can be 
performed. The score also introduces borders and frames by way of asking the performers to 
realise the piece using “any rule” in measuring the perpendiculars from points to lines. But 
these limiting aspects have a paradoxical effect. The performers are asked to use chance 
operations in deciding what to do within the chosen frames − to “measure the perpendiculars 
by any rule”. This confines personal freedom – the performers cannot choose just whatever 
they would like to pick from the open “landscape” drawn up in the score and thus form 
“tunes” reflecting their own personal taste. The score puts the performers in a situation where 
they must be open for unexpected choices made by chance. Thus the realisation will not be a 
musical event organized with the purpose of unfolding the musical ideas363of the performers.  
 
In fact, the score restricts personal freedom by invoking the use of chance operations, while at 
the same time it “frees” the musical material from personal taste and allows it to be “heard” 
even if it is not comprised of preferred sounds and silences. The restrictions on personal taste 
and preferences enables all the possibilities of the musical material, within the chosen frame, 
the potential to be “voiced”. The restriction interrupts the function of the borders and frames 
for giving intentional meaning to the realised musical happening. Borders and frames 
become, seemingly, just practical tools for making something happen. Or we could say they 
become tools for a different voicing beyond the anthropocentric for-structure.  
 
Let us now imagine that we are among a group of several performers who are embarking on a 
realisation of Variations 2. All get the score and are asked to “solve it” in their own way 
without an overall plan for how this should be done. The only things decided are the length of 
time for the realization, where it will take place, and that we will be slightly spread around 
during the performance. In the performance, everybody will perform their realisation at the 
same time in the same room. The result will be unpredictable; the multiple effects of several 
performers, who have “solved” the score in different ways, will make the event even more de-
centred than if just one person performed the piece. The breaking up of a centralized 
perspective caused by both chance operations and the multiplying of these operations, makes 
                                                 
363 ‘Musical idea’ is here just an expression for a unifying vision of how the imagined musical piece should be - 
a vision that guides the working out of the musical unfolding and conceives of the music as a manifestation of 
that vision.   
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it difficult for frames and borders to function as organizing tools for the production of 
intentional meaning in the event. 
 
Borders and frames play a paradoxical role. They have concrete and important functions, 
organizing the compositional process in a practical sense and restricting personal preferences. 
They discipline both the process of composing and performing and challenge the composer-
performer to open his/her senses to other possibilities than he/she has considered. In this 
sense, borders and frames function as disciplinary aspects that instead of delimiting and 
founding interpretive possibilities, break through the interpretive way of listening, make 
interpretation senseless, and present an aesthetic meaning that has to be experienced in all its 
diversity and which goes beyond an anthropocentric being-in-the-world: 
 
But this fearlessness only follows if, at the parting of the ways, where it is realized that sounds occur 
whether intended or not, one turns in the direction of those he does not intend. This turning is 
psychological and seems at first to be a giving up of everything that belongs to humanity – for a 
musician, the giving up of music. This psychological turning leads to the world of nature, where, 
gradually or suddenly, one sees that humanity and nature, not separate, are in this world together; that 
nothing was lost when everything was given away. In fact, everything is gained. In musical terms, any 
sounds may occur in any combination and in any continuity.364 
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Though Heidegger’s philosophy exhibits non-dualistic ambitions and accentuates aspects of 
process, activity and conditionality, it does not banish the need for an essential difference − 
the a priori other − to establish the necessary horizon for a reflective encounter with Being. 
The scent of dualism thereby preserved is further elaborated by the logic of hermeneutics that 
saves us from an indifferent state of invisible meaning. Instead we make a difference in the 
world by our anticipatory creativity. Cage though uses this creative intervention in a 
counterproductive way by exploring and developing strategies that hinder the drive to 
figuration and a centralised perspective. 
 
Cage challenges, thereby, Heidegger’s ontological-aesthetic hermeneutics and the centrality 
given to the act of making difference correlated to the ability to create (establish) a point of 
view from which differentiations and distributions of values can be arrived at. To frame and 
limit contributes concretely to Cage’s compositional strategies, but this activity does not 
                                                 
364 Cage, Silence, p. 8. 
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function as the provider of meaning. Instead borders and frames are introduced to transform 
and transcend our habit of dividing things, organizing them in different categories and 
favouring one thing by discriminating against something else. Boundaries as arbitrary “lines” 
in an infinite diversity are exaggerated until these limiting and framing elements are not even 
just ambiguous but become “senseless” in the meaning production of the musical event. 
 
As mentioned, Fischer-Lichte emphasises how performances since the 1960s have staged 
theatrical elements differently than earlier and in doing so have also transferred attention from 
a coherent plot or character, to the emergent quality of a performance. The phenomenon of 
emergence (das Phänomen der Emergenz) is, through different techniques, highlighted and 
palpable. Methods are used that dissolve the temporal structures that would help the perceiver 
trace back appearing elements according to a chain of causes which appear to be logical and 
reasonable, and thereby meaningful in the light of the development of a plot or the 
psychology of a character. The “senseless” way borders and frames are set in a realisation of 
Variations II has a similar function: Instead of contributing to an organisation of the material 
according to a certain imagined totality (a musical plot (idea), characters (themes and motifs) 
and their course of logical development resulting in for example a coherent sonata form), the 
framing and limiting activity split up such intentional organisation. Boundaries become 
paradoxical. As definers of coherent meanings, they become somehow senseless, just set by 
chance. However, they function as useful tools to provoke alert listening for what actually 
appears here in all its diversity. 
 
We could perhaps solve this paradox by introducing Gumbrecht’s differentiation between the 
‘production of meaning’ and the ‘production of presence’. Gumbrecht, in Production of 
Presence (2004), separates on one hand meaning-effects and on the other presence-effects. 
Presence is in this respect understood not primarily as a temporal relationship, but “a spatial 
relationship to the world and its objects. Something that is ‘present’ is supposed to be tangible 
for human hands, which implies that, conversely, it can have an immediate impact on human 
bodies.”365 This understanding of ‘presence’ is combined with a conception of production as 
“the act of ‘bringing forth’ an object in space.”366 Therefore, by combining ‘presence’ and 
‘production’, Gumbrecht points out that “all kinds of events and processes in which the 
                                                 
365 Gumbrecht 2004, p xiii. 
366 Loc. cit. 
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impact that ‘present’ objects have on human bodies is being initiated or intensified.”367 In 
contrast, the ‘production of meaning’ is linked to a process that reduces the significance of 
physical immediacy in favour of the formation of abstract meaning − what Gumbrecht calls 
‘metaphysics’: “If we attribute a meaning to a thing that is present, that is, if we form an idea 
of what this thing may be in relation to us, we seem to attenuate, inevitably, the impact that 
this thing can have on our bodies and our senses. It is in this sense, too, that the word 
‘metaphysics’ is used here.”368  
 
‘Presence’, therefore, in Gumbrect’s sense, has a kind of physicality attached to its conception 
that is, not least, spatially defined, while the concept of ‘meaning’ is associated to an 
approach where the awareness of physical presence, in its here-ness, is reduced and interest is 
directed to what this − that which is present here and now − can mean in an abstract – 
“metaphysical” – sense.  
 
With regard to meaning-production as it operates within a hermeneutic system, the chance-
ridden borders and frames of Variations II make this system as a producer of meanings almost 
non-applicable and senseless. However, as producers of presence in Gumbrecht’s sense, these 
framing and limiting elements function efficiently both by concretely contributing to what 
happens and by bringing about an intensified awareness of what appears here and now in its 
diverse and perishable materiality.369   
 
As we have seen, for both Heidegger and Gadamer, aesthetic meaning is not detachable from 
the physicality of the artwork as we stand in its presence. Meaning-production and the 
production of presence appear to overlap each other and in fact are founded upon the same 
phenomenon:370 The work of art, as the setting-into-work-of-truth, works through a logic that 
generates the premises for the emergence of hermeneutic reflection. This reflection makes the 
presence of Being present both in relation to its material implications and its transcendence.   
 
Variations II, though, we could argue, does not produce presence by enforcing the dynamics 
                                                 
367 Loc. cit. 
368 Ibid, xiv. 
369 Göran, 2009, illuminates this point eminently in her Cage study from 2009. Moments from her study are 
brought up and presented later in this thesis in chapter six and seven. 
370 We could in fact say that the capacity for creating a unified arena for the display of meaning-production and 
the production of presence marks the artwork’s peculiar mode of being.  
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of a hermeneutic circle and in that way establishing aesthetic meaning. On the contrary, a 
situation is sensitized by strategies that resist hermeneutic logic getting a foothold; the 
production of presence is achieved at the expense of what Gumbrecht identifies as the 
meaning-effects.371 The quality of emergence accentuated by Fischer-Lichte is, so to speak, 
sensitized by the deprivation of the power of hermeneutic logic. 
 
Are we then back again at the point we were before we did the re-reading of a work-concept? 
Is the presence-effect enforced by Cage’s strategies achieved at the expense of what could 
save this presence from immediate isolation?  
 
Through the re-read version I presented a reading of the performative initiative as genuinely 
connected to a creative involvement in the world. Performative efficacy was thereby not 
connected fundamentally to the implementation of standards but to the capability for opening 
a world-horizon, providing genuine meetings and creating a site for interplay. Such a reading 
does not only enable us to free performative efficacy from the totalitarian regime of norms, it 
also makes it possible to revise the reflexivity involved in the performative attitude. Cage’s 
aesthetic project, as I mentioned in the section “Performance − event”, questions an attitude 
of “showing doing” as defined by the (self-)conscious carrying out of  intentional action.372 
Accordingly, we could question the relevance of the concept of performativity in this respect. 
Maybe we could have instead jumped directly towards the notion of the staged event and 
approached this phenomenon from the point of view of actions and events. However, by 
connecting the performative attitude to the creative intervention, the mode of exploring is 
accentuated. We could thereby revise the “showing doing” of performance to “explorative 
doing”, and instead of giving the self-consciousness aspect priority, see the self-consciousness 
potential as an end of the creative explorations.373 This would in fact be in line with the 
experimental aesthetics voiced by Cage.374 
                                                 
371 Variations II, therefore, could be an example where Gumbrecht’s differentiation is helpful as a tool to analyse 
different processes that creates aesthetic significance. These do not, however, need to cancel each other out. 
According to Gumbrecht, the production of presence and meaning are probably best understood as processes of 
oscillation even if one of them can take precedence over the other. (See for example Gumbrecht, p. 107-108.) 
372 See pp. 102-103. 
373 I am going to present Thomas J. Csordas’ ‘paradigm of performativity’ later in this chapter. If we use Csordas 
argument about the pre-objective, the notion of a self-performing and self-understanding agent does not need to 
be the first step. Instead the self-reflective consciousness can be the end result of the creative gesture.  
374 Cage’s proclaimed project of ego-less art can be seen, not as an annihilation of self-consciousness, but an 
alteration of it. Through artistic activity the possibility of an altered self-understanding can be envisioned, for 
example, the “ego-less” self-consciousness of coexisting in a world, in a web of interactions with other beings. 
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I find these points of immense importance for the reading of the concept of performativity 
that I present in this thesis, and they inform the frame in which I have placed Fischer-Lichte’s 
aesthetics. Cage problematizes in this respect not the feature of the Heideggerian artwork 
which opens up a field of Being for us but how this feature is conceived as anchored and 
maintained. The hermeneutic dialectic is questioned pointing to its need for privileged 
perspectives, unequal valuations and a sense-giving differentiating mark to make its logic 
function. Do we really need this kind of discrimination, or can we enter the state of co-
presence alternatively tuned?375 The question raised by Variation II is therefore: Though the 
re-read version of workhood can illuminate the performative gesture of opening a field for 
experience, how can this opening be retained without retaining the need for “a unifying 
scaffold that joins, keeps the elements together and settles them”?376 We are in this respect 
moving from the theme of ruptured conventions as our guiding line in the study of 
performativity, to the impact of our embodied condition and the ‘body’ as a resource to think 
meaning formation and presence sustenance.  
 
The theme of ‘art as event’ will in this respect be more thoroughly examined, and this time 
with the background of a semiotic position.  Fischer-Lichte speaks about de-semanticization 
in reference to examples similar to Variations II, and as we have already seen in the example 
of the untitled event at Black Mountain College, this de-semanticized quality and the 
connected phenomenon of emergence form a phenomenal core that informs her theorizing. 
Therefore, to explore her theoretical position closer in this respect, I will outline a semiotic 
understanding of art as a background and counterpart for her aesthetics of performativity. We 
will thereby also prepare the ground for discussing the concept of performativity more 
profoundly according to the significance given to an embodied condition.  
 
Though we mainly leave the Heideggerian work concept at this point, it is not entirely 
omitted from the discussion. It will continue to inform, inspire and provoke theoretical 
reflections throughout the thesis.  
 
                                                 
375 These questions will be more profoundly discussed from the point of view of Cage’s aesthetics in chapter 6, 
but they are also to a certain extent relevant for Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetics. 
376 See presentation at p. 125. 
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Fischer-Lichte notes that performances of the new art scene in the 1960s destabilised 
conventions by questioning the relationship between materiality, the signifier and the 
signified. Behind her observation lies a critique of theories that basically see the ontological 
status of art as based in the functions of signs. She has herself contributed to such theories 
with seminal works like The Semiotics of Theatre (Semiotik des Theaters, published in 
German for the first time in 1983).377  Let us briefly explore this criticized semiotic position, 
which presents the business of art in terms of the production and interpretation of signs.  
 
In the introductory remarks of The Semiotics of Theatre we read: “Viewed from the 
standpoint of the cultural sciences, theatre appears initially to be one of many possible 
cultural systems. […] Culture is understood here in quite a broad sense as something created 
by humans as opposed to nature […]. Everything which humans produce is ‘significant’ for 
themselves and each other, because humans in principle live ‘in a signifying world’, that is, in 
a world where everything that is perceived is perceived as a signifier which must be judged to 
have a signified, i.e. a meaning.”378 The relation between signifier and signified, though, 
becomes highly ambiguous when considering performances from the 1960s and 1970s. Put 
simplistically, the semiotic approach, consisting of revealing sign-structures, meets resistance 
because even the condition of sign-formation is evaded in these performances. To explain this 
point let me rudimentarily sketch the semiotic position indicated in the quote above.  
 
Cultural phenomena are basically seen as founded in an ability to establish sign-systems that 
map out the world, function as the intermediate link between ourselves and the world, and 
unify humans in communicative communities. These systems of signs have a structure that 
organises their practical and individual use; a systemic logic is at work in any use of signs. 
Saussure, the pioneer of Structuralism, drew attention to the sign’s dual aspects: The signifier, 
which represents a codified image of material shaped in a distinct way (e.g. the sound-image 
of a word), and the signified, which represents the meaning/concept to which this shaped 
materiality is correlated. The relation between these two aspects is defined by conventions. 
                                                 
377 Semiotik des Theaters, published in German for the first time in 1983.  
378 Fischer-Lichte 1992, p. 1. 
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That is, there is no natural connection between the sounds that for example make up the word 
“musician” and the meaning of the word. The sign-system operates as an organising regime 
between the signifiers and the signified. In other words, the correlation between material 
shaped in a distinctive way and its meaning is arbitrary − defined by convention − whereas 
the system that organises the relationships between signifiers and signified does not work in 
an arbitrary way.  It is systemic and codifies the elements by their interrelated position within 
the system. This system functions primarily by organising and defining its elements according 
to a binary opposition that creates a complex pattern of paired functional differences. Because 
internal relations define the logic of the system, these functional differences make up a 
coherent, interdependent and well balanced structure that operates in a self-defining and self-
regulating way independent of the external world to which it refers and maps out. It is thereby 
possible to approach a sign-system as a complete system that in fact as a totality is at work in 
partial use. The essence is therefore not the individual sign per se, but the general structure of 
which this sign is a part; only through its function within a system made up of significant 
contrasts and binary oppositions does the individual sign acquire a definition. 
 
Generally speaking, semiotic theories of art present the artwork as a kind of sign, or an 
aesthetic text composed of a constellation of different signs.379 Mukařovský 380 in this respect 
adopts Saussure’s dual perspective of the sign and differentiates the artwork into principally 
two aspects: The artefact (the signifier) − the work of art in its concrete sensuous appearance; 
and the aesthetic object (the signified) that denotes the artefact’s meaning. The work of art as 
an aesthetic sign is, though, in many respects a complex and ambiguous one. Whereas the 
relationship between signifier and signified in the context of historic languages shows, to a 
great extent, stability, this is not the case with the aesthetic counterpart.  To explain this 
character of complexity and ambiguity Fischer-Lichte’s semiotic theory elaborates 
+!1%,)!2’s two-dimensional determination of the artwork and applies, in line with 
Morris,381 the three-dimensional determination of a sign formulated by Pierce382 consisting of 
a syntactic dimension (the sign’s relation to other signs), a semantic dimension (the sign’s 
relation to the signified, meaning − an object/matter/reality that the sign refers to) and a 
pragmatic dimension (the sign’s relationship to the interpreter).  The aesthetic sign differs 
                                                 
379 The semiotic position presented here relies mainly on Fischer-Lichte’s presented version in Ästhetische 
Erfahrung (2001), pp. 51-64.  
380 $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381 Charles Morris (1901-1979). American semiotician and philosopher. 
382 Charles S. Pierce (1839-1914). American philosopher.  
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from the linguistic sign of ordinary language by not having its own semantic dimension. The 
semantic dimension of an aesthetic sign is constituted in a dialectical relationship between the 
syntactic and pragmatic dimensions. That means, the meaning of an artwork is constituted 
through a dialectical process arising between our own frames of reference (general 
knowledge, personal history, et cetera) and what we as interpreters can reconstruct (with the 
background of our own frames of references) of the author’s intentions and relevant contexts 
(historic knowledge − aesthetic, political and social circumstances, artistic styles et cetera) 
from the recognised sign structure.  
  
Even though Fischer-Lichte emphasises the non-settled character of the aesthetic sign (not 
having its own semantic dimension and being in a basic manner dependent upon the 
interpreter’s knowledge and frame of reference), this productive mode of ambiguity is not 
enough to account for what happens in the performances’ of the 1960s. Though she does not 
deny the semiotic potential of these performances, she abandons the approach to seeing them 
fundamentally in terms of signs or texts.   
 
Fischer-Lichte arrives at the conclusion that the problem is not solved by further refinements 
of the semiotic approach. It is, so to speak, the semiotic logic in itself that is the problem. This 
logic presupposes that the elements of a performance are structured in a certain way that can 
be traced back to a recognizable and underpinning system consisting of significant contrasts 
and paired functional differences.383  
 
I have pointed out how Variations II calls into question the circular logic of the hermeneutic 
circle by making demarcation lines arbitrary. The same could be said in considering the structure 
of paired functional differences. As in my presentation of the hermeneutic circle, semiotic logic 
presupposes a differentiating boundary − a dividing line. It is against its contrast that the 
settlement of meaning is arrived at and that identity (a domain of reality) gets its name. Therefore, 
Variations II does not only question the logic of the hermeneutic circle by its senseless borders, it 
questions also the functional difference at the core of semiotics.  
                                                 
383 I have emphasised that the aesthetic sign in Fischer-Lichte’s semiotic theory lacks its own semantic 
dimension and thereby in its nature harbours a high potentiality for ambiguity. However, even if a corresponding 
semantic dimension is lacking, that does not mean that the logic of sign formation has no importance. I would 
remind the reader of the Saussaurean system of paired functional differences. The semantic dimension Fischer-
Lichte describes is dependent upon the recognition of some kind of sign system − of a syntactic dimension. It is 
by the dialectic that thereby arises between the recognised sign system and the interpreter’s own frame of 
reference (pragmatic dimension) that the artwork acquires a meaning. 
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Fischer-Lichte, for her part, refers basically to two different strategies where sign formation is 
evaded:  
 
1) Theatrical elements are handled as emergent phenomena freed from meanings and 
functions defined by an underpinning coherent structure − theatrical elements appear 
as though they do not refer to anything other than themselves. An example is found in 
the untitled event at Black Mountain College, already referred to. In these instances 
materiality, the signifier and the signified fall together with the result that any 
“decipherment” of the meanings falls short. There are no other references for what is 
presented than what takes place.384  
2) A contrary strategy to letting materiality, the signifier and the signified fall together is 
to dissociate these aspects from each other. In these performances a signifier can be 
connected to the most divergent meanings.  
 
Both of the strategies mentioned open up a plurality of possibilities of meanings and 
associations because of the loosened relation between the theatrical means and any given 
convention. Even though they denote two opposite directions according to the relations 
between materiality, the signifier and the signified, both have in common that neither 
generates meanings grounded in inter-subjective valid codes. There is a disentanglement of 
theatrical elements from given interpretational contexts.385  
 
Understood as sign, it is by its sign-character that the artwork connects the aspect of an inner 
subjective space (site) of experience with the exterior of a shared world, both in a concrete 
sense of materiality (artefact/signifier) and in the sense of a shared communicative system 
(signified).  Through its sign-character the artwork functions as an interface between 
subjectivity and objectivity, endless interpretative possibilities and facts. In this way the 
ontological status of the artwork points to a kind of duplication of reality in continuation with 
the historic view of art as mimesis: The sign as an artefact is produced and exists as a fact in a 
shared world − many can experience it through their own senses − but its mode of being (as a 
                                                 
384 The theatrical elements become thereby de-semanticized (desemantisiert); they are loosened from a syntactic 
structure that could have brought some codified distributions of meanings. In this sense, they become 
nonsensical – they do not function as signs. The aesthetic theory of performativity becomes thereby a revision of 
understanding theatre as a semiotic system, pointing to the semiotic positions' limitations. 
385 Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 243-250. 
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sign) is to refer to a reality beyond its own concrete figuration. The sign’s ontological status is 
defined in mediating and communicating. Art as signs stands in an intermediary position 
between the flow of reality and our experiences of it. It is this ontological status as referent 
that is so to speak changed by the conception of art as an event in its own right.  
 
Through the concept event the relationship between art and reality acquires a different 
footing. We do not have a conception of art as a mediation of the real world through its sign 
character. Art is factual events that happen and transform our existential condition as it is. It 
does not stand in an oppositional mode to the real, nor is a tool through which we approach 
the fact of existence. It is itself a mode of reality, created by modes of actions, interaction and 
incidents. Its ontological status is therefore not situated in the sign function, but in the 
actuality of fateful reality. We are here of course moving towards an embodied conception 
where things evolve as much by their physical implications as in the potential for 
interpretations, a view we are going to examine later under the heading “The paradigm of 
embodiment.”  
 
While the semiotic approach (art as sign) sees the relationship between art and reality as 
mediated through the concept of meaning with the help of physical tokens, the view of art as 
event sees art as part of reality itself. This mode of reality, though, is brought about by active 
intervention: It is staged (mise en scène). Fischer-Lichte therefore does not preach a naïve 
correlation between our experiences of what happens and objective reality as it is: Our being 
in the world, inclusive of how we experience this state, is dependent upon modes of 
intervention, upon the aspect of mise en scène (staging). We bring about situations and events 
more or less purposefully. We do not only interpret our life situation, we actively contribute 
to how it is constituted.386 At the intermediary position between the flow of reality and our 
experiences of it stand more or less consciously performed interventions. The ontological 
status of performances is connected to such intervening activity, and it is through this 
intervention that a space for transformative experience is created.  
 
                                                 
386 Fischer-Lichte, in this respect, emphasises the performative mode of being self-referential and reality-
constitutive that intervenes and transforms the reality we dwell within. Meaning production is somehow given a 
different footing, not based in any uncovering of meanings “behind” the presented material, but based in the 
significance of the reality constituted at the site and its possible effects. 
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As described, the semiotic system of paired functional differences implies that we organize 
and communicate our experiences with the help of schemes of oppositions. Such schemes 
though are questioned by the performances to which Fischer-Lichte refers. She mentions in 
this respect oppositions such as art vs. reality, subject vs. object, body vs. mind, animals vs. 
human beings, signifier vs. signified.387  
 
A perspective of both/and, instead of either/or, is emphasized. This perspective is also 
articulated by the autopoietischen feedback-Schleife where participants contribute both as 
subjects and objects, actors and spectators, in a dynamic and alternating structure. Subject and 
object do not form a dichotomy, but gliding positions. We inhabit both states, though alternate 
in having them.  
 
Performances that let established schemes of opposites (dichotomous pairs of concepts) fail, 
constituting a reality of instability, blurring, plurality of meanings and transitions. Such 
performances resist being understood through dichotomous descriptions leaving us in a 
condition of being betwixt and between.  
 
As we have seen, Fischer-Lichte connects performative efficacy to a liminal state and the 
experience of threshold (Swellen Erfahrung). This experience is brought about through 
strategies of staging (mise en scène). Through staging, understood as strategies for creating a 
situation (more than strategies for representation), a specific attention is aimed at. This 
attention affects and shapes the aesthetic experience. Fischer-Lichte connects this attentive 
state to an experience of presence. This is not a passive reflection of being there in a 
contemporaneous mode. It draws attention to the presence and impact of the alternation 
between being touched and touch, between responding and acting. It brings attention to the 
experience of ourselves and others as embodied minds,388 palpable in our mode of becoming 
(our presence), meaning that we interact and contribute to how events unfold (the presence 
production) and exist in relations of exchange to our surroundings. In this state the world 
appears as re-enchanted. 
 
                                                 
387 Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 294-304. 
388 The concept ‘embodied mind’ will be commented later. See p. 166 ff. 
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This is a threshold experience; to be in the midst of the events’ developments, their 
transformation and constitution; to be in the midst of the evolvement of a shared reality on the 
verge of being; to be in the midst of a process in its moment of creation that has the double 
character of crystallization and throughput, being emergent and productive.  
 
Art is, in this instance, connected to modes of experiencing reality in its ongoing moments of 
production. Seen in this way, the relationship between art and reality is neither described 
through a mimetic relationship nor through segregation (art seen as an autonomous domain). 
Art and reality do not make up a conceptual contrast (dichotomy); art is part of reality that 
through different techniques (strategies) of staging draws attention to this shared reality and 
how we contribute and are affected by its productivity: 
 
In performance, both artists and spectators could experience the world as enchanted. As creatures in 
transition, they could apprehend themselves in the process of transformation.  
[…] the aesthetics of the performative marks the limits of the Enlightenment by undermining 
Enlightenment reliance on binary oppositions to describe the world, and by enabling people to appear 
as embodied minds. […] It does not call upon all human beings to govern over nature − neither their 
own nor that surrounds them − but instead encourages them to enter into a new relationship with 
themselves and the world. This relationship is not determined by an “either/or” situation but by an “as 
well as.” The reenchantment of the world is inclusive rather than exclusive; it asks everyone to act in 
life as in performance.389  
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Fischer-Lichte’s shift of emphasis from the sign function of art to its eventful character can be 
paralleled to a shift of methodology, from textuality to embodiment. Thomas J. Csordas 
outlines such a shift in the article “Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology” (1990). He 
does in this respect not disclaim the validity of semiotic approaches, but he presents the 
paradigm of embodiment390 as a dialectical partner to textuality,391 and the body as an 
alternative methodological figure to the text. 
 
The ‘body’ however is “not an object to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be 
considered as the subject of culture, or in other words as the existential ground of culture.”392 
The body is in this instance rethought from the scheme of body versus mind. Instead we have 
                                                 
389 Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 207. 
390 By paradigm Csordas understands a consistent methodological perspective, and as a paradigm of embodiment 
this perspective takes as its point of view our embodied condition. (Csordas 1990, p. 5.) 
391 Csordas 1994, p. 12. 
392 Csordas 1990, p. 5. 
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here an I-body that incorporates, in its embodied state, mental intentionality.393 It is an 
existential body which actively is-in-the-world, localised in a substantive web of 
connections.394 
 
I have mentioned that the sign can be understood as an interface between the individual and 
the social, the private interior experience and the act of externalization, the subjective and the 
objective, and that through this function as an interface it connects these different dimensions 
together and creates meaning as a category of shared values. We could argue that within the 
paradigm of embodiment the body itself takes on this function. The collective is, so to speak, 
inscribed in the individual body. The body vibrates in a field between the private and the 
public, between the localised singular and generalised ambitions. Such a notion could easily 
be associated to a representative entity engraved by cultural marks that in this sense exhibits 
textual qualities. Csordas however emphasises that it is not the representative body he has in 
mind.395 It is the living body occupied by its projects; it is the body of our perceptions that 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty points to. Csordas invokes in this respect Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
the preobjective396 and argues that a “fully phenomenological account would recognize that 
while we are capable of becoming objects to ourselves, in daily life this seldom occurs.”397 
The body therefore has the possibility to become a representative body that is handled as an 
object amongst others in the world, but this is not its exclusive mode of being: “Our lives are 
not always lived in objectified bodies, for our bodies are not originally objects to us. They are 
instead the ground of perceptual processes that end in objectification.”398 As embodied we are 
                                                 
393 The conception of an ‘incarnate subject’ (sujet incarné), or ‘body-subject,’ engaged in its world is derived 
from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perseption. See for example, Phenomenology of Perception (2002), 
pp. 161-170. 
394 Csordas refers to Donna Haraway for the notion of being “localised in a substantive web of connections.” See 
Haraway, 1988, who there outlines a conception of ‘situated knowledge.’ (Csordas 1994, p. 2.) 
395 By embodiment Csordas seeks a different understanding of the body than the representative body − the 
“analytic body”, the “topical body” or the “multiple body” − that he sees has grown within the anthropology of 
the body at the time he was writing (1980s and early ‘90s). (Csordas, 1994 pp. 4-6.) 
396 Like Heidegger’s notion of the ‘ready-to-hand’ (see former footnote at p. 123), Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a 
pre-objective relation to the world, points to the primordial intimacy between the experiencer and the 
experienced where the “known” not primarily shows up as delimited entities (unambiguous, given and 
measurable) independent of us, but transient, open and ambiguous phenomena (appearances) that we in our 
bodily constitution interacts with. Further, the transition from the pre-objective to the objective corresponds to a 
changed form of consciousness, from pre-reflective to reflective consciousness. In the pre-reflective mode, the 
‘body-subject’ experiences the pre-objective field of phenomena, when I begin to reflect, the pre-objective 
phenomena become objects.  What I initially experienced in a pre-objective mode sort of congeals and becomes 
something limited, different, an object opposite me. (See the introduction to Merleau-Ponty 1994, written by 
Dag Østerberg.) 
397 Csordas 1990, p. 6. 
398 Csordas 1994, 7. Csordas points in this respect to the play between preobjective and objectified bodies and 
how issues of this dynamics in our own culture have been addressed by contemporaneous critiques of our 
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not a given entity. We have become those we are through the play between pre-objective 
involvement and objectifying reflections − between loosing sight of ourselves in the act of 
pursuing a task and developing self-awareness through modes of objectifications that apply 
established conceptualisations and ideological knowledge.399  
 
The ‘body’ therefore as a methodological interface presents different perspectives than the 
sign for the thinking about unity between the private and the collective, the internal and the 
external, and thereby meaning as a category at this point of intersection. Firstly, the ‘body’ 
enables us to think meaning formation and meaning distribution in the frame of self-
referentiality and reality-constitutive/transformative power where the sense of meaning in this 
respect has an irreducible and non-transferable quality because it is linked to the existential 
condition of an individual. Meaning is here so to speak inscribed in the reality of existence 
itself, and in Heidegger’s words, is immediately recognised as the possibility of continued 
existence and wellbeing. As the site that gives rise to this possibility and that and carries it 
out, the body is the epitome of the fact that we exist. Meaning becomes thereby associated to 
the urgency of existential situations, to the reality of live opportunities. These meanings, 
though, do not disappear as the situation changes. The body as a methodological figure 
represents an opportunity to think the segmentation of urgent presence as bodily dispositions, 
bodily configuration and distribution. Not only as memories and experiences do we 
incorporate a world that we carry with us, but also through skills, behavioural patterns and 
strategies for solutions are meanings kept and sustained. 
 
But though the figure of the body has the ability to mediate the relation between the transitory 
moment and a lasting state, it also transforms the perspective in this respect. It is not through 
the grid of “paired function differences”, but by being included in life projects through 
embodiment that moments become sustained. We carry meaning with us and distribute and 
impart it through the way we socialize and face challenges.  
 
It is tempting at this point to invoke Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh and its chiasmic structure 
that appears in his late and unfinished work The visible and the invisible.400 We are here 
                                                 
notions of body and gender. (Loc. cit.)  
399 In the article from 1990 Csordas connects in this respect Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the preobjective with 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.  
400 Posthumously published. Merleau-Ponty, 1968. 
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presented an ontological approach that founds Being in a fleshy condition of dimensionality 
and latency. This pregnant condition exhibits folds and crossings and through the productive 
activity of the formations of Being are dehiscences401 created for existential awareness and 
influential power. Borders and boundaries become passages and zones of exchange within 
this theory. They are perforated and point to a gliding position between seeing and being seen, 
touching and being touched, the visible and the invisible, and they indicate a faith402 in the 
unique meeting between co-parties where the other part implies a positive indeterminacy at 
the other side of perception and interaction that cannot simply be deduced but has to be 
listened to, experienced, explored, interacted with and counted on. We can transfer these 
comments to the body as the keeper and distributer of meaning. It holds meanings by 
circulating them in its environment − by being involved in the world, by being in a co-existent 
mode that necessarily entails exchange and reciprocity. Though the I-body can illustrate a 
centripetal force, that connects different experiences and thereby creates a junction of sense in 
the midst of an engaging world, it also exhibits a centrifugal force on its environment. 
Meanings are in this respect created at these converging lines of centripetal and centrifugal 
power, being both placed (incorporated in the bodily reservoir and repertoire) and displaced 
(passed on to a worldly situation of interactive adaptation and negotiation) in an ongoing 
process of bodily-worldly formulation. We could therefore argue that we are here presented a 
picture of meaning formation, maintenance and distribution that is not sustained by the 
inscribed difference − the pure opposition − but by the movement of crossings and returns at 
the intermediary zones between existential junctions. Instead of a sign stabilized by its place 
in a semiotic structure of paired functional differences, we have a body that holds and 
performs its impact though processes of exchange. It is an entity of both/and in this respect 
that enacts the duplicity of the semiotic duality in an alternating structure between touching 
and being touched, between having influential power and being influenced and points thereby 
to a spectrum of positivity and elasticity between the opposite parties of co-existence. 
  
Though the ‘body’ in this respect points to a dimension of meaning that evades being fixed 
because of its agent’s mobile condition and the constant climate of negotiations at the 
                                                 
401 This metaphor from the field of botany visualizes both a gesture of opening, a certain discrepancy or slip of 
non-identity, and the efflorescent quality arising from this slip of non-identity, or excess, in the chiasmic 
structure of flesh, creating disseminating structures and pollinating exchanges.  
402 Merleau-Ponty stresses the grant of the ‘perceptual faith’, which belongs to our inherence to the world, that 
the world exists to be experienced − that it exists independently of our ideas about it. ‘Perceptual faith’ is 
discussed by Merleau-Ponty in the first chapter of The visible and the invisible (1968). 
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intermediary zone of transmission, the body as figure has, as mentioned, also the capacity to 
illuminate ‘meaning’ as a category of unavoidable significance and with indisputable power 
of determination. We can associate the immediate impact of existential situations to their pure 
actuality − how our bodies bear the stamp of the life we have led and practically remind us of 
this in our corporeality. As embodied, we are already a meeting point in the flux of life 
between the histories of the past and present situations, lines of genus and coincidental 
happening, and by our inevitable readiness for prospective situations the future vibrates in our 
perceptive awareness. The ‘text’ and the ‘body’ illuminate in this respect different qualities of 
fixedness and flexibility. While a semiotic system upholds meanings by binding them to 
collectively shared structures that exist independently of the individual phenomena, embodied 
meanings are so to speak fixed and rooted in the condition of not being transferable to 
somebody else. This sense of meaning is irreducible in its character of having to be 
experienced in the first person.  
 
The ‘body’ shows in this respect a certain inertia that the text does not share. From a semiotic 
point of view we can describe the same incident in different ways, through different sign 
constellations, and thereby evoke different perspectives on the very same subject, or a wide 
variety of interpretations can arise from a single text. Embodiment points to a different 
dimension of meaning formation directly connected to reality and reality as lived and felt by 
individuals. The body as an inertial system of presence maintenance can illustrate an 
actualisation of senses that harbour their impact by their singular positivity bound to a local 
site within an extended web of connections.403 We have thereby the possibility to ground a 
meaning system in the plurality of many co-existent participants. 
 
In embodiment we are presented with a conception where the immediate impact of existence 
exhibits its significance by concretely shaping our embodied condition.  However, the process 
of embodiment also evades being fixed. As embodied, meanings are to a certain extent 
already in flux; they are already ready to be modified and adjusted to altered situations, and 
when segmented they have already been put on the stage for further re-workings. The body, 
as a store of meaning, is already on the move, modifying the storage device as new 
experiences are stored. We have a perspective that follows changes in its foundation, and a 
perspectival foundation that alters according to what is perceived. Like the openness of 
                                                 
403 That as local, this site will also take on the character of being unique. 
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performative directionality − that is, its responsive conditionality − embodied meaning cannot 
be totally private, cannot be totally secluded from its environment, but will necessarily be 
involved in interplay and feedback.  We can highlight this last observation by drawing 
attention to the relationship between the process of embodiment as the localised sediment of 
meaning and the creation of a world horizon as a shared frame of experience and exchange. 
As embodied we are intimately of this world and an expression of it, but we also represent a 
‘reply’. We do not simply inherit a world but create new dehiscences of significance. 
 
We can now connect the body as a methodological figure to the definition of art as event. The 
‘body’ makes it possible to think of impact and sense in frames of actuality and physicality 
that add to cultural systems of organisation. Aesthetic sensuousness is, in this respect, directly 
connected to an existential awareness.  
 
The ‘body’ makes it thereby possible to think the significance of an aesthetic event not only 
through the formation and interpretation of signs but as sustained and continued through 
states of embodiment and interaction. The body, as a perceptive-interactive reservoir, acts as a 
point of inertia that accumulates the urgency of presence so it does not merely fly away but 
also becomes extended and swollen out in its actuality. The artistic event, in this respect, is 
however not only captured in individuated bodies. As an interface the ‘body’ points towards a 
shared environment. The body does not only embody an individual premise. It also 
incorporates a social world. There is an oscillating relationship between the generation of 
meaning in the sense of embodiment as the bodily-worldly site for my existence, and the 
generation of meaning (impact/significance) in the sense of creating/negotiating a shared 
world to experience.    
 
As we have seen, Fischer-Lichte emphasises how the art event exhibits a conditional 
dynamic. The performance as medium is dependent upon the co-presence of actors and 
spectators and the dynamic that arises between them. A form of collaboration creates the 
event where the pulsation between acting and reacting, initiation and response is necessary. 
Transferred to a paradigm of embodiment, this accentuates the dependency between the 
individual quality of embodiment and the aim of creating a common sphere. Therefore, we 
could say that the immediacy of existential impact is not only expressed in processes of 
embodiment but also through the events that we initiate and co-create as a shared world and 
common point of experience. The shared topography of the specific event as communal and 
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the involved processes of embodiment that incarnate and comment on the faces of this shared 
landscape from a local perspective, create the possibility for thinking theoretically of the art 
event as a multifocal and multilayered structure that exhibits meaning formations both in 
different tempi and forms and includes the dynamics of auto-poietic feedback coils in its 
workings. 
 
Csordas (1994) does not argue the methodology of semiotics should be disregarded. A 
methodology of body and embodiment can complement notions of ‘text’ and ‘textuality’.404 I 
understand Fischer-Lichte to be in the same vein. The aesthetics of performativity does not 
per se exclude semiotic theories (positions). Though I have presented her theory as a move 
away from a semiotic position, her performative stance does not abandon the usefulness of 
textual approaches. In fact she voices a complementary relationship between semiotics and 
performative theories in her book Ästhetische Erfahrung: Das Semiotische und das 
Performative (2001). Each approach supports different perspectives which are not mutually 
exclusive but reflect different emphases. Read like this, Fischer-Lichte’s outlining of the 
performance as an event does not exclude the possibility of interpreting this event as a text − a 
constellation of signs. However, in the aesthetics of performativity (2004) we sense the 
primacy of the performative stance. Firstly, from the performative platform – that of being 
done, performed within a dynamic of co-presence and interplay − the condition for a textual 
character arises. The preferred focus, though, is to a certain extent related to an economy of 
attention.405 Like the meditative practice that makes us conscious of the otherwise unnoticed 
act of breathing, performances can incite awareness to the automated processes that 
accompany our conscious life, or to fields of embodied knowledge that only find expression 
in practice through a reality-constitutive capacity. Or, like the heated political discussion that 
absorbs its participants and distracts them from being conscious of the exact pace of their 
breathing, their posture, or the act of scratching a head (although these factors in a live 
situation will probably colour the discussion’s milieu), a performance can enforce a textual 
reading by its applied means. 
 
The link between ‘text’ and ‘body’ in this instance can be associated to a relationship of 
dimensionality that points to different regions of meaning formation. Though the whole scale 
                                                 
404 Csordas 1994, p. 12. 
405 Fischer-Lichte 2004, discusses the economy of attention at pp. 289-291, there though within a different 
context than the one sketched up by me here.  
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of this meaning formation can be at work in a performance, our economy of attention would 
focus on some parts and leave others as supporting automated processes. This economising, 
though, is not a static process and our focus can vary during a performance. What we 
apprehend automatically – take for granted − can draw our focus and what has attracted our 
attention can be included in supportive structures.406 In contrast to my presentation of 
Gumbrect’s concept of meaning407 I have discussed ‘meaning’ in a broad sense in the current 
context. It is associated here with a kind of sustenance of some states − with a kind of 
extension and continuity − and with a kind of patterning of the flux of life. ‘Meaning’ 
understood in this way is a highly relevant category to both embodiment and textuality, and it 
does not exclude being intimately linked to physical states.408 This dimension of meaning 
however is illuminated differently, with alternative accentuations, by the figure of ‘body’ and 
‘text’ pointing to the dynamic stretch between the individual and the local significance of 
non-escapable existence and the creation of shared maps of orientation.  
 
The aesthetics of performativity move in this oscillating landscape between non-escapable 
existence and shared scripts, though with special attention to the modes of reality production 
created in the live situation of co-presence. This includes a special aesthetic attention to the 
minutely nuanced processes of existential immediacy409 that evades semiotic introspection. 
Though the aesthetics of performativity displace the primacy of semiotic positions and instead 
approach art in the continuation of the performative gesture, and thereby indicate a different 
foundation for aesthetic reflection that points to a non-dualistic possibility for theorizing, this 
approach does not replace semiotic theories in the domain of sign analysis. To a certain extent 
the aesthetics of performativity add to semiotic stances in an attempt to elaborate a conceptual 
apparatus for those regions of aesthetic significance that the sign does not cover. 
 
                                                 
406 The experience of learning to play an instrument is in this respect an instructive example. From investing a lot 
of energy and focused attention to learn and adapt certain skills, these are at a later stage automatized and can 
support a focused attention about other issues. Further, we can go back to the automatized technique, 
consciously examine what we do, refine the technique, or perhaps unlearn some “bad” habits.   
407 See p. 142-143. 
408 ‘Meaning,’ presented here, does in this respect differ from Gumbrech’s definition. 
409 Immediacy is in this respect understood as a “temporally/historically” informed sensory presence and 
engagement; it is not unmediated in the sense of a precultural universalism but in the sense of the preobjective 
reservoir.” (Csordas 1994, p. 10.) 
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Cage emphasises that sounds have their own intrinsic value (their own being) independently 
of the composer’s intentions. The material, so to speak, has to be met as having its own life, 
its own motivations beyond our desires.  
 
We could now think this intrinsic value according to Heidegger’s notion of the ‘earth’ as that 
which “shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up”.410 That is, if the 
work is seen as setting up a world and letting the earth be seen, and the earth represents an 
aspect that withholds itself from being known, we could read the encounter with the artwork 
as also being an event for reflecting on what withholds our knowledge, but at the same time 
conditions it and contributes to our existence. If we turn this reflection into a Cagean kind of 
rhetoric, we could say that we should respect our non-knowledge by taking it into account 
when we meet people and things of the world, for example by approaching the musical 
material as having a life of its own that we cannot fully comprehend, but can leave space for 
and meet respectfully.  
 
The position sketched over could, in fact, be problematic according to a performative turn of 
perspective, not least if such a turn was based on an extreme reading of Butler’s upside-down 
perspective.411 Even though the significance of physicality is emphasised in this perspective 
by its accentuation of our embodied being, this body as material acquires an identity firstly by 
being staged through performative acts. Identity and predispositions do not need to be 
equalised. However, the Butlerean perspective can give the impression that the material is 
empty of an “own life” − of material imprints for their own sake − and becomes just what it is 
as a result of constructions.  This extreme reading calls attention to a potential lopsidedness of 
constructivism within available concepts of performativity that are problematized by Cage’s 
aesthetics and practice. Because, although Cage can furnish us with excellent examples of 
how a performance can construct an identity that did not exist prior to presentation (for 
example with 4’33’’ discussed in this context later) we could argue that in these constructions 
he primarily creates an awareness of life lines that exceed our constructive grasp.412 With 
                                                 
410 Heidegger 1971, p. 47. 
411 See former presentation at p. 108-109. 
412 See Hayles 1994, which is presented in chapter six. She uses ‘worldline’ to denote a sequential path of 
connected events − chains of cause and effects −, and uses Cage’s chance operation to illustrate the complexity 
that emerges in the interacting zone between lines that initially acted independently.  
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these comments in mind I will now look at the aspect of material and materiality from the 
point of view of a performative turn. 
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The Butleran perspective, as sketched before turns the view upside down by rather then 
questioning what is expressed, focusing on how performances create a sense of identity and 
confirm it through repeated patterns of “doing your body”. Included in this shift in 
perspective is a certain attack on the dual construction of body and mind. Our identity and 
physical appearance cannot be detached from the embodying process that materialises 
possibilities given in social conventions and repertoire. That is, our materiality, our 
physicality, cannot be separated from our performances of identity, and our identity cannot be 
detached from the performance of our body. Can we transfer this understanding of our 
physicality to the aesthetic theme of materiality?  
 
Fischer-Lichte discusses the aspect of a performance’s materiality under the heading “Zur 
performativen Hervorbringung von Materialität” − “Towards a performative generation of 
materiality” – in her Ästhetik des Performativen. This heading is a reminder of the upside 
down perspective of Butler’s concept of performativity, and triggered my interest when I was 
first introduced to her aesthetic theory of performativity. I was intrigued by her presentation 
whereby the material aspect is not understood as something having a pre-existing potential 
which can be given a specific shape, as clay which can be shaped into pots, or building bricks 
which can be put together in different forms. Instead the material – in its materiality, in its 
nature as material – first appears as such (as material at all) through performative acts.  4’33’’ 
by Cage can be an illuminating example. The sonic material of this piece is not a scale, 
harmonic progressions or a gamut of sounds. There is no given material that then is shaped 
and presented as a worked out piece of music. The piece consists only of worked out portions 
of notated tacet. The musical material of the piece – sounds that just appear without intention 
– is brought to attention by the acts performed by the performer live at the concert. For 
example, at its first performance the eminent pianist David Tudor entered the stage, sat down 
at the piano as expected, then shut the piano lid. After 33 seconds in concentrated silence he 
opened it in order thereafter to shut it again. This time he waited for two minutes and forty 
seconds before the lid was opened and the last movement was introduced as the former two 
by shutting the lid. This last part lasted for one minute and twenty seconds. Then the piece 
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was over and Tudor had not played a single tone. He had used the conventions of giving a 
classical concert, though not playing anything, but had performed being silent (as we might 
imagine a percussionist in a symphonic orchestra does when he/she has portions of tacet in 
their part).413    
 
At a second working through of Fischer-Lichte’s theory, I wondered if perhaps my first 
reading was too radical, or even wrong. The materiality discussed was perhaps not as general 
as I had read it in the first place. Perhaps a more correct understanding was to think of the 
project as a theorizing of the specific materiality of a performance. That is, a performance 
does not have at its disposal a fixable or tradable material artefact. It is transitory and elusive. 
It exhausts itself in its current (immediate) presence, that is, in the permanent process of 
becoming and ending, and in the autopoiesis of the feedback coil. This does not hinder the use 
of objects in a performance, but the performance in itself, in its totality, cannot be reduced to 
a collection of these objects. When a performance is documented, for example by being 
captured on film, the performance’s materiality is transformed into a new type of materiality. 
Documentation can never function as a perfect double; the documentation transfers the 
performance into a new and other type of manifestation that has its own structure of medial 
character, materiality, semiotic quality and aesthetic being. From such a point of view, a 
performance cannot entirely be repeated. Essentially, both a performance’s medial character 
and its materiality dwell in the performance’s presence in real time.414  
 
My two readings of Fischer-Lichte – or perhaps more correctly, my first more superficial 
reading and my second correction – do not need to annul each other. In fact, they can be seen 
as supplementary. Both ‘material’ read in a sequential way as denoting a state before the 
material’s shaped out condition, and ‘materiality’ read synchronously as an aspect of the case 
under consideration, are affected by a performative turn. The transitory quality of 
performances is accentuated and the aspect of materiality is linked up to this temporal quality. 
Firstly through performative acts the material is actualised and provides the performance with 
its specific materiality that is brought forth, maintained and transformed though the course of 
the accomplishment of the performance.415 Butler’s shift of perspective is therefore easily 
                                                 
413 This example will be further discussed later in connection with the presentation of performative space at p. 
169 ff. It will also appear clearer in that context how this piece stages non-intentional sounds. 
414 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 127. 
415 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 227. 
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brought to mind, but this turn also carries with it some difficulties such as the non-identity, so 
to speak, of the material (if we really extend Butler’s shift of perspective) − its emptiness 
before realized through performative acts. These questions are quite interesting when 
considering Cage’s aesthetics and his emphasis on the sounds’ significance in themselves.  
 
As we have seen, Butler uses the concept of performativity to re-think our gendered being as 
being generated and established through performative acts, through processes of embodiment.  
The performative acts as bodily actions are thought of as being non-referential insofar as they 
do not refer to something predetermined, an inner core, a substance, or just an essence of 
some sort of which the actions are expressions. Fischer-Lichte incorporates parts of Butler’s 
theorizing about body and identity, and transfers the perspective of bodily actions as 
performative acts to the sphere of aesthetics.  However, in transforming these ideas to the 
theatre, she emphasizes how the actor acts in a position of tension between his/her own 
embodied being-in-the-world (“leiblichen In-der-Welt-Sein des Schauspielers”) and the role 
of presenting/representing a (fictitious) character (“Darstellung einer Figur”). This tension 
bestows the conditions and the possibility for a performative generation of corporality 
presented on the stage and the manner in which the audience can perceive this embodied 
condition.416  
 
To illuminate Fischer-Lichte’s concept of embodiment, a brief summary of her historical 
outline is helpful.417 She identifies two important directions developed within German theatre 
in the second half of the 18th century: The development of a literature-theatre 
(Literaturtheater) and the development of a new realistic-psychological art of acting.  
 
A school developed where the aim of the art of acting was to express (manifest) the written 
play as closely to the written version as possible. The written text was the authority for what 
should be presented on the stage. The tension between the actor’s own phenomenal body (the 
actor’s actual corporeal presence) and the actor’s role as representing a character in the play 
should be transcended in favour of the represented character. Embodiment (Verkörperung) in 
                                                 
416 Ibid, p. 130.  
417 Even if her presentation is done at the backdrop of the history of theatre, we can see clear parallels to Goehr’s 
historic presentation and Goehr’s explanation for the dominant position Werktreue has got within Western art 
music. In fact, the historic interpretation of ‘embodiment’ presented by Fischer-Lichte and the ideal of 
Werktreue has clear parallels that are affected by the re-interpretation done within the aesthetics of 
performativity. 
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this context was understood as a concept to designate the actor’s transformation of his/her 
own phenomenal, perceivable body as much as possible to a semiotic body (semiotischen 
Körper).  This semiotic body was at the drama’s disposal to express the (linguistic) meanings 
written in the text. The audience should have the opportunity to find in the actor’s corporeal 
presence a perceptible body of signs (Zeichen-Körper). The factor of bodily qualities that was 
not directly linked to the text’s meanings should ideally be transcended and erased.418  
 
Such a conception, Fischer-Lichte argues, is based in a concept of meaning that is in turn 
based in a two-world theory.  Meanings are understood as entities of the mind that are 
expressed through physical signs − signs that make the meanings visible.419  
 
Contrary to this concept of embodiment, where the actor’s phenomenal body (corporal 
presence) is conceived as being completely transformed into the character of the play, the 
concept Fischer-Lichte operates with aims to reflect the way the phenomenon of the body (the 
actor’s material) is handled and explored in theatrical performances and performance art since 
the 1960s. The aim here is not to completely transform the actor’s phenomenal body. The 
performances work from the doubleness of being a body (Leib-Sein) and having a body 
(Körper-Haben), from the phenomenal body (phänomenalem Leib) and the semiotic body 
(semiotischem Körper), and do not regard the body as something which can fully be 
controlled and transformed. The actor’s use of his/her body is founded in an actual existence, 
the actor’s own embodied being-in-the-world (leiblichen In-der-Welt-Sein). By this, Fischer-
Lichte argues, the condition arises for a new and radical definition of the concept of 
embodiment (Verkörperung).420 This redefinition accentuates the notion that the first 
condition for presenting the human body as an object, theme, source of symbol-building, 
material for generating signs, product of cultural inscriptions and so on, is the human being’s 
embodied (corporal) and existential being-in-the-world (Leibliche In-der-Welt-Sein).421  
 
The constructed nature of materiality encountered with the Butleran shift of perspective, is 
here somehow questioned. The material, the actor’s own body, adds something to the picture 
of embodiment. We are here reminded of Heidegger’s emphasis on the aspect of our “thrown” 
                                                 
418 Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 132-133. 
419 Ibid, p. 133. 
420 Ibid, p. 139. 
421 Ibid. p. 153. 
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factual existence.422 The material has qualities that resist easy incorporation and add their own 
imprints.  
 
We have seen how Heidegger deconstructs a work concept based on a thing-conception and 
instead brings to the fore the event which the work, by its being, initiates and upholds. A kind 
of performative generation of materiality is here in operation, because nothing can really be 
experienced without the projective movement, the creative intervention that the work, in its 
created being, represents. This movement is reflective and involved in its character, and it 
brings us to a concerned encounter with the materiality of things. However, within this view 
there is also something that eludes being captured by construction. The performative gesture 
meets resistance. We could say that the phenomenon of ‘earth’ represents a resistance that 
presents a quality of the material that resists being accounted for by the performative pursuit. 
The phenomenon of ‘earth’ resists being completely incorporated in the ‘world’s’ exposing 
movement and illustrates how the performative gesture resides in a meeting, even described 
in such strong terms as a struggle. In the light of Heidegger’s theory, therefore, embodiment 
could be seen as a kind of configuration emerging from the tensional meeting between 
inherent qualities of the material, hideous in its character with unknown qualities and histories 
to be met, and the performative drive to incorporate these in life projects that head towards 
the future.   
 
?3@3= #$)&
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Fischer-Lichte does not problematize to the same extent the constructivist traits inherent in 
the Butlerian concept of embodiment as she draws attention to the concept’s capacity to 
reflect the process of becoming.  Materially, the performer – the living unity of body and soul 
– is somehow not available; the performer is not, but becomes.423 This phenomenon of 
presence (Präsenz) in an embodied condition of becoming shows a different dynamic 
between body and mind than the dichotomous view that has dominated Western traditions. 
When an actor presents his/her phenomenal body as vital and energetic and by that generates 
presence, he/she then reveals himself/herself as an embodied mind. That means, he/she is 
                                                 
422 See for example Heidegger 1962, p. 174. 
423 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 158. 
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revealed as a being where body and mind cannot be separated. The one part gives the other.424 
Mind operates in the continuation of our embodied state, and the body exists in the 
continuation of our soulful character expressed in processes of embodiment that incorporate 
mental imaginativeness and intentionality as part of our bodily constitution.  
 
Fischer-Lichte further connects this embodied presentness, which in fact is a state of 
becoming and draws attention to the multilayered presence of an I-body, to an aesthetic 
category of presence. Like Gumbrecht, she finds in this phenomenon a different tool to think 
aesthetic impact than through a model of interpretation. ‘Presence’ in this context is seen not 
as an expressive quality, but dealt with as a performative quality that is generated through 
specific processes of embodiment and masteries of space that bring about a heightened 
awareness of what is present in the moment in its full materiality. That is, she emphasises like 
Gumbrecht the ability to generate presence and sees this production in connection with 
performative abilities and techniques. In this respect she differentiates between a weak 
concept of presence and a strong one. The weak concept of presence refers just to the pure 
presentness of an actor’s phenomenal body (phänomenalen Leib). The strong concept of 
presence designates a presence revealed through an intense experience and awareness of 
contemporaneity and present-ness. Such an impressive experience is described as being like a 
stream of magic, like a source of energy or an energy field, which reveals the ordinary in a 
striking way: The being of humans as embodied minds.425 As a performative quality, 
therefore, we can use ‘presence’ as an aesthetic category to analyse strategies that initiate 
heightened awareness, and to use Gumbrecht’s vocabulary, produce presence-effects.426 
 
The concept of presence that Fischer-Lichte presents is associated to a striking physicality. 
But by being connected to the conspicuousness of an I-body that performs within the 
doubleness of being a body (Leib) and having a body (Körper), in the bodily stretch between 
the phenomenal leib and the I-body’s capacity to produce a representation, between pre-
objective involvement and objectifying reflection, this concept parallels Heidegger’s 
conception where material presentness is unified with a transcending vision, though without 
reducing either aspect to the presence of the other. Nevertheless, like the I-body of Merleau-
                                                 
424 Ibid. pp. 170-171. 
425 Ibid. p.165. 
426 I must remark in this respect that Fischer-Lichte differentiates between ’presence’ and ’presence-effects’, and 
she declares that the aesthetic theory of performativity is an aesthetics of presence but not an aesthetics of 
presence-effects. (Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 174-175.) 
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Ponty’s philosophy that emphasises the bodily condition of a Dasein and thereby transfers 
weight within the internal structure of being-in-the-world to the fleshy condition of local 
exchange,427 physicality is given a more prominent position in the conception Fischer-Lichte 
presents. ‘Presence’, as an aesthetic category, is associated to the immediacy428 of bodily 
sensuousness that includes a readiness to respond. Processes and energies connected to our 
bodily presence are in this respect emphasised. Furthermore, with reference to our earlier 
presentation of the body as a methodological figure within a paradigm of embodiment, we 
could say that ‘presence’ is attached to the generation of sense connected to our embodiment 
that is self-referential and reality-constitutive. It is a present sense connected to the urgency of 
existence − a meaning we cannot flee or transfer to others, but must be experienced.  
 
Fischer-Lichte, like Gumbrecht, focuses on the sensitizing processes involved in the phenomenon 
of presence and tones down the processes of conceptualisations. ‘Presence’ is associated to the 
vitality and energy that we, as living embodied beings, represent and how this energy can be built 
up and put into circulation. This energy moves us and makes us respond as a psychosomatic 
unity. 
 
As we have seen, the phenomenon of presence is connected to the concept of embodiment; 
presence is a performative quality. Furthermore, a strong concept of presence is linked to the 
conception of an embodied mind. In fact, Fischer-Lichte reserves a different conception for 
the strong awareness of the being-there of things.429 She develops a differentiated conceptual 
apparatus for the dimension of the liveness of aesthetic performances based in an analysis of 
the role of actors, objects and space as elements constituting the materiality of theatre.430 
Maybe such a distinction can be of analytical help in some instances, but I find this kind of 
differentiation unsatisfactory with regard to Cage’s aesthetics. To reserve a different concept 
for the strong present-ness of people than for example animals or things indicates an 
anthropocentric approach that is questioned by Cage’s aesthetics and artistic practice.431 
                                                 
427 This point will be further discussed in chapter six. 
428 See former remark to ‘immediacy’ in footnote at p. 159.  
429 The concept she uses in German is Ekstase (ecstasy). She writes: “Der Begriff der Ekstase meint also nicht 
ganz dasselbe wie der Begriff der Präsenz. […] Während es sich bei Präsenz jedoch um energetische Vorgänge 
zwischen Menschen handelt, lässt sich den Dingen wohl nur bedingt eine in ihnen bzw. von ihnen erzeugte 
Energie zusprechen.“ (Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 202-203.) 
430 Fischer-Lichte operates with ’presence’, the ‘ecstasy of things’ and the ‘atmospheric space’.  
431 It must be mentioned that Fischer-Lichte introduce a anthropocentric criticism by theorizing the role animals 
have got in performances since the 1960s as equal co-performers that contribute to the auto-poietic feedback coil 
and bring about heightened awareness of the situation’s presentness and emergent quality. E.g. Joseph Beuys’ I 
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Besides, ‘presence’ becomes thereby split up into different sectors. The all-inclusive term is 
somehow lost. Fischer-Lichte’s concept differs in this respect both from Gumbrecht’s concept 
and Gadamer’s presentation of the phenomenon that I will soon present. It has to be said in 
Fischer-Lichte’s defence that she operates with an inclusive term, the concept of 
reenchantment,432 which arguably covers the other forms of strong presentness and to a 
certain extent presents the all-embracing term that I seek. Still I find her approach in this 
respect problematic. 
 
My discomfort is not only based in a kind of categorisation that upholds a form of 
anthropocentric approach, but also in loosing the view of an inclusive phenomenon. That is, 
we could argue that from an experiential point of view the phenomenon of presence is 
characterised by being inclusive in its character. I would like to exemplify my point by again 
bringing Gadamer into the presentation, this time by presenting some of the ideas in his 
reflection upon art as festival.  
 
By the term ’festival’ Gadamer emphasises not only the communal and social character of art.   
‘Festival’ also represents a temporal structure of presence: “The temporal character of the 
festive celebration that we enact lies in the fact that it does not dissolve into a series of 
separate moments.”433 ‘Presence’ is linked to a phenomenon of time that is defined by an 
inclusive and absorbing experience. Our time experience is often marked by the unfilled 
intervals indicated by the moves of clock hands. Time passes by, step by step; we run to be in 
time, or are bored by lapses where “nothing happens”. Time is here seen as empty and a 
measure to be filled. It is not experienced in its own right, but approached as something that 
has to be “spent”.434 The temporal structure of presence represents a different experience; 
time is experienced as fulfilled and autonomous:  
 
There is in addition, however, a totally different experience of time which I think is profoundly related 
to the kind of time characteristic of both the festival and the work of art. In contrast with the empty time 
that needs to be filled, I propose to call this “fulfilled” or “autonomous” time.435  
 
                                                 
like America and America likes me (1974; René Block Galerie New York). (Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 176-186.) 
432 The concept of re-enchantment is an inclusive term that we could argue embraces the other phenomena of 
conspicuous presentness: When the performers appear as strikingly present, things become ecstatic in their 
appearance and the room emerges as atmospheric, the world turns up as a re-enchanted place to exist within. See 
former quote at p. 152.  
433 Gadamer 1986, p. 41. 
434 Gadamer 1986, p. 42. 
435 Ibid. p. 42. 
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I will just point out some of the aspects of this phenomenon of fulfilled time:  Firstly, like the 
conception of space as performative, soon to be here discussed, fulfilled time is not separated 
from what happens. Time appears not as an empty measure; it is what we could call 
materialised time. In this way temporal, spatial and material qualities fall together and by 
their internal organisation define the resulting time structure. In other words, the time of the 
festival is not detached from its enactments. Secondly, I will refer again to the human mode 
of being presented in Being and Time (Heidegger), and the temporal structure thereby 
outlined. What I have in mind is the unified phenomenon of time where the present 
incorporates the horizons of past and future. We could perhaps read the festive character of 
art as an ecstatic presentation of this phenomenon. That is, by being absorbed in the festive 
moment, we do not speak about a temporal structure that temporalizes our experience as 
isolated “ecstatic” moments that appear one after the other with no memory or future. We 
speak about an experience where past and future is present in the moment as a “sounding 
board” for what happens now in its full materiality. 
 
The inclusive quality of this time-experience is further accentuated by Gadamer’s emphasis of 
the communal character of festivals that unite everybody: “If there is one thing that pertains to 
all festive experiences, then it is surely the fact that they allow no separation between one 
person and another. A festival is an experience of community and represents community in its 
most perfect form.”436 We could therefore ask if it really would be theoretically advantageous, 
even for merely analytic reasons, to split up this phenomenon into different categories 
according to what presents itself / is present.  
 
3.4.1.1 $!$&(%"
Like Gadamer’s description of fulfilled time, the phenomenon of space can be approached as 
a materialized space that includes in its conception the use and experience of it; it can be 
understood as a performative space.437 This is a space that is conditioned by what happens 
there; its appearance is intimately linked to the performance’s spatiality generated by 
performative acts. The spatial quality becomes in this respect a transformative and fleeting 
phenomenon. It does not exist before or after a performance, but is brought forth by and 
                                                 
436 Ibid. p. 39. 
437 The notion presented here of ‘performative space’ is a rendering of Fischer-Lichte’s concept basically 
outlined at pp. 187-200 (Fischer-Lichte, 2004).  
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through the performance.  
 
When performative space is understood in this way geometrical descriptions do not need to be 
discarded but alternative perspectives are made available. The perspective of a performative 
space opens an understanding of the performance’s spatiality as emerging in the interaction 
between the actual shape of a venue and the performed acts at the site, including the 
performance’s generation of imagined, fictional spaces. That is, a performance’s specific 
locality, conceived as a performative space, opens certain possibilities for how and which 
relations can be established between actors and audience, and it opens up certain possibilities 
for which movements and perceptions are likely to appear at that specific site. Therefore, 
through the specific qualities of that place, the space contributes to the organization of what 
happens there. At the same time, the specific production shapes how this locality appears and 
is experienced by the participants. The space is in a certain sense mise en scène (staged).  
 
The category of space as performative denotes a continuously changing phenomenon. It is 
generated by interaction and co-determination where the spatial characteristics are not 
detached from the contributions of actors and spectators’/listeners’ movements and 
perceptions; it is a space that cannot be thought of as independent of the workings of the auto-
poietic feedback-coil. This spatiality includes the capacity to cross-fade between real and 
imagined localities, between fiction and what is actually present. Because of this cross-fading 
capacity, and by being at times in non-settled modes, the performative space takes on 
qualities of being in-between: It becomes a liminal place.438  
 
The performative space therefore is not any given entity like a space geometrically viewed, 
and as performative, it cannot be aligned to an artefact that is designed by one creator (or a 
distinct group). The space instead acquires the character of the event. The sonic aspect of a 
performance and its intimate linkage to how space is articulated, articulates itself and is set 
into reverberation exemplifies this emphatically. Again 4’33’’ by Cage is an illuminating 
example.  
 
Fischer-Lichte uses 4’33’’ as an example of how the performance site as an aural space (Hör-
Raum) – a room for hearing – has been explored. 4’33’’ broke with the paradigm of 
                                                 
438 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 199. 
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performances. Since the 18th century the rule was that just the sounds made by actors, 
musicians and technicians – the intended sounds (or those which were so unavoidable 
(technical sounds) that they had to be accepted) – were understood as constituting a 
production’s auditory character. Noise from the audience was disturbing.439  
 
But what constitutes the content of a piece like 4’33’’? What fills the silences? Who are 
“playing” when the pianist is asked to be silent (tacet – do not play)? Fischer-Lichte writes: 
“der Hör-Raum wurde überwiegend nicht vom Künstler hervorgebracht, sondern von den 
Geräuschen, die entweder von draussen in den Saal drangen oder vom Publikum erzeugt 
wurden.”440 The aural space was not created by artists but by the sounds and noises that either 
poured in from the outside or were made unintentionally by the audience. The orchestrated 
silence of 4’33’’ was filled with sounds not intended for a piece of music, but sounds which 
by chance made up exactly this soundscape, this aural space (Hör-Raum).  
 
The sounds that filled 4’33’’ had not been planned, they were not predictable and they could 
not be traced back to one source or originator. Fischer-Lichte sees this as an example of the 
work of the auto-poietic feedback coil. That is, together, the activity of the audience, the 
performer and other coinciding factors generated the sounds that filled 4’33’’. These sonic 
results were not planned or predictable: “Sie war zum einen der autopoietischen feedback-
Schleife geschuldet, das heisst durch die Handlungen des Akteurs und der Zuschauer erzeugt, 
die überwiegend weder plan-  noch vorhersehbar waren.”441  
 
Fischer-Lichte therefore argues that the phenomenon of a soundscape explored by 4’33’’ 
evidently does not appropriate the character of a work, of a distinct artefact. We are speaking 
here again about the character of an event.442 Furthermore, the Hör-Raum dissolves the 
boundaries of the performative space. The soundscape stretches itself beyond the limitations 
of a geometrical room where the performance takes place. Sounds from the outside permeate 
to the performance site and sounds from the performance leak to the outside. The 
performative space looses in this way its settled borders. The borders become permeable and 
                                                 
439 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 214. 
440 Ibid. p. 215. “The aural space was not created intentionally by the artist but largely by accidental sounds from 
outside and from the audience itself.” (The English translation, Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 123.) 
441 Loc. cit. “It was the result of unforeseeable actions of actors and spectators that constituted the autopoietic 
feedback loop, and of external sounds beyond the realm of the theatre.” (Loc. cit.) 
442 “Es ist evident, dass ihr kein Werk-, sondern ein Ereignischarakter eignet.” (Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 216.) 
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open for surrounding areas. Everything that by chance can be heard becomes elements of the 
performance and by that has the capacity to change the performative space and extend it.443  
 
The discussion ends by emphasizing how 4’33’’, by its exploration of chance and a 
soundscape’s ephemeral and indeterminate aspects, emphatically exemplifies the character of 
event that belongs to the spatial character of aural spaces: “Die Zufälligkeit, das Flüchtige und 
Unverfügbare der Lautlichkeit, ihr Ereignischarakter trat so geradezu emphatisch hervor. Der 
performative Raum veränderte sich auch und gerade als Hör-Raum permanent, entgrenzte 
sich und dehnte sich weit über den geometrischen Raum aus, in dem die Aufführung 
stattfand.”444 Belonging to this eventful character is the way the performative space changes. 
Precisely like the aural space of 4’33’’, a performative space shifts permanently, breaking 
down pre-set limits and extending far beyond the architectural-geometric space in which the 
performance takes place.445 
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Fischer-Lichte, as we have seen, grounds the performance in the ontology of an event, and not 
just any event, but the staged event. The act of staging, therefore, represents the performative 
quality that brings about exactly this kind of event. However, by emphasizing the contingent 
structures, the open-endedness of the performative gesture is accentuated. We could infer that 
Fischer-Lichte emphasises the nature of the event which depends on chance, indeterminacy, 
interplay and coincidences, and plays downs the significance of given norms, repertoire and 
conventions. To a certain extent she connects the ontological status of performances as events to 
the disruption of conventions, and not their enactment. This is highlighted by her emphasis on 
three interlinked complexes she finds especially thematized in performances since the 1960s:  
  
1) The autopoetic feedback coil and the phenomenon of emergence;  
2) Destabilisation; 
3) Liminality and transformation. 
                                                 
443 Fischer-Lichte 2004, pp. 216-217. 
444 Ibid. p. 219.  
445 This is a paraphrase of the English translation of the quote above: “Each performance emphasized the 
randomness, transience, and elusiveness of tonality and its overall nature as event. As aural space, the 
performative space shifted permanently, breaking down pre-set limits and extending far beyond the 
architectural-geometric space in which the performance took place.” (Fischer-Lichte, 2008, p. 125.) 
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The autopoietic feedback coil has been widely discussed already, but let me summarize some 
points. Firstly, the model of the autopoietic feedback coil points to interactive dynamics in 
operation as constitutive for the character of event. The event emerges and operates in the 
interplay between participants; between different factors; is fed, fuelled and brought into 
operation by the movements to the others and vice versa. It is this landscape of responses and 
reciprocity that defines the process character of the event that we consider here. We are not 
referring to a linear relationship where event A causes event B to happen. The autopoietic 
feedback coil reflects a responsive dynamic, coil like in its structure, where the event character 
resides in the movement of complementing actions-reactions where an action can both form the 
element of a new factor and at the same time be a reaction to something else. This situation 
creates an overflow. The action-reaction relationships produce something more than just the sum 
of the two factors, a time-space span taking on of its own accord auto-generative and auto-
formative elements. This time-space span cannot be thought of as being apart from the 
contributive actions, but neither do these actions arise independently of the resultant time-space 
span − the created locality establishes a new situation according to which to act. The overflow 
therefore expressed by autopoiesis and emergence, represents not only the unforeseen, but also 
resistance against the constructive traits of performativity. The next complex − destabilization − 
expands on the dynamics that unsettle conventions, showing how established organising schema 
can be put out of balance by the aesthetic performative and bring the participants into a liminal 
state. 
 
This liminal state is associated with an experience of threshold (Schwellenerfahrung) that 
brings awareness to phases of transformation − their open-endedness and irreducible 
character, their character of belonging to a shared nexus of interrelatedness and their quality 
of being non-transferable, defining my situation, my reality.446 It brings us to performance as a 
place where meaning systems are questioned and reworked. The aesthetic experience is 
thereby intimately connected to a field of cultural labour that has the power to transform our 
self-understanding and the schemas through which we approach our surroundings. The 
emphasis of the performative quality per se in the performances that Fischer-Lichte uses as 
examples, places this experience of threshold within the immediacy of existence − within the 
                                                 
446“Immer wieder hat sich gezeigt, dass die ästhetische Erfahrung, die Aufführungen ermöglichen, sich 
zuallererst als eine Schwellenerfahrung beschreiben lässt, die für den, der sie durchläuft, eine Transformation 
herbeizuführen vermag.” (Fischer-Lichet 2004, p. 305.) 
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reality of being embodied individuals tuned to act within social contexts:  
 
The state of betwixt and between, the experience of a crisis, is primarily realized as a physical 
transformation, in other words a change to the physiological, energetic, affective, and motoric state. A 
liminal state or crisis may also be induced by the conscious realization of physical change. Strong 
emotions triggered in the perceiving subject when confronted with sudden appearances in the space, fall 
under this category.447  
 
We can in this respect remind the reader of the creative intervention presented in connection 
with the Heideggerian work concept, or the solution oriented I-body that we find in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy. The immediacy of the existential condition − its urgent presence and call 
to be acted upon − makes it possible to anchor the productivity of meaning formations within 
the reality of a situation − its eventful character − even though habitual codes of orientation 
have lost their footing and we are asked for new orientations, for creative responses. 
 
The event character of ‘performance’ having the quality of being liminal and non-settled, 
conditioned by the contributions of many actors and factors, accentuates a critique of the 
autonomous work as the hallmark of art and the view that art results from the creative activity of 
one distinct and autonomous artist. The feedback dynamics stresses the interplay at work that also 
implicates the unforeseen. There will always emerge new and not planned elements that have to 
be integrated in the process.448  
 
Which alternative conceptions does Fischer-Lichte outline by basing her aesthetics on the 
ontology of the staged event and not the artefact? I will emphasize three main points here:  
 
1) A process perspective; 
2) The perspective of participation – a social perspective; 
3) To-be-in-the-middle-of-dealing-with-not-knowing-the-totality perspective as a 
situation of being-in-the-middle-of-presence-production. 
 
Fischer-Lichte, by grounding her aesthetics in the event and elaborate conceptions in accordance 
with the coil like dynamics of interplay, provides theoretical tools to explore different process 
qualities. Our subject-field to study becomes initiated processes, and even if we do not have a 
delimited artefact with certain properties to be analyzed, interpreted and explained, it would be 
                                                 
447 Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 177.  
448 Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 285. 
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possible to speak about factors, variables, guidelines, frames et cetera that modulate the initiated 
process. Fischer-Lichte’s transfer from creation to staging as one of the constituent concepts in 
the tripod staging-event-experience reflects this. The element of staging and how an event is 
organized becomes here essential. That is, taken to extremes, from viewing the characteristics of 
an unchanging object (like its main theme, motifs, harmonic progression, rhythmic organization 
and so on), the theoretical gaze is directed to what initiates and modulates a certain process: 
Which factors, variables and parameters are enforced and illuminated? Incorporated in this view 
are social perspectives and sensitivity to the significance of interplay.  
 
From the beginning on, Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetic explorations lead into a complex feedback-
structured model of a relational dynamic where importance is as much given to bodily presence 
and liveness as the involvement of mental capacities. This direction moves Fischer-Lichte’s 
theorizing into modes where established schemes of opposites as navigating tools are questioned 
as are dialectical models based upon oppositional poles, such as the mind-body division. The 
outlined model of the autopoietic feedback coil undermines the well-structured appearance of 
phenomena held apart, and may, by doing so, point at what is really at stake − to think the case 
from another position, from being within the art event, as when you walk within a Musicircus, not 
knowing the totality, where it really begins or ends.449  
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The transfer of perspective from that of standing opposite a distinct, delimited object − assumed 
to have certain properties that characterise its artistic identity and aesthetic potential − to the 
inclusive and conditional character of the event perspective has analytical consequences. Within 
music, for example, we have a well stocked toolbox for describing musical works according to 
their specific properties: Their form, how the material has been shaped into motifs, themes, 
harmonic progressions and so on. We know, so to speak, how to handle music as a specific 
artefact with certain attributes. At least we have a refined conceptual apparatus to do so. Fischer-
Lichte argues, though, that it is not the musical artefact that founds the discussed performances’ 
specific materiality and aesthetic character, but rather the course of being brought forth, 
maintained, transformed and extinguished. When the given is not there, how do we approach the 
process? 
                                                 
449 We will come back to this within-not-knowing-the-totality perspective in the chapter six.  
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From my presentation of the auto-poietic feedback coil, the alternation structure between action 
and response (performers and audience), the gliding state between subject and object positions, 
the emergent and transitory quality of a performance’s materiality, and the aesthetic character 
bound to experiences of presence and change (liminality), it may seem that we, by the transfer 
from object to process, have ended up with aesthetic issues that by their nature resist analysis. 
Different aspects, factors and contributors are so interwoven − conditioning and modulating each 
other’s contribution − that to try to split them up would destroy the unique character that we are 
seeking to examine.  
 
The aesthetics of performativity do not however negate the capacity for analytical encounters. 
Even though a category of properties to a certain extent has been rejected as an adequate 
description, we encounter events that are initiated and that through this initiation create specific 
situations and attention whereupon something happens − a process unfolds. Thus we deal with: 
 
1) Strategies of staging (mise en scène): We can explore the production plan and the 
techniques of staging that are used. (These can be described quite specifically and 
concretely.)  
2) Situation: The applied strategies contribute to create a specific situation (this situation can 
also be described in a quite literal sense), and a specific attention:  
3) Mode of attention: How the applied strategies in interaction with the created situation (the 
situation that has emerged) invoke a certain awareness (focus and attention) in those who 
participate. This includes the awareness and focus on certain initiated dynamics, forces 
and factors that contribute to shape the process which takes place.  
4) The modulation, restriction and concentration of the process through the chosen/used 
strategies: Which guidelines are imposed on the interplay between performers and 
audience and thereby how the auto-poietic feedback is controlled/focused; the strategies 
that are used to generate the performance’s materiality and so on. We are concerned here 
with processes that to a certain extent are governed.  Strategies can be detected (the aspect 
of intentionality) that aim to initiate and handle the processes that arise. But there is also 
the potentiality of “oversteering” (more or less aimed at), or a giving over of intentionality 
more or less intended where we move to the openness of intentionality and the auto-
poietic character of the process. Included in this picture is the exploration of different 
dynamics of co-presence and interplay.  
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It is precisely these staging strategies that I will use in the next chapter to create a space for 
analytical reflection. In that context we will more specifically discuss the themes of time, space, 
auto-poietic feedback coil, the performative generation of materiality, and presence, presented in 
this chapter, and use concepts elaborated by the aesthetics of performativity to discuss Musicircus 
as a case for analysis.  
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5  MUSICIRCUS AS A STAGED EVENT  
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If we shift our focus from the work of art to an understanding of Musicircus as a staged event, 
which perspectives are then opened up? Goehr’s analysis of the concept of the musical work 
uncovers a conception in which music is understood as an objectified artistic expression 
manifested in specific sonic constellations, a definite object of art which has a permanent and 
autonomous existence through a hypostatization of its ideal form. This ideal functions as the 
interpretative norm of reference for performances of the piece (Werktreue). Therefore, the 
musical work can be aligned to a platonic idea, which in its hypostatized ideality functions 
both as the general form the individual performance (manifestation) has to reflect to constitute 
a performance of the work, and it operates as the ideal norm (giving the telos of the individual 
appearances) that a performance strives to represent. Opposed to this, the concept of event 
highlights the aspects of transition and change; it emphasises the temporal dimension, 
inclusive of an awareness of the non-repetitional, processual and unforeseen qualities of 
artistic productions. 
 
The concept of event also highlights the situational character of an art production, including 
its place in history. An artistic event is not just aesthetic. It is also historical. Like a historical 
event, the artistic event is coloured and conditioned by its specific locality, its when and who 
and what contribute to this specific happening. Contrary to this, the work concept describes 
music as something that can be performed again and again, at various places and times, 
without this difference in location affecting the music essentially. 
 
Simplified, we can say that the work concept provides us with a conception where the art 
object − the musical work − can be seen as a lasting entity that has certain characteristics 
independent of where and when it is performed. The concept event, though, emphasises the 
situational character of artistic productions. However, confronted with an artistic event like 
Musicircus, it is difficult to keep these two conceptions (the work and the event) so strictly 
apart. This event is not just a historical event; it has also the character of a work that can be 
re-performed at different places and times. At least it acquires this character through re-
realisations of what we could call its design of staging.  My collected list, that I presented in 
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the first chapter,450 can be thought of as the score for these productions. This list could be 
different from one realisation to another depending on the resources available to those who 
stage the event and their priorities. However, understood as a design or an artistic idea, 
Musicircus has some general characteristics that can be detected and re-realised, or what we 
could call “eventualized” (made into a new and unique event) through new productions. In 
other words, it can be difficult to avoid some kind of fluctuation between the conceptions of a 
work and an event especially when one is confronted with the task of doing a Musicircus. 
This conceptual fluctuation could even be seen as a doubleness that is apparent particularly in 
the practical process of carrying out such a production. I am going to discuss these questions 
further in the chapter about the Musicircus we realised in Trondheim in 2006. 
 
The aesthetic theory of performativity separates the artistic event from other occurrences by 
emphasising its aspect of being staged. The staged quality of artistic productions secure their 
status as art, even if the actions performed are as ordinary as drinking a glass of water when 
you write a letter. Cage did this during a performance of 0’00’’ (4’33’’ No. 2) at Rose Art 
Museum, Brandeis University, in 1965.451 Based on the staged event, the aesthetic theory of 
performativity builds up an alternative analytical tripod to the interlinked concepts creator 
(artist/composer), work and reception, and instead emphasises the aspects of 
staging/production (Inszenierung), event (Ereignis) and aesthetic experience (Ästhetische 
Erfahrung) where the aesthetic experience is as much understood as a threshold experience as 
an interpretative activity.  
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Compared to a conception in which a work is created detail by detail like a sculptor carves out 
his/her creation in stone, the conception of staging can represent a more open-ended task: No 
work is worked out but distinctive initiations are made to make something (more or less 
specific) happen. These staging strategies would not need to aim “like an omnipresent and 
                                                 
450 See p. 37. 
451 See Pritchett 1993, pp. 138-140. 0’00’’ was composed in 1962, during his first tour in Japan. The first 
performance in Tokyo consisted in fact of Cage’s amplified writing of the score he performed: ”In a situation 
provided with maximum amplification (no feedback), perform a disciplined action.” Four other qualifications 
were later added to this basic instruction: ”With any interruptions. Fulfilling in whole or part an obligation to 
others. No two performances to be of the same action, nor may that action be the performance of a ’musical’ 
composition. No attention to be given the situation (electronic, musical, theatrical).” See also Fetterman 1996, 
pp. 84-90. 
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autonomous god”452 to control every step that is going to take place. As we have seen, the 
aesthetic theory of performativity bases its conceptualisations upon performances that in 
different ways illuminate the contingency of a performance’s situation. The factor of staging 
in this respect initiates an event and provides it with certain arrangements, like the initiation 
of a game or an experiment, but does not outline how it should proceed or what the result 
should be. Nevertheless the element of staging would also represent some distinctive 
regulations of what could, or would likely, happen. 
 
Transferred to the case of Musicircus performed in 1967, how was this event staged? Can its 
production tell us something about the aesthetic nature of this specific event and even 
Musicircus as a general concept?  
 
Musicircus actualises a situation where a lot of different music is performed simultaneously. 
We are often confronted with such situations, unintentionally, in our daily life. For example 
when we walk down a street in a big city or move through a corridor flanked with rehearsal 
rooms each containing an eager musician. However, such a situation of simultaneity breaks 
with the way composed music ordinarily is presented. The musical content of the different 
pieces performed does not need in itself to challenge or break with established practises of 
interpretation, but the way a Musicircus puts the performances together destabilises these 
same interpretational practices.  
 
Fischer-Lichte emphasises how performances since the 1960s and 1970s have staged 
situations, elements and aspects that are very difficult to understand in terms of hermeneutics 
or semiotics as for example when performances put the audience in a situation where 
interpretative norms become ambivalent. The non-coordination of simultaneously performed 
music is an example of this. The title of Musicircus, the chosen site and how the event was 
presented in 1967 can also be seen as examples provoking ambivalence − in the ambiguity 
between the interpretative norms of serious avant-garde art and the norms of popular 
entertainment like parties, carnivals, and circuses.453 An opposition between high and low 
culture (serious as opposed to purely entertaining pastimes) is destabilised and nearly made 
                                                 
452 The artist as the God-like creator in the aesthetics of genius and masterworks, see Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 
281. 
453 “A stand-up, eat-in, music-out, freak-down” is how John Cage describes the ‘Music Circus’ he will direct at 8 
p.m. Friday in the Stock Pavillion.” (Converse 1967c.) See chapter two, p. 39 ff. 
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meaningless. There are also other frames of interpretation, more strictly connected to classical 
music that are challenged, for example the undisturbed performance of a piece of music and 
the quietness of the listeners.  
 
We have seen how the aesthetic theory of performativity emphasises the active role of the 
audience as a counterpart and as “team-mates” to the performers. Performances since the 
1960s and 1970s magnify this factor of role alternation and audience participation.454 By 
different methods the audience is pulled to action. What about the circus event in 1967? We 
know that the composer Barney Childs had designed a percussion platform where the 
audience were invited to play and that there was a blackboard with special chalk where the 
audience could feel free to draw.455 Another aspect of audience participation, which perhaps 
is not so obvious but significant for the spatial character of Musicircus and implied by its 
arrangements, was the freedom for the audience to walk around, come and go. By this 
freedom of movement the audience took part in a dynamic articulation of the room, and 
probably it reduced the distance between performers and audience, both conceptually and 
physically. 
 
The model of the autopoietic feedback-coils including role alternating factors and unforeseen 
events make it difficult to sustain the artist’s position as autonomous and independent, 
creating, like a “God”, his/her art. The aesthetics of performativity arise, so to speak, from a 
conception of the creative community as the base for artistic events and not the autonomous 
artist, even in the instances where the community is established only for the duration of a 
performance.456 From chapter two we know that Cage’s circus was staged as part of a 
centennial celebration at UIUC and intimately connected to the University’s creative circles. 
In fact Cage says to Charles in one of their conversations that he was just happy to come up 
with the idea and did not himself organise the event: 
 
I had nothing to do with organizing the two American musicircuses − I was happy to just throw out an 
idea. But both times, in Illinois and in Minneapolis, someone was there to assume the role of a utility. 
Not someone who acted like a director, saying ‘Don’t do that’, but who acted in a way that facilitated 
the work of others.457  
 
                                                 
454 See Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 63-82. 
455 See p. 23, chapter two. 
456 See Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 82-100.  
457 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p.196. 
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The collaborative effort is also witnessed by Ronald Nameth in an interview I had with him in 
2006. He coordinated the visual aspects of the first Musicircus, and he mentioned that the 
whole creative community of UIUC was involved in the event: 
 
And he [Cage] invited the whole creative community to come to a meeting, and then we just all sat and 
discussed when he presented the idea. That’s why there wasn’t so much correspondence because we 
were all there physically. And, he was just like a magnet. He brought all these creative people, of 
course from music, but also, I was kind of involved, because I had been working a lot with projections 
and light shows with other musicians. So I was kind of involved with it on that side. And then 
eventually, I was asked to co-ordinate all the visual things for the Musicircus. And, […] he had help 
from the music department. A man named Jack McKenzie who helped him find this place [Stock 
Pavilion].458  
 
As regards the role of originator (composer), none of the previews site Cage as the composer 
of the event in 1967. In fact, a composer is not mentioned. What is presented is Cage as an 
avant-garde composer who helps to organise and facilitate the Musicircus. As we can see 
from Cage’s conversation with Charles quoted over, Cage mentions the role of a utility; the 
organisation of a Musicircus should ideally function in the same manner as utilities − function 
as facilitation for activity, not its restriction:   
 
John Cage: I know that it’s difficult to draw a line between the activity of a well-contained utility and 
that of, say, a policeman. But I’m sure that the difference exists and that it can be sensed. It’s really a 
question of recognizing how important the difference is and not letting it escape. 
 
Daniel Charles: Can you define it? 
 
J.C.: You need the same kind of organization for a musicircus as for a world’s fair. Let’s start from the 
beginning. When you go to the world’s fair, you first enter an immense parking lot. Such a huge 
parking lot that it might be very difficult for you to find your car again when you’re ready to leave. In 
Montreal, they solved that problem nicely. They labelled each section of the parking lot with the 
emblem of a different animal. It was easier to remember whether you belonged in the kangaroo, the 
snake, or the tortoise section. And they decided to use animals rather than words because people were 
coming from around the whole world and couldn’t be expected to understand a given language.459 
 
Cage, therefore, expresses ideas about how Cagean circuses should ideally be organised. This 
is exemplified by his satisfaction with the American Musicircuses at Urbana (1967) and 
Minneapolis (1970). Those who organised these circuses assumed the role of a utility and not 
the role of a director. Cage, though, was not as happy with the organisation of the Musicircus 
done in Paris in 1970:  
 
Cage: In the United States, the first two musicircuses came off in an atmosphere I felt to be harmonious 
                                                 
458 Interview with Nameth, 2006.  
459 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, pp.196-197. 
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with my ideas on world improvement. A lot of people working together without getting in each other’s 
way. In France, the same idea fell prey to ... a sort of social constipation! How do you resolve this 
problem? Should I blame the Parisian public? Or myself? Is it that I know America, in the sense that I 
know who David Tudor is, while I don’t know anything about France, or about what it’s like to be 
French? I can’t answer those questions. I would like to be able to say that all men, all over the earth, are 
but one and the same person.460    
 
In this respect, Cage emphasises the importance of space and enough space connected to the 
planning of a Musicircus: 
 
D.C.: When you began planning Musicircus in June and July, 1970, you insisted on the need for 
providing everyone with a maximum amount of space. But none of the organizers thought the turn-out 
would be so large. 
 
J.C.: And these works require more and more space ... an undivided space which truly allows artists and 
audience complete freedom of movement. Space must be just as free as time. Sound sources need an 
extremely wide spatial dispersion, especially if amplified sounds are involved along with ordinary 
unamplified sounds.461  
 
Literally speaking, how was the actual space organised in the first Musicircus? As we know, 
the site was a stock pavilion, a place that already had sawdust on the floor like at a circus. 
Nameth gave me this description of the place in the interview I did in 2006: 
 
[The Stock Auditorium] was like an oval with seats all around, and in the middle they have sawdust, 
and, you know, the cows could come in there. […] There was a roof on it. It wasn’t open to the sky. But 
it was very high and very big. So it was a very huge open expansive space. And there were no girders 
within the centring at all. […] And [Cage] thought that the room was perfect because it was like a 
carnival in United States or a circus where you have sawdust.462  
 
 
                                                 
460 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p.180. 
461 Ibid, p. 130-131. 
462 Interview with Nameth, 2006. 
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There exists a rudimentary sketch where an organisation of this venue is indicated: 
 
REALIZATION OF MUSICIRCUS (Folder JPB 95-3 Folder 344) 
4th paper: 
Perc. 
 
Double stops 
Singing 
poetry 
 
Jocey 
 
Perc. 
 
 
Cuomo 
 
Zamora            Cuomo 
 
           D.T. & 
 
          2 ...((?)) 
 
         Feedback 
 
        4 + 6 channels 
 
 
This sketch indicates the distribution of different platforms and performers. As mentioned in 
chapter two, spatial distribution is commented on in some previews and letters by Cage. 
There should be “plenty of space for the audience to walk around” and the audience should be 
in the round with “performers going in between them, around them, maybe even over 
them.”463 We can probably deduce from the sketch over that the organisation of the space was 
done deliberately and not by chance operations. Of course, because the audience had the 
opportunity to walk around, this mobility created an aspect of fluidity and chance in the 
formation of the space. The basic organisation however was planned. 
 
                                                 
463 See p. 37 in this thesis. 
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What about the aspect of time? How was time organised? The advertisements of the event 
inform those interested that the event was to start at 8 p.m. and continue until 1 a.m. So the 
event had a start time and an end time, but what about the time span in-between? How was 
this time period organised? 
 
As shown in chapter two, the previews connect the upcoming Musicircus to Cage’s former 
experimentation with happenings, especially the happening done at Black Mountain College 
during the Summer of 1952.464 There is no score for this happening, but we know that they 
used ‘time brackets’.465 The different performers had their own independent time schedule. 
The time brackets told the performers when they could perform, but not what should be 
performed. The performers could fill their brackets with a content of their own choice. One of 
these time schedules is archived in the music manuscript collection at the New York Public 
Library. It is the schedule for the projector. The information given is:466 
 
 
 
Stephen Montague who has both performed in several Musicircuses organised by Cage, and 
himself organised a number of such events, has informed me that time brackets were also 
used in the circuses in which he performed.467 Montague has also used chance-determined 
time brackets in those Musicircuses for which he was the curator. And there are sketches for 
Musicircus for Children (1984) in the John Cage Music Manuscript Collection at the New 
York Public Library that also indicate the use of time brackets. 
                                                 
464 See p. 43. 
465 Cage describes these ’time brackets’ in an interview, 1965: ”During periods that I called time brackets, the 
performers were free within limitations − I think you could call them compartments − compartments which they 
didn’t have to fill, like a green light in traffic. Until this compartment began, they were not free to act, but once it 
had begun they could act as long as they wanted to during it.” (Cage and Kirby and Schechner 1965, p. 52.) 
466 The document is at New York Public Library, call no: JPB 95-3, folder 197. 
467 Conversations with Montague in London, Spring 2005. 
Projector:  
 
Begin at 16 min  
play freely until 23 min.  
 
Begin again at 24:30  
play freely until 35:45  
 
Begin at 38:20  
play freely until 44:25 
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What about the first Musicircus in 1967? Did they use set time frames? I have not found 
information about the use of such schedules, either in the article by Husarik or the article by 
Rivest.  Cage does not mention their use either. 
 
I asked Ronald Nameth about this when I interviewed him in 2006, referring to the time 
brackets of the untitled piece − the happening at Black Mountain College − and the 
information given by Montague. He could not remember that there was any use of time 
frames at the first Musicircus. What organised the time span of the different performances, 
were practical concerns and the choices of the performers.468  
 
Surely it is necessary to have organisers to realize a Musicircus – someone to prepare and 
coordinate the event. And even if this organisation remains neutral with regard to the aesthetic 
result, or perhaps we should rather say, totally open to whatever the aesthetic result would be, 
the organisation would have some form of impact on that aesthetic result. The organisation of 
the event in 1967 can briefly be summarised into these points: 
 
- It was a collaborative effort − Cage brought up an idea and a creative community 
responded to that idea. 
- An unorthodox site was chosen, the Stock Pavilion that was usually used to exhibit 
livestock. This venue, however, was spacious and could provide the possibility of 
intermingling sought by the circus idea. Further, the site in itself, reinforced by the 
title of the event, contributed to associations with circus, animals and public 
entertainment that could initiate other associations and means of approach than the 
classic concert hall. 
- There existed a certain organisation of the space providing platforms for performers 
and free space to walk about for the audience. Further, the organisers provided stations 
where the audience were explicitly invited to perform and contribute to a mishmash of 
artistic visions.469 
                                                 
468 “It was on a very practical level that these things happened. Some people were playing, you 
know, gonna play another music somewhere else and had to leave earlier. You know, it was all 
based on whatever the needs were of the people involved.” (Interview with Nameth, 2006.) 
469 See chapter two, p. 23.  
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- The event lasted longer than an ordinary concert - from 8 p.m. to 1 a.m. The time 
between the appointed start time and ending was organised according to practical 
considerations. However, the organisers by their spatial organisation had provided for 
the possibility of a lot of different performances going on at the same time. 
 
I asked above what the specific production of the event in 1967 could tell us about the 
aesthetic nature of this specific event and even Musicircus as a general concept. In the rest of 
this chapter we will discuss further some of the aspects that I have touched upon here in my 
presentation of the 1967 production: The factor of audience participation and role alternation, 
autopoietic processes, aesthetic versus social issues, and the generation of the event’s 
aesthetic nature and materiality through certain organisational moves according to space, time 
and not least the initiation of inviting people to contribute.  
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The eventful character of performances is emphasised in the aesthetic theory of 
performativity. This character is further described through the relational dynamic of the 
autopoietic feedback coil. Theoretical attention is directed towards processes that emerge 
between people, between people and the performance site, between people and animals, 
between people and things. It is a relational dynamic. Three interlinked complexes are in this 
respect stressed which can be directly connected to these performances’ eventfulness 
(Ereignishaftigkeit), and which are doubtless significant for their aesthetic character 
(Ästhetizität):  
 
1) The autopoietic feedback coil and the phenomenon of emergence; 
2) Destabilisation; 
3) Liminality and transformation. 
 
In my analyses here, I want to dwell with the first complex denoted by Fischer-Lichte’s 
compound concept of the autopoietic feedback coil (die autopoietische feedback-Schleife). I 
think her compound concept can be helpful to illuminate aspects of Musicircus. Some of these 
aspects quite obviously fall within the conception she outlines and highlight the work of 
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autopoietic feedback coils:  
 
- A realised version of Musicircus does not have one originator, one source.  
- Musicircus as an idea/concept can basically be understood as an open invitation to 
participate.  
- There is no prescription for how the event should sound. 
- The audience can walk freely around, come and go, and by that make their own sonic 
and visual course of experience.  
 
Other aspects, in fact, resist to a certain degree falling easily into the outlined characterisation 
of the conception of an autopoietic feedback coil. This is especially the case with respect to 
the feedback element and the function of role alternation. I find this productive. There are 
nuances to detect through the prism of this compound conception. But first, let us inspect 
those aspects shown above which appear more obviously to represent autopoietic prospects. 
Autopoiesis, as we have seen, denotes self-creative and self-propelling processes of an artistic 
event. It denotes creative forces that emerge in the meeting between people, things and 
different factors; it denotes a force nobody has full control over, but which everybody 
contributes to and partakes in.  
 
Musicircus brings many independent performers together. It can be understood as an open 
invitation to perform simultaneously. Total anarchy, though, it is not, even if the Cagean 
circus can be understood as a musical event that seeks to artistically realise a form of anarchic 
community or society.470 For example, as we have seen, the spatial distribution of the 
performers seems to have been planned to a certain degree at the first Musicircus, and Cage 
emphasises that the performers and the audience have to be provided with enough space. 
However, the content of what the different performers did seems not to have been determined 
by a central organiser. When the performers performed, and for how long seems not to have 
been coordinated either. There was some organisation with respect to time, but this was, 
according to Nameth, done according to practical considerations.  
 
Even if the different performers could plan what they themselves wanted to do, they could not 
control what the others wanted to do. The constellation, or what we could call the collage   or 
                                                 
470 See for example quote at p. 43 from a preview of the event in 1967. 
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montage, resulted therefore with what we could call a self-creative, self-propelling process. 
That is, all the participants contributed to the formation of the event, what happened, how 
things sounded, the visions, movements and so on, but none had the full control or the entire 
overview of what happened. Autopoietic processes in this way saturate the aesthetic character 
of a Musicircus.  
 
‘Musicircus’ can be understood as a technique of performance.471 We can even call it a 
performative strategy. The basic elements of this strategy are simultaneity and abundance 
added to with space. That is, musicircus as performative technique is explicitly a spatial 
strategy.  
 
Seen as a technique we can understand musicircus as a continuation of Cage’s compositional 
techniques of chance operations and indeterminacy. That is, they are techniques that 
deliberately invite autopoietic elements to take place and shape the resulting music. This is 
often done in a systematic way, as for example in Cage’s method of performing chance 
operations as composer. The systematisation even enforces the autopoietic aspects. 
 
As a method of composition, chance operations become a way to explore self-propelling and 
self-creative potential in a material outlined by the composer. Through indeterminacy this 
exploration is shared with the performer.  
 
Musicircus as a technique of performance can be understood to take this exploration of 
chance, indeterminacy, and by that, autopoietic aspects of music making, a step further to the 
live site of performance and include the audience in these processes. It is not just the 
composer who is confronted by autopoietic power through using chance operations, or the 
performer that is put in the composer’s situation using chance operations to realise 
indeterminate scores. The technique of musicircus makes the autopoietic dimensions also 
strikingly present for the audience, among other things in the way the audience can move 
freely around and make their own explorations. 
 
To examine musicircus as a performative technique more thoroughly with an eye to the 
autopoietic feedback coil, I want to make a detour that will hopefully enlighten our case 
                                                 
471 See description in chapter two, pp. 26-28. 
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further. The detour is HPSCHD, the composition that was Cage’s main project at UIUC. 
Unlike Musicircus, which appears to have been an event planned shortly before it was done, 
HPSCHD took two years to complete. Cage was not alone in this work. Lejaren Hiller 
became heavily involved and ended up being a co-composer of the work.  
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The work consists of seven solos for harpsichord and 52 computer-generated monaural 
tapes.472 Beside this, an amazing amount of visuals were prepared and showed at the first 
performance. HPSCHD does not have an ordinary score. What we can call a score is a 
collection of instrumental parts, which together with the material of tapes and visuals (slides), 
can be rented but not bought. This rentable material consists of the seven solos, 3 sets of 36 of 
the 52 composed tapes and 73 boxes of slides.473  
 
The only information that can function as a score for a whole event is written introductorily in 
each harpsichord part: 
 
Twenty minute solos for 1-7 amplified harpsichords and tapes for 1-51 amplified monaural machines to 
be used in whole or in part in any combination with or without interruptions, etc. to make an 
indeterminate concert of any agreed upon length having 2-58 separate channels with loudspeakers 
around the audience.474  
 
Otherwise, the work is just a collection of individual parts (the seven solos) − not coordinated 
− and other material (tapes and slides) that can be used in a performance. Score instructions 
are therefore scarce about how a performance of HPSCHD should be staged. For example, 
                                                 
472 Husarik 1983, Rivest 2003 (note to recording, see the next footnote) operates with 52 tapes, because each of 
the tapes had a specific scale and Cage/Hiller divided the octave from 5 to 56 divisions, which makes for 52. The 
program note to the first performance also refers to 52 tapes (see coming quote at p. 192). The information in the 
published instrumental parts, Yates’s note to the recording in 1969 (see next footnote) and Hiller’s article from 
1970 however operates with 51 tapes. 
473 This presentation of HPSCHD rests mainly upon information given in Husarik’s article ”John Cage and 
LeJaren Hiller: HPSCHD, 1969” (1983) and studies of the rental material at C.F. Peters, New York. I was not 
able to listen to the tapes because of the lack of playback equipment. But recordings do exist: Nonesuch’s 
recording from 1969, a 20 minutes realisation recorded before the first performance, consists of three of the 
solos “across a composite of the 51 tapes [electronical sound tapes].” (Cover, Nonesuch, 1969.) And Joel 
Chadabe (realization) and Robert Conant (harpsichord) have done a full-scale recorded realisation of the music 
(all harpsichord solos and tapes) at Electronic Music Foundation Inc, 2003. I must admit that I do not know what 
has happened to the tapes that are not in custody of Peters.  
474 Solo I−VII, HPSCHD. 
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nothing is said about the visual part though we know that the first performance appeared as a 
highly audiovisual event in 1969. 
 
4.2.1.1 !"!%&! "$!%%
HPSCHD resulted from a meticulous compositional process that involved the use of 
computers, computer programming and procedures of numerous chance operations. Six 20 
minute long solos for harpsichord were composed. Five of these used the Musical Dice Game 
attributed to W. A. Mozart (Musikalisches Würfelspiel, K. 294d) as their basic material, a 
form of chance composition that was quite popular throughout Western Europe in the 18th 
century. The piece used by Cage and Hiller contains 176 pre-composed measures that are 
arranged in two charts, one for an A section and one for a B section. By throwing dice 
measures are chosen and put together into a composition.475 For HPSCHD a variant of this 
game was developed, adjusted for Cage’s favoured tool for doing chance operations namely I-
Ching and its 64 hexagrams. In the 1950s Cage threw coins to get his hexagrams. For 
HPSCHD a computer program was developed for this task − ICHING. Portions of one minute 
long segments containing 64 measures were composed with the help of these computer-
derived hexagrams. This procedure had to be repeated 20 times to get a solo of 20 minutes. 
Additionally, procedures were developed to replace material from the original Dice Game 
with segments from other compositions by Mozart and by historic material representing the 
time-span from Mozart to Cage/Hiller. Chance operations were involved in all these 
procedures. In addition, 52 monaural tapes were composed, each lasting 20 minutes. These 
were generated by a computer in 3 minute long segments and spliced together. The idea for 
the tapes was to explore micro-tonality. An octave was divided in all ways from 5 to 56 
pitches. In addition a field of sharpening and flattening possibilities for the pitches arrived at 
was given. Together the different ranges and the given possibilities for sharpening and 
flattening pitches gave HPSCHD a potential reservoir of approximately 885000 pitches.476 
Solo no.1 for cembalo is a transcription of one of the tape-parts for 12-tone gamut. The last 
solo consists of practising or performing any composition by Mozart. 
 
                                                 
475 Husarik informs us “The material is arranged in the charts in such a way that all compositional problems such 
as cadences are automatically adjusted and the compositional process is reduced to a game of throwing dice and 
matching measure numbers. By using repeat signs and a chart for the B material, a composition eighty measures 
in length is generated, having the form AABBaabbAB.” (Husarik, p. 7.) 
476 Husarik 1983, p. 10. 
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Because micro-tonality was explored by the parts of a tape-orchestra, Cage thought that the 
graphic material should be telescopic.477  The responsibility for working out the visual part 
was given to Calvin Sumsion, a graduate student in the Illinois department of design, and 
Ronald Nameth, who I have already referred to in connection with the first Musicircus. The 
process behind the visual part was as meticulously based upon chance operations as the sonic 
part. The result was about 8400 slides containing technographic photographs from 
encyclopaedias manipulated through chance operations, slides obtained from NASA, the 
Mount Wilson Observatory, Palomar, and the Adler Planetarium, and about 1600 hand-
painted slides that also were made by applying chance operations. A lot of films478 were 
selected that reflected the theme of stars, planets, and travel through space both scientifically 
and metaphysically, such as films about Stonehenge and other ancient sites that showed 
mankind’s long-standing concerns about the universe. Chance operations were also applied 
here: “Using the ICHING, films were placed in random relationships, and as one film was 
completed, another would replace it.”479 
 
4.2.1.2 $%&"$!$ 
HPSCHD had its first performance the 16th of May 1969. It was a multimedia performance 
that was staged in the Assembly Hall of UIUC, a huge circular building constructed as a 
sports arena with radial aisles and concentric promenades that could seat 17000 people.  The 
program note described the music this way:  
 
Twenty-minute solos for one to seven amplified harpsichords and tapes for one to fifty-two amplified 
monaural machines to be used in whole or in part in any combination with or without interruptions, etc., 
to make an indeterminate concert of any agreed-upon length having two to fifty-nine channels with 
loud-speakers around the audience.  
 
Solo I    Computer printout for 12-tone gamut […] 
Solo II  Mozart Dicegame […] 
Solo III Dicegame with Mozart compositions used as replacements, tremble and bass linked 
[…] 
Solo IV Dicegame with Mozart compositions used as replacements, tremble and bass 
independent […] 
Solo V Dicegame with historical sequence used as replacements, tremble and bass linked 
[…] 
Solo VI Dicegame with historical sequence used as replacements, tremble and bass linked 
[…] 
Solo VII  Practice or performance of any Mozart compositions […] 
 
In addition to playing his own solo, each harpsichordist is free to play any of the others.  
                                                 
477 Husarik 1983, p. 11. Husarik refers to his own interviews of Cage. 
478 Fetterman speaks about 40 films. (Fetterman 1996, p. 140.) 
479 Husarik 1983, p. 14. Husarik quote Ronald Nameth (letter, 1980).  
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Monaural tapes giving all division of the octave from five to fifty-six tones performed by […]480 
 
At the first performance all the seven solos were performed simultaneously. The 52 monaural 
tapes composed were all in use with the help of 52 tape recorders – each provided with four 
sets of a tape (together amounting to 208 tapes), and 52 speakers placed high up in the 
perimeter of the dome. The abundance of images was put into play by the help of 84 slide 
projectors and 12 movie projectors. 11 parallel screens made of transparent plastic hung in the 
middle of the hall so images could fade away step by step through this grid of screens. 
Surrounding them was a 340-foot circumference circular screen also of translucent plastic.481 
Further, images were projected at the bay windows of the Assembly Hall, “so that the slides 
would be visible over the Illinois prairie during the expected four-hour evening 
performance.”482 Smocks that audience members could wear were printed in fluorescent-
coloured inks: “Blacklight would pick out the audience members who wore them during the 
event, giving an added sense of involvement and participation”,483 and there were banners 
with drawings by Ronald Resch, various ranks of coloured lights, a mirror ball − similar to 
those seen in discotheques − and more. The audience could, as in the Musicircus, walk around 
as they wished and the concert lasted longer than usual, from 7:30 p.m. to Midnight. About 
7000 attended the performance. 
 
The strategy of HPSCHD’s performance was quite similar to Musicircus even though the two 
events became distinctively different according to Husarik: “Whereas MUSICIRCUS could be 
labelled a grand experiment, HPSCHD was a demonstrated artistic affirmation.”484 In contrast 
with the event in 1967, HPSCHD had thematically and materially a much more unified shape: 
The theme of microscopic exploration of sonic material (micro-cosmos), reflected in the 
exploring of micro-tonality in the created tapes, and telescopic themes (macro-cosmos) 
presented in the visual material. Further, the sonic world of the harpsichords was also adopted 
in the computer-generated tapes by using saw-tooth waveforms that came closest to their 
sound, and the material of Mozart’s Musical Dice Game prevails within the harpsichord solos. 
The similarity between HPSCHD and Musicircus however consists in a shared strategy for 
their performances. The keywords are in this respect simultaneity, abundance and spatial 
                                                 
480 Program note for the first performance (John Cage Collection, Northwestern University, C41 A.2). As the 
reader can see, this description is nearly the same as that given in the instrumental part that can be rented at 
Peters, but with some slight differences.  
481 “The theme of these images was said to describe yet another program: the history of man from his primitive 
beginnings up to modern times. The idea ran parallel to the history of music sequence in the solo parts.” 
(Husarik 1983, p. 14.) 
482 Husarik 1983, p. 12. 
483 Loc. cit. Husarik refers to Calvin Sumsion: The Integration of Visual Elements by I-Ching Philosophy and 
Gestalt Psychology, p. 4. 
484 Husarik 1983, p. 19. 
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distribution that includes the space for the audience to walk freely around. Besides this, both 
performances lasted longer than usual concerts.   
 
4.2.1.3 & #'!'%$'% ! %&$'&! 
It is tempting to bring in the concept of deconstruction into the discussion of Cage’s 
performative technique of simultaneity and abundance – the technique of musicircus. From 
the point of view of composition, ‘musicircus’ by analogy can be described as deconstructive.   
 
What I have in mind is that HPSCHD as a performed musicircus, almost by the way it is 
presented (performed) deconstructs the composed aspects of the work and emphasises instead 
the aspects of autopoiesis and the phenomenon of emergence.  
 
Cage and Hiller used, to a great extent, chance operations to compose HPSCHD, so already 
there, autopoietic processes were introduced. However, the results of these processes were 
written down in scores and captured on tapes. The fixity of these parts, the composed aspects 
of the work, become again loosened and permeated by autopoietic processes in the work’s 
performance.  
 
To clarify my point: Compositionally, HPSCHD consists of fixed parts that are composed out 
(pre-composed before performance).  However, the composed parts of HPSCHD are not 
coordinated but function as material for a performance, and the score, which just consists of 
this collection of pre-composed material, does not have any further instruction about how to 
coordinate the parts than what is given in the general description in the introduction to each 
part. (See former quote). Besides, what we can call the score does not at all mention the visual 
aspects that were an important ingredient of the event in 1969.  
 
The non-coordination of the different parts introduces again explicitly, when performed, 
processes of chance and indeterminacy as constitutive of what happens, of the emerging 
work. As more parts are used, the chance elements are multiplied and the autopoietic 
processes are strengthened. Therefore, the performative technique of non-coordinated 
simultaneity and abundance can be understood as a form of deconstruction that again tears 
open the fixed character of HPSCHD. It literally de-constructs by reducing the constructed 
quality of the work, making it again fluid and vulnerable. 
  
To use the concept of deconstruction about musicircus as a performative technique may be a 
bit misleading because we cannot here adopt, unreservedly, a strategy for reading or 
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analysing. The concept is transferred from the field of literary reading to, in fact, that of 
musical doing.  
 
We can see de-constructive aspects of Cage’s practice already in his use of chance and 
indeterminacy as composer. The de-constructive approach starts with chance operations at the 
writing desk. Cage, situated within the practise of writing music, which to a great extent 
means to construct a piece of music by organising sounds in a specific way by the means 
writing gives, develops techniques which have counteractive properties. Through chance 
operations Cage develops systematic approaches to what we could call a double way of 
writing: to construct and de-construct. The intentional musical “building” he constructs − the 
work he composes − is at the same time de-constructed by chance and laid open to non-
constructed elements that “just” emerge.   In other words, the intentional construction is 
somehow de-constructed deliberately through the techniques he has invented for writing 
music.  
 
Cage’s chance operations are to a great extent performed at the “writing desk”, or carried out 
as part of preparations, for example, for indeterminate compositions that demand preparatory 
execution of chance operations to be performable. The technique of simultaneous 
performances multiplied through abundance transfers a similar technique to the performance 
itself. The constructive and de-constructive aspects happen also here at the same time. 
 
The concept of deconstruction, as I use it here, appears in a transferred form. That is, it is 
used through a form of analogy. No texts or work are seen through a deconstructive approach, 
but the deconstruction is enacted in the performance itself. HPSCHD as a written work of 
music – in its fixed, finished and completed quality485 – is in a distinctive way decomposed by 
its own performance. Deconstruction in this context becomes part of the performance, in fact, 
part of the concept of performativity itself. The performance opens the finished for the 
unfinished, for the future, but also settles matters and grapples with the real. The performative 
therefore moves in opposing directions. That is, performative acts both have constructive 
power, in constituting and maintaining, but have also a deconstructive lopsidedness, always 
bringing along lose ends, evading being set, or brought back to an origin, haunted by the 
indeterminate and chance ridden. Deconstruction used as an analogy for what happens when 
HPSCHD is performed, appears as a movement where construction and deconstruction 
emerge at the same time.  
 
 
                                                 
485 As mentioned, also in its score form HPSCHD incorporates the unsolved, unfinished and open in being just a 
collection of material to be applied in a performance (instrumental parts, tapes, slides). That means that there is a 
master score that coordinates this material with a kind of fixed representation.  
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Musicircus, unlike HPSCHD, does not have any pre-composed parts worked out by Cage. 
The performers are the originators of the material: They can bring with them any music they 
want, including their own “pre-composed” music. However, the same happens in the 
realisation of a Musicircus as in HPSCHD. The simultaneity of the performances, increased 
by the number of performers reinforces the autopoietic aspects of the event.  
 
Even if the individual performer can control to a certain degree his/her own performance 
(what is performed, how it is done and so on), the performer cannot control what is 
played/performed next to him/her. The harmonies that emerge by chance, the resulting 
collage, the soundscape the performers participate to create, are indeterminate. Nobody 
controls what the co-existence of all the different performances creates. This is dependent on 
chance. 
 
We have spoken about the deconstructive aspects of simultaneity and abundance and how 
these expose the work of autopoietic and contingent elements. However, with reference to the 
autopoietic feedback coil outlined by Fischer-Lichte it is also interesting to approach the 
Cagean circus from another point of view; the performative mode of the individual performer. 
 
Musicircus, as we saw in the second chapter, does not have a published score. The nearest we 
come to a published score is the text in Scenarios, a highly descriptive text (describing the 
event in 1967) appearing ambiguously in the book’s context as an anthology of “scripts to 
perform”.486 We can also consider oral scores, not published, not fixed in an authorized 
written form, but of which traces can be seen in letters, interviews, comments and reports 
about how things have been done. What prompts these remarks is that Cage expresses views 
about the mode of performing in a Musicircus, and this mode, independent of what is 
performed, has implications for how the coils of feedback are explored.  
 
Cage, in the published text referred to above writes that  “no directions were given anyone.” 
However, he has some preferences:  
 
Let each thing that happens happen from its own centre, whether it is music or dance.  Don’t go in the 
direction of one thing ‘using’ another.  Then they will all go together beautifully (as birds, air planes, 
trucks, radios, etc. do).487  
 
To not let one thing “use” another seems also to include a conversational mode of approach to 
the situation; to converse: 
                                                 
486 See p. 31 in this thesis. 
487 John Cage, letter dated February 17, 1979. 
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D.C.: And in the musicircuses, do you find that the musicians have freed themselves from their habits - 
in particular, the habit of conversing? 
 
J.C.: In Paris, I noticed that some groups fell silent when they noticed that other groups were starting to 
play. That’s in fact exactly what happens in jazz, except that in Musicircus, the effect was the opposite. 
However, in the two musicircuses which we produced in the United States, each group really worked in 
an independent manner. No one worried about his neighbour. The result was amazing. But if you stick 
to concentrated attention, or if you retain the principle of discourse, musicircuses may not be of any 
interest at all.488  
 
The performative mode favoured here is that of independently performing your own material. 
Could that not be like promoting a sort of performative solipsism (conceptually contradictory 
according to our delimitations of performativity); a deprivation of our inclination to be part of 
a community by tuning ourselves to the communal situation, using the available vehicle of 
conversional codes, and feed back? I will leave this question for a while. However, the 
autopoietic feedback coils operating in the intimate dialogs between people seem not to be of 
any interest here in view of Cage’s comments. From the point of view of feedback and 
autopoiesis, the interest is directed to the processes happening at a macro level: “No one 
worried about his neighbour. The result was amazing.”  
 
Cage’s advice to not “converse”, can be understood as a way to discipline an inclination to go 
into a role alternating situation. The performative strategy described could be seen as a way to 
break up an immediate inclination to “feed back” and thereby restrict the relational dynamic 
described by Fischer-Lichte. Disciplinary obstacles are put into the coils of actions and 
reactions. Which processes are we dealing with here? We have seen how Fischer-Lichte 
emphasises different strategies and methods that performance artists use to illuminate certain 
variables and parameters at work in the contingent situation of the art event, not least by 
isolating and magnifying certain elements and aspects. Cage’s suggested performative 
approach could therefore be seen as such a delimitation that disciplines the actions involved 
to generate, magnify and explore certain qualities of the situation.  
 
Therefore, on one hand the technique of simultaneous performances, through the preferred 
mode of approach, restricts and even breaks the performers’ immediate inclination to give 
feedback. The autopoietic feedback coil is somehow constrained. On the other hand, we can 
see that the techniques Cage introduces can make us aware and open our ears and senses to 
other coils of feedback, not least the ones which transcend an anthropocentric view of the 
feedback situation. That is, by breaking habits, by putting the participants in an unsettled 
situation, experiences can appear and perspectives be revealed which are different, and 
possibly transformative, from those we are used to in our habitual way of behaving.  
                                                 
488 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p.172. 
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However, from where we are now in our discussion, let us go back to a consideration of the 
restriction of the feedback situation. It will be interesting here to compare Cage’s 
performative strategies to In between pieces for three players (1963) composed by Christian 
Wolff. Wolff, a fellow composer and close friend of Cage, explores here the dynamics of 
autopoietic feedback coils quite differently than what is presumed by performing 
independently in a Musicircus. 
 
Wolff’s piece, like most of Cage’s compositions since the 1950s, is open-ended and 
indeterminate with regard to how it would sound from one realisation to another. It is, as the 
title indicates, for three players, but which instruments, or to use a phrase from a score by 
Cage, which “sound producing means” 489 these players should use, are not indicated by the 
composer. That is one of the indeterminate aspects of the score. The piece’s notation is a mix 
between traditional and graphical notation and equipped with instructions on how to read the 
notated signs. There are pitch indicating symbols made relative (indeterminate) according to 
the chosen instrument (sound producing means) − because no key is given − and there are 
signs indicating the performing (execution) of certain actions.  
 
Example, page three of the score In between pieces for three players by Wolff: 
 
 
 
                                                 
489 Variations II. 
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The main impression is therefore of a score where the notational signs mainly function as 
indications of certain actions and not as symbols of the sounds to be produced. Therefore, like 
in many of the scores of Cage, the attention is turned to the execution itself. However, in 
Wolff’s piece, these actions are required (by the instructions and the use of elaborate 
notational signs) to be minutely attuned to what the other performers do.490 
  
We have here a piece which unfolds by the intimate action-reaction processes emerging 
between three players conditioned by how each of them perceives the situation and acts/reacts 
accordingly. We could even say that the piece is what emerges only because of their minutely 
tuned role alternation and interaction. This is also indicated by the title: In between pieces for 
three players. The title therefore signals a focus on the processes which happens between the 
players when they are highly attentive to what the others do and coordinate their behaviour 
(decisions and acts) accordingly. The performative mode asked for disciplines and focuses the 
executions of acts by outlining a situation where the performers have to listen to each other to 
decide what they will do next. This highly relational and interactive awareness is increased by 
the immediacy of the situation. The musical “game” (chamber situation) is framed in a 
manner giving a different task according to what your co-players do. Even if the performers 
rehearse the piece many times, slight differences of execution, or different choices made 
during the performance, combined by how these are perceived in real time will reveal new 
performative tasks to be resolved. The performers have to be on the alert all the time.  
 
By making the realisation of the work so dependent upon what the musicians perceive in real 
time, in the actual and interactive performing situation, and leaving a lot of choices open to be 
decided by the performers, In between pieces for three players is an open-ended and 
indeterminate piece which fits Cage’s definition of indeterminacy and thereby experimental 
music.491  
 
The autopoietic processes explored by this piece are however quite different from Musicircus 
modulated by independently performed performances.  Cage’s works since the 1950s mainly 
stage disciplined action in one way or another, musical or more theatrical. Contingent 
processes are invoked through techniques of discipline. Wolff’s piece also stages disciplined 
actions. Here it is a relational matrix that disciplines and focuses each player’s performance. 
In Musicircus it is suggested, this should be anchored in another place:  
 
Let each thing that happens happen from its own centre. […] Don’t go in the direction of one thing 
‘using’ another.  
                                                 
490 For example: ”Diagonal lines from one player’s note to another’s = second player plays immediately after the 
first stops.” (Instruction, In between pieces.) 
491 See Cage’s definition at p. 67 in this thesis.  
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Others are somehow involved here too, but we are not asked to act in relation to each other in 
the sense that the relationship defines our contribution. The guiding challenge is to allow and 
give space to all and everything. We are here moving in the direction of Cage’s anarchism.  
 
In between pieces for three player explores a social situation, the situation of chamber music, 
where musical awareness is directed to the finely tuned interactions between people in such 
situations and not so much guided by the idea of producing a specific prefigured sound object. 
However, here the emerging autopoietic feedback coils explored are those finely tuned 
interactive processes that are intimately part of communication. The autopoietic feedback 
coils explored by Musicircus are those arising as result of all the unforeseen encounters that 
happen when a multitude of beings are gathered, which are engaged by different interests and 
tasks, having their own unique points of departure and returning sites.  
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“Nowhere has Cage contrived a more experiential model of an amiable community than in the 
genre he invented called the Musicircus”492 writes Charles Junkerman in the article “‘nEw / 
foRms of living together’: The Model of the Musicircus”. The aesthetic theory of 
performativity, as we have seen, emphasises how a performance from the beginning, in its 
medial condition of togetherness – of corporal co-presence – is social as well as aesthetic, and 
we could add, political.493 This co-presence and the dynamic it sets to work, is approached by 
Wolff and Cage from quite different angles in In between pieces and Cage’s circus. From our 
previous discussion, it could seem that the interest of a Musicircus is not at all in the social 
aspect, but either in the purely individual, or what emerges from a bird’s-eye view. This 
however is not at all the conclusion Junkerman arrives at. Musicircus is discussed from the 
point of view of a social agenda expressed by Cage. We have seen this agenda not least 
spelled out in previews of the event in 1967.494 Here Cage’s anarchism plays an important 
role.  
 
The aesthetic thinking Cage represents includes the belief in art’s potential to change our 
minds, and thereby what we experience and do. Junkerman situates this belief within a “still-
                                                 
492 Junkerman 1994, p. 40. 
493 See for example Fischer-Lichte 2004, p. 68. 
494 See for example quote at p. 43. 
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influential Romantic paradigm”495 where artists “can break the mold of the present, by 
constructing aesthetic analogues of alternative futures”.496 Musicircus’s way of breaking this 
mould of the present and of presenting an alternative model for the future is approached 
through the contours of Hegelian dialectics: Firstly the Cagean circus is seen as posing a 
critical antithesis that “subverts dominant aesthetic and social codes by subjecting them to 
oppositional and arbitrary rules”.  Secondly it presents an affirmative thesis where life and the 
immanent world are celebrated and we are made aware of “the enjoyment of the senses and 
the pleasure of being”, and finally it exemplifies a visionary synthesis that poses a “utopian 
possibility for the human community, ‘new forms of living together’.”497 The restriction on 
feedback discussed in the former paragraph can in this respect be seen as part of the critical 
antithesis that finally makes way for an altered understanding and a visionary synthesis.  
 
Junkerman discusses Cage’s circus aesthetic with special reference to the one staged at 
Stanford University in January 1992 where Cage himself participated.498 And he reads it in 
connection with another event held at Stanford at the same time, Cage’s delivery of the 
lecture “Overpopulation and Art”499 and sees the Cagean circus as “an urban genre − 
crowded, noisy, and insubordinate”500 that subverts the segregated structure of many cities to 
an envisioned non-segregated multitude of autonomous individuals. Musicircus, therefore, as 
a vision of a possible way to organise our lives of togetherness, does not escape the city as the 
overcrowded space where most of us have to live, but uses this condition of our time − our 
“overpopulation” − as a possibility where “the crowd functions as a kind of emancipatory 
solution, dissolving structures and organizations that immobilize people, restoring them to 
what Cage alternatively calls ‘process’, ‘openness’, ‘the circus situation’, or, most 
emphatically ‘being’.”501  
 
How then does the crowd acquire an emancipatory function? Junkerman refers to the Cagean 
circus at Standford and gives the example of musicians in a quartet who could not follow the 
habitual way of playing together:  
                                                 
495 Junkerman 1994, p. 39. 
496 Loc.cit. 
497 Ibid, p. 42. 
498 The event happened only seven months before Cage died.  
499 This lecture is published in John Cage: composed in America (1994), ed. M. Perloff and C. Junkerman. The 
first part of Junkerman’s title − “nEw / foRms of living together” − is a quote from this lecture.  
500 Junkerman 1994, p. 40. 
501 Ibid. p. 47. 
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Players in a classical quartet had to deal with a similar dilemma: their ability to harmonize depends on 
each member of the quartet being able to hear the others, and only them. This is a music, Cage would 
say, of the old-fashioned fish tank, the product of an aesthetic ecology as undifferentiated as Simi 
Valley, in which consensus is achieved by isolation. In the noisome “dissensus” of the Musicircus, the 
players in the quartet could not hear each other, and could not help hearing their most proximate 
neighbors. How they resolved their dilemma is interesting: they had no choice, they reported 
afterwards, other than to play alone, i.e., as individuals in the crowd.502  
 
The musicians had to play alone as individuals in the crowd. Probably, many would object 
that such a situation would not at all impart emancipation but rather represent an exposed 
position of loneliness and homelessness. Junkerman however accentuates how Cage “regards 
this result as healthy and liberating.”503 The challenge brought about by the simultaneity of 
performances can free the musicians from “both the control of the group and the tyranny of 
the composition they are playing.”504 
 
Two elements in Cage’s thinking are in this respect called attention to: The ideals of self-
creation and human solidarity. According to the belief in self-creation the banner is kept high 
for an attitude of respectful non-interference505: ”We need a society in which every man may 
live in a manner freely determined by him himself.”506 This is done by leaving space around 
each person − by imposing nothing but live and let live, and permitting “each person, as well 
as each sound, to be the center of creation.”507  
 
We can here see the contour of a very individualistically based society and might consider 
that the ideals of self-creation and human solidarity contradict each other. This though is not 
the case for Cage: ”To Cage’s mind, there is no contradiction. The crowd is creative, 
engendering free individuals who exercise their freedom by identifying themselves with the 
whole.”508 It is not enough to identify yourself with a limited (“segregated”) group like your 
family, an ethnic group, or a nation. Cage advocates a form of universalism that includes the 
whole of mankind: “The religious spirit must now become social so that all Mankind is seen 
                                                 
502 Junkerman 1994, p. 47. 
503 Loc. cit. 
504 Loc. cit. 
505 Junkerman delivers a clarifying reading of Cage in this respect. He refers to how social constructivists argue 
that our understanding of things is always already differential and textual − our understanding is always 
comparative. Cage, though, takes a contrary position. Relationships are “imposed” on entities by ”minds seeking 
some sort of logical understandings. These impositions make mental “objects” out of beings and the 
consequence of such impositions is that we live in an insubstantial shadow world.” (Junkerman, p. 56.) 
506 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p. 99. 
507 Ibid. p. 100. 
508 Junkerman 1994, p. 59. 
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as Family, Earth as Home.”509 Junkerman denotes Cage’s view in this respect as 
individualistic universalism.510  
 
Cage’s individualistic universalism can shed light on Cage’s anarchism and Musicircus as 
reflecting a social agenda. ‘Non-interference’ is not only an important component of Cage’s 
thinking, as a political principle it has for a long time been a main ingredient of the anarchic 
disposition of Western liberalism. However, as Junkerman argues, in Cage’s thinking this 
goes further; ‘non-inference’ is elevated to an ontological principle, among other things by 
incorporating Buddhist influenced conceptions:  “In Zen terms, Cage says that our being in 
the world should be both non-obstructive (respectful of the void, the space around things) and 
interpenetrating (available for encounter with all things).”511 I will come back to this 
conception of ‘non-interference’, translated as being non-obstructive, that incorporates the 
seemingly paradoxical condition of interpenetration in the next chapter when we will discuss 
and question Cage’s non-dualistic aesthetics more profoundly. For the time being, let me refer 
to Junkerman’s reading. He compares Cage’s understanding to the seemingly paradoxical 
virtue sophrosyne (poise/balance) − an ancient Greek virtue that “was an entirely private 
disposition, but it could be achieved only in the push and shove of public life, in the crowded 
agora.”512 The conception reflected in this virtue implies that one needs the others to become 
one’s best self. However, this does not mean that one is necessarily bound to others in 
solidarity or sympathy by this need. Paradoxically the crowded agora can liberate the 
individual from the others motivation, like the musicians of the quartet who had to find their 
own creative autonomy as a response to a situation where they could not use their habitual 
way of adjustment. It is, says Junkerman, “this condition of poised autonomy − 
interpenetrating and nonobstructing − that Cage calls ‘anarchy’.”513  
 
@3? *("*/
What is the musical material of Musicircus, and what about the materiality of the event? 
Musicircus can be characterised as a performatively generated collage, spatial in its character, 
                                                 
509 Cage, Empty Words : Writings ´67-´72, p. 181. 
510 Junkerman explains that this was a progressive position in the years immediately following World War II 
though being slightly anachronistic when he writes his article in the 1990s. (Junkerman, p. 60.)  
511 Junkerman 1994, p. 58. 
512 Loc. cit. 
513 Ibid. p, 58. 
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which is performatively brought about on the spot, conditioned by forms of autopoiesis 
(Autopoiesis) and emerging spontaneously (Emergenz). 
 
Material, as I said in the former chapter, can be understood as not denoting some pre-existing 
potential, which is then given a specific shape, like clay which can be shaped into cups, or 
like building bricks put together into different constructions. Instead the material in its 
materiality − in its material quality − first appears as this material through the performative 
acts. 4’33’’ by Cage, as we saw, functions as a telling example, because it is first through the 
performance of the piece that a focus is created, which transforms the sonic environment of 
the concert hall to musical material. Before this, there is no sonic material, but through the 
performative acts, the notated silences, or what we could call openness, are filled with Cage’s 
material for the piece: unintended sounds.  
 
The silence of 4’33’’ turns out not to be silent at all when performed. The sonic material of 
4’33’’ is nothing else than what is thematized through the staging of the piece and the 
performative acts of the performer. Are there parallels here to be drawn to Musicircus?  
 
We can extract some starting points for a realisation of a Musicircus: 
 
1) An open invitation to participate in the production − Musicircus being, in fact, based 
upon this gesture; 
2) The organisers have to provide certain facilities that make the realisation feasible; 
3) What the different performers bring with them – what they have planned to do – can 
be unknown to the organisers. A realisation of Musicircus does not require that this is 
coordinated beforehand (the opposite seems to be more in the spirit of Musicircus’s 
anarchy);  
4) The possibility for the audience to move freely around.  
 
Therefore, if we look upon Musicircus as a kind of collage, the material of this collage is the 
performers who say yes to an invitation and who bring their own material – their own 
prepared performances. The material seen like this is therefore situational in its character. 
That is, it is conditioned by who says yes to the invitation to this specific realisation of a 
Musicircus and what they choose to bring with them.  Seen like this, the material is also 
indeterminate from one realisation to another, because it only first achieves some form of 
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determination when the performers have said yes to participate and when they prepare 
themselves for their participation by making some decisions and preparations according to 
what they want to do – how they will contribute.  
 
1), 2), 3) and 4) are the starting points for creating a collage. This is not just a sonic mixture 
or a visual montage. It is multi-medial, a mix which I will call a live performed collage; a 
collage the audience does not only have the possibility to look at, or listen to, but which they 
can move inside and explore.  
 
If we were to understand the material of this collage, as denoting some pre-existing potential 
that is then given a specific shape as if using building bricks, the bricks would differ from one 
realisation to another. They would be dependent on the local situation and which possibilities 
where brought up there. Consequently, the material would even in this “non-performative” 
sense be dependent on the initiation of the invitation. The invitation would be the first step to 
getting any musical material.  
 
How can we understand this invitation? I will here bring in Hans-Friedrich Bormann’s study 
of Cage’s silent piece (4’33’’)514 because the structure of the promise, which he finds 
descriptive for Cage’s aesthetics and artistic work, can inform our analysis of Musicircus’s 
initiating invitation.  
 
@3?3< %)*$,$**(%+**%$,*$
If we look upon an invitational act as crucial to the staging of a Musicircus, what is then 
revealed? What is the logic of an invitation? How does an invitation function and operate? 
What are its conditions?  
 
An invitation is a gesture directed towards somebody. The other is already, from the 
beginning, a condition for an invitation to appear. Already here, there is an aspect of 
alternation and circular structure. It is tempting to draw a parallel to the factor of role 
alternation in the autopoietic feedback coil emphasised by Fischer-Lichte. The invitation in its 
structure − in its invitational logic (to function and operate as an invitation) − reflects this role 
alternating structure. The inviter’s action, to invite, does not acquire meaning without a form 
of expected response from the one who is invited (the other) − an invitation is uttered to be 
answered. If we think of this structure through the perspective of subject /object positions, we 
could say that because an invitation is open-ended – the invited can say yes or no – the 
position of subject and object also alternate. The initiative as a subjective quality is alternated 
                                                 
514 Bormann 2005. 
 206
in the process; from belonging to the one who invites it is transferred to the one who gets the 
invitation. 
 
Bormann, in his book Verschwiegene Stille: John Cages performative Ästhetik, starts his 
presentation with the utterance “Der Beginn ist ein Versprechen.”515 The beginning is a 
promise. The promise Bormann refers to is Cage’s assurance that he will devote his life to 
music. The promise is given to Schönberg, who in return offers to teach him free of charge.  
 
The story, told by Cage, goes like this: 
 
When I asked Schoenberg to teach me, he said, ‘You probably can’t afford my price.’ I said, ‘Don’t 
mention it; I don’t have any money.’ He said, ‘Will you devote your life to music?’ This time I said 
‘Yes’. He said he would teach me free of charge: I gave up painting and concentrated on music.516  
 
This story, this anecdote, telling us about a cross holding promise, is a central moment of 
initiation and a reason for Cage’s compositional career. But not only that, argues Bormann, 
Cage’s promise to devote his life to music, differs fundamentally from a basic schema of 
communication which operates with a sender (the one who makes a promise), a recipient (the 
acceptor − the one who is promised something) and the content (what is promised). It is not 
just Cage who gives Schönberg his promise. Schönberg gives also a promise on the premise 
of Cage’s vow (to Schönberg). The structure becomes circular. Instead of an elementary 
exchange − to be taught in return for a fee − there is a reciprocal ceaseless inter-exchange: 
Each promise (vow) is mutually given to the other. As dedicated to, the other becomes also 
obliged. The promise reveals an aporetic structure. It becomes apparent that it is about a 
radical and immeasurable responsibility that cannot be fulfilled by its gift, the promised – by 
being given. The promise (the vow) addresses itself fundamentally to the other: in Cage’s 
lifetime, in the time of his works, in our time. In this way, the promise can be understood as 
an established anticipated belatedness (deferred action), requiring continuous (endless) 
supplements. The establishment appears like a not yet given gift, which opens itself like the 
open time to come.  
 
Bormann uses the structure of the promise as a prism on Cage’s compositional career in 
general, and not only for his musical compositions, but also for the rest of his artistic 
output.517 At certain points, the invitation can be aligned to the promise. The invitation is also 
directed to somebody. The other/-s forms a constituting, fundamental part of its structure, and 
certain expectations and responses have to come into operation for an invitation to be 
                                                 
515 Bormann 2005, p. 7. 
516 Ibid. p. 7. (From “An Autobiographical statement” (1989) in Cage and Kostelanetz 1993, p. 238.)   
517 Cage’s texts, lectures, interviews and so on. Bormann 2005, p. 8. 
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meaningful; an invitation initiates structures of responsibility. However, the initiation is 
somehow a promise that is not settled yet. The initiation of an invitation is even more open-
ended than the establishment of a promise. (In fact, the promise “pretends” to be very 
certain.) In the invitation’s character of initiating, the mutual dependency is clearly present. It 
is an initiation dependent on the response. In this way we can explicitly see a reciprocal 
conditioning, a two-way directionality, and its mutual dependency.  
 
An invitation’s initiation is conditioned by the response, but still the content would be 
indeterminate. That is, what the invitation would imply would to certain degrees not be 
actualised before the event happened which you had been invited to, had said yes to and 
contributed to by your participation. The “gift” of the invitation would first be delivered by 
the unfolding of the event, and this “gift” is not “pre-fixed” – the ones who are invited would 
contribute to “this gift” themselves.  
 
Invitations are intimately linked to events. They are not linked to objects. We create objects, 
but invite to an event. Further, the gesture of invitation brings hospitality – you are invited to 
partake; you are invited to join. It opens doors. Included in its hospitable gesture is its 
freedom: You do not need to say yes. (Of course, this freedom is probably felt relatively, but I 
see it as a structural element of what we could call an “utterance” of invitation, otherwise we 
could instead speak about orders.) We are invited to partake in an event – in the unfolding of 
an event that is prepared (in a way, staged). 
 
Evidently, a constitutional aspect of the invitation is anticipation. It is an event-to-be that is 
sketched out. That is, it is the possibility that is framed. And this possibility is framed quite 
openly, because we are asked if we want to be present and participate in this anticipated 
event. We could say that an invitation mainly is a gesture that by its anticipation helps to 
organize a meeting between people.  
 
If we condense the form of an invitation, we could say that it basically sketches out the frame 
of a meeting between people (in real time). Because it is so open in its form, we could also 
say that an invitation reflects quite clearly the form of (auto-) poietic feedback. A parallel 
then can be drawn between Fischer-Lichte's concept of die autopoietische feedback-Schleife 
and the structure of an invitation. An invitation indicates a situation, such as a performance, 
where people would meet and something would emerge, would be celebrated, by this 
meeting. The invitation indicates certain frames and plays on expectations that will contribute 
to modulate the event to come. In other words, to draw a parallel with the medial condition of 
a performance, certain frames are given and these frames imply certain expectations, which 
would contribute in the modulation of the autopoietic feedback coils.  
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From the general considerations of the character and structure of an invitation, let us transfer 
our gaze to Musicircus. There are especially three points I want to discuss: 
 
1) The gesture directed to the other; 
2) The indeterminacy of musical content; 
3) The invitation as the “origin” (foundation/generator) of a performance (which is also 
the “work”) instead of the creation by an artist of a work which is then presented 
(performed) for the audience.  
 
From the initiation of a realisation, through invitation, the others as co-players, co-creators, or 
co-actors are a constitutive part of the event. The contributions of others are presupposed; the 
event cannot be realized without their participation. Through this, a relational dynamic of 
reciprocality and mutual dependence is also outlined.   We have seen how the advised 
performance attitude, of those participating in a Musicircus, in certain instances restricts the 
operation of role alternating processes. Here we see that in fact, in its genesis – to be 
actualized – Musicircus presupposes interactive structures of responsibility and role change 
from the outset. If we understand Musicircus as starting with the gesture of inviting, then the 
autopoietic feedback coil is already at work from the beginning. We could say that the 
materialising of the event starts already here, with the invitation. Role alternation and the 
dynamic of the autopoietic feedback coil are thereby at work already from the event’s 
initiation, contributing to the generation of the event’s materiality from the outset.  
 
The gesture of invitation could be understood as the first performative step in a realisation of 
a Musicircus. Seen in this way, the performative generation of materiality starts already with 
this gesture, which in its logic depends on the acts of the others. The Cagean circus, therefore, 
breaks already here, in its initiation, with the aesthetic of the autonomous work, caricatured 
by the image of the autonomous creator (artist/”God”) who by his/her own intuition, 
imagination and creative power creates the independent work of art. The invitation – to stage 
through the act of inviting – explicitly undermines any accreditation of autonomy to the work 
or an author (composer). If however we should continue to speak in terms of an aesthetic of 
autonomy, we have to think about it differently − not in terms of a self-sufficient subject or a 
work. 
 
@3?3= &(%(#*,$(*#+"*#"%""
I have already mentioned that Musicircus can be understood as a kind of collage, which 
emerges live as a result of the different performances that are performed simultaneously.  
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The materiality of Musicircus can therefore be seen as this live generated collage that 
emerges through the performative acts of the participants. No one has the full overview of this 
emerged and emerging collage, but all contribute to it. Autopoietic feedback coils are here at 
work.  
 
Musicircus’ character of collage can be approached from different angles, even a purely 
aesthetic one, although Cage says that no aesthetic bias is involved. Again it is interesting to 
bring in our former discussion about the preferred performative attitude and musicircus as a 
performative technique of uncoordinated simultaneous performances. Grove Music Online 
describes collage as: “A term borrowed from the visual arts, where it refers to the act of 
pasting diverse objects, fragments or clippings on to a background, or to the work of art that 
results. Musical collage is the juxtaposition of multiple quotations, styles or textures so that 
each element maintains its individuality and the elements are perceived as excerpted from 
many sources and arranged together, rather than sharing common origins.”518 Therefore, in 
applying this definition to Musicircus, executions of the different performances should occur 
with at least a minimal degree of independence (from what others do) to label the event a 
collage. Otherwise, we could imagine that the event from being a heterogeneous assembly of 
many different groups and individuals could develop into a well-integrated and homogenous 
gesamtkunstwerk. The supposed heterogenic quality of a Musicircus can therefore be 
analysed and discussed from quite different points of view, and all of them can be mutually 
compatible. I have here especially three points in mind: 
 
1) Pure aesthetic considerations; 
2) A social perspective – the aspects of visioned anarchy; 
3) A perspective that transcends an anthropocentric viewpoint.  
 
A fourth point, the aim to break habits as a method of opening the mind (and body) for 
threshold, and possible transformative experiences can be seen as “reasonable” with respect to 
all the three aforementioned points. 
 
4.3.1.0 $!"'$+%&&"$%"&(
Cage, as we have seen, prefers a performative mode where the performers do what they do 
independently of what the others do. For example, that they do not retain a principle of 
“conversation”. We have discussed this with reference to the autopoietic feedback coil. From 
an aesthetic perspective, even if what the performers play and present is indeterminate, not 
coordinated and not founded in any aesthetic bias (whereby any music is allowed) how the 
                                                 
518 Burkholder, “Collage” in Grove Music Online. My italics. 
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performances are done will be of extreme importance with respect to the aesthetic result of 
the event. From a purely aesthetic point of view, therefore, the how can be linked to the 
characteristics of a collage (especially when the content is indeterminate).  
 
To exemplify my point I will here describe my own experience from a workshop in free 
improvisation.519 We were a group of people with diverse musical and artistic backgrounds, 
from sound artists trained as visual artists and sculptors, amateurs like me, to professional 
jazz musicians. As a start, we were just asked to improvise without any further directions. 
What happened? A lot of interesting things occurred which were coloured by our different 
backgrounds. However, it was interesting to notice, that even if we had not formerly played 
together and our backgrounds were very diverse, there was a drive to attune our contributions 
(improvisations) to what the others did and move in the direction of becoming a unified 
ensemble that was creating a unified sound work. In other words, we tried to find a common 
musical/sonic/aesthetic world, almost like trying to improvise forth an organic unity (an 
organic work) by finding ones own place within it, for example by imitating what someone 
else had played a little bit altered, elaborating on it, making a second voice or a contra voice, 
filling out harmonies, continuing some rhythmic patterns someone else had introduced and so 
on.   
 
After this “doing” of an introduction we were given the task to not imitate or snap up 
elements of the others. Instead we should try to improvise independently of what the others 
did, but at the same time, listen and register what they were doing. What happened? The task 
was not easy, almost a paradox. Regardless of the outcome, the task regulated our approach 
and the aesthetic result became different. Put simply, whereas, without any instruction we 
moved in the direction of common references and the development of a shared sonic world 
and of a coherent sonic object, the next challenge brought about an aesthetic result that was 
much more heterogeneous and extraordinary in its form. 
 
The same could have happened with a realisation of Musicircus. We could also have 
imagined that the performers in such an event would have tried to attune to the other 
performances, and to try to contribute, like one of many voices, to the generation of a 
coherent art work (an improvised gesamtkunstwerk, if that could indeed be considered 
plausible). Therefore, the performative mode Cage advises can from a purely aesthetic point 
of view be desirable and seen as effective as regards the aim of securing a highly 
heterogeneous collage. Another method to secure this effect would be to use time brackets. A 
                                                 
519 Workshop with Johannes Bergmark, Trondheim 2005. 
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method extensively used by Cage, and as we have seen, a method that later has been applied 
in realisations of Musicircus. 
 
4.3.1.1 %!"$%"&(/&%"&%!(%!  $+
From a social perspective, a highly heterogeneous collage can exemplify the possibility of co-
existence – sharing the same time and place – not by adjusting individual differences, but by 
making such tolerant structures that these differences may operate side by side. The co-
existence – the society – is not thought of as a unified organism, but as a broadened temporal-
spatial meeting place for many different life lines, histories and motivations that do not have a 
common point of reference. We could say that in Cage’s thinking it is not the organism that is 
the “ideal” analogy for a society but rather the heterogeneous collage. Musicircus as an 
envisioned anarchy bequeaths the possibility of generating an arena where people from 
different musical and artistic practices and cultures can meet and do their own thing without 
being unified by a shared reference. They create a ‘global village’ like a collage where 
different elements still maintain their individuality and are perceived as excerpted from many 
sources rather than sharing common origins. 
 
4.3.1.2 !* &$!"! &$%
As already mentioned, the suggested performative attitude can also be seen as evoking a 
different voicing of the feedback coils than those we mainly focus on in daily life. The 
perforations of feedback systems based on “for-the-sake-of-which” of human interests, 
accentuate an ecological situation of human intentionality − the human as just one “fold” of 
an extended web of interconnected agencies. Like the economy of attention that I brought up 
in the context of embodiment in chapter four,520 the restriction on the habitual way of feeding 
back makes us aware of other constitutive dynamics in the situation of co-presence and 
interactivity. That does not mean that human intentionality is ruled out, or considered 
insignificant. We could argue that Cage’s strategies of staging direct the magnifying glass to 
those intersectional zones between different aims and causes and thereby emphasise the 
relative position of human directives, embedded in a world that includes the activity of a great 
variety of life forms. This ecological perspective and the former point will be elaborated in 
the next chapter. 
                                                 
520 See p. 158. 
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@3?3> &(%(#*,)&
Through the way Musicircus is organized spatially, providing simultaneous performances and 
free space for the audience to walk around – between and within the performances, in and out 
of the performance site – the musical work becomes something to walk within, its spatiality 
becomes something for the audience to aesthetically explore through physical movement. The 
real space converges with the spatiality of the work and becomes an essential part of the 
work’s artistic − musical, visual, theatrical, dance, pantomimic...− material. This 
convergence, this spatiality of the work, is created and thematized by the appearance and 
disappearance of the performances, their uncoordinated simultaneity, the emerging spatial 
collage which the audience can walk within adding their own performance, as though mixing 
their own soundtrack by their own physical movements, and perhaps becoming performers 
themselves, playing provided public instruments (Childs’s percussion sculptor), or becoming 
visual artists, dancers and more. The space becomes “eventualized” − something to 
experience as something which happens and reverberates.  
 
Fischer-Lichte’s notion of performative space seems here very appropriate. As we have seen, 
when a performance is performed, the location where this performance takes place is affected. 
We have to take account of a performative space. The actual site with its geometrical 
attributes, atmospheric possibilities and the arrangement made specifically for an event, 
interact with the movements of people, objects, light, sounds and so on. This interaction 
generates a space in constant transformation. We refer to an unstable spatiality conditioned by 
the autopoietic feedback coil. The performative space, therefore, envisions space as an 
eventualized category. 
 
The performative space is not just thought of as a result or product of a performance, but it 
opens and supports certain possibilities for how and which relations can be established 
between actors and audience, and which movements and perceptions are likely to occur. The 
spatial quality, therefore, contributes to what happens at the site through its specific spatiality 
which in its specificity opens certain performative and interactive possibilities, possibilities 
which pop up a new all the time.  
 
What interests me especially here is how the spatial organisation of Musicircus invites us to 
listen in a physical way. I will therefore, for the sake of analysis, focus upon the audience as 
listeners, even though Musicircus so engagingly involves other senses. The main reason for 
my analytical choice of approach lies with the specification of the role of the listener within 
the practice of Western classical music − that is, seated, expected to keep quiet and to give 
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minimal bodily expression during the performance. According to this norm, the spatial 
arrangement of Musicircus is striking by providing the opportunity for the audience to freely 
walk around amongst the performers. This loosens any strict division between performers and 
audience, and activates the listening quite literally by making the role of listening into a 
physical activity. This physical listening becomes part of Musicircus’ spatial materiality. 
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Musicircus, through its spatial arrangement and its invitation to the audience to walk around, 
makes the act of listening into a physical exploration. This statement, one might say, is 
obvious and unremarkable. However, in the ordinary way of giving a concert, the listener’s 
body is, so to speak, silenced. The audience is only expected to show how moved they are at 
the end of a presented work. The spatial organisation with a clear division between musicians 
and audience, and with the listeners fixed in one spatial position during the whole concert, 
encourages a mentally focused listening. Deep and concentrated listening becomes a mental 
activity. Besides the ability to hear, the significance of the listener’s physical existence 
becomes, then and there, minimal. To hear properly what is presented, bodily movements 
must be cancelled out.  They can disturb what is presented from the stage – they can disturb 
the proper, created sounds – and they can distract the listener from the proper object of 
concentration, the performed work.  
 
Even if the norm at a classical concert is to be seated and listen quietly, at museums and 
galleries we are expected to walk around to look at the presented art works. Therefore, seen 
within an art context, we can imagine that Musicircus takes the habits from one field, the 
visual arts, and transfers them to a multimedia event. This transfer, however, has crucial 
implications for the experience of the act of listening. It is here interesting to speak about 
materiality. Because of the difference between the material quality of visual objects and 
sounds (and performances), the analogous mode of exhibition entails a new situation. We 
could, for example, speak about the simultaneous exhibition of different sound objects 
(musical works) as analogous to visual objects (paintings, sculptures and so on), which the 
visitors by their own choice can look at and contemplate. However, because of their sonic 
materiality, to keep the different sonic objects discretely apart as distinct independent works 
would be difficult. They would necessarily, to a certain extent, infiltrate each other and 
overlap. Further, as performances they would take a certain time span to be accomplished.  
 
Therefore, even if the mode of walking around is not new, the situation of this merging 
between the spectators’ mode of moving around in a gallery and the musical and 
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performative-exhibitive mode of Musicircus generates a new situation, not least for the way 
we are used to listen to music.521   
 
I will here use my own experience at a Musicircus staged in Ludwigshafen am Rhein as an 
example and a case to reflect upon. This event, staged by Sigune von Osten and marking the 
start of a festival of dramatic art, began outdoors.522 At 5 p.m. it started with church bells and 
filled the square in front of the theatre house with a mishmash of celebrative activities from 
performances by the fire brigade to stilt dancing, orchestrated cars, several bands, Tibetan 
horns and public transportation. The circus continued indoors and invited the audience to 
explore a house full of music, visuals, Cage quotes, sculptures, films, mingling the different 
spaces into a conglomerate of artistic activities, reflecting a huge variety of cultural practices, 
before we ended in the theatre hall where this variety of practices continued in a condensed 
collage of performances emerging from all sides.523  
 
This was my first Musicircus experience, and I found most startling the mode of listening we 
were invited to perform. A form of exploration where we were allowed to move around, 
listening from positions we otherwise would not be permitted to listen from (like close behind 
a double bass). The listening became a physical as well as a mental act where I became very 
aware of my own moving body as an agent of my own spatial mix. The physicality of 
listening became very apparent, even more so when we ended up sitting in the theatre hall and 
were not able to move freely anymore. The experience of the emerging collage became very 
different there, even though the theatre hall with its architectonic signature somehow was 
deconstructed by what had happened before and by the spatial arrangement of the 
performances in the hall, having performing groups placed both on the stage, amongst the 
audience, behind and at the stage.  
 
To use my own experience as an example, the exploration of my own physicality, my own 
moving body as part of and framing what I heard became an aesthetic experience in itself, and 
an aesthetic theme to explore of its own accord. The collage and fusing of different 
performances became intimately linked to my own exploration, and this interaction – what 
                                                 
521 Even though the spectators’ movements are incorporated into the normal practice of looking at for example 
the paintings exhibited at a gallery that does not mean that we consciously connect our gaze to the movements of 
our bodies. It could be equally as prominent that we move our position to silently contemplate a new object, this 
contemplation experienced as “mental” in its character - as is the way we listen to music at a classical concert.  
522 This Cagean circus opened the first festival of Ludwigshafen (Festspiele Ludwigshafen) and had about 330 
performers and over 30 different groups − orchestras, bands, diverse ensembles, theatre groups, choirs and others 
such as the fire brigade − engaging both local resources and musicians and artists across the country, making up 
an atmosphere of a ‘global village’ in action.  
523 Though this production both had entrance fee and seated the audience in the end, I found it impressive with 
regard to the destabilization of a consecrated space devoted to the “high” art of theatre and an invitation to 
audience and performers to explore and inhabit this space afresh. 
 215 
happened if I moved close to something or away from it, rocked from side to side, turned my 
head, or moved into a listening position not usually available to a listener − became 
entrancing and fascinating. This physical, active listening became in its explorative mode as 
captivating as “just” listening to what emerged.  
 
Such an experience, as the one I had in Ludwigshafen, is of course not really new. Most of us 
have danced and improvised movements to music, and put on music to enliven boring tasks 
such as cleaning the house or driving a car. Probably it is because of the other norm, the one 
where you sit still and listen, that the mode of listening at a Musicircus becomes revealing.524  
  
If we now go back to the role where the body is silenced, the activity of listening in this mode 
with all its associative and interpretative activity does not need to be felt less intensively. 
However, in a Musicircus this role is activated in another way, and the activity of listening as 
a physical activity also has implications for how the spatial dimension is experienced and 
emerges.  
 
We could say, to use Fischer-Lichte’s direction of thought, that the spatial arrangement of a 
Musicircus invites us to a change of focus from the role of listening as an act of interpretation 
and emphatic “reading” to being a performance of its own accord.  
 
The sounds’ capacity to reflect, define and create space becomes more striking because we 
can change our spatial position at any time by our own movements. This revealed spatiality 
becomes intimately linked to our sensing bodies. The act of listening becomes an independent 
performance adding to the others. The event that emerges happens in these intersections, 
supporting coils of feedback.  
 
The listener literally becomes a “doer” who creates his/her own “strip of experience”525 and 
the listening act becomes a bodily experience felt in the pace of the walk, in the movement of 
the hips, in the turning of the head, in the near touchable zone of a musician. This experience 
is also spatial, where the body, so to speak, appears with permeable borders, linked to the 
extended dimensions of space and the extensive-radiating contributions of others.  
 
From the point of view of the live emerging collage, Musicircus’ spatiality changes constantly 
by what at any given time is performed. Through the audience’s ability to move around, the 
                                                 
524 A vivid example of the issue of different modes of listening and clashes that can appear between different 
practices is discussed in Ola-Kai Ledang’s article “Open Form in African Tribal Music” (1983). The subject is 
there approached the other way around, from the established practice of dancing to music to the presentation of 
the norm of the silent audience.  
525 A term from Erving Goffman. See Carlson 2004, p. 46. 
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spatial quality of the event becomes even more noticeable, and this spatiality becomes 
emphatically connected to the listener’s own listening performance as a bodily performance, 
not only a mental one. The experienced spatiality, therefore, quite explicitly emerges in the 
points of intersection between the emerging live collage and the performance of the listeners 
(as embodied minds, psychosomatic beings). We can thus speak about additive performances 
that intersect. Musicircus emerges through these additive performances overlapping and 
crossing each other.  
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I have emphasised the liveness of Musicircus as a collage. The collage is generated live by 
simultaneous performances, and by not being based in coordinated simultaneity, this collage 
is not predicted in detail but reflects the intermingling result from many individual 
contributions that in sum represents a high potency of autopoietic dynamics. The Cagean 
circus can therefore be seen as a kind of production that emphatically draws the attention 
towards the factor of liveness and the impossibility of making a fair documentation of such an 
event. It evades commodification and needs to be experienced in its real time of execution. 
The circus productions initiate autopoietic, additive and interactive processes that intimately 
are connected to the generation of a performative spatial-temporal dimension that hardly can 
be detached from the situation, place and participants that contribute to what emerges: The art 
event – its meaning and aesthetic nature – represents an irreducible measure that has to be 
experienced live. 
 
Bormann’s reading represents here a complication, because Cage’s aesthetics and artistic 
practice are not seen as ultimately residing in an aesthetic of the omnipresent though 
processual moment. I find in Bormann’s study a potential critique of Fischer-Lichte’s 
performative aesthetics. At least, he implements reflections upon other aspects triggered by 
the concept of performativity. Fischer-Lichte describes the unavailable and indeterminate 
quality of performances – their Unverfügbarkeit – according to a kind of immediacy and 
liveness defined by the unique (non-deferral) character of the moment, a character brought 
about not least because of the productivity of the exchange that arises between participants. 
Bormann, however, by using the example of the promise as a guideline draws attention to the 
structural deferral involved in performative acts. His analysis, therefore, by seeing Cage’s 
aesthetics and artistic practice as analogous to the structure of a promise, opens other horizons 
for discussing presence, liveness and the now which appear so important within Cage’s 
aesthetics. This important discussion that includes the themes of presence, immediacy, 
mediation, deferral, and dislocation, will be brought up again in the next chapter and 
confronted by a concrete example when our Musicircus done in 2006 is going to be discussed.  
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6  CAGE’S NON-DUALISTIC APPROACH TO 
AESTHETICS  
 
[Suzuki] then spoke of two qualities: Unimpededness and interpenetration. Now this unimpededness is 
seeing that in all of space each thing and each human being is at the center and furthermore that each 
one being at the centre is the most honored one of all. Interpenetration means that each one of these 
most honored ones of all is moving out in all directions penetrating and being penetrated by every other 
one  no matter what the time or what the space. So that when one says that there is no cause and effect, 
what is meant is that there are an incalculable infinity of causes and effects, that in fact each and every 
thing in all of time and space is related to each and every other thing in all of time and space.526  
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Through Goehr’s historical-analytical analysis we are presented with a work concept in which 
music is regarded as constituted by lasting objects (products) existing independently of their 
time and place of performance, though representing the ideal to strive for in these very same 
performances. Goehr presents a non-essentialist approach to concepts. However, through her 
analysis, the revealed work-concept re-establishes an essentialist frame as the ontological 
horizon for how to speak about and practice music still today. I connected this frame to the 
hegemony of a two-world perspective where we, at one side of the spectrum, have the 
spiritual, ideal and exemplary, and at the other side, the physical, impure and imperfect. Cage, 
I argued, problematizes this perspective basically for what it excludes, or judges deficient. I 
introduced in this respect the conception of ‘lack’ and mentioned three points, all attacked in 
Cage’s aesthetics: Firstly, what is present in its transformative quality cannot be accounted for 
as present in a fully ontological sense. As transformative it will necessarily exist in an 
insufficient mode. Secondly, the perspectival aspect of ‘lack’ means also that what is 
perceived has to be compared to an ideal, an abstract form that provides a standard according 
to which what is perceived can be apprehended (“read”) as a certain (purposeful) 
materialisation. And not least, appearances and events that fall outside of our standards could 
be called a kind of ontological noise. This “noise” invokes questions about plurality, 
otherness, and what can be seen, heard and voiced by our approaches. Cage does not only 
preach the inclusion of sonic noise in the fabric of music. What is really at stake is to break 
ground for considering the “noisy” climate of existence as fully worthy in an ontological 
sense. 
                                                 
526 Cage, Silence, pp. 46-47. 
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In chapter four we partly left the work as our central category and took up the ‘event’ as the 
starting point for aesthetic reflections. Through Fischer-Lichte’s aesthetic theory of 
performativity we were presented concepts that aimed to treat the “work-critical” activity 
discussed in chapter three in positive terms − that is, theorizations that do not only intend to 
formulate what is attacked, but aspire to work out conceptions that reflect what these artistic 
events pose. However, the transfer of our attention from workhood to the character of event 
and the concept of performativity did not leave us without questions. I pointed to tensions 
within the concept of performativity itself, such as between the intentional and reflexive 
quality associated to performed actions and the chance-ridden and coincidental flavour 
associated to the concept of event. Further, even if we moved away from the work concept 
presented in chapter three, we did not leave behind questions about the meaning and function 
of conventional norms, standards, or what we could call “ideals”.  
 
A new discussion of the work-concept was introduced. Through Heidegger and Gadamer’s 
theories of the artwork we were presented a re-formulated concept that incorporated the 
performative initiative and response through a theorizing of the artwork as an event. At the 
same time, this reformulated work-concept included a gathering and unifying aspect that 
managed to account for the work-event’s comprehensibility. Further, we could also argue that 
this reformulated work-concept managed to theorize the significance of materiality in its own 
terms and not only as a result of performative acts. However, I argued that this explanation 
presupposes a hierarchical perspective – a kind of centre/periphery thinking – that Cage 
problematizes.  Cage does not only challenge a Platonic-Aristotelian world-view, also the 
Heideggerian presuppositions of hierarchic principles of structuration are attacked. I linked 
this attack to an altered direction of thought from dialectical models based upon the play 
between a defined/projected totality and parts that express/constitute this totality, to a 
situation of being-in-the-middle-of-something-not-knowing-the-totality where bodily 
processes as much as mental ones have importance for the aesthetic experience and its 
meaning. The analysis in chapter five elaborates on this situation by pointing to, for example, 
Cage’s questioning of the tendency for an anthropocentric focus and valuation. We are, in 
other words, confronted by a situation of being-in-the-middle-of-something-not-knowing-the-
totality that challenges anthropocentrism and a chasm between human nature and the rest of 
the world.  
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In this chapter I want to go further into this sketched theoretical terrain by focusing upon 
Cage’s questioning of dualism. To do this I will especially focus on the concepts of 
interpenetration and non-obstruction (unimpededness) that appear in his aesthetics from 
about 1950. These concepts, that I find are used to epitomize his non-dualistic approach, are 
also closely related to his exploration of simultaneity exemplified by musicircus as a 
performative technique (a technique of performance) of co-presence. Cage himself connects 
these concepts to the Musicircus. He says in a conversation with Daniel Charles in 1970: 
 
Cage: [...] [Musicircus] is a principle of a flexible relationship, of a flexibility of relationships.  
Daniel Charles: What do you mean by that? 
Cage: Interpenetration must appear through non-obstruction.527  
 
As mentioned, a central characteristic of Musicircus is the simultaneity of different artistic 
performances that take place, spread about, though “under the same roof”. This simultaneity 
is almost the only characteristic that all realized Musicircuses have in common. My 
hypothesis is that an examination of interpenetration and non-obstruction can illuminate the 
specific simultaneous character spotlighted in these productions and further enlighten Cage’s 
aesthetic project of non-dualism. Hopefully, this will bring us back to the more general 
theoretical question of thinking an aesthetic situation from being-in-the-middle-of-it-not-
knowing-the-totality as being-in-the-middle-of-presence-production.  
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The quote introducing this chapter is one of many examples where Cage refers to Buddhism 
to elaborate his aesthetic views. What has Buddhism meant for Cage’s aesthetics, or perhaps 
to ask more precisely: How has Cage’s adoption of Buddhist concepts and ideas helped to 
address specific questions of Western art music? And correlated to this, what has this 
adoption meant in formulating alternative views to those that had dominated the artistic field 
he entered? 
 
Low addresses similar questions in her thesis Religion and the invention(s) of John Cage.528 
                                                 
527 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p. 52. 
528 Low 2007. 
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She even emphasises that Cage’s appropriation of an Buddhist inspired rhetoric helped to   
(re-)invent a tradition for his music − a specific American tradition of experimental music − 
that distanced him from the “old world” of Europe. In this respect she is in line with Patterson 
who emphasises that “in appropriating terms and concepts from his [Cage’s] sources, his 
borrowings were not so much faithful transcriptions of ideas as they were carefully 
constructed intellectual subversions.”529 The invented Orient530 functioned as an authorization 
for Cage’s attitude to experimentation where the aim is not to express or create masterworks, 
but to erase ego-driven fetters and make the mind susceptible to divine influences.531 Instead 
of the aesthetics of genius and masterworks so firmly planted in the old world’s soil of 
Europe, the Orient envisioned the freedom of the self to transcend the limits of egoistic 
desires and be at one with the anonymous creativity of existence as a compassionate act.532  
 
Anderson also stresses the significance of Cage’s Buddhist influences, especially the Zen 
Buddhism presented by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki.533 He does not so much explore subversive 
traits in Cage’s appropriations as he sees the potential for an affirmative examination of 
Cage’s creative project with Zen as common denominator. From a deconstructive point of 
view the apparent meaninglessness of Cage’s works easily falls into nihilism. Within the 
context of the practice of Zen, Cage’s compositional strategies point to experiences that 
exceed conceptualized knowledge − to the emergence of life before it is framed in known 
notions. Anderson points in this respect to a move from object to process, from meaning to 
attitude. Cage situates processes that aim to provide certain performative and attentive 
attitudes that have the capacity to bring about a certain type of experience that Anderson calls 
a Cagean experience, a kind of liminal experience at the boundary of what make sense: “I 
                                                 
529 Patterson 2002a, p. 43. Patterson further explains this point: “This is not to lend an insidious tone to Cage’s 
attitude towards his material but more objectively refers to a particular type of appropriation whereby the basic 
elements and unifying structure of an idea are maintained, though the intended effect is first undercut and then 
reversed (i.e., subverted) by a motivation contrary to the idea’s original purpose.” (Loc. cit.) Patterson especially 
shows Cage’s appropriation of elements from Ananda Coomaraswamy’s aesthetics in such a context. See also 
Patterson 2002/2009b. 
530 Low sees in fact Cage’s evocation of the Orient as fostering alternatives to Western practices (especially in 
his rhetoric from the 1950s) to be a kind of ‘orientalising’ in line with Said’s description as “a purposeful 
representation of the Other to the end of achieving a particular political or cultural goal.” Low 2008, footnote at 
p. 5. See for example Low 2008, pp. 155-157. 
531 “The purpose of music is to sober and quiet the mind, thus making it susceptible to divine influences.” (Cage: 
“An Autobiographical Statement” (1989) in Cage and Kostelanetz 1993, p. 239.) This phrase that Cage ascribes 
to Gira Sarabhai, an Indian singer and tabla player Cage met in 1946 and exchanged respective knowledge of 
Western and Indian music and aesthetics, recurs in Cage’s explanations of his compositional activity and appears 
as a tenet of the aesthetics he develops from the 1940s. See also Kostelanetz 2003, pp. 43 and 45. 
532 Low 2008, Patterson 2002.   
533 Andersson 2009.  
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have called the intellect’s attempt to grasp what is not possible to understand with Cage’s 
work to have a ‘Cagean experience’”.534 This non-matrixed experience − to “accept the 
uncertainty rather than trying to dissolve it”,535 invests its attention in the act of experiencing 
itself, i.e. the activity of listening, performing, composing, which opens a horizon of 
enjoyment in the midst of the unresolved flux of the emergent situation.536 In fact, Anderson 
sketches similar moves to those presented in the aesthetics of performativity where the 
significance of the event is in its effect − the transformative experience.  However, he uses 
Cage’s involvement with Zen as a clue to theorize these.537 
 
My main issue in this chapter is neither historiographical, nor a detailed study of Cage’s 
sources and their use, but a delimited reading of Cage, the thinker, who aimed to expound 
alternative objectives for the practice he joined. The air of Buddhism framing the sense and 
authority of concepts employed in this respect − such as Cage’s use of ‘interpenetration’ and 
‘non-obstruction’ − prevails in Cage’s usage, and this estranged though known frame of 
reference is utilized to provide a different ground from which to think aesthetic questions and 
solutions. Therefore, though Cage’s Buddhist references can be criticized as misplaced and 
misrepresented,538 they occupy an important place in his aesthetic argumentation that helps to 
open new fields for discourse and practice.  
 
Buddhism has a long and huge tradition, both historically and geographically, and it embraces 
a wide variety of philosophic schools and religious practices. This huge tradition has not 
remained unchanged by its introduction and inclusion in Western cultural and religious life. 
McMahan (2008) speaks about the making of Buddhist Modernism. The entry of Buddhism 
into Western life at the turn of the 20th century happened in a climate of translation and 
transformation. McMahan emphasises, in this respect, processes of creolization and 
hybridization where Buddhist conceptions were re-formulated in fashions adaptable to 
established systems of thought in the West:  
 
                                                 
534 Andersson 2008, p. 8. 
535 Andersson 2008, p. 8. See also pp. 24-30. 
536 See also “Experiential openness” in this chapter and my presentation of Göran’s Cage study. 
537 Andersson’s study does not refer to theories of performativity, and he does not use the concept of liminality 
to denote the ‘Cagean experience’ as I have done here, but I find striking parallels between his reading of Cage 
and conceptualisations to be found within theories of performativity. 
538 See for example Low’s argument that Cage was romancing the concept of ‘emptiness’ and appropriated an 
understanding that deviated from the normative Buddhist understanding. Low 2006 and 2007. 
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What many Americans and Europeans often understand by the term ‘Buddhism,’ however, is actually a 
modern hybrid tradition with roots in the European Enlightenment no less than the Buddha’s 
enlightenment, in Romanticism and transcendentalism as much as Pali canon, and in the clash of Asian 
cultures and colonial powers as much as in mindfulness and meditation.539 
 
However, he does not abandon the term Buddhism in describing these new appropriations. 
Instead he shows how its presentation to a Western audience has transformed and added to the 
scope of Buddhism on a global plane. I find the Buddhist Modernism that McMahan outlines 
clarifying in circumscribing notions that Cage adopts. This term also provides a view for the 
soundboard that Cage’s Buddhist inspired notions could put in vibration. No doubt, the 
publication of Silence in 1961 hit upon something and became inspirational for a group of 
people far beyond those accustomed to contemporary issues of avant-garde music and art.540 
Silence is not a unified statement. It is a collection of different texts, written for different 
purposes, spanning in time from the end of the thirties to the early sixties, and 
exhibiting/exploring different styles of literary writing. However, Cage’s Buddhist rhetoric 
flavours many of the texts, not least seminal contributions like “Lecture for Nothing” (1949) 
and “Lecture for Something” (1950), and this rhetoric is used to support and envision a 
different subject field for music than the objectified version of the masterwork.541 
 
In this respect it is worth referring to a point made by McMahan. Buddhism as introduced to 
the West addressed questions of modernity. The progress of science and its paradigm of 
verifiable empirical knowledge had shaken religious dogmas. However, the secularity thereby 
enforced was in danger of dis-enchanting the world. Early promoters of Buddhism managed 
to present Buddhist teachings as bridging this gap.542 These teachings were, like the scientific 
paradigm of the modern world prescribed, based in “empirical” experiences, but did not 
thereby dis-enchant the world. Buddhism could therefore be approached as a “secular” 
religion − with no Gods, based in direct experience − that however managed to re-spiritualise 
the modern ruin of a disenchanted universe.  
 
Cage’s appropriations of ‘interpenetration’ and ‘non-obstruction’ reflect this presentation of 
                                                 
539 McMahan 2008, p. 5. 
540 See Patterson 2002b. 
541 See discussions in chapter three. 
542 Examples are here the Japanese Zen Master Soyen Shaku (1860-1919) and Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-
1933) from Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) who both spoke at the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago, 1893 − 
an important event in the dissemination of Buddhism to the West, especially America. See McMahan 2004 and 
Snodgrass 2003. 
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Buddhism, bridging the gap in the modern world, and in Cage’s case this is used to express a 
non-dualistic approach to music where matter and spirituality are not split up in a dual and 
contesting relationship: The here of the matter is also the place for spirituality, or to use a 
notion presented in chapter four, matter and transcendence act in embodied unity. With the 
help of Buddhist notions Cage envisions the possibility of basing music in an ontology of 
flux, with firm interpretative grounds afloat, though without loosing sense for the real and its 
call for compassion. 
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Today, McMahan argues, interdependence has become a tenet of modern Buddhism that has 
the capacity to resonate with the inter of a modern world:  
 
Indeed, this age of internationalism and the internet might well be called the age of inter: there is 
nothing that is not interconnected, interdependent, interwoven, interlaced, interactive, or interfacing 
with something else to make it what it is. Thus, any religious tradition that can claim ‘interdependence’ 
as a central doctrine lays claim to timely cultural resonance and considerable cultural cachet.543  
 
The Buddhist doctrine of interdependence − dependent co-arising, or dependent origination 
(pratitya-samutpada), of which Cage’s adopted concept of interpenetration is a variant − can 
be found in early Buddhist literature. But while early sources mainly use it to describe the 
fetters of life, contemporary descriptions of interdependence often express “a sense of 
celebration of this interwoven world, of intimacy and oneness with the great, interconnected, 
living fabric of life, and an expansion of the sense of selfhood into it.”544 McMahan points to 
different sources for this contemporary version. These include both elaborations on the long 
history of Buddhism in the Asian continent − such as Nagarjuna’s elaboration of ‘emptiness’ 
(sunyata) where nirvana becomes basically not different from samsara, just perceived 
differently,545 the metaphysics of interpenetration developed by the school of Hua-yen,546 the 
conception of buddhisatvas in Mahayana Buddhism who are not only content with their own 
liberation but pursue enlightenment to benefit all sentient beings, and a more positive attitude 
to nature in the South-Asian subcontinent − and Western ideas of “an animate universe, of a 
                                                 
543 McMahan 2008, p. 149. 
544 Ibid. p. 151. 
545 Nagarjuna (about 2nd century CE) is regarded as the founder the Madhyamika (the middle way) school, an 
important tradition of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. For Nagarjuna’s philosophy, see Westerhoff 2009 and 
Garfield/Priest 2003.  
546 See description of Hua-yen at p. 228. 
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life-force flowing through all things and offering an inner access to the spiritual essence of the 
whole”547 to be found in German Romanticism and American Transcendentalism, added to by 
“popular accounts of modern scientific thought, systems theory, and recent ecological 
thought.”548 
 
The contemporary concept combines empirical description, world-affirming wonder, and an 
ethical imperative. Empirically, it presents the world “as a vast, interconnected web of 
internally related beings − that is, whose identity is not a priori independent of the systems 
they are a part of but is inseparable from those systems”.GFK Ethically, this interwoven 
condition calls for care and consideration because the contemporary conception also 
“emphasize the fragility of the interconnected network of beings: because everything depends 
on everything else, altering the balance of the web of life can be − and has been − 
catastrophic.”550  
 
These last descriptions are especially related to more recent developments of engaged 
Buddhism and Eco-Buddhism. But though some of the described flavours above are related to 
trends developed after Cage’s introduction to Buddhism, Cage’s appropriation clearly shares 
the world-affirming character and the compassionate invocation associated to this modernist 
version of ‘dependent co-arising’.  
 
Not only Cage but also my reading of his Buddhist inspired notions is framed by a modernist 
understanding of Buddhism that is demythologized and addresses questions of the modern 
area. That is, Buddhism as a kind of process philosophy enabling us to envision the idea of 
ontological-epistemological and existential arguments as based in the flux of experience, a 
sense of Being as becoming, and not in the stability of the word − the linguistic sign. Further, 
the possibility of developing a philosophy of life on this condition, even though an ideal 
world collapses into a phenomenal world and nirvana becomes not basically different from 
samsara − the ontological view of “groundlessness” does not need to leave us in an 
epistemological, existential and ethical trap. There are also inspirations to be found for 
loosening up the notion of the taxonomic entity at the base of epistemological systems and see 
                                                 
547 McMahan 2008, p. 164. 
548 Ibid. p. 153. 
549 Ibid. &7CGB7 
550 Ibid. pp. 151-152.  
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the particular unit as an association of driving forces, more or less tidily connected, as 
imparted by Rahula: “What we call a ‘being’, or an ‘individual’, or an ‘I’, according to 
Buddhist philosophy, is only a combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or 
energies, which may be divided into five groups or aggregates.”551 Finally, we have the 
teaching of liberation that does not leave this groundless condition in “damnation”, but acts 
upon it as the ultimate opportunity for happiness. This opens an existential frame of 
interpretation. Without doubt the teaching of liberation is essential for Cage’s Buddhist 
rhetoric. Most often ontological arguments are supported by existential considerations, such 
as how we can come to terms with the lives we live in a fruitful way. With these remarks 
mentioned, let us proceed to Cage’s conceptions. 
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Cage’s concepts of interpenetration and non-obstruction and variants of non-obstruction like 
unimpededness and non-hindrance begin to emerge frequently in Cage’s texts and interviews 
from the early 1950s and continue to be part of Cage’s aesthetic vocabulary throughout his 
career. These concepts are both used to describe general conceptions of life and issues of 
specific musical and compositional character: “The sounds enter the time-space centred 
within themselves, unimpeded by service to any abstraction, their 360 degrees of 
circumference free for an infinite play of interpenetration.”GGD  
 
Evidently there is a link between Cage’s study of East-Asian philosophy − of Zen Buddhism 
and Taoism − and his incorporation of ‘interpenetration’ and ‘non-obstruction’ 
(unimpededness/non-hinderance) in his aesthetics. But even though the concepts appear to be 
derived from East-Asian philosophies, they are mainly used to underpin aesthetic arguments 
that belong to discussions of topics within Western art music. In this respect, I would like to 
use one of Cage’s anecdotes as an example:GGE  
                                                 
551 Rahula, p. 20. McMahan mentions Rahula’s book What the Buddha Taught (first edition, 1959) amongst 
those that have contribution to the modernist understanding of Buddhism. My conception of Buddhism has also 
been shaped by this book.  
552 Cage, Silence, p. 59. My italics. 
553 The anecdote is one of the one-minute long stories that make up the corpus of Indeterminacy (1958/59), a 
piece that consists of 90 short stories. In Silence these stories are spread about and appear as small independent 
literary pieces. 
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The question of leading tones came up in the class in experimental composition that I give at the New 
School. I said, “You surely aren’t talking about ascending half-steps in diatonic music. Is it not true that 
anything leads to whatever follows?” But the situation is more complex, for things also lead backwards 
in time. This also does not give a picture that corresponds with reality. For, it is said, the Buddha’s 
enlightenment penetrated in every direction to every point in space and time.554  
 
Cage performs a rhetorical move in this story that in a concise form shows a common feature 
of his application of the discussed concepts. That is, the notions of interpenetration and non-
obstruction are used to comment on and critique musical and aesthetic questions. From this 
specificity we are moved to general reflections upon life that thereby give the reasons for his 
stand on specific musical matters.  
 
What is it, then, that ‘interpenetration’ and ‘non-obstruction’ describe? Patterson writes that 
Cage “adopted the notion of interpenetration from both Buddhist and Taoist strains of 
thought to describe the dynamic element of continuity.”GGG I wrote in chapter two that Cage in 
the 1950s uses the notion of no-continuity to describe musical forms that break with the 
ordinary idea of coherence and unity.556 The discontinuous character of pieces by Feldman, 
Wolff, Brown and Cage himself drew attention to other parameters like the minute physical 
character of the sonic material, the act of producing and experiencing it, and relations that did 
not follow the typical linear logic of element A followed by B making up a narrative structure 
with a distinct beginning and end. This no-continuity has according to Cage the capacity to 
exhibit the continuous quality of space-time in an expansive and inclusive manner. We speak 
in this respect about a notion of continuity that exceeds an intentionally shaped course of 
events that is assumed to have a unified frame of reference. Instead we are surrounded by 
lapses of events that emerge through the concurrence of many factors − many frames of 
references and reasons for acting − being multi-centred and multi-faceted, with no unifying 
story to be told.  
 
It is this last notion of continuity that Patterson refers to when he says that ‘interpenetration’ 
describes the “dynamic element of continuity” and connects the notion of interpenetration to 
Cage’s experimentation with simultaneous performances:  
 
                                                 
554 Cage, Silence, p. 66. 
555 Patterson 1996, p. 166. 
556 See pp. 29-30 in this thesis. 
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Ultimately, the dual notion of continuity and interpenetration became a significant part of Cage’s own 
developing fascination with creating ‘multiple centers’ of action in many of his works, such as the 
multi-media Black Mountain Piece (1952), which was conceived and premiered at Black Mountain 
College.557  
 
I will now translate this term of continuity to the dynamics of co-presence, co-activity and 
interplay of entities (centres/junctions of being).  We could consequently say that 
‘interpenetration’ refers to how these entities interact and are co-present in the world. 
However, the concept is not restricted to the dynamics between existing things. It also 
describes their ontological foundation, because no thing, no entity is, according to this 
perspective, seen as having at its base an underlying substance.  
 
In this respect it can be helpful to briefly outline the Buddhist teaching of no-self, because the 
doctrine of anatman (no-self) preaches the un-substantialized universe where no thing, no 
being, exists in an unconditional state, or has anything like that at its core; no real substance 
exists, everything becomes what it is by contingent processes. Substance is in this respect 
understood in an essentialist manner. It represents a constant in the fluid of experienced 
reality that has an eternal, unchangeable and unconditioned quality. Buddhism though argues 
that no such underlying constants (constant) are to be found, and that we are doomed to fail if 
we try to base our happiness on the assumption of such stable and fixed measures.  
 
The concept of sunyata (emptiness) is part of this non-substantialized perspective: Every 
being is in essence emptied of any substantial character. They are basically the result of 
ongoing processes of becoming that connects all and everything in a nexus of interdependent 
and conditional states. Interpenetration, therefore, does not only describe a mode of 
interaction between things. It characterises the process of becoming in which these things 
only are arisen-arising knots; nothing substantially separates them from the invasion of 
mutual transformation. They have in this sense a non-obstructive quality that through and 
through is characterised by interpenetrations − that is, of mutual arising, mutual entering, 
mutual containment, mutual reflection and mutual sameness.GGJ 
 
                                                 
557 Patterson 1996, pp. 166-167. 
558 This description alludes to the system of though outlined by Hua-yen. See footnote at p. 228. 
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Cage presents, in fact, respectively a definition for ‘unimpededness’ and ‘interpenetration’ in 
the quote that introduces this chapter (“[Suzuki] then spoke of two qualities: Unimpededness 
and interpenetration..”), and he refers to D.T. Suzuki as the source for these definitions. 
Suzuki discusses the doctrine of interpenetration in Essays in Zen Buddhism (Third Series).559 
His presentation appears in the explanation of the Buddhist text Gandavyuha, a seminal 
Mahayana Sutra and part of the larger text Avatamsaka Sutra, which forms the doctrinal basis 
for Hua-yen’s worked out metaphysics of non-obstructed interpenetration, formative for many 
East-Asian Schools of Buddhism, including Zen. The essence of Hua-yen is that everything is 
connected in dependent co-origination, and every phenomenon reflects all other phenomena. 
Every living being is a Buddha, and the division between the ordinary world (samsara) and 
nirvana is illusory.GHB Suzuki presents in this instance ‘unimpededness’ and ‘interpenetration’ 
as characteristics of the world when enlightenment is achieved. The world is then no longer a 
place where individual things exist in separation opposed to each other. Instead, the world is 
perceived as unified, both abundant in its variety and united in co-existence and interplay. 
Suzuki illustrates this condition through an image given by a master of the Hua-yen School: 
 
He had first a candle lighted, and then had mirrors placed encircling it on all sides. The central light 
reflected itself in every one of the mirrors, and every one of these reflected lights was reflected again in 
every mirror, so that there was a perfect interplay of lights, that is, of concrete-universals.561  
 
The “perfect interplay of lights, that is, of concrete-universals” describes the principle of 
interpenetration: No thing, no being exists in a separate and isolated condition. They reflect 
each other from their respective individual positions; they are in a continuous exchange, and 
thereby mirror universal qualities in their individual appearance.562 But even though Suzuki 
poses that everything infiltrates and is infiltrated, this reading does not reject the reality of 
individual existences:  
 
                                                 
559 Suzuki 1970. His aim in this series of essays is to trace the relationship between two chief Mahayana sutras, 
the Gandavyuha and Prajñaparamita, and Zen Buddhism. 
560 During the period of 559-900 masters of the Hua-yen school worked out a systematic metaphysics based 
upon the school’s interpretation of Avatamsaka Sutra’s doctrines of “non-obstruction, mutual arising, mutual 
entering, mutual containment, mutual reflection and mutual sameness” (Odin, p. 18), most exaltedly expressed in 
the concluding chapter, the Gandavyuha Sutra. The school is characterised by an adjustment of the Buddhist 
teachings to Chinese conceptions of the universe as harmonious and the nature of humans as innately good. The 
school was introduced to Japan in the 8th century and is there called Kegon.  
561 Suzuki 1970, p. 87 ff. 
562 Suzuki 1970, p. 87.  
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When we speak of identity, interpenetration, or unobstructedness as the fundamental philosophical 
conception of the Avatamsaka, we must not, however, forget that this conception by no means ignores 
the reality of individual existences. For unobstructedness is only possible when there are individual 
existences; for interpenetration is to be regarded as characteristic only of a world of particulars; for 
when there are no particulars, no individual existences, identity is an empty notion.563     
 
Suzuki points to a non-dualistic experience through the concepts of interpenetration and non-
obstruction that can be hard to come to terms with. The conception appears paradoxical by 
pointing to a kind of non-differentiated condition (not made different according to something 
else) though not erasing the unique qualities of the singular entities. This conception appears 
less mysterious by being contrasted to a perspective that approaches the world as consisting 
of separate things defined by their difference. Cage adopts this type of rhetoric:  
 
From a non-dualistic point of view, each thing and each being is seen at the center, and these centers are 
in a state of interpenetration and non-obstruction. From a dualistic point of view, on the other hand, 
each thing and each being is not seen: relationships are seen and interference are seen. To avoid 
undesired interferences and to make one’s intentions clear, a dualistic point of view requires a careful 
integration of the opposites.564  


From chapter three to five − from the discussion of the work-concept to the staged event − we 
have been presented different shades of dualism attacked by Cage’s aesthetics and practice:
  
1) The chasm between ideals and their implementation, or failure of implementation – 
the hegemonic split between soul and body, spiritual qualities and material qualities; 
2) The semiotic position’s emphasis on an operating binary and oppositional logic;  
3) The significance given to the phenomenon of a total otherness and the act of 
differentiation in Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics;  
4) A chasm between the nature of men and the rest of nature. 
 
Cage’s adopted concepts of interpenetration and non-obstruction pronounce an alternative to 
these shades of dualism, including theories that reject Platonic models and instead operate 
with systems of difference formation at the base for how we understand, approach and act in 
the world.  

In this respect I will remark that Cage connects, in the quote above, a dualistic perspective to 
a focus on specific (restricted) relations as definitional. Lurking in this critique I find an 
                                                 
563 Suzuki 1970, p. 154. 
564 Cage, Silence, p. 38. 
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interesting question: What is the relationship between a relativistic view (which we could say 
Cage promotes with his non-essentialist worldview) and the critique stated above?565

Conversely to a perspective of definitional relationships, Cage associates the presented non-
dualistic view to the apprehension of things as they are, acting from their respective centres. 
We need therefore to explore the notion of centre to account for his use of the other two 
concepts. This also readily leads us to questions about identity. Are we not, through this 
conceptual constellation of centre, interpenetration and non-obstruction, confronted with 
views that erode ordinary understandings of identity and identity formation?
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Let us once more go back to this chapter’s introductory quote,“He [Suzuki] then spoke of two 
qualities...” and examine the presented notions as Cagean conceptions: ‘Unimpededness’ 
being to see “that in all of space each thing and each human being is at the center and 
furthermore that each one being at the centre is the most honored one of all”; 
‘interpenetration’ meaning “that each one of these most honored ones of all is moving out in 
all directions penetrating and being penetrated by every other one no matter what the time or 
what the space.” 

First, let us focus on the use of ‘centre’ in these definitions, because we could imagine that 
‘centre’ substitutes for what we could think of as being a distinct and delimited entity. The 
transfer from ‘entity’ to ‘centre’ however produces a difference; it creates different 
associations: ‘Centre’ points at a locality − the midpoint of an area − but does not, in a strict 
manner, outline the outer limits of its relevance.  Like something that radiates, the centre’s 
borders are arguable and permeable. Besides, ‘centre’ also gives rise to associations of a 
meeting point where different trails concur. We could therefore argue that Cage with an 
emphasis on ‘centre’ as the conceptualizing metaphor of a core of being makes an ontological 
transfer from a taxonomy of distinct and delimited objects to talking about junctions of being 
within an encompassing flood of becoming:GHH “So there is then an interpenetration of 
unlimited centers. This is a fundamental of Buddhism.”567  
                                                 
565 This question will be discussed under the heading “Relation and relativity” at p. 234 ff. 
566 See for example my discussion of event and object concepts at pp. 90-94. 
567 Cage in interview, 1979, in Kostelanetz 2003, p. 44.  
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Cage further elaborates this conception of centre by connecting it to the Buddhist expression 
“most honored one of all.”568 It is a short step to argue that Cage in this respect presents an 
ethical saying: Each and everyone should be approached, considered and behaved towards 
with the perspective of having their own junction of being that should be respected and 
venerated. That is, Cage links the concept of unimpededness not only to how the world is 
perceived, but also to ethical values of how we should approach it. This also includes an 
existential interpretation, because also included in this ethical stance is an approach to our 
own existence and potentiality: Our own being, existing amidst the interactive requests of life, 
is a place to venerate and is the place for our opportunity. 
 
We could maybe restrict the concept of unimpededness to a perspectival quality – a quality of 
how we see and approach ourselves, others and rest of the world, for example, whether our 
view is obstructed by egoistic desires or not. Read like this ‘non-hindrance’ does not need to 
have any ontological consequences for the conception of interpenetration. We could imagine 
that unimpededness denotes the quality belonging to a certain perspective and that 
interpenetration is the feature the perceived reality shows when this non-obstructed 
perspective is applied. Cage however does not use unimpededness in this restricted way 
throughout his writings and utterances. Instead we are as often confronted with a concept that 
does not only describe a certain perspective, but also has ontological dimensions, as attested 
to, for example, in the quote at p. 229.569 
 
Read as an ontological characterization, the concept becomes really challenging when it is 
paired with the next concept Cage defines: Interpenetration. ‘To impede’ is in Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary explained by “to interfere or slow the progress of”570 and the dictionary 
gives ‘hinder’ as a synonym for the verb. Unimpede means therefore the opposite: Not to 
hinder, not to interfere or slow the progress of. This could further be extended by reference to 
the verb ‘obstruct’ which in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary is explained by:   
                                                 
568 “The most honoured one” is often used to denote Buddha, and Cage’s alludes therefore to the Buddha nature 
in all beings, sentient and non-sentient alike: “Each thing whether sentient or non-sentient is at the center of the 
universe. Everything is the world honored one, in other words everything is the Buddha. So that means that no 
one of the Buddhas should look down on another Buddha.” (Cage in one of his last interviews. Kostelanetz 
2003, pp. 274-275.)  
569 “From a non-dualistic point of view, each thing and each being is seen at the center, and these centers are in a 
state of interpenetration and non-obstruction.” (My italics.) See also quote at p. 243 (from For the Birds).    
570 “impede” in Merriam-Webster.com. 
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1 : to block or close up by an obstacle 
2 : to hinder from passage, action, or operation : IMPEDE 
3 : to cut off from sight <a wall obstructs the view>  
synonyms see HINDER 
 
The opposite, non-obstruct, would therefore mean to not block, or hinder from passage, 
action, or operation. As mentioned before, ‘unimpededness’ and ‘non-obstruction’ appear as 
synonymous concepts in Cage’s aesthetic rhetoric, and according to the definitions Merriam-
Webster gives of the verbs ‘impede’ and ‘obstruct’ it is interesting to look at Cage’s definition 
of ‘interpenetration’, because the state of unimpededness is correlated to being “penetrating 
and being penetrated by every other one no matter what the time and space”.  
 
I have mentioned that we could read ‘centre’ as a significant substitute for ‘entity’ and 
thereby provide a different ontological framework where the anchors of being have become 
more open-ended. However, from the point of departure of ordinary use, the first association I 
detect is that the quality of interpenetration would threaten the quality of a non-obstructed 
state of any thing, any being. Straight away the pairing of ‘unimpededness’ and 
‘interpenetration’ seems very paradoxical − how can something be in an unimpeded mode 
when it is infiltrated?  
 
Several pre-understandings probably underlie this spontaneous reading, not least 
understandings of identity. That is, it is easy to associate an existential centre (a junction of 
being) to a kind of identity. From psychology, anthropology and sociology we have acquired 
theories of identity and identity-formation that have oozed into our daily language. We speak 
of crisis of identity, rootlessness, Norwegian identity and so on. However, the state of 
interpenetration outlined by Cage undermines these ordinary understandings of identity 
whether we are speaking here about a substantially based concept (identity as founded upon 
the membership of a distinct entity (like a group of people) assumed to have such and such 
characteristics), or identity as basically created through processes of differentiation (identities 
are created with a backdrop of what we do not identify with).GIC In the first instance we have 
to assume that there exists some or other constant in the transitory conditions whose qualities 
the identity is connected to. In the second, identity is created by going into a grid of 
oppositional terms − my identity is created (defined) in opposition to something/someone 
                                                 
571 See Nielsen 2000. 
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else.  
 
The pairing of ‘unimpededness’ and ‘interpenetration’ both deconstructs the view of a 
constant entity whose properties define identity, and identity as created through processes of 
differentiation. Then, what kind of conception are we here presented with?  To be at the 
centre of one’s existence in the mode of non-hindrance means neither to be uninfluenced or 
independent of others, nor to be in a mode of non-identification with anything. Cage speaks in 
fact about identification as central for a non-dualistic view. We can extend our starting 
excerpt as an example. Just before the given quotation Cage writes: 

In the course of a lecture last winter at Columbia, Suzuki said that there was a difference between 
oriental thinking and European thinking, that in European thinking things are seen as causing one 
another and having effects, whereas in oriental thinking this seeing of cause and effect is not 
emphasized but instead one makes an identification with what is here and now.572  

We could remark that it is not the complication of cause and effects that Cage accentuates 
here, but 1) the act of identification, and 2) the significance of the here and now in this act of 
identification. We are presented with an experience of presence that is defined by an inclusive 
and expansive capacity for identification. This capacity links Cage to a non-dualistic view 
where you do not “cautiously proceed in dualistic terms of success and failure or the beautiful 
and the ugly or good and evil but rather simply to walk on ‘not wondering,’ to quote Meister 
Eckhart, ‘am I right or doing something wrong.’”GIE  
 
The image of a lot of centres that interpenetrate each other, though not, through this 
superimposed state, hindering the unique appearances of each, brings about a completely 
perforated notion of identity. Identity is completely conditional, relying in continuous 
processes of interdependent character. However, through the concept of centre, Cage 
accentuates a sense of locality in this flux of interconnectedness − like a node in an extensive 
nexus, a fold in a plane of Being.574 This locality is placed within a positive framework, a 
connected horizon with no limit; the process of mutual arising, mutual entering, mutual 
reflection and mutual sameness has no real periphery: “One of the principles of Buddhist 
philosophy is that everything causes everything else, and that there is nothing that is not 
caused by everything else, and that each thing is at the center of the universe, and these 
                                                 
572 Cage, Silence, p. 46. My italics.  
573 Ibid. p. 47. This is written straight after the excerpt I have quoted in the beginning. 
574 These reflections will be further elaborated in the last part of this chapter. 
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centers are in interpenetration and non-obstruction.”575 
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The potential interconnected non-dual experience of identity, expressed by not “cautiously 
proceed[ing] in dualistic terms,” brings us nevertheless to the question of relations. From one 
point of view, the conceptions outlined through the paired notions of ‘interpenetration’ and 
‘non-obstruction’ add to the critique of essentialism put forward in relativistic theories. No 
thing exists unconditionally of anything else, everything infiltrates each other. However, we 
are at the same time presented a critique of seeing things in light of a relationally based 
matrix.576  
 
We could ask what kind of relationships Cage refers to. Firstly, we could address Cage’s 
criticism to a dualistic perspective that operates with a kind of duplication between the ideal 
referent and the actual appearance. Such appearances are so to speak judged according to their 
relationship to an ideal form (a norm). This criticism was brought up in chapter three when 
we discussed the work-concept. Secondly, it is not only a Platonic world view that is attacked 
by Cage but also relativistic world views that, so to speak, have torn down Platonic ideals and 
substituted them with conventions. At the moment, it is not the conventional aspect per se that 
is of interest, but the presupposed logic of differentiation as founding these measures, and the 
need, so to speak, to violate conditions of indifference to bring about ruptures of sense. 
Although the created frames of reference are mobile, the need of dissection is not, and to 
catch the eye for what is, a purpose has to guide our view.577 The equal subjecthood of agents, 
though potentially staged through competing accounts, is however like an unthinkable dream. 
The relational based classification means also the operation of relational structures of power − 
of the potency to define and the impotency of being defined.  
 
Even though Cage criticizes a relationally based matrix of classification, he speaks about a 
perspective that demands all-embracing identification and empathy: We should approach all 
and everything as having its own centre. Would that not imply a kind of relativizing move in 
an extensive way?  The aim would be to see anyone/anything as not defined in relation to our 
                                                 
575 Cage 1969, transcript of radio interview done by Richard Friedman. 
576 See former quote “From a non-dualistic point of view…” at p. 229. 
577 See for example my discussion of the Heideggerian ‘rift’ in chapter four. 
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own “purpose”, but seen as having their own existential hub. We could even argue that Cage 
advances a radical variant of relativism, asking us to relativize our own subjective view to 
those of other positions and in this sense be aware of our non-exclusive situation, though at 
the same time demanding an approach that does not define through relations, but sees all and 
everything in their unique, irreplaceable and unreduced being. 
 
We could perhaps describe this move as a call to an extensive expansion of subjecthood, but 
if this should not imply giving credit for having an omnipotent potential of knowing the 
subjective positions and intentions of others, this would mean to take on a humble attitude of 
non-knowledge and relativize our own importance to the co-play of equally valued agents. In 
my introductory comments I recalled our discussion of ‘lack’ in chapter three. Cage, we could 
argue, presents a perspective that aims at avoiding a horizon of deficiency as the backdrop for 
experiences of presence – of what presents itself. This is exemplified in his argumentation 
against the positioning of value judgements at the heart of aesthetics:  

Value judgments are not in the nature of this work as regards either composition, performance, or 
listening. The idea of a relation (the idea: 2) being absent, anything (the idea: 1) may happen. A 
“mistake” is beside the point, for once anything happens it authentically is.578 
  
But are we thereby left with a visionless immediacy? The call for compassionate awareness of 
co-presence of subjectivity, relativizing one’s own position in the world to the extended 
condition of co-agency, points to different readings of Cage’s aesthetics of presence than that 
of the simple-minded here and now absorbed in the moment’s affirmative power. There is a 
need for the surveying sight, the double view of being located and compassionate beyond. 
Cage’s invocation of the empty reference of ‘no-self’ does not erase self-understanding but 
alters it.579 The notion envisions a different scope; it opens horizons for re-understandings/re-
experiences that modulate our active engagement with Being, our existence in the world580; it 
opens up the possibility to transcend the drive of egoistic desires and approach oneself as a 
node in a world of non-secluded ‘inter-being.’581  
                                                 
578 Cage, Silence, 59. 
579 The “empty” reference could even be though as leaving space for a flexible notion, an identity in flow, 
situational adaptive and flexible. The apparatuses of projected visions, modified by the self-understanding of 
‘no-self,’ opens a horizon of identity formation, not expecting to be confirmed through a settled category, but 
modified to be ready for the oscillating meeting, to situate the sense of identity and self-awareness in a position 
flow.  
580 See former presentation of Heidegger at p. 120 ff. 
581 ‘Interbeing’ is a term used by the Vietnamese Buddhist monk *	$7 See McMahan 2008, pp. 
150-151. 
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I want, in this respect, to anticipate an argument presented more fully in the last part of this 
chapter. Cage’s aim to proceed non-dualistically can be approach in light of Merleu-Ponty’s 
notion of a positive indeterminacy operating in the lengthening of the manifested. The sight’s 
directionality is not guided by what is not there, but what can appear. In the awaiting gesture 
of the perceptive view, there is a readiness for the positive answer, the presence that still is 
not present: “a non-knowledge of something that had not yet happened.”582 Cage’s prolonged 
identification could thereby be seen as tuned by a compassionate horizon of non-knowledge, 
an awareness of presence as positive indeterminacy. The “empty” identity, also invoked by 
Heidegger’s notion of the Dasein of a historic world, is not resolved at the backdrop of the 
silence of death, but lived through a granting of affirmative meetings, the iterative oscillations 
of never-ending worldly formulations.  
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We could argue that Cage’s non-dualistic approach sites the domain of aesthetic meaning 
with the act of experience itself and the mode of presence that thereby can be explored.583 
Like Suzuki, he expresses suspicion of abstractions and emphasises the significance of direct 
experiences. Still, how can we through experience have access to that which falls between 
categories − how do we include the “noisy” climate of life in an epistemological sense?   
 
Suzuki carries out a critique of theorizations that elevate linguistic logics to the heights of 
Truth. Through his Zen teachings, he points at dimensions of experiential possibilities beyond 
the confines of conceptual dualities. Based in this belief in experience, a personal arsenal of 
perceptive abilities is emphasised as the prosperous channel for an intimate knowledge of the 
founding structures of life. The immediate, personal experience therefore is the genuine 
source for knowledge in Suzuki’s teaching. Suzuki himself draws a parallel between this view 
and the mystics’ accentuation of personal experiences, represented for example by the 
Christian, Eckhart in the Middle Ages, and we could probably justify a reading of Suzuki’s 
teaching of spontaneous awakening as a kind of mystic revelation, and further link Cage’s 
aesthetics of presence to such views. This is, however, not what I intend to do. Instead I want 
                                                 
582 Cage, Silence, p. 39. 
583 The aesthetic meaning becomes connected to the opportunities of exploration, the possibilities of the 
experiment.  
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to emphasise the synaesthetic potential in the experiential view pronounced by Suzuki. That 
is, that we are not only knowingly linked to the world through our linguistic capacities. These 
capacities are bound to a whole aggregate of sensory apparatus that give access to 
multifaceted experiences of reality.  
 
By synaesthesia I have partly in mind, here, the correlation between different experiential 
capabilities, such as the different sense impressions, that expand the view and make it richer, 
but not only that. As important is an accentuation of the flexibility involved in this multi-
channelled system of experience where different capabilities not only add to each other but 
also act independently.584 Like the difference between exploring the environment with eyes 
closed and surveying it with clogged ears, the diversity of our perceptive capacities shows so 
to speak a surplus potential; they add up and give us several “feet” to stand on. If we lose one, 
we have still others to rely on. I am thinking here about this surplus situation not only in a 
perceptive sense, but also in a creative, metaphorical sense: How the different apparatuses of 
perceptions leave spaces for different conceptualisations of the world and our existential 
situation.585 We could for example imagine the difference it would have created to think 
‘being-in-the-world’ from the act of listening instead of from the point of view of seeing. 
 
Another aspect, illuminated by Merleau-Ponty and brought up in chapter four, is the openness 
in the perceptive readiness for the meeting, for what arises in the reciprocal structure of 
perception. The logic of awareness contains in this respect the element of expectation and 
responsiveness to the co-presence of agencies, of the conditionality of a formative reality.  
 
The responsive and flexible condition of perception is further linked to an economy of 
attention. Lakoff emphasises that we are just conscious of a little portion of what informs us 
while orientating ourselves in the world. Many of those perceptive processes through which 
we experience are non-conscious and automatized.586  However, even though the conscious 
                                                 
584 See for example chapter six, pp. 105-130, in Varela and Thompson and Rosch, The Embodied Mind (1991). 
585 Partly I have in mind here Lakoff’s theory of abstract concept as metaphorical, nurtured by embodied 
experience (see Lakoff 1999), and partly a remark by Bruce Johnson at the conference Sonic Interventions: 
Pushing the Boundaries of Cultural Analysis in Amsterdam, 2005. Johnston raised the question about the 
adequacy of theory according to the aurality of music. Theory, even the word − theoria inflected from seeing − 
is so modulated by the logics of sight. How then to theorize in line with an adequate logic of listening and sonic 
production? My aim is not to take up this question here, but just point at the creative potential at a conceptual 
level that the multiplicity of experiential abilities brings about. 
586 My point here is not to adequately outline a scientific theory of perception and cognition, but point at some 
markers of the flexibility that our embodied condition of experience represent.  
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agent is just the top of an iceberg of a network of interrelated apparatuses and systems, it is 
not a passive agent totally determined by automation. In this context I briefly want to present 
a reading elaborated by Göran in her study of Cage’s creative practice from a performer’s 
point of view.587  
 
She emphasises the significance of destabilization that Cage’s methods of rule-based 
procedures represents.588 These procedures help to “reset” the performer’s habitual views and 
draw attention to aesthetic fields formerly ignored. We also saw destabilisation as a point of 
reorientation in chapter four. What I want to accentuate at here is a notion of dissipative 
structures, of being in a mode of throughput, which Göran presents.589 She explores a 
performative-attentive mode of being in the between and betwixt of liminality that is not 
coloured by the “abyss” of doubt, uncertainty and agonies of choice, but the affirmation of 
being in emergence. To do this, she presents Cage’s works as designs of self-organising 
systems and couples this conception with the ideas of the “free” creative act in action painting 
and automatism in surrealism.590 The automation provided by the procedures of disciplined 
action makes it possible to release the creative energy of the work as an autopoietic system, a 
collective of propelling contributions, “unhindered” by habitual censorship, and “free” the 
performers to stay within this intensified energy of appearance, being non-responsible for the 
result but responsive for what comes. The surrender to the work’s autopoietic energy releases 
capacities of attention from control and judgement to be attentive to the energetic flow of 
becoming. The work as an experiment that the participants have the faith to join leaves 
capacities for an altered economy of attention to appear.  
 
Cage’s non-dualistic approach proclaims a non-reductionist view where co-partners are not 
reduced to objectives for one’s purposes or desires but met as equal subjects. This, though, 
requires humility with regard to one’s own agential potential and subjective position. One 
exists as a participant and not the sole actor.  We saw also this relativization of the authorial 
role in the aesthetics of performativity where the alternations of roles points to the oscillation 
                                                 
587 Göran 2009.  
588 For an example of these rule-based procedures that discipline the act of composing, or performing, see also 
my analysis of Variations II in chapter four. 
589 Her thesis is written in Norwegian and the notion she uses is gjennomstrømningsstruktur. See Göran 2009, p. 
4 and pp. 145-151. 
590 Both of these ideas searched to pave the way for altered experiences behind learned schemes of attention. 
Though the subconscious plays an important role in this respect for these artistic schools, Cage’s acquisition 
does not pay much attention to the hidden sources of a self but directs it outwards, to the way we sense the world 
and find us selves within it. See Göran 2009, pp. 77-94. 
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between acting and reacting and subjectivity becomes a gliding state between positions of 
subject and object. The Cagean concept of interpenetration addresses in this respect similar 
issues as those raised by Fischer-Lichte’s emphasis on the co-contributive character of 
performances. Cage, though, by his adoption of Buddhist phrases, seems to take this further − 
to a spiritual point of view where all and everything are seen as interconnected. Paired with 
his emphasis on the direct, first person experience, this could lead to a reading where the goal 
of his aesthetics is the mystic experience of unity with an inner and shared Being of things. 
Even if we did not fully pursue this path of mysticism, we could emphasise a holistic model 
of thought, in coming to grips with Cage’s aesthetics, where all and everything are seen as 
neatly correlated to each other. I will however question such a reading. Instead I have found it 
more fruitful to think in web-based terms, allowing us to envision a looser conception of 
interconnectedness. My theoretical stance will in this respect be elaborated in the last part of 
this chapter, based in no small part on the continuation of our reading of Cagean concepts 
through a comparative analysis of some of his works. 

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Cage as an aesthetic thinker presents his reflections in texts and lectures that as much exhibit 
their meanings through literary forms and graphic design as report them in the ordinary 
genres of theoretical argumentation and criticism. We are dealing with a “philosopher” who 
performs his thinking in poetic turns that complicate the task of the conceptual detective. At 
the same time, it is exactly these literary qualities that make Cage’s aesthetic rhetoric 
ravishing, striking and thought-provoking. Until now I have not taken so much notice of these 
performative features. I have presented readings, questions and reflections that basically are 
based upon what Cage has said. In what follows I want to direct attention to what he does. 
The guiding question is: How are Cage’s concepts of interpenetration and non-obstruction 
visible in his artistic practice? And, in return, what do his practical explorations tell us about 
the scope of the presented theoretical conceptions?  
 
I will in this respect analyse some notated compositions by Cage. These are works from the 
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series of Variations, written in the period from 1958 to 1978.GKC As mentioned in chapter two, 
Fetterman connects these pieces to the genre of musicircus,GKD and though Musicircus does 
not have a score, it is intertwined in Cage’s practice of writing – a practice that explores new 
fields for music making through notational experimentations. The Variations are interesting 
in that respect. Pointedly, they explore notational possibilities that break with the linearity of 
ordinary notation and explore states of co-presence and simultaneity through techniques of 
writing.  
 
I am not going to present all the pieces in the series, but will limit my survey to No. II (1961), 
III (1962-1963), IV (1963) and V (1965), with special attention to No. IV. Some of these have 
also been introduced earlier: No. II was discussed in chapter four, and I briefly presented No. 
V in chapter two.  
 
As we have seen, Variations II is a highly open and indeterminate piece where performers are 
asked to use chance operations in the realisation of the work. However, even though the 
composition is very open-ended, it operates with specific musical (sonic) parameters: 
Frequency, amplitude, timbre, duration, point of occurrence in an established period of time 
and structure of event (number of sounds making up an aggregate or constellation). 
Variations III, on the other hand, does not mention sounds or music at all. Actions are here the 
main issue; the piece is for one or any number of people performing any actions. The 
character of these actions (musical, visual, or whatever) is not specified. Variations IV is 
again delimited to some form of musical composition (sound composition). The piece is for 
any number of players, any sounds or combinations of sounds produced by any means, with 
or without other activities. Variations V is a multimedia piece with an a posteriori score that 
refers to a performance already done.    
 
All the scores, except Variations V, include the use of transparent sheets.GKE I find the 
translucent quality interesting. It alters the situation of writing: The transparent material can 
be superimposed, and even in this condition, notational signs written on different sheets can 
                                                 
591 The published version of Variations VIII, the last one in the series of Variations, is from 1978 but refers to a 
performance in 1967. 
592 =#+)(+)$($)-*$*)()%*$&! %%#&%)*-$CKGJ$CKHI7>
@**(#$CKKH5&7CDG7A 
593 $*%+)*($)&($*)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"**)7.#&")($&! %
-(**$%(,+%(<)(*/$CKGJ5! & 
*@CKGJA$$&$
'%@CKHBA7 
 241 
be seen. Visually, the transparency illustrates a condition of non-obstruction: It makes it 
possible for a set of notational signs to co-act in a multi-directional way beyond the linear 
logic of A causes B.  
 
The score of Variations II is an eminent example. It has eleven transparent sheets: Six with a 
line and five with a point. To make a reading, the sheets have to be superimposed, preferably 
by chance. A constellation of points and lines appear that can be used to determine five sonic 
events. This type of notation – single notational signs on separate transparent sheets – opens a 
notational situation where any of the written symbols can interact with any of the others. This 
is not a system that is unidirectional and two-dimensional, read from left to right, top to 
bottom, but a notational universe of interacting possibilities that act in a multidirectional way 
and exhibit an equality in notational relevance (no possibility outlined by the score being 
really distant or irrelevant, but the sketched agents of possible conjunctions are equally 
present). Further, because of the translucent quality, signs can be superimposed without 
erasing the individual characteristics of the single elements. Variations II, therefore, provides 
us with an example where Cage creates a notational system, a form of writing, which reflects 
his concept of ‘interpenetration’ and ‘non-obstruction’ as characteristics of the indeterminate 
score.  
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Example: The score of Variation II, with the eleven transparent sheets randomly 
superimposing each other:  
 
 
 
But what happens if we want to realize the piece? A performer of Variations II is almost 
obligated to make his/her own performance score if he/she wants to follow the score’s 
instructions. Simply, this would mean to transform the visual quality of non-obstructive 
interpenetration to the traditional practice of unidirectional writing. Though the result would 
probably reflect Cage’s expansive notion of continuity, presented previously in this 
chapter,594 it would be the last notation that functioned as the score for the actual performance 
of Variations II.595  
 
From this point of view, it is interesting to note some of the different approaches sketched in 
the instructions to Variations III: 

Some or all of one’s obligations may be performed through ambient circumstances (environmental 
changes) by simply noticing or responding to them.  
                                                 
594 See p. 226. 
595 The notation chosen would be dependent upon the performer’s choice and could therefore be totally 
individual in its shape, nearly un-readably for somebody else. Pritchett has written an interesting article about 
David Tudor’s realisation (“solution”) of Variations II and how Tudor’s choices of execution placed the 
realisation into a context of live electronics close to the compositional world he later explored as a composer. 
See Pritchett 2000. 
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
Some factors though not all of a given interpenetration or succession of several may be planned in 
advance. But leave room for the use of unforeseen eventualities.  

These guidelines reflect the condition of interpenetration as part of a performative attitude. 
The performer should be aware of ambient circumstances and environmental changes that 
take place in real time and adapt the performed actions and respond to these conditions. In 
other words, the planned actions should be open-ended enough to let the environment’s own 
activity be included in the performance. This is emphatically expressed in the last comment: 

Any other activities are going on at the same time.  

The visual shape of the score of Variations III gives even further associations to a condition 
of non-obstructive interpenetration: The score consists of 42 equal circles on separate 
transparent sheets. By letting the circles fall on a horizontal plane, the circles can overlap each 
other in any combination. Cage, however, asks the performer to use a single maze of 
superimpositions as the base for a reading: 

If a circle does not overlap at least one other circle, remove it. Remove also any smaller groups of 
circles that are separated from the largest group, so that a single maze of circles remains, no one of 
them isolated from at least one other.596  

It is easy to associate this maze of circles with Cage’s notion of a plurality of centres: 

Therefore, there is a plurality of centers, a multiplicity of centers. And they are all interpenetrating and, 
as Zen would add, non-obstructing. Living for a thing is to be at the center. That entails interpenetration 
and non-obstruction.597  

The score produces a condition of superimpositions without erasing the circles’ circular 
character and their individual midpoint.  
 
                                                 
596 Variations III, score.  
597 Cage and Charles, For the Birds, p. 91. 
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Example: The score of Variation III, with a single maze of overlapping circles:  
 
 

Variations III focuses on actions. These are explored and handled as acts that fuse with 
others, both planned and unplanned. The situation created and investigated accentuates the 
intersections between acts and incidents: It explores the dynamics of interaction in a broad 
sense. The performer is in this respect asked to have an open (non-obstructive) attitude to 
these situations of concurrence. While Variations II reflects a situation of interpenetration in 
the compositional process and the process from score (concept/idea) to a worked-out 
performance (the process of realisation), No. III in addition explores this condition in the 
situation of performance itself.GKJ  

What about Variations IV? Variations IV also has single notational signs, each placed on a 
single transparent sheet of paper. There are seven with a point and two with small circles. 
Here the score is meant to interact with a map over the chosen performance site. The 
notational signs can be scattered, inside or outside of this mapped venue.  Here the question is 
not of a single maze of overlapping circles, but the quality of diffusion of notational markers.  
                                                 
598 We could argue that No. III reflects the performative turn in the arts more distinctly than Variations II. No. II 
is a piece where many choices and decision-making processes are left to the performer. However, Variations II 
also, to a certain extent, asks the performer to take on the role of a traditional composer who writes his/her music 
before it is performed, resulting in a worked out composition. In contrast, the score of No. III emphasises the co-
active dynamics at play in a performance. In this sense, it exemplifies the performative turn described by 
Fischer-Lichte more radically than No. II.   
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
Space is the main theme, and Cage emphasises on several occasions the importance of space 
connected to a permeating dynamic of individual centres (particulars). One example is his 
accentuation of the need for enough space in a realisation of Musicircus, as we saw in a 
former chapter.GKK The link Cage makes between a condition of non-obstructed 
interpenetration of particulars and “enough space” is interesting, because lurking in the 
concepts of interpenetration and non-obstruction are also conceptions of general categories 
like space, time, identity and individuality. The metaphysics of Hua-yen Buddhism for 
example, where the concepts of interpenetration and non-obstruction have a prominent place, 
operates with a spatial unity where the distant is present in the near and the other way around. 
Such a spatial conception, where everything shares a spatial connectedness, implied in the 
notion of interpenetration, is also alluded to by Cage in a quotation previously referred to: “in 
fact each and every thing in all of time and space is related to each and every other thing in all 
of time and space.”HBB  

As I have mentioned, Cage’s conception of interpenetration reflects a notion where a 
multitude of individual centres interact in a complex interplay that is too complex to be 
described in terms of linear causal relationships. This notion of a complex interacting 
dynamic has a spatial dimension. I want now to do a more minute analysis of Variations IV. 
The aim is, through an analysis of how space is handled in this piece, to reveal possible 
aspects of (or possible questions connected to) the understanding of extension implied in 
Cage’s notion of interpenetration and non-obstruction.  

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Variations IV is a piece for “any number of players, any sounds or combinations of sounds 
produced by any means, with or without other activities.”HBC In other words, it is mainly a 
piece where the material is sounds, but these sounds are not at all prescribed. Again we can 
compare with no. II. Variations II is also for “any numbers of players and any sound 
                                                 
599 See quote at p. 183. 
600 5"$5&7FH7 
601 Variations IV, score. 
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producing means.”HBD However, no. II operates with sonic parameters that define the events of 
the piece: Frequency, amplitude, timbre, duration, point of occurrence in an established 
period of time, and structure of event. No. IV does not have any of these measures. The only 
parameter in operation is spatial distribution, including the possibility of using a public 
address system.  

The score consists of an instruction and a transparent sheet with 7 points and two circles. This 
sheet should be cut up into nine pieces, seven with a point and two with a circle. Besides this, 
the instruction informs us that the score includes material not provided − a plan or map over 
the actual performance site.  Thus: 

1) “Material not provided: A plan or map of the area used for performance, and 
optionally a copy of it on transparent material”  
2) “Material provided: Seven points and two circles on a transparent sheet. (Cut so that 
there are nine pieces, each with only 1 notation.)”  

Further, the instruction informs us how to employ these points and circles:  

1) “Place one of the circles anywhere on the plan.”  
2) “Let the other circle and the points fall on the plan or outside it.”  
3) “Taking the placed circle as a centre, produce lines from it to each of the points. 
(Straight lines.)”  
4) “The second circle is only operative when one of the lines so produced (one or more) 
intersects or is tangent to it.”  
5) “Make as many readings of the material as desired (before or during the 
performance).”    
 
By carrying out these operations a map will result where one circle is placed within the 
performance site. The second circle and the seven points will have fallen randomly on the 
same map, within or outside the mapped venue.  

                                                 
602 Variations II, score. 
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Here is an example. The performance site is my office: 
 
                  ● 
 
 
 W   ●               ●   D 
 I    My office     O 
 N          O 
 D              ●      R 
 O       ● 
 W          ● 
      ● 
            Circle 1 
 
       Circle 2 

The example above is the result of one reading of the score. What kind of information can we 
get from such a reading? The first action Cage asks us to do is to “place one of the circles”. 
Here Cage does not ask for an unintentional action, but an intended placement. However, 
action number two implies chance operations: “Let the other circle and the points fall on the 
plan or outside it.” The intentional placement of circle number one secures a certain control of 
how the unintentional spatial distribution, through action two, is organised. Circle number one 
establishes a spatial frame, not by outlining the outer borders, but by establishing a midpoint 
for spatial action (distribution).HBE  

What do the circles, points and lines mean? How can this abstract notation be transformed 
into musical information? Some clues are given in the next paragraph of the instruction: 

1) “Sound(s) to be produced at any point on the lines outside the theatre space (extend 
lines where necessary). Open door(s) pertaining to a given point. (Sound production 
may be understood as simply opening doors.)”  
                                                 
603 $$%**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2) “Intersections of second circle = sound in total theatre space (public address system) 
or at any specific point on the produced line within the space.”  
3) “Two or more points may be taken as a sound in movement. (Open pertinent doors.) 
Movement is also indicated by using transparent map in addition. A single notation 
will then give two points in space. Several of these may be associated with one 
sound.”  

The straight lines from circle number one to the seven points indicate placement of sound 
sources (sound production means). In other words, placement is not primarily indicated by the 
points, but by the lines. These lines can be extended if necessary. Further, when circle number 
2 is not operative (no lines intersect or are at a tangent to it) the sonic material has to emerge 
from the outside. Only when circle number 2 is in operation are sounds produced within the 
room. That means, figure 1 indicates no sonic production within the office, but the direction 
of attention to sonic events from outside. This could have been done, for example, by opening 
a window or the door. The lines connected to three points provide this interpretative 
possibility.  The theme of a spatial inside and outside appears. This theme is not only 
articulated by the intentional placement of sound sources. The act of simply opening a door or 
window can direct attention to sounds that already exist in an environment. In the last case, 
the material in the example above would be the sonic events that by chance happened to occur 
from outside when we opened a window or the door. 

What about the character of the actual performance sites? Does the score give any conditions 
for which venues suit or not? The instruction indicates different places for a performance: 
Theatre space (auditorium with doors) – 1) one floor, or 2) with balcony or balconies; 
building with one or more floors (when necessary open windows instead of doors); apartment 
or suite; closed space (cave); and outdoor space (any amount). These descriptions of possible 
sites are so varied that the resulting impression is that any place can be used. 

The time span of a realisation is not outlined either: “Measurements of time and space are not 
required. When performed with another activity which has a given time-length (or on a 
program where a given amount of time is available) let the performance of this take a shorter 
amount.”HBF The second sentence leads to ambivalence. Should Variations IV take shorter 
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%7*7 
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time than the other activity, or should the other activity take shorter time than Variations IV? 
This is just another example of the uncertainties that open Cage’s instructive style to the co-
creativity of the performers.HBG 

Back to the first sentence: “Measurements of time and space are not required.” As we have 
seen, the second sentence (“When performed with another activity…”) can be understood to 
indicate that the total time span of a performance should be adjusted to the circumstances, for 
example, to how long another activity takes. But the score does not inform us how to 
measure, or how to define the durations of sound events within the total time span of the 
piece, nor is any tool given to obtain such measurements.  

“Measurements of time and space are not required.” Nearly a similar expression is used in 
Variations III:  

Though no means are given for the measurement of time or space (beginning, ending or questions of 
continuity) […] such measurement and determination means are not necessarily excluded from the 
‘interpenetrating variables’.606  

Though rules for measurement can be used, they are not required. The piece is open to a form 
of improvisation, or perhaps we could say, circumstantial-practical ways of deciding time 
lengths.  

What about space? The score says that measurements of space are not required. But the 
procedures of providing a map, letting chance choose places for sonic production/exploration, 
or the direction for the attentive act of listening, organise spatial-sonic activity that also 
temporalizes the room. The score provides a systematic approach to the dimension of space as 
dynamized by sonic activity and attention. 

The score gives directions for the spatial distribution of sounds, or the distribution of spatial 
attention, and indicates that public address systems can be used, but a reading of the score 
does not tell us anything about the involved sounds’ character, such as their frequency, 
amplitude, timbre and duration. The piece is mainly and broadly, almost in a general way, 
about the dimension of space as intimately part of musical production: Sounds as spatially 
                                                 
605 See for example the discussion of the text in Scenarios in chapter two. 
606 Score, Variations III.  
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defined, and the other way around; the space as defined (spatialized) by sonic activity. 

The score, in this respect, operates with a generic notion of space. But in order to do a 
realisation, we would have to use the map of a specific location: From the generality of the 
score, the realisation draws attention to the co-dependent dimension of space and sound as 
only actual (existing/sounding/emerging) in the shape of a specific and local place − an 
embodied space-time emerging as a locality with sounding-resounding extensions. The 
outside is in this respect not an opposite, but an extension of the inside.  

I have pointed out that circle number 1 is intentionally placed within the performance site (the 
map of the site). This placement secures a certain ramification of the piece’s spatial radius of 
action. This ramification, though, is not defined by outer borders, but by a moveable centre of 
orientation with extendable horizons in all directions that have no limit, but fade away.  

The score mentions the possibility of using a public address system, and we will now look at 
a realisation done by Cage and David Tudor that used radios, tape recordings, and sound 
sources recorded in and outside of the gallery where the performance took place. A recording 
exists, made of material from this realisation, and it is interesting to compare this recorded 
version with the reading just performed, not least because of the technology involved. 
Technologies of recording, amplification and broadcasting affect our conceptions of space 
and the relation between sonic reverberations and spatial topographies. Cage and Tudor’s 
realisation indicates in this respect other generative factors and spatial reflections than those 
sketched in my reading of the score. 

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Cage and Tudor did Variations IV at the Feigen/Palmer Gallery in Los Angeles, August 1965. 
The live event lasted for six hours. The consequent recording, that I am going to refer to, 
consists of six sequences that last from 5’26’’ (5 minutes and 26 seconds) to 15’28’’. These 
sequences are excerpts from each of the hours that the live performance lasted.  

A spoken introduction at the recording tells us that the live concert began with setting up the 
electronic equipment in two rooms that both became fully equipped with loudspeakers, radio 
tuners, tape recorders and a mixer. Cage and Tudor each controlled a mixer. Microphones 
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were placed at unusual places like out on the street, in front of the gallery’s entrance, and on 
the bar counter. Sounds picked up by these microphones were used as sound sources together 
with radio broadcasts and tape recordings. 
 
I have emphasised how Variations IV explores spatiality, spatial directionality, movements 
and points in space by interacting with the specific character of a venue. The rootedness in a 
distinct place is, though, not the impression I get from the recording. The stereophonic 
technology is used to present one collage at the right side and another at the left side. The 
result is a lively mixture with many different sonic fragments, but with little spatial 
exploration in an acoustical sense. It is like a flat one-dimensional soundscape.  
 
The specific location does not colour the sonic result significantly either, even though we can 
hear conversations between gallery visitors, laughter and the noise of clattering glass and 
cutlery. The main impression therefore is not the sonic print of a specific place, but the global 
situation created by transmission and this topography’s heterogeneous character through the 
presence of fragments picked from a diversity of soundtracks. We are brought into a world of 
mediated sounds – a collage where a diversity of sonic traditions collide and by their 
intersections create their own associative landscape (often funny and unpredictable). This 
diverse character is among other things created by having fragments that last so long that we 
can recognise genre, type of radio program, what is said (if we know the language), which 
language (different languages appear, even Swedish and Norwegian) and what it is that makes 
the sounds (cutlery, glass, et cetera). This includes the appearance of known musical works, 
real classics, and popular music that a lot of people have heard before and have a relationship 
with. In other words, the collage inspires to a play of associations, memories and additive 
meanings. My key-word for this experience is broadcast. It is interesting in this respect to 
compare this realisation with Variations V that also used technology extensively.  
 
5.3.1.2 (*%$) & !!+
As mentioned in chapter two, the first performance of Variations V was a multi-media event 
with dance, music and visual images. It was the result of a close collaboration between artists 
and engineers, and it had a setup that translated dance movements to governing signals within 
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the sound system.607 The interaction between dance and sound produced a situation where 
contributive factors explicitly became mingled and created states that had no single cause but 
were the result of the co-activity of a diversity of interpenetrating factors and actions.608  
 
The sound sources used in this interactive setup were mediated sounds: Signals received by short 
wave radios, sounds recorded on tape, small sounds sensed by contact microphones, transferred 
and amplified – the media itself and its own noisy materiality was the musical material. Cage’s 
remark in the score is an example of this: “Accept leakage, feedback, etc.”  
 
The first performance used several systems − photoelectric cells, capacitive antennas, and 
contact microphones − to transform bodily movements to signals within the sound system. 
Because these systems were not synchronized, “miles of wires” caused delays in the 
systems,HBK and the dancers didn’t play the electronic devices as “sound instruments”, the 
technological systems explicitly acquired an independent role; they functioned as co-
constituting participants of the event.  
 
The music of Variations V is in fact what comes out after a complex journey within a non-
synchronised distribution system, in addition to the sound of this distribution system itself. No 
IV, from 1965, and the multi-media event of no V enact a form of globalization locally that re-
locates sonic activity and referential frames to new topographies of involvement, reaction and 
reprocessing (no. IV), exhibiting thereby new geographies of relational possibilities. The 
involved technologies in these processes are not passive devices of transmission but take on 
an agential role in the production of the sonic reality. These realisations reflect in this sense 
the sonic geography of a modern world that uses public address systems and music 
technology extensively.HCB  
                                                 
607 See description of the setup at p. 35 ff. ""()()%$)"/%-*+$*%$6 “Whenever the 
dancers interrupted the light to the photocells or came within a four-foot radius of the antennas, they triggered 
switching circuitry in the mixer, which in turn fed six loudspeakers spread around the hall.” (L. Miller 2001, p. 
545-546.)  
608 -%(!<))%())$/5,$*%+*-%(!()+"*(%#*(+"/%""%(*,%(*
$,%",$#$/($*(*)*)$$$()7%##$*$&*(*-%5&7EH7 
609 A kind of anarchy: Merce Cunningham and music, videotaped panel discussion. Merce Cunningham Dance 
Foundation Collection, New York Public Library.  
610 Kahn 1999 uses the $,$*%$%&%$%(&*$%"%/@&*$*CJIIA*%+"+&$(+#$*
%+**$-+("*/$%(&/%)%+$)***(/-((*7$-*$%"%/&*+(
*&#(")%+$%(*()**#7%&"%+"%(*()**#(*(%-$,%(%#*(
&()%$<)&()&*,5=+$9%$>$+$%+$*%*(%-$%"/*%)&!$7&$%#$%$%
)%+$%+"*(/$*($*%*%*""/$-%$%#/%)*(+*%$$(&()$**%$7 
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As mentioned several times, Cage succinctly describes Musicircus in the foreword of M as: 

Bringing together under one roof as much of the music of the surrounding community as one 
practicably can611  

Cage and Tudor’s realisation of Variations IV brings together many traces from different 
sonic worlds under the same roof. What does this tell us about space and locality? A collage 
is created that both mixes temporal traces and displaces spatial belongings to new areas of 
relevance and prolonging. Does this heterogeneous joining exemplify (bring about) a situation 
of connectedness that illustrates Cage’s adopted conception of interpenetration?  
 
5.3.1.3 (*%$)
 %"
The score of Variations IV provides a tool to explore a sonic landscape as a spatial landscape 
and a spatial landscape as a sonic world. Our reading emphasised that this exploration lead us 
to the local site of the sonic-spatial enactment: The investigation/emergence of a specific 
location through sonic production and reverberations and their extendable horizons.  
 
As we have seen, circle number 1 is placed on the map of the performance site. It outlines a 
certain spatial frame for the events, not by outlining the outer borders, but by providing a 
junction. Because the score can be read as many times as wished and circle number one does 
not have a fixed placed but can be placed anywhere on the plan, the orientational centre can 
be multiplied and we can arrive at a multifocal rendering. Cage’s collaboration with the 
dancer and choreographer Merce Cunningham is in this context worth mentioning. 
 
Cage and Cunningham collaborated closely from the early 1940s to the end of Cage’s life, 
and Cunningham says something very interesting about spatial orientations in the 
documentary Cage/Cunningham, a film from 1991. What he says, I think, can illuminate 
aspects of Cage’s strategies in Variations IV. He recounts how he, as a dancer and 
choreographer, acquired a new way of understanding space. Through his education and early 
dance experiences he had learned to orient the body’s movement according to a fixed space 
with a front, a back and two sides. The rule was that a dancer moved according to these 
                                                 
611 Cage, M: writings, '67-'72, p. xiii. 
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unchanging attributes of the stage − i.e. a settled space independent of the moving body. 
 
Cunningham reports how his conception changed. Instead of operating with a front, back and 
sides as givens for orientation, he began to thing of the dancers’ positions, anywhere on the 
stage, as the orientational point from which to organise the dance. 
 
I find Cunningham’s new understanding of spatial orientation very interesting. He expresses a 
conditional understanding of space. For example: If there are eight dancers on the stage, they 
do not need to adjust their movements according to a general standard of front, back and 
sides. The dancers can employ different organisational schemes according to their own 
locality on the shared stage. In other words, the organisation of the space (or the use of the 
space) has eight different perspectives − perspectives that always move on and which are all 
as “close” as each other to their referential points. The space is not an external frame of 
reference, but a reference that the dancers carry with them. This point of departure − their 
own moveable centre − gives them multidirectional possibilities for their dance. Cunningham 
emphasises the feeling of freedom this conception created. It opened new possibilities of 
understanding directionality and spatial movements. 
 
We could transfer this understanding to Variations IV. Circle number one situates a point of 
reference (a centre) for the sonic-spatial movements (directions). The space accordingly 
becomes organised from a point that eradiates in all directions, and which does not have a 
fixed outer limit. Because the score can be read as many times as wished, a realisation can 
establish a plurality of centres, independent of each other, which all function as a reference 
for spatial distribution. In other words, a multiplied reading of the score can establish a multi-
perspective rendering of a specific locality.  
 
I will now introduce another perspective angle that brings to mind again arguments presented 
in chapter three: The romantic notion of the musical work implies that the work’s character, 
identity and existence are independent (autonomous) of the different sites where it is 
performed. The work creates its own musical landscape with imaginary scenes, dramas and 
movements: It creates its own time and space. The aim of the concert hall is to enforce this 
musical-imaginative vision, not to intrude on or disturb it with its local attributes.  
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We could argue that Variations IV, quite contrary to the romantic work, has the local site as 
its main theme. This would follow a general turn of focus, emphasised by Fischer-Lichte, 
from the “eternal” aesthetics of the autonomous work to the conditional, ephemeral and 
concrete qualities accentuated by the performative turn in the arts. At the same time, we have 
seen how Cage and Tudor’s realisation is characterised by recorded and mediated sounds. 
Does this bring about an exploration of a spatial situation other than that of a “simple” turn of 
focus from the “eternal nature” of the autonomous work, to the ephemeral “here and now” of 
a given locality?  

A3?3> %5$/
Variations V is not only an eminent example on the implementation of technology, but also of 
collaboration and a setup that fuses contributions. The technical devices have here a prominent 
position. The technological system becomes part of an interactive situation wherein this system 
functions both as actor and mediator. The performers are put into a situation where they have to 
relate themselves to a nest of intermingling factors that, to a great extent, act of their own accord. 
These factors and actions interpenetrate in ways that transcend simple linear relations where A 
causes B to happen. The event, or perhaps I should say events, are shaped by ongoing acts 
performed by co-existing independent participants (subjects). Within this mixture it is difficult to 
locate any fixed subject’s position. The individual’s intentions and actions emerge in a nexus 
intermingled with the actions of others, a network where the different materials themselves – 
radios, capacitive antennas, photoelectric cells, mixer − also actively take part. The subjects’ 
performative states interpenetrate each other, even though they act in an independent way. The 
technology involved, through its capacity to collect, translate and dislocate, explicitly mixes and 
emphasizes this fluid state of subjectivity – located and dislocated.  
 
Quite obviously the composer of Variations V is just a participant together with many other 
contributors. What they are doing has consequences, but at the same time the events take their 
own directions, take their own shapes, beyond the control of the individual participants. Still, 
it is not a non-place that is revealed in this process, but a new performed locality where 
mediation, revitalization and accumulation of traces of time and space actively take part. It is 
a process of both relativity and independence, a process that shapes a concrete space-time by 
complex interactions between a plurality of agents, mediating technologies and anchoring free 
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floating “unboned”612 traces of time and space. At the same time, the processes are already 
ahead into new situations, new realities with new possibilities. There is always an overflow − 
the embodied state is already in a state of distribution and new topological configurations. 
 
A3?3? )**)%$*(&$*(*%$$%#&%)*%$"*(#)
In the first part of my introduction to Cage’s conception of interpenetration and non-
obstruction I pointed to a view of co-presence and an inclusive awareness to conditions of co-
activity and dependence that exceed simple causal relations − A causes B − or the teleology 
of intentional acts. However, though this view is directed to a relational complexity, we are 
challenged not to reduce things to relative values, but approach them in there unique 
singularity. I rendered this as a call to extend the sense of subjecthood. The relativizing move 
is, so to speak, absolutized where no entity sustains the relation’s differentiating force, but not 
only that. No aim for differentiation sustains it either: ‘Interpenetration’ as pointing to an 
interrelated perspective on existence undermines the organising principle of difference that 
many theories of relativism rely on. Instead we could argue that Cage asserts a relativity that 
does not have difference as its pivot, but the conditional mode of co-presence expressed in the 
Buddhist term dependent origination and the epistemological dehiscence of experiential 
openness.  Though, before we explore such a path of thinking closer, I would like to 
emphasise some points in a continuation of the comparative analysis just presented.   
 
The techniques of writing developed by Cage that use transparent sheets break the drift to a 
linear and narrative logic of events. Instead we are presented with a universe of possibilities 
that exists “all at once” − non-discriminately.  We could explain this co-present universe with 
Odin’s reading of the Hua-yen metaphysics of unhindered interpenetration. The doctrine of 
unhindered interpenetration implies a microcosmic-macrocosmic model of reality wherein 
each dharma or event becomes a living mirror of the totality, reflecting all other dharmas – 
past, present and future alike – from its own standpoint in nature. The one universe is 
multiplied ad infinitum in a panoramic and kaleidoscopic spectacle of simultaneous-mutual-
reflections:613  
 
Finally, Fa-tsang asserts that all particles of dust not only interpenetrate in the spatial sense whereby the 
                                                 
612 See footnote about Kahn 1999 at p. 252. 
613 Odin, p. 16. 
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ten cardinal directions are immanent in a single atom, but also in the much more radical sense of 
temporal interfusion such that hundreds of thousands of infinitely long periods are immanent in a single 
thought-instant, thereby establishing the strictly symmetrical structure of internal relations between all 
events.614  
 
We are presented with a well-balanced universe where the singular fully reflects the 
universal. There is a perfect net of reflections. However, the envisioned “all at once” of the 
score is paralysed as long as it is not put to use. The direction to performance − to be done − 
does something with this envisioned all-embracive universe.  

To be realised, to be put into operation, the score points towards the locality and situation of 
enactment. The creative energy thereby released points to processes of embodiment on a big 
scale, not as a confined singular organism but a “non-continuous”615 surplus of heterogeneity 
that evades a unifying frame story. It is in continuation with these lines that I will transfer my 
theoretical frame of reference from Cage’s Buddhist inspired rhetoric to Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of flesh, a view of the “here and now” as complex, and Karen Barad’s notions of intra-
activity and discursive-material practices through her post-humanist concept of 
performativity.616 

A3@ (#$+*)*+*%$("0− )&"#$*
%&,%*
A3@3< ")
I mentioned in chapter four that the ‘body’ as a methodological figure represents an 
opportunity to think temporal conjunction and meaning formation differently from the sign’s 
manner of operation. But though the figure of the body has the capacity to mediate the 
relation between the transitory moment and a lasting state, it also transforms the perspective 
in this respect. It is not basically through the grid of “paired function differences”, but by 
being included in life projects through embodied states that moments become sustained. The 
body as an inertial system of presence maintenance can illustrate an actualisation of meanings 
                                                 
614 Odin, p. 22. 
615 See former presentation of ‘no-continuity’, p. 226 ff. 
616 Beside the sources that are presented in the next section, I will also mention Code’s (2006) presentation of 
ecological thinking, Landa’s geological metaphors applied within ontology and Berman’s (2004) comparative 
presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and Nagarjuna’s teachings as formative for the reading and theoretic 
perspective outlined in the last part of this chapter.  
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that harbour their impact by their singular positivity bound to a local617 site within an 
extended web of connections. The paradigm of embodiment opens in this respect a theoretical 
awareness for the multifocal qualities and horizontal structures involved in the production of 
meaning and actuality by in fact lending an ear to the physicality of our lives. In what follows 
I want to go further into this theoretical terrain with a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
flesh in a continuation of my Heidegger reading presented in chapter four. This will also 
extend the discussions introduced under the notions of embodiment and art as event, 
presented in the same chapter.  
 
The phenomenon of being-in-the-world is for Merleau-Ponty like Heidegger the basic 
condition from which to think epistemological questions. The world is not a foreign place for 
us. We have a primordial relationship to our surrounding prior to objective knowledge. Before 
we have made any propositions, the world is exposed to us as our space for action and 
obstruction, potentiality and fate, co-existence and community, interplay and 
acknowledgement. We are born as reverberating, responsive structures that cannot evade 
being moved; that cannot evade being tuned to the environment’s requirements. In this sense 
the world has an immediate and emergent sense that we cannot flee.618  
 
Merleau-Ponty though scrutinizes this condition more concretely from the point of view of 
being/having a body than Heidegger’s spatial-temporal notion of Dasein suggests.619 Through 
Merleau-Ponty’s focus on perception, Dasein becomes not a fleshless existential structure, but 
the phenomenon of “being-there” becomes inspected with a specific attention to the “fleshy” 
state of this condition. We are in the world as perceptive/thinking/aspirational bodies. Dasein 
becomes embodied, a body-subject that is “actively engaged with the environment in which 
[it] finds [itself], trying to solve problems in [its] existence and adapting [its] behaviour in the 
light of the solutions [it] finds to those problems.”620 The notion of flesh can be seen as a 
continuation of this turn to the bodily significance, and it does not only give Dasein a fleshy 
outfit, it also displaces the point of gravity within the Heideggerian structure of being-in-the-
                                                 
617 That as local, this site will also take on the character of being unique. 
618 See my presentation in chapter four, p. 152 ff. 
619 We could argue that the bodily character of being in the world is implied in Heidegger’s theory by 
emphasising a primary mode of doing where things in the world show up (get meaning) as ‘ready to hand’ 
beside operating with facticity as one of the existentiales that structure Dasein. (Heidegger, Being and Time.) 
However, the bodily condition of Dasein, in its concrete fashion as a prerequsite for being in the world, is so to 
speak absent from the analyses performed in Being and Time. The phenomenology of Merleua-Ponty differs in 
this respect from Heidegger. 
620 Matthews, p. 85. 
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world. It can thereby give rise to a radicalisation of the hermeneutic situation that even 
transforms its operative logic.  
 
Though Heidegger presents conceptions that surpass the subject-object polarity of 
epistemology, he operates with oppositional forces that through their oppositional drive open 
a field for a knowing relationship to Being. The ‘world’ is a disclosing force that clears glades 
for the play of being to be revealed, against which ‘earth’ is the closing force − “that which 
shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up.”621  The ‘rift’ stands in 
the middle of this productivity, and through the metaphor of strife it becomes as a zone of 
high intensity that holds apart the opposing parties, though both are attracted to what is 
offered there at the front line, like two parties grabbing the same thing but pulling it in 
opposite directions. Easily, therefore, we get the picture of ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as contesting 
forth a space for reflection by pulling a current state in different directions. This is 
transformed by Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the chiasmic structure of the flesh. It is not by 
the dynamics of contestation, visualized as strife between two opposite forces − ‘world’ and 
‘earth’ − which creates spans and tensions in the play of Being. The spans are created by the 
pulsating movement between sensing and being sensed, in excess of itself and coming back, 
perceiving and being perceived. This structure of reversibility has the germ of divergence, a 
dehiscence of exterior-interior that operates in the embodied constitution itself. As 
reinterpreted, the disclosing force (‘world’) and the closing force (‘earth’) become dynamics 
of the same dimensionality (flesh), though not understood as opposite forces, but exhibited 
through the dynamics of reversals.   
 
The term flesh I understand as a notion whereby we can think the being-in-the-world from 
basically an embodied point of view where the significance of the physicality of both 
ourselves, others and the rest of the world is taken seriously though without reducing us to 
biological automata. The notion enables us to surpass the idea of spirit versus matter, 
consciousness versus object, intentionality versus mechanical-causal explanatory model, 
intellectualism versus empiricism. Flesh aspires in a sense to embrace both the concrete 
quality of materiality, its inertia, mass and experienced specificity, and the “spirit’s” evasive 
and immaterial character where neither matter nor spirit is reduced to each other’s by-
products. The transcendence of spirit is immanent in the fluidity of materiality, and the 
                                                 
621 Heidegger 1971, p. 47. 
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processes of embodiment incorporate the movement of transcendence (spirituality) in its 
actuality. Mind is in the continuation of the body, and the body is in the continuation of mind 
in processes of continuous embodiments.  
 
But though we arrive at a spiritualized body and an embodied mind, this unification does not 
present us a figure of pure identity between intentionality and actuality, aspirations and brute 
facts: We do not get a pure surface with no depths. The chiasmic structure of the flesh makes 
the now  “thick”, the here “deep”. We are presented stretches and folds where the invisible 
haunts the visible in a structure of asymmetric reversibility where we never are able to have 
the total picture − the visible will always have a support of invisibility − and when we want to 
explore this hideous latency, the perspective and time will necessarily change producing new 
blind spots. We can never supply a view by an exact return; we can never come to a complete 
introspection of our own act of perception. To a certain degree our point of view will always 
evade us, and from the point of view of that other that we direct our perception at and become 
absorbed by, this exceeds our perception: There is always more to explore, more to envision. 
At both ends there is a positive indeterminacy.622 The visibility of Being points to a field of 
latency and dimensionality that never stops to promise new configurations,623 solutions and 
discoveries.  
  
The notion of flesh has the capacity to create an idea of Being as extensive − a dimension 
with a multitude of bulges and folds that through these swellings adds a myriad of vertical 
structural possibilities to the founding horizontal plane. Instead of establishing a view for the 
play of Being through the settlement of provisional totalities, the ontology of flesh places this 
                                                 
622 Besides an asymmetric reversibility and the hideous supplement that this process presupposes, I also read the 
'visible' and 'invisible' in line with the extendable lines to be found in the score of Variations IV. Though the 
formulation of visibility acquires its specific character by taking place in and shaping a locality, its pivot has 
endlessly extendable horizons in all directions, both discursive and material, that more fades away than breaks 
off in total silence. The 'invisible' operates not as the structural opposite to the visible, but as the promise of a 
presupposed lengthening that continuously grants the appearance of new visible formulations but never fulfills 
them in full exposure. This is inspired by my previous presentation of Cage's concept of interpenetration and an 
extensive call for empathy. I understand the notions of 'invisible' and 'visible' in this respect not necessarily 
following the axis of abstract concept contra present physicality, or universal notions contra specific 
manifestation. As the extensive call for identification includes in its view the indeterminacy and "invisibility" 
(from a individual position) that other localities represent in an extensive field of co-habitation, and enacts 
formulations of visibility with this acknowledged indeterminacy as a soundboard, we can also think about the 
visible and invisible in terms of apparatuses of general notions, creative abilities and visions that both are close 
at hand, distinctively present in the formation of visibilities, and further away, having endless horizons of 
"invisible" support − in terms of history, creativity, cultural and social resources, et cetera.  This points to 
Barad's discursive-material practices soon to be presented. 
623 For my use of ‘configuration,’ see the coming reading of Barad.  
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opening for active engagement with the is at the coil of exchange, the responsive dynamics 
that emerge through the plurality of agential viewpoints624 − through the plurality of 
dehiscences co-acting at a horizontal plane of becoming (Being). Through this pulsating 
activity visibility is created and acted upon, and its formulating activity is anchored in a local 
environment, a local region, within a dimensionality that in principle can be extended 
infinitely. This gives a view to a horizontal productivity of Being that is multifocal in its 
operation without a master’s plan but having the germ to bring about self-formative structures 
that in their co-activity widen the one-dimensional view to a kaleidoscope of excavated 
worlds, a diversity of embodied widened-out histories, life-practices and referential frames. 
Interconnectedness can thereby be viewed as a heterogeneous affair although things are 
intimately connected.  
 
A3@3= %#&".&()$
The notion of flesh can help us to think the ontological condition as basically grounded in a 
horizontal plane of interconnected becoming. But as mentioned, this levelling down of 
ontology’s centre of gravity does not imply that we are left with a pure surface, a 
deterministic one-way drive of behaviouristic instincts, or a blast of the surveying sight. Flesh 
has also the ability to envision inertia, depth and excess; how the fleshy condition of Being 
folds up the seemingly elusive surface of the moment to complex forms of presence.   
 
I want in this respect to emphasise three points:  
 
1) Self-formative dynamics; 
2) Embodiment of tenses in different tempi and formula, building up layers of Being and 
creating different world-lines; 
3) Plurality of world-lines, agential nodes and ‘chance’. 
 
Through the chiasmic structure of flesh we can envisions a dynamic where agential nodes are 
created that exhibit autonomous impact on their surroundings though not, at the same time, 
being secluded from this environment. That is, the junction created by the folded movement 
                                                 
624 My reading is here inspired by Barad’s agential realism that I am soon to present. ‘Agential viewpoints’ are in 
this respect not reserved for human agencies but characterize the whole spectrum of life forms and processes of 
materialization. Irrespective of being human or not, these life forms and processes contribute to distinguishing 
the specific discursive-material configurations of a topological site. See forthcoming presentation. 
 262
of the flesh, becomes not only a result that repeats, or simply reacts to a former situation, it 
halts the stream of becoming, whirling it up, and can redirect its direction. It genuinely 
contributes to what happens.625 Though we can speak in this respect about autonomy in terms 
of genuine contributions, the result of a contribution will mingle with others, and we will get 
a situation with participants that through their interrelated offerings create a specific 
environment. In this sense, we also get self-formative potentials from which to think creative 
evolutions of a multitude of orientational visibilities/soundboards,626 not from a master’s plan, 
but through the bubbling energy − the surplus and uncertainty given by the 
oscillating/exchanging/feeding movement between co-contributors enacting at each point of 
the extensive space-time body.   
 
Correlated to the outward engagement of flesh − its energetic stretches and restless condition 
− a returning movement folds moments upon each other, accumulates tenses and embodies 
spaces as a local thickening in a web of connections. Thinking upon these processes of 
“thickenings” as based in the seed of self-formative processes at a horizontal plane of 
interconnectedness, and not lined out by the prescription of a superior structure, opens for a 
non-linear, non-synchronized view of co-presence, a mix of agential centres that embody the 
flow of becoming in various tempi, excavate the world in different directions and 
creates/continues the drive of different world-lines. We get a heterogeneous universe with 
various solutions and resources, embodied as layers of Being, non-synchronous formula and 
dissimilar practices of life, which exist side by side.  
 
From this sketched scenery of a bubbling universe that at each point contributes to an 
excavation of the moment to a plurality of referential frames, connectional links and layers of 
spatiotemporal stories, I would like to introduce the concept of ‘chance’ through a reading of 
Cage’s ‘chance operation’ done by Katherine Hayles (1994). She emphasises how 
randomness contributes to instruct the decisive character of events. Her reading uses 
definitions of chance and randomness elaborated within a scientific context, such as of 
nonequilibrium thermodynamics and information theory (mathematics).627 The first definition 
                                                 
625 My reading is here based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the perceptive body where the involved, engaged, 
anticipative intentionality is part of our intimate relationship to the world as sensing beings. See Merleau-Ponty 
1994. 
626 ‘Orientational visibility’ means in this context a ‘field of vision’ and ‘soundboard’ representing a ‘space for 
reverberation’. 
627  Hayle’s refers for example to Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers’ work on irreversibility and the 
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focuses upon the unpredictability that emerges when different world-lines (which in 
themselves can be described/prescribed according to a deterministic logic of cause and effect) 
merge or coincide. Like the calamitous situation of a car being hit by a rockslide where the 
driver is injured for the rest of his/her life, the probability of such an incident is minimal, but 
when it happens the collision of the driver’s intentions (for example to attend a meeting) and 
the development of a fissure in the rock − two lines of reasons that have initially nothing to do 
with each other − creates an irreversible new situation. Or, like the more fortuitous example 
given by Hayles: The probability that exactly I should have been born is in fact very little. A 
multitude of circumstances have to fall together to create the condition for my birth. 
 
Hayles presents, in this context, a concept of chance that defines randomness as concurrences 
between initially independent chains of cause and effect. That is, each of the chains can be 
viewed as strictly defined by causes, but because of unpredicted concurrences unforeseen 
situations emerge. In other words, ‘chance’ defined as an accidental connection could not 
have been predicted from the view of the individual chains involved.628  
 
The second definition Hayles outlines focuses on chance’s directional character, and how the 
quality of randomness informs the irreversible character of time. Time cannot be rewound 
because of the play of coincidences. ‘Chance’ expresses itself as a horizon of possibilities in a 
given situation, but from this ocean of opportunities one crystallises and becomes directive 
for what happens next. Hayles refers in this respect to Cage’s operations. Before he has 
thrown his coins, a magnitude of options are present, but by the throw ‘chance’ chooses 
which of these shall be instructive for the result and the flow of the work’s events.629  
 
Because there exists a countless amount of alternatives at each point of real time, a gap 
emerges between past and future − there is a barrier of information. We can reconstruct 
events, but during their course in real time there would have been countless other possible 
directions that they could have taken. Because of this multitude of possible directions, the 
chance for an exact repetition of events is minimal. This barrier of information secures time’s 
one-way direction, inevitably heading into an unknown future.630  
                                                 
mathematician Gregory Chaitin’s work on random numbers. See Hayles 1994, pp. 232 and 235. 
628 Hayles 1994, p. 227. 
629 Ibid. p. 231. 
630 Ibid. p. 232. 
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Hayles further links this informational barrier to a third definition of ‘chance’ developed 
within information technology. This definition is connected to the amount of information 
needed to represent a number. The asymmetry that randomness represents is not reducible to a 
formula based on regularity. The most economical way to represent randomness is to copy its 
asymmetry. Based on this argument, the amount of information augments when the level of 
randomness increases. However, this is not the conclusion of information scientists. 
Randomness increases the amount of information only to a certain point: “After that point, the 
quality of information decreases as randomness continues to increase. This construction 
allowed them to interpret information as an interplay between order and randomness, 
expectation and surprise.”631  
 
Hayles connects the three above presented definitions: Accidental concurrences create 
temporal asymmetry. This asymmetric situation brings about an informational barrier that 
separates the past from the unknown future, and chance’s irreducible character leads to this 
maximum of information that creates this barrier.632  
 
These definitions of chance can illuminate the energetic climate at the intersectional lines 
between different drives and intentions − between agential nodes in a web of possible 
interactions/concurrences − and not only that, but also how these zones of interactions and 
concurrences create decisive and irreversible states. We could now transfer these comments to 
Cage’s invocation of no-continuity through the use of chance operations. It is not the 
indifferent state of irresoluteness that is explored, but the meaning of the intersectional lines 
that traverse our life indiscriminately whether we are humans, animals, stones or bacteria.  

Through the notion of flesh I have outlined a possible understanding of Cage’s 
‘interpenetration’ that emphasises a heterogenic and instable condition. Though the notion of 
flesh allows us to envision an affinity between all forms of beings through their mutual 
belonging to the dimension of flesh, and in addition a non-dual conception of spirituality and 
matter through flesh’s chiasmic structure, the notion also outlines the possible alterity 
between life-forms because of their local formulation within an extensive plane of Being. 
                                                 
631 Hayles 1994, p. 237. 
632 Ibid. p. 238. 
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Further, the co-agency that thereby arises and operates, does not act in a sectorial manner. We 
get what I will call ecological situations. As mentioned before, Cage’s use of chance can be 
seen as a critique of unquestioned anthropocentrism. He initiates situations that voice 
presence as not exclusively defined in human terms, but as part of a wider context. It is in this 
respect I will introduce Barad’s agential realism and her notion of post-humanist 
performativity. 
 
A3@3> %)*5+#$)*&(%(#*,*/
Barad writes in “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
Comes to Matter” (2003) that “language has been granted too much power. The linguistic 
turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn 
lately every “thing”—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other 
form of cultural representation.”633 We touched on this problem in chapter four, and I argued 
that though the concept of performativity builds its sense upon action and embodiment, this 
concept can also end in a kind of constructive trap where matter ceases to matter. What is 
done and embodied is simply read as the partial enactment of collectively shared scripts. 
Reasons beyond the domination of human conventions become invisible and intangible. 
Barad takes this question a step further and undertakes the task of elaborating a conception 
that manages to account for the significance of matter.  Through a reading of Bohr’s 
philosophy-physics that brought him to the quantum model of the atom, Barad envisions a 
seamless elaboration of ‘embodiment’ that includes all kinds of beings, humans and non-
humans alike − animate or not. Materiality and discursivity are not placed opposite each other 
but shape joint practices of ongoing reconfigurations of the world. I think Barad’s conceptual 
elaborations can help to illuminate how Cage’s performative techniques matter in a 
materialistic sense though without loosing the horizons of being staged (mise en scène), 
which include discursive and intentional elements.  
 
Like the universe of dependent origination (Buddhism) and the fleshy condition of Being 
(Merleau-Ponty), Barad operates with a universe that has no prior independent entities beyond 
the conditional (re)figurations that appear and enact in the process of becoming themselves.  
And like the emphasis on process within process philosophies, she outlines a world that never 
                                                 
633 Barad 2003, p. 801. 
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stands still other than through the iterative movement of (re)actualisations. Culture and nature 
are in this respect reconciled. The paradigm of embodiment, described in chapter four, where 
the physical body has to be thought as a historical body that has incorporated social and 
historical conditions, is by Barad extended to the production of all phenomena. In this sense, 
she also places the human agency not opposite a passive nature, but intimately as part of an 
agential realism that includes the activity of nature. Culture is not immaterial, and nature is 
not ahistorical. It is in this sense I find Barad interesting for my project, because Cage’s 
aesthetics of chance, indeterminacy, no-continuity, silence, performativity, insist so to speak 
on the co-activity of the material, of the produced/found sounds. The creativity explored 
happens in the meeting points between different agential forces, including the material’s own 
drives, histories, causalities, and potentialities. Cage’s techniques, which perforate human 
habitual intentionality, enforce these other agential factors and direct a magnifying glass 
towards these mingled processes, between human agencies, cultural forms, inanimate 
materials and lively situations, processes where the elements do not disappear in mingled 
diffusion, but affirm themselves as the creation of a concrete, specific (sonic) environment.   

Barad presents an agential realism through which she bases her post-humanist concept of 
performativity. That is, she presents a performative account of the production of material 
bodies that is not limited to human activity but presented as a general ontology − a 
performative metaphysics.634 This performative account relies on a relational ontology that 
advocates “a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific 
material configurations of the world (i.e., discursive practices/(con)figurations rather than 
“words”) and specific material phenomena (i.e., relations rather than “things”).”635 This 
causal relationship is called agential intra-action.636 Causality is thereby also re-interpreted. 
We can pause the presentation of Barad’s theory here for a moment and remind ourselves 
about the feedback structure presented in chapter four.637 The autopoietic feedback coil 
                                                 
634 Barad, pp. 811-814. Barad comments on her use of metaphysics in this respect by referring to ‘experimental 
metaphysics’ that takes place in physics laboratories around the world “calling into question the common belief 
that there is an inherent boundary between the ‘physical’ and the ‘metaphysical’.” (Barad 2003, p. 812 and 
elaborated in Barad 2007, pp. 287-352).  
635 Barad 2003, p. 814. 
636 Loc. cit. The reason that Barad uses ‘intra-action’ instead of interaction is to emphasise that there exists no 
prior things apart from being constituted through the activity of ongoing (re)configuration, through iterative 
intra-activity. The primary ontological units within her performative metaphysics are therefore not “things” but 
phenomena − dynamic topological reconfigurations/ 
entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations −, and the primary semantic units are not words, but material-
discursive practices. (Ibid. p. 815-818.) 
637 See p. 112 ff. 
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presented there, problematized a linear understanding of cause and effect, or 
intention/idea/aim and result. Instead we were presented with an oscillating structure of 
responses where an act’s effects are dependent upon the reaction. Further, we pointed at the 
openness of the responsive structure in its passing of the initiative to the other part to be 
answered and returned. Barad points at similar dynamics. The potency of cause and effect 
relies in their intra-activity. That is, Barad accentuates the inseparability of “observed object” 
and “agencies of observation,” of phenomena and apparatuses.638 To use a vocabulary 
introduced in chapter four, an apparatus, or “agencies of observation,” means a specific 
physical arrangement that implies an intervention in the world, a mise en scene, that initiates 
dynamics of feedback (intra-action) through which phenomena (“observed objects”) arise. 
 
In the context of agential realism Barad reworks the relation between discursivity and 
materiality. She emphasizes that matter does not only matter because it “‘support’ particular 
discourses that are the actual generative factors in the formation of bodies.”639  Matter intra-
acts with the physical arrangement of the discourse. ‘Discourse’ (not what is said, but that 
which constrains and enables what can be said) as a horizon of guiding lines, seen 
opportunities and a toolbox for perception and action, functions indefinitely as long as it is 
not put to use. Discursivity performs its significance through its application. Barad therefore 
outlines discursive practices as specific material (re)configurations through which “local 
determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted.”640 This 
means also that it is firstly through their execution that discursive practices get their 
definition. They have to be used in a local situation, that is, as a topological (re-)configuration 
of the world which entails the initiation/invitation of specific intra-active dynamics to 
emerge.641 Matter is not innocent in this respect.  It is not “little bits of nature, or a blank slate, 
surface, or site passively awaiting signification,”642 but already an ongoing historicity that 
acts through intra-activity: “Matter does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is 
                                                 
638 Barad 2003, p. 814. 
639 Ibid. p. 823. 
640 Ibid. p. 821. 
641 Barad contrasts the concept of topology with that of geometry. While geometry is concerned with shapes and 
sizes, “topology investigates questions of connectivity and boundaries.” (Barad 2003, p. 825.) This is further 
explained in Barad 2007: “Understanding the dynamics of this complex ‘trans-action’ − which involves not 
merely the transgression of spatial and other material-discursive boundaries but a re(con)figuration of the space-
time-matter manifold itself − requires topological analysis. Questions of size and shape (geometrical concerns) 
must be supplemented by, and reevaluated in terms of, questions of boundary, connectivity, interiority, and 
exteriority (topological concerns).” (Barad 2007, p. 244.) 
642 Barad 2003, p. 821.  
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substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of agency. 
Matter is a stabilizing and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity.”643 Materiality is 
discursive, just as discursive practices are always already material. That is, material 
phenomena “are inseparable from the apparatuses of bodily production: matter emerges out of 
and includes as part of its being the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries,”644 and discursive 
practices “are ongoing material (re)configurings of the world.”645 Therefore, “the material and 
the discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamics of intra-activity.”646  
 
Barad’s reworkings of discursivity and materiality through the notion of agential realism aims 
to avoid both the distance of reality as only available through mediating tokens, or the 
transparent or immediate givenness given to it in the traditional empiricist assumption. The 
objective referent becomes, in Barad’s reworking, phenomena, (re)configurations that both 
define apparatuses and the measured, cause and effect.  
 
Through Barad’s reworked version, all bodies, not merely human ones, “come to matter 
through the world’s iterative intra-activity—its performativity.”647 In this sense, human 
“bodies are not inherently different from ‘nonhuman’ ones.”648 What is at issue is “a material 
dynamics of intra-activity: material apparatuses produce material phenomena through specific 
causal intra-actions, where “material” is always already material-discursive—that is what it 
means to matter.”649 
 
Barad proposes a post-humanist materialist account of performativity. This account 
challenges the positioning of materiality as either a given or a mere effect of human agency: 
“Materiality is an active factor in processes of materialization.”650 It is not a fixed essence, but 
a “substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency.”651 
This modulates also the understanding of discursivity. Like the concept of performativity, it is 
not restricted to human abilities. Discursive practices are “not human-based activities but 
rather specific material (re)configurings of the world through which local determinations of 
                                                 
643 Ibid. p. 822. 
644 Loc. cit. 
645 Loc. cit. 
646 Loc. cit. 
647 Barad 2003, p. 823.  
648 Loc. cit.  
649 Ibid. p. 824. 
650 Ibid. p. 827. 
651 Ibid. p. 828. 
 269 
boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted.”652 The concept of 
performativity is in this respect loosened from Butler’s convention-dependent concept and 
instead based upon the open though poietic character of the multidirectional for − the turn of 
the performative drive − presented as die Auto-poietische feedback-Scleife in chapter four: 
“Performativity is not understood as iterative citationality (Butler) but rather iterative intra-
activity.”653 
 
The intimacy between discursive processes and materialisation, between material phenomena 
and discursive practices, can illuminate the performative generation of materiality brought up 
in chapter four were material qualities neither become theoretically non-significant, nor 
simply an unshaped fact to be formulated (shaped to distinction). The aesthetic event, like 
Barad’s material phenomena, is due to the intra-action happening in the conjunction of 
discursive abilities and material configurations. Material qualities are here co-producers of the 
event. The significance of staging strategies occurs firstly when they meet the resistance 
(agency/dynamic actuality) of existing material figurations through which feedback structures 
arise that in the climate of intra-activity produce the discursive-material configurations of this 
specific event. 

A3A 	*(%$*/$+$*/
Through flesh and Barad’s post-humanistic concept of performativity the concept of 
embodiment is extended from a human domain to the general character of Being: Being as a 
process of becoming is a process of embodiment. The human being is in this respect not 
different from other material phenomena. The question is not about categorical differences, 
but a spectrum of abundance of configurations that co-exists and interacts in all directions. 
Even aesthetics can be founded in this relativized position of existence. The conditionality of 
a performance is in this respect not only outlined in the dynamics between actors and 
spectators, but the whole environment put into play at the venue. 
 
Through the notion of flesh I have outlined a theory of Being as an extended field of intra-
activity where different material phenomena do not need to share the same discursive traits 
                                                 
652 Loc. cit. 
653 Loc. cit. 
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but can represent different discursive-material practices. We get a heterogenic web of 
connections (a multitude of agential forces) as a model to think ontology and not the organic 
model of unity. This spread out condition of activated Being, the heterogeneous though 
seamless condition of embodiment with a multitude of swellings and folds that perform the 
confined situation of existence by different solutions, makes up a theoretic view where we do 
not need to share the same references to share an area of space-time. We do not need to create 
homogeneous cultures to have a view to co-existence and interdependence. The conception of 
an extensive field of discursive-material activity leaves an ontological space for Cage’s notion 
of anarchic harmony.654 Meaning and ethics become in this respect in the end connected to 
the specific locality and individuality of lives where senses hurt − to existence as embodied 
and lived locally within specific environments. I rely here on Haraway’s notion of 
situatedness,655 which emphasizes the irreducible character of a locality that cannot be 
relativized (reduced) to a no-where or everywhere. It is unique, not replaceable nor 
transferable; it is a particular location in the intricacies of world-lines and topographic 
configurations.  
 
Introductory to this thesis I used Heidegger to sketch a main question for this dissertation. 
Even though Heidegger places the production of knowledge in the sphere of conditional 
conditions, and not essential qualities, he emphasises the need to make differences. The 
Heideggerian ‘rift’ indicates the basic need, in epistemological terms, for hierarchic principles 
of structuration.  
 
Cage challenges these. There is a wish for equal value − a view that can encompass the 
“noise” of our lives that does not fit categorizations of this or that, either/or.  Cage’s 
aesthetics was linked in chapter three to a critique of the masterwork, a work-concept that I 
further connected to an essentialist approach to Being. The reasons behind Cage’s criticism, I 
argued, were: 
 
1) The principles of exclusion put in operation by this work concept; 
                                                 
654 “you could call iT / anarcHic harmony / harmony that / doEs not exclude noise / no ideAs / noThing to say no 
feelings no taste / no vaRiations / no rEpetitions.” (Cage, Mesosticha (1990) in Neue Zeitschrift Für 
Musik 155, no. 5, 1994). ‘Anarchic harmony’ appears late in Cage’s vocabulary, but it follows the same line of 
thought as expressed earlier by the inclusive view of a non-continuous continuity, a heterogeneous sphere of co-
existence.  
655 Haraway 1988. 
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2) The evaluation of the perceptive and sensitive condition of our immediate and given 
existence as second-rated in comparison with an idealized sensibility cultivated 
through aestheticism.  
 
Cage, by his criticism, points to the need for an alternative epistemology that takes the 
sensuousness and sensibility of ordinary life seriously, and bases ontology on the experiences 
of the transitoriness of life. We are led to the concept of performativity discussed in chapter 
four. Instead of an objectified expression as the point of departure, the aesthetics of 
performativity bring the conditional event to the centre. And instead of a message, we have a 
process that provokes transformative experiences.  
 
The discussed concept of performativity in chapter four brought up the intimate relationship 
between sensitivity, experience and embodied existence. Through this accentuation we were 
also presented with the ‘body’ as a methodological figure that could depict the segmentation, 
sustenance and distribution of meaning differently from the ‘sign’. Meaning as embodied 
became closely connected to the experience of and reaction to immediate presence − the 
urgent presence of existing. The concept of performativity, in this context, does something 
with the difference as an epistemological marker: 
 
1) Perception and embodiment display boundaries as zones of transitions and exchange 
that do not stand still. They bring also awareness to the openness and activity at the 
intersectional lines of perception and interactivity. The difference thereby does not 
mark a brute binary divide, but a zone with shades, colours and elastic states. 
 
2) The aspect of action and the connected conditional qualities accentuate the dynamics 
of interplay, of interactivity, what Barad calls intra-action. The performative for, 
discussed in chapter four, assumes already in its performative drive the other as co-
partner of the activity. The meeting as the place where the performative effect is 
shaped is both characterised by the openness of the responsive structure and the 
settlement that the oscillating answers bring about. We have a meaning bound to the 
creation of existential conditions, which is also the creation of a common reality, that 
is shaped in the intersectional lines between a plurality of centrifugal and centripetal 
forces.    
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The framework that I have outlined in this chapter connects ontology to processes of 
embodiment, and through the notions of flesh, discursive-material practices and iterative 
intra-activity I have tried to present an idea of both interconnectedness and independence, 
where a notion of co-existence does not need to be bound to a shared frame of reference − a 
shared story − but an assembly of life-practices, a spacious temporality of parallel activities 
that, like a Musicircus, exhibits a diversity of histories, practices and individual solutions in a 
conglomerate of heterogeneous collaboration.  
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7  MUSICIRCUS, TRONDHEIM 2006 
 
Then – in an instant the indoor street at Dragvoll vibrates with sound from all corners. The cacophony, 
the noise and the racket were palpable. And the experience of simultaneous sound-bombardment from 
all over the place and how that instantly opened up the room was one of the most spectacular events 
yours truly has ever partaken in.656 
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This “simultaneous sound-bombardment” filling the hall at Dragvoll happened on 
Sunday the 23rd of April 2006, at five o’clock in the afternoon. The program note 
announced: 
 
5 p.m.–7 p.m. 
The indoor street at Dragvoll 
Free entrance  
Artistic adviser and curator: Stephen Montague 
 
“You don’t hear a thing, you hear everything”  
 
In the anarchic spirit of the 1960s John Cage organised a Musicircus in 1967 – an artistic vision of a 
’global village’ where many independent participants perform at the same time unproblematically. The 
performers participated with a program of their own choice. Spread about in a big hall they performed 
their program simultaneously. The audience could wander around, come and go. No entrance fee. No 
honorarium, but opportunities to buy refreshments. Sunday the 23rd of April at 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. this 
concept will be realised at the indoor street at Dragvoll. Free entrance. One can come, go and wander 
around as you wish. Café-sito will be open. All are heartily welcome!  
 
We were about 76 contributors, mainly musicians and dancers, but someone also contributed 
with a film and someone else set up a James Joyce installation. There were fiddle players 
performing Norwegian folk music, a male choir performing everything from boy band 
repertoire to national hymns, jazz groups, a DJ, organ music, African drums and much more. 
About 250 people visited the event.  
 
The context and inspiration for doing a Musicircus today can be diverse. The Musicircus I 
attended in Ludwigshafen happened within the context of a theatrical festival and was, among 
other things, used as a way to invite and engage the local community to use a theatre hall that 
had become somewhat estranged from the people who lived there. Stephen Montague curated 
a circus in London in 2004 which had 341 performers and about 2000 visitors. This was done 
                                                 
656 Andersson, Morgenbladet, April 28 − May, 2006. Translated from Norwegian. 
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at the Barbican Hall as part of a festival devoted to Cage’s music. Not surprisingly, early on I 
had the idea to initiate and organise a Cagean circus as part of my study. An opportunity arose 
when a group of PhD-scholars and musicians I had joined got the support of NTNU to do a 
seminar/workshop with the theme ‘open form’. I contacted Montague, who I had already been 
in contact with and had interviewed in connection with the Musicircus realised at the 
Barbican in 2004, and asked if he could be interested in curating our Cagean circus in 
Trondheim. This set the ball rolling. 
 
An invitation, as was asserted in chapter five, can be seen as the first step in generating any 
artistic material for a Musicircus. Within the invitational structure the dynamics of auto-
poietic feedback coils would also be at work. Therefore, I argued, that the significance of 
these dynamics becomes noticeable already with the initiation of the event as an invitational 
gesture dependent upon others to be fulfilled and further framed.  
 
For an audience the distance or difference between, for instance, an indeterminate score 
written by Cage and recorded realisations, can be quite unknown. The “doing” perspective 
(what we could call a performative perspective) – what a realisation of a Cage piece demands 
of the performers/organisers – is revealing here. This is not only an illuminating perspective 
for an audience unfamiliar with Cage’s aesthetics and works, it is also a perspective that in a 
striking way can direct theoretical reflections to aspects otherwise easily missed. 
 
Such a “doing” perspective, building upon the experiences of organizing an event in 
Trondheim, will guide our reflections in this chapter. Some of these reflections take as their 
basis very prosaic elements and processes that may, at first view, seem too ordinary to be 
regarded as profound and significant with regard to the specific aesthetic imprint of an event. 
I think though that these prosaic elements can expand and exemplify – and even raise 
questions about – topics formerly discussed, such as aesthetic autonomy, performative 
generation of materiality, the ideal of Werktreue and so on.  
 
I argued, in chapter five, for seeing the staging strategies of a Musicircus as starting already in 
the invitation of people to perform in the event. However, when I think back on the process in 
Trondheim I find that it is also natural to divide the process of staging into two phases, the 
first one being the preparatory process leading up to the performance day, not least providing 
the event with contributors (artistic material). The second one consisted of the strategies 
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applied the day we performed, such as the use of time brackets and the curator’s pep talk to 
the performers.   
 
This division into two phases, or two kinds of applied staging strategies also indicates (and 
here perhaps we are speaking about a kind of oscillation) a certain split between the more 
prosaic processes leading up to the event and the event as standing out from the ordinary, 
being without doubt an artistic event that demarcated itself from what happened before and 
after. The concept of autonomy can in this respect be interesting to discuss. First, however, I 
would like to start with the preparatory process under the heading of Staging, phase 1.  
 
B3= *$1&)<− *$,**%$
B3=3< &(&(*%(/&(%))
The dynamics of the invitation were felt strongly in the preparatory process, not least because 
of the vulnerability I as the organiser felt being dependent upon those who agreed to 
participate. In this instance I experienced Cagean chance operating in the field of response, 
not least in the scope of the event depending on the number agreeing to participate and what 
they wanted to offer. The contingent structure of invitation became very palpable, and its 
significance for what we could call the artistic material became very obvious.  
 
This needs to be made concrete, and I will now try to outline the process of preparation and 
invitation that took place in Trondheim. To do so, I have described the process in a slightly 
more clear-cut and schematic way than it really was. In fact it would be difficult to record all 
the minute coils of feedback and responses (or non-responses) taking place in such processes. 
The simplifications are not only a solution to this, but as simplifications, are already part of an 
analytical and reflective approach to these experiences. 
 
The initiative 
It would probably be correct to call myself the initiator of the event. However, the initiative 
did not arise from a “solipsistic agent”. When more concrete action was taken, a network had 
already been created with other PhD scholars and musicians who were interested in related 
topics. I mention this mostly to stress that in such processes the aspects of seeking response – 
putting some form of role alternation and community building into action – play an important 
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and informative role from the beginning on as part of one’s own decisional processes, for 
example, in ascertaining if you really should go further with your ideas and so on.   
 
Besides this, the opportunities to be seized upon must be mentioned. For our network, the 
announcement of means to arrange a master class/workshop for PhD students was such an 
opportunity. Within the framework of a seminar/workshop set, work could progress towards 
trying to include more people in the project, a kind of community building work. It was here 
natural to think about the other employees and students of the Department of Music at NTNU. 
The project was presented at staff meetings where I also presented ideas for how the 
Department could be involved, resulting in the decision to arrange a course for undergraduate 
and post-graduate students in the spring of 2006 with the theme Open form, which was also 
the theme for the planned seminar. The ball was rolling. 
 
Curator 
At the Barbican, London, a large scale Musicircus took place in 2004 with 341 performers 
and over 2000 visitors. This circus was part of the festival John Cage UnCaged arranged by 
the BBC Symphony Orchestra. The composer, conductor and pianist Stephen Montague657 
was artistic adviser for the festival and organized and curated the circus event. I did not attend 
the event, but in 2005 I interviewed Montague about the Barbican circus. 
 
When our workshop/seminar was set, I contacted Montague and asked if he could curate our 
event in Trondheim. He was of course contacted because of his knowledge and experience 
with the work of Cage. He had curated several Cagean circuses, and he had performed in 
circuses organized by Cage. However, I did not consciously think about the moment of oral 
transmission when I asked Montague in 2005. Now I can see, referring to our discussion of a 
score in chapter two,658 that Montague besides his experience in organising Musicircuses 
himself, also, by having taken part in Musicircuses Cage’s organised, represented a form of 
“oral” link between our circus and circuses organized by Cage.  
 
                                                 
657 Stephen Montague: Composer, pianist and conductor (from 1975 based in London). His own compositions 
range from big multimedia events to compositions for established orchestras and ensembles, such as the London 
Symphony Orchestra and Hilliard Ensemble. As musician, Montague has worked internationally with composers 
like Cage, Morton Feldman, Christian Wolff, Conlon Nancarrow, Steve Reich, Terry Riley, Xenakis, and he has 
among other things worked together with Merce Cunningham Dance Company. 
658 See p. 31 ff. 
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Briefly, what I have sketched here is a network of actors, the roles connected to them, forms 
of communities, but also occasions found possible to act upon. We could ask about these roles 
in regard to the ideal of the Werktreue that Goehr outlines (see chapter three).  As mentioned 
in the presentation of Musicircus in 1967 (chapter two), Cage had expressed doubts that he 
should really be seen as the composer of the event: The event belongs much more to the 
performers.659 Neither do previews of the event present a composer as such, even if Cage – as 
avant-garde composer and radical thinker – is given a lot of attention in these previews in 
preparing the audience for the coming event. Still, the Musicircus concept has become 
essentially linked to Cage as its originator and treated in that way.  
 
This was also the case with our circus. In presenting the project to the Department, for other 
possible performers and milieus, the project was presented as a realisation of a Cage concept, 
and his position within the avant-garde of the 20th century was emphasised as a reason behind 
why the project was interesting. Therefore, we could say, that even though Cage had 
reservations about being described as the composer of the event the function he acquired in 
our presentation was similar to that of other composers. The difference lay in what was 
expected of those interested in participating in the event. That is, we did not have written out 
parts that the participants should rehearse and prepare before we met. The performers 
themselves had to choose what they would like to do and to prepare this material for the 
performance. However, the participants were expected to accept and take part in the 
realisation of a production idea/concept – simultaneous and non-coordinated performances – 
that was presented by referring to Cage as a kind of composer/originator. I will come back to 
these questions in connection with the formulation of the invitations. For the moment, I want 
to go back to the preparatory process and the setting of some frames and guidelines. 
 
Planning the event − outlining some frames and guidelines 
Montague and I met in January 2006 to outline a further plan for the event. Montague brought 
his ideas for how to stage the event, and I had some of my own thoughts in addition to the 
knowledge I had about the place and what I though was realistic in view of the local 
circumstances.  
 
A certain strategy for staging was outlined. This was not rigid, but some working frames were 
                                                 
659 See p. 38. 
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suggested. These suggested frames were:  
 
- An event lasting for two hours from perhaps 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. 
- Rehearsal and briefing the same day as the performance would take place.  
- No admission fee and no honorarium to the performers.  
- The use of time brackets. (The performers should have stop watches.) 
 
Montague had also some ideas for the “content”; the material and “theme” for the event. As 
we know from sources formerly referred to, Cage does not specify what a Musicircus should 
consist of other than mentioning the music of the surrounding community.660 Besides, he 
includes other forms of art without restrictions. Fetterman informs us however that the 
Musicircuses organised in the 1980s mainly became celebrations of Cage’s music and work: 
“During the 1980s the musicircus became not so much a festival of global music, but a 
playful retrospective of Cage’s own historical output in music composition.”661 The 
Musicircus at Barbican was in line with the development sketched by Fetterman. Participants 
contributed with music by Cage, his friends, or something that could be associated to Cage’s 
work and preferences. Montague suggested a circus in that line also for our performance in 
Trondheim. That is, a circus where not only the idea, but also the “content” – the circus’ 
material – reflected Cage’s artistic output and his related artistic circles.  This could be done 
in practice by formulating invitations that suggested what performers could do and in some 
instances being more specific about certain contributions. 
 
Firstly, I tried to a certain degree to follow this direction when I asked people to participate, 
but quite quickly the invitation became so open as to include whatever participants would like 
to do. Therefore, the participants mainly came with their own material. This can be seen as an 
example of the responsive dynamics at play in the invitational structure that modulates the 
outcome of the invitational process. 
 
B3=3= 
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Some performers were already involved when Montague and I drew some further frames and 
guidelines for the event, and some were expected to participate, such as the participants in the 
                                                 
660 See p. 37. 
661 Fetterman 1996, p. 146.  
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course on open form already mentioned. However, from the beginning the idea was to involve 
more people than those mentioned here. The next step was therefore to ask people if they 
would like to take part in this event.  
 
Often when reflections are made on the process of planning an event, this is done with the 
aim of evaluating how successful it had been with respect to achieving a certain intended and 
planned result. That is not what really interests me in the discussion I present here. My 
interest is with the “prosaic” elements, such as misunderstandings, practical circumstances 
and fortunate coincidences, that shape the preparatory process and thereby the coming event. 
These “prosaic” elements become part of chance. For example, at the time I was formulating 
invitations I was in the USA. Physically, therefore, I was far away from the place we were 
going to do the event, and the channel for communication and presentation was the e-mail. 
Because I was not physically present I could not turn up personally to present the project, for 
example, to students. E-mails were instead written, and this situation made it easier for 
misunderstandings to occur.  
 
I would like to call the prosaic aspects mentioned over situational, pragmatic and non-
idealistic and draw attention to them according to a broader Cagean context. For example, 
many of Cage’s works are composed so that it is possible either to use a lot of the composed 
material or just a single portion. HPSCHD is an example of this where a performance of the 
work can range from that of the expansive scope of the first performance to a realisation in 
chamber format.662 These compositions are flexible in scope, adjustable to practical 
circumstances. They show a non-idealistic approach. The aim is not to realise or materialise 
an ideal form. Instead they explicitly accentuate the potential of pragmatic and situational 
considerations.  
 
I mentioned in chapter five that even though an invitation is open-ended, giving the receiver 
the opportunity to refuse, some frames would be sketched. These would raise certain 
prospects and expectations, making the invitation attractive or not. Besides, some of these 
frames would be of the character that if the invitation was accepted, these frames would also 
have been taken for granted. The dynamics between setting frames and the open, contingent 
character of an invitation can therefore be interesting to look at.  
                                                 
662 See p. 190 ff. 
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Let us imagine a very open invitation, trying to set as few restricting frames as possible, and 
in that way, considering it to be truly anarchic. The organisers in such an instance might for 
example have made a site available and merely specified a time for the event to begin. Then 
they might have invited anyone interested to just show up − those wanting to perform, to 
bring their own material, and others just to come as they were. We could imagine that this 
invitation was distributed via posters, announcements at public internet sites, maybe e-mail 
and SMS. Then, it would be just to wait and see who turned up.  
 
Such an invitation would be very open and free. Those taking part would do so merely by 
showing up, and the initiators could risk ending up alone at the site! An invitation formulated 
in such an open-ended and non-binding way would in its form be very insecure; few 
obligations would be made as part of the process leading up to the event. Another element, 
perhaps as interesting, is connected to what prompts us to respond positively to an invitation. 
Is it the most open and non-binding invitations that are most attractive? We can imagine that a 
very open-ended and indeterminate invitation easily provokes the response: “What is this?” 
followed up by our paying no further attention to it.  There would be too few hints to catch 
our attention and interest. That is, most of us like to be aware of what we might gain from 
joining such a project. If we had no knowledge of Musicircus and an invitation to participate 
had as few restrictive stipulations as possible, it would probably be difficult to generate such 
prospects. The chosen media for distributing such an invitation would probably also make a 
difference. Personal e-mails and SMS would likely have a stronger impact - especially if 
those invited knew those doing the inviting - than just posters and announcements spread at 
easily available Internet sites and poster walls. 
 
My point is that a very open-ended invitation would quickly be found to be too vague to 
provoke interest. Why? Of course, a lot of open invitations are made to us without obligation. 
Public concerts and open political meetings are examples of this. The audience in these 
instances has received an open invitation to come if they want. Subject to expected 
popularity, we either just show up for such an event or make a decision beforehand and make 
a kind of commitment by buying a ticket some time before the event has been scheduled. 
Seen like this, the audience of our Musicircus received also a very open invitation – no tickets 
were necessary and no request for turning up on time was made. An announcement of such 
events however would most often outline what is planned, so a potential audience can make 
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up their minds whether or not they thought it worth investigation. This was also the case in 
Trondheim. Posters and flyers were made with information, a preview appeared in the local 
newspaper and the performance was also presented in a national Internet-based magazine for 
music.663 
 
The specification of an invitation − what it is about, what you are invited to − is therefore 
important in creating an image and raising expectations for what an event has to offer. If the 
specifications are too open or vague, then perhaps participants who do not know really what 
to expect of it, would find it not worth the risk, or too vague to provoke any interest at all.  
 
Specifications, therefore, can help an invitation to be experienced or felt as an invitation: 
Something we can deliberately say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to contributing to. However, the specification 
also frames the mind and closes up some of the indeterminate aspects of an invitation, 
extended by strategies that are somehow aimed at anchoring the coming event, for example, 
by making different kinds of promises. 
 
I accentuated in my analysis of the invitational structure that the one who invites initiates an 
event, though, by the act of inviting also gives the control away to those who are invited. The 
invitation reflects a role-alternating figure in its logic and is by this essentially open-ended. 
That does not exclude moves representing an attempt to direct and control the invitational 
process. The risk sketched above is often tried, controlled and eliminated one way or another, 
for instance, by going from the invitational character to the character of promise and 
commitment.  
 
We can transfer some of these more general considerations to the formulations of my 
invitations in 2006. The following points can be emphasised: 
 
1) I present my PhD project and myself. 
2) There is a short presentation of the project and I express the hope that as many as 
possible from the Department of Music would like to participate. 
3) I present an idea for what they could do. 
                                                 
663 See Andersen 2006, and Habbestad 2006. 
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4) The context − the simultaneity, aesthetically and musically – is sketched, so those 
asked can imagine how the project will be presented aesthetically.  
5) I inform all that there will be no honorarium. (It is not about saying yes to a “job”.) 
6) I include a general presentation of the project: 
a. A historical outlining and presentation. 
b. Certain aesthetic implications, derived from the historical presentation, that 
sketch an aesthetic and music-historical placement of the ‘open form’ that was 
the theme of our seminar. 
c. A general description of what one could imagine this event to be like: A 
cacophony of simultaneous performances spread around and an audience that 
can walk about in this live generated soundscape. 
7) Specific information about our project: 
a. Time and place for the performance. 
b. The name of the curator, and his background. 
c. The expected scope of performers.  
d. What those who want to participate are expected to prepare − what obligations 
are involved. 
e. Rehearsal time − how much time must those who have responded 
affirmatively devote to this project by being present at a certain place and time. 
8) Information about who to contact. 
 
So, when I asked people to participate in the event I included quite a lot of information: Some 
suggestion of what they could do, a brief historic contextualisation, an outlining of what they 
aesthetically could expect to be confronted by and the concrete details of when and where the 
event was going to happen. 
 
Except for the suggestion of what they could do, which was not anything binding, and which 
later was emphasised as being totally open, the frames given are mainly of a practical 
character: The date and the time scope of the rehearsal and performance. However, they are 
also asked to take on some obligations: To prepare performance material for about 20-30 
minutes. That is, this was to be prepared. 
 
In chapter three, discussing Musicircus according to the work concept, I emphasized that we 
probably would have used known conceptual frames when marketing the event and that these 
 283 
probably would have been related to the work concept, for example, the emphasis on a 
composer, connected ideas and aesthetics, the emphasis of a work’s specific character and so 
on. As seen in my formulation of invitations formerly discussed, this was not only the case for 
marketing the event, but also formed part of the invitational rhetoric. Allow me to carry out a 
kind of self-analysis in this respect:  
 
The use of a work-related discourse was not only a rhetorical ploy. From the beginning on, 
the project was established as part of a seminar mainly devoted to experimental music of the 
1950- and 1960s and in the context of my PhD-study on a prominent composer of the 20th 
century – canonized as one of the most prominent representatives of the avant-garde music. 
The project was placed within a musical setting, historical contextualised according to a 
Western history of art music that focuses on extraordinary works and their composers. That 
is, we could have imagined that instead of focusing upon the musical-historical context we 
could have accentuated Cage’s circus as a model for a social construction and presented the 
project as a social experiment, for instance, with reference to Cage’s emphasis on anarchism 
and the adoption of McLuhan’s vision of a ‘global village’ in the presentation of the first 
circus. However, perhaps this would not have been the wisest way of presenting the project to 
colleagues and students of the Music Department, where it was proposed that the project 
would take place, in the hope – conscious or unconscious – of getting many of them involved. 
The anarchic and social connotations are indicated, but the event is not presented primarily as 
a social experiment. It is the artistic and musical exploration that is emphasised. 
 
 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I have several times contextualised Musicircus according to other works by Cage and 
techniques that recur in his artistic practice. Often I have done this by calling attention to 
similarities. It is interesting, though, to examine how different pieces and productions stage 
different aesthetic situations. In this respect we could again bring up the theme of identity. 
Are we not here referring to some kind of specific identity – an individual character – that a 
piece or a production idea represents? 
 
We have seen how Cage challenges the notion of the work understood as a musical unity with 
its identity connected to the consistency of a specific sonic construction revived in different 
performances. However, even though Cage challenges this notion of consistency in the 
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representation of a work’s identity, it is not far removed to consider distinct strategies of 
staging, or generating music, as in any case, regardless of how indeterminate the score or the 
production concept/idea is, framing the aesthetic results and giving it a certain character.  
 
I want again to draw attention to the materiality of Musicircus by comparing it to 4’33’’. 
4’33’’, by staging silence which turns out not to be silent at all, can be seen as an emphatic 
example of a performative generation of materiality,664 and the materiality of Musicircus can 
in the first instance be claimed to be performatively generated through an invitational gesture. 
However, the examples of 4’33’’ and Musicircus can show how these performatively 
generated materialities, through the strategies applied, bring about different results. Briefly, as 
mentioned in chapter four, 4’33’’ focuses attention on the sounds that surround us and 
contribute to our sonic environment, but which we seldom listen carefully to. The human 
agents, the performer and the audience, are here somehow asked to be “quiet” and listen: The 
performer, literally by performing tacet, the audience by playing the established role of 
listeners at a classical concert. Contrary to this, the material of Musicircus, brought forward 
by the invitation, is the “sounds”665 of a lot of human actors. From the silenced performer, 
Musicircus calls attention to the human contribution to a sonic landscape.  
  
It struck me, when I attended the Cagean circus in Ludwigshafen, how living histories, 
traditions, and not least physicality left their mark on the event. Perhaps I was especially 
prepared for these reflections because of my reading of Kahn at that time.666 Kahn criticises 
Cage’s understanding of sounds. He finds Cage’s conception problematic because of its lack 
of a social, cultural and political understanding of the nature of sounds. Sounds in themselves 
become purely a-referential – natural, universal and apolitical.  
 
With Kahn’s criticism kept in my mind, my experience in Ludwigshafen struck me as not at 
all an unbodied event. The event’s worldly character of social embedment was very 
present.667 What was remarkable was the plural quality in the character of this enactment, like 
an extended field of actual resources and bubbling energy. If we see the invitation as the 
                                                 
664 See presentation in chapter four, pp. 160-161 and 170-172. 
665 Of course, as a multimedial hapening we do not basically speak only about sounds, but the whole vibrational 
field of multi-sensible quality put in operation by this human activity. 
666 Kahn 1999. 
667 The specific production plays of course an important role in this respect. See my presentation of the 
production in Ludwigshafen in chapter five, p. 214.  
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performative gesture that generates the material, it is the performers (embodied, alive) that are 
willing to perform something from their repertoire – from their culture, their tradition, their 
living practice − that constitutes this aspect. 
 
In fact, we can speak about two phases in the performative generation of materiality: The first 
one brings people together; the second phase happens on the spot through the simultaneous 
performances. I will now call attention to this last stage, because in certain instances this 
second phase splits the event itself from the preparatory process and gives the performance a 
kind of independent character: It stands out from what happened before and after, marking a 
kind of autonomous time of the performance itself. 
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Until now, the focus has been on the process leading up to the performance day – a process 
that brought together performers and contributions. Now I want to concentrate on what 
happened on the day, what we can call the second phase of the staging, representing a strategy 
applied on our material (the performers with their prepared contributions): 
 
1) The organising of time: 
a. The time scope of the event. 
b. The use of time brackets and how they were worked out. 
 
2) The organising of space 
a. The spatial distribution of the performers. 
 
3) Presence 
a. The generation of focus, concentration and presence − the curator’s role here.   
 
B3>3< #
The first Musicircus had a time scope from eight o’clock in the afternoon to one o’clock at 
night.668 We did not follow the model of the 1967-circus here.  Montague suggested a 
                                                 
668 And as mentioned earlier, in some sources Cage says that such events should last longer then ordinary 
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performance that would last for at least two hours. Probably through his experience of 
organizing earlier circuses he knew that such a frame would be feasible whereas a longer 
event would have demanded more from its organizers, for example in getting enough 
performers and contributions to fill a longer time-span, or getting performers that would have 
the capacity to offer more time on the project than was necessary for the two-hour 
performance we sketched. Of course, if we had allocated a much longer time period, we 
would also have needed to adapt our preparation accordingly. 
 
The use of time brackets, I have shown, are not obvious with respect to the Cagean circus.669 
Montague had used chance generated time brackets in the circuses he had previously 
organized. Such time brackets were also used in the circuses he joined that Cage organized. 
We have discussed in chapter five the preferred performative attitude sketched by Cage. Time 
brackets are helpful here. They represent a disciplinary interference, almost an obstacle; the 
performers cannot just go on playing but must accommodate their performance to the schema 
of brackets. They get a new task that restricts their freedom, but also gives them a tool with 
which to focus their performance, both by giving them a time-route to follow (they know 
what to do) and by challenging the performers to perform in a different way and in other 
circumstances than they are used to. The method of time brackets not only disciplines the 
performers, and thereby acts as a tool with which to hold on to their own performance and 
maintain the “fragmented” and non-resolved diverse character of the generated collage. The 
working out of time brackets also has an impact, in purely aesthetic terms, on the texture of 
the event, for example in the distribution between activated sounds and tacet, the possible 
time span of a single bracket and so on. For our event in Trondheim, I was put on the task of 
working out these time brackets with the help of chance operations. 
 
Pritchett, in his doctoral theses of 1988,670 shows the play between distinctive frames 
designed by the composer and the impact of chance in Cage’s compositions from the 1950s. 
He shows how important the designed aspects are for Cage’s compositions even though 
procedures are developed in an attempt to override the intentional aspects of these pieces. 
Cage’s chance operations are not at all just random. They are executed within well-defined 
                                                 
concerts. (See p. 37 in this thesis.) 
669 See chapter five, pp. 185-186. 
670 Pritchett 1988: The development of chance techniques in the music of John Cage, 1950-1956. 
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frames.671 The same could be said about the time schedules created for our performance in 
Trondheim. They were developed within the play between designed frames and the execution 
of chance operations. 
 
)!$ !'&!&$&%
I decided not to throw coins and consult hexagrams, representing Cage’s I ching-method. 
That seemed too laborious for the actual situation. I developed a method I thought was easier 
for me to realise. Nevertheless, it took a lot of time to develop a system and to carry out the 
chance operation. Briefly, my approach can be described as follows:  
 
1) To design a system of procedures which were manageable.  
2) To design procedures of chance operations. 
 
The designed system became as follows: 
 
1) I reserved a certain amount of time, about 50 minutes, to represent performance time. 
The rest, 1 hour and 10 minutes was reserved for pauses – tacet. Then I broke these 
time-spans into smaller units lasting from about 20 seconds to 3 minutes and 20 
seconds. These smaller units were written on slips of paper and divided into a group 
for performance-time (group A, making up 50 minutes) and for rest-time (group B, 55 
minutes – a 15 minute break was pre-distributed, see under).  
2) A slip of paper from either group A or B was selected by throwing dice. I had made a 
rule for when the same group was chosen several times − that after three times the 
next slip of paper would be chosen from the other group. 
3) Each schedule (part) had a 15 minute break which was fixed and appeared at different 
points of time during the two-hour performance, so that not everybody would have 
their long break at the same time. This rule was changed after consulting Montague 
and filled in with the help of chance operations following mainly the procedure 
described in point 1) and 2) above though with slight changes (see the next point).  
                                                 
671 These frames can though perform a paradoxical role, like shown in my analysis of Variation II in chapter 
four. To a certain extent they frame the possible scope of what can appear. At the same time, by disciplining the 
procedures, they also enforce the dynamics of chance and breaks open habitual preferences. 
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4) Montague found that my system, within which time brackets could be up to 10 
minutes long, fostered brackets that were too long.  However, due to the shortage of 
time,672 the time parts were basically used as they were, though altering the longest 
brackets into smaller units through an ad hoc procedure in line with the chance 
operations I used, given above. The result was that I did not exactly know the 
performance time for each group. The 50 minutes could both have been extended and 
shortened. 
 
The conscious, intentional choices were therefore:  
 
1) Performance time − about 50 minutes, later extended or shortened by chance: The 
same amount of performance time for everybody who participated. I wanted to create 
a system that resulted in all the participants getting the same amount of time to 
perform. I did not want a situation to arise where some of the performers, by chance, 
should play nearly all the time and others scarcely got any time brackets to fill.  
2) At first, I made a fifteen minute break so all the groups that participated would be able 
to walk around for a while like the audience. This was, as mentioned, later changed 
after consulting Montague. 
3) I made the choices of possible time lengths not too short. My reason was that I thought 
a very fragmented time schedule would appear too complicated (impractical) to follow 
for performers not at all used to this type of performance instruction.673  
4) I made a system that to certain degree would secure distribution of performance time 
throughout the span of the event. 
 
To summarize, therefore, the working out of time brackets were framed by some conscious 
choices. These were:  
 
1) Equal distribution of performance time. This was mainly done for democratic reasons: 
Even though we had decided to use chance derived time brackets, I did not want to 
make the system so potentially inconsiderate that some participants who had prepared 
                                                 
672 Montague’s advice came only two days before the event, and beside the Cagean circus I had also other duties 
to follow up during our weekend devoted to “Open form”, the title for our seminar.  
673 In my own experience of performing at the event, however, I was aware that what I had thought of as a short 
amount of time, even a single second, did not feel so short when concentrating on doing our performance.  
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themselves for the event and reserved a day for this project might end up being asked 
to be silent nearly all the time. A second reason was aesthetic: By securing an equal 
amount of performance time to all those who performed, the heterogeneous and varied 
aesthetic quality these performers represented would also be secured and have a 
greater imprint on the live generated collage than if the system did not guarantee a 
certain equal distribution of performance time. 
2) Secure the distribution of performance time throughout the time-span of the event. 
3) Practical considerations: Not making too complicated time schedules. 
4) Formulate procedures that would not be too time-consuming to execute.  
 
 
What, then, was actually generated by chance in the method sketched over?  The general 
factors and frames within which to act were to a large extent set intentionally and were 
deliberately thought about. Chance, though, was put into operation in shaping how the time 
brackets occurred in detail − how short/long (within certain limits intentionally set) they were 
and when they appeared. Further, the time schedules (parts) were made independently of each 
other – I made them one at a time. These were not put together before the event, so we did not 
really know for example if there would be very little going on at certain points during the 
performance, or who would be performing at the same time. Besides, the time schedules were 
randomly distributed amongst the performers. I do not in fact have an overview of who had 
the different time parts, and some of the worked out schedules were not used, because some 
of the expected performers reported their absence only at the last minute.  
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Examples of the time schedules that we used: 
 
Time schedule no. 9  
Example: 03’45’’ – 06’45’’  09’45’’ – 10’30’’ means that you should play from 3 minutes and 
45 seconds until 6 minutes and 45 seconds. Pause until 9 minutes and 45 seconds. Play again from 9 
minutes and 45 seconds until 10 minutes and 30 seconds.  
 
02’00’’–05’40’’ 
19’30’’–20’00’’  
21’00’’–24’00’’  24’30’’–26’45’’  27’30’’–29’30’’ 
39’30’’–40’00’’  41’00’’–44’00’’  44’30’’–46’45’’ 
53’15’’–56’45’’ 
05’35’’–06’05’’ 
10’05’’–12’05’’ 
15’50’’–16’40’’ 
20’10’’–22’30’’ 
26’00’’–28’45’’ 
31’45’’–34’45’’ 
38’15’’–41’45’’ 
49’15’’–50’25’’ 
 
Time schedule no. 18  
[…] 
 
02’15’’–02’55’’  09’00’’–09’45’’  
10’00’’–11’00’’  11’15’’–11’45’’  12’00’’–13’30’’  15’00’’–17’00’’ 
21’00’’–22’10’’ 
32’20’’–33’50’’  34’20’’–35’35’’  36’05’’–37’20’’ 
42’20’’–43’50’’  44’20’’–45’35’’  46’05’’–47’20’’ 
52’15’’–52’55’’  58’15’’–59’15’’  
00’25’’–03’15’’  06’15’’–06’30’’  06’45’’–07’15’’  08’15’’–11’45’’ 
17’15’’–18’30’’  19’45’’–21’05’’ 
22’20’’–25’50’’ 
32’50’’–33’50’’  34’05’’–34’30’’  36’00’’–37’00’’  37’30’’–38’00’’ 
38’45’’–39’30’’  
40’30’’–43’10’’  46’40’’–47’10’’  48’10’’–48’40’’  49’10’’–49’40’’ 
49’55’’–50’55’’ 
51’25’’–51’55’’  53’10’’–55’20’’ 
 
Time schedule no. 20  
[…] 
 
00’00’’–00’40’’  02’10’’–3’20’’  09’25’’–10’25’’  
11’25’’–17’25’’ 
24’30’’–27’00’’  28’00’’–33’10’’ 
37’10’’–37’40’’ 
40’40’’–47’30’’  48’45’’–50’05’’ 
54’35’’–59’35’’ 
04’45’’–08’15’’ 
11’25’’–17’25’’ 
26’45’’–31’15’’ 
36’30’’–38’45’’ 
40’05’’–45’05’’  46’25’’–47’40’’ 
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I emphasised in chapter five that even though Cage describes Musicircus as having no 
aesthetic bias, we can approach the Cagean circus from a purely aesthetic point of view. That 
is, even though there is no theme, harmonic progression or rhythm that can be identified as 
characteristic of this work, we can identify a certain texture that can be associated with these 
kinds of events connected to the abundance of its contributions and the preferred performance 
attitude (performing material independently of others). In general terms, we are referring here 
to an abundant and heterogeneous collage. However, the specific character of this collage is 
formed in the staging of the singular performance. That is, the aesthetic features are 
dependent upon who agrees to participate, the venue chosen for the event, how the schedules 
(parts) for the time brackets are worked out if such are used, the distribution of the space et 
cetera. The aesthetic character of such an event is therefore intimately connected to its 
specific production. The time schedules (parts) worked out for our event illustrates this.  If we 
had not used time brackets at all we might have arrived at a situation where performers either 
performed all the time, or perhaps, when somebody nearby played kept silent, or even became 
so frustrated by the simultaneity of activity that they gave up performing and began walking 
around instead. Of course, we cannot know this, and it would be dependent upon a lot of 
factors. However, we can imagine that such a staging strategy would probably have resulted 
in a more homogenous sonic-spatial texture than our Musicircus. That is, it would produce the 
same amount of sonic activity all the time, all over the place. The time schedules (parts) for 
our performance however were framed by the decision to have nearly the same amount of 
“performance time” (activated sound) and tacet  (“silence”) at their disposal. During the 
performance, therefore, the sonic activity and volume varied from one place to another, 
modulating the performance site in a way whereby the audience could be drawn to different 
parts of the site by the sudden sound-breaking activity beginning there.  
 
For pragmatic reasons, I chose to not make the length of the possible time brackets too short. 
Probably, if the frames had been designed differently, the chance generated time brackets 
could also have become much shorter, and time schedules with, for example, shorter time 
brackets and rests, would also have resulted in a more fragmented collage.  
 
B3>3= &*"%($)*%$
We could have used chance operations to distribute the performers throughout the 
performance site so that the spatial organisation of performances was carried out through 
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chance. Variations IV, discussed in the former chapter, provides an example in that respect. It 
stages a performance site as a room of sonic activity through chance operations designed 
according to spatial characteristics. Of course, even if chance is not used concretely in the 
spatial organisation of performances, the way the space functions as a performative space will 
also be dependent upon how time is organised. The use of time brackets affects in this respect 
the performative space as it emerges spatially/temporally through the activity that takes place 
and which interacts with the geometrical attributes of that space. However, it is possible to 
explicitly use chance as a method to organise the spatial distribution of performances. The 
Cagean circus at Stanford seems to have done that: “All spaces were appropriated 
indiscriminately for musical performance and social interaction. Musicians were assigned 
performance spaces, but without consideration for what kind of music they were playing, so 
that a classical trio performed adjacent to an Indian tabla player, madrigal and torch singers 
shared a common space, and a man playing water music set up shoulder-to-shoulder with a 
saxophone sextet.”674 In Trondheim we did not use chance operations in that respect. 
Performers were deliberately placed by Montague according to the sparse information I had 
about what they were going to do, which was not at all detailed but very general, giving 
descriptions such as: Electro-acoustic music; jazz songs and improvisations; own-composed 
material; African drums, and so on. And of course practical considerations were taken into 
account, such as where necessary instruments and equipment could be positioned. Besides 
those groups that were placed, there were performers that followed their own “staging of 
space”. There was a group who did Variations IV by Cage and moved around by using Cage’s 
score.675 Another performer became part of this moving around because of a shared piano. 
Then there were the dancers, who not at all were restricted in spatial or temporal terms by the 
organisers. 
 
B3>3> ()$
Some of the performers knew of Cage’s work and aesthetics, but many of them did not. 
However, everybody performed with a high degree of concentration and presence. Fischer-
Lichte, as we saw in chapter four, denotes ‘presence’ as describing a performative quality.676 
As a performative quality, we could ask which strategies were used to enforce presence as an 
                                                 
674 Junkerman 1994, p. 44. 
675 Neither did this group use a schedule − part − of worked out time brackets. 
676 See presentation and discussion under the heading “Presence” in chapter four. 
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aesthetic category in Trondheim. For example, through the years a lot of objections have been 
raised viewing Cage’s aesthetics as promoting an attitude of indifference.677 We could counter 
this criticism by referring to performative techniques, and emphasise that even when the 
content is indeterminate a difference can be made by the attitude in which the material and the 
situation is approached.  
 
Fischer-Lichte denotes presence as a quality the actor evokes where he/she appears in a 
strong presentness as embodied mind. For my topic, Cage’s Musicircus, I found Fischer-
Lichte’s three-partition of presentness according to actor, things and space awkward and I 
presented Gadamer’s notion of fulfilled time as an alternative.678 Nevertheless, both Fischer-
Lichte’s and Gadamer’s notions share the view of an intensified attention to the ongoing 
event as a united phenomenon of matter and intentionality. We are in this respect reminded of 
the notion of flesh presented in chapter 6 where this unification does not mean a static 
identity, but a different conception of both measures. Fleshy being exhibits stretches of hard 
facts and aspirations where the physically bounded are in a state of destabilisation that 
actively displaces as it incorporates. Presence therefore, in the present context, describes a 
performative quality that invokes a special attention to a mode of the ongoing production of 
reality that sensitizes to a high degree the physical-aspiring hereness of a situation. 
 
I will in this respect invoke the definition of Cage’s works that Göran presents in her study 
from 2009,679 referred to in chapter six.680 She understands them as systems to be put in 
operation. The meaning of these works does not rely in a repeatable and recognizable identity. 
Quite the opposite, these systems have the capacity to free performers from pre-established 
schemes of identity formation, to evoke liminality, and nonetheless, still give the performers 
something to hold on to.  It is these moments of having something to rely on that I will 
emphasise here. That is, presence as a performative quality of our presentation was dependent 
on the letting go of the actional potential within Musicircus as a system. This implied the 
willingness of the participants to devote their performances to the auto-poietic energy 
released by the event’s “starting gunshot”, like players of a game that devote their 
performances to the dynamic of that game. 
                                                 
677 An eminent example is Boulez’ criticism put forward in the article “Alea” (1957), English translation, 1964. 
678 See pp. 168-169. 
679 Göran 2009: Sansningens poetikk. John Cages estetiske praksis − “a non-knowledge of something that had 
not yet happened”. 
680 See p. 238. 
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Musicircus 2006 as a system was the result of the whole process that led up to the 
performance: The idea (suggestion, invitation, or challenge) put forward in 1967, a tradition 
of re-productions, my and Montague’s response to this complex, consideration of the practical 
circumstances, responses to invitations, et cetera.  On the day, this responsively structured 
process had collected the “material” − those who were willing to perform and their prepared 
material − some rules to follow, and a distinctive venue. Then, like a sports event this system 
was put in operation at 5 p.m. exactly.  
 
Göran describes Cage’s systems as having the capacity to “free” a mode of action through 
procedures of automation and bring the performers into a performative-attentive state of flow. 
They dwell in a structure of throughput as nodes in a circulating field of increased energy. 
Göran’s notion of the work as a system overlaps Fischer-Lichte’s mise en scène (staging) but 
also extends it. Göran gives these systems self-organising potential. I would like to use this 
extension in a reflection upon ‘presence’ as it appeared in Trondheim. 
 
Based on Göran’s analysis, the performative quality of presence exhibited in Cage’s works 
relies on:  
 
1) A worked out system (certain material and rules/procedures for action) that has self-
organising potential; 
2) An increased level of energy to put into the system (accumulated through 
preparations); 
3) The released energy has the ability to flow unhindered within the limitation of the 
system; 
4) This creates a circuit of auto-poietic energy within a delimited situation that both 
performers and audience can give themselves over to and follow up as co-players, as 
nodes in a circuit of heightened awareness to this condition’s dynamic productivity. 
 
To get this increased flow of actional energy that spreads throughout a situation and 
continuously enacts a spatial-temporal topology of discursive-material configurations, the 
production (mise en scène) is dependent upon participants that are willing to be part of the 
play and invest their performative interest to the logic of the game.  Without this willingness 
to co-play, the system’s level of auto-poietic creativity would be obstructed, and what could 
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have arisen as an opportunity to explore the emergent state of playing and co-acting would 
loose its energetic power.  
 
According to Göran’s analysis, a kind of Werktreue is necessary to evoke the level of auto-
generative flow that is needed to raise the performative-attentive quality of presence − alert to 
the emergence of the situation, open to its conditional creativity. The outlining of a system, 
the preparation of an event, accumulates so to speak an actional energy that is set free and 
unhindered streams as an increased level of agential force into the system’s auto-generative 
procedures. The presence thereby created is directed to what emerges, to what happens. 
Göran shows how Cage re-directs the identity formation of music from the repetition of 
established forms to the emergent quality of the unknown. To do so, his poetics do not 
investigate the freedom of performers to do whatever they want. His anarchy is not a 
permission of unrestricted desires, but a call to discipline that has the capacity to transform a 
perspective and provoke a transforming experience.  
 
Cage’s system designs have therefore contra-productive dynamics. They establish obstacles 
for habitual confirmation, but provide at the same time the performer with rules to hold on to, 
so the performer can invest his/her performative attention and energy to a creative process in 
flow that appears in the real time of becoming, uncensored by the responsibility of confirming 
an established identity. The non-responsibility for reinvesting a norm of identification leaves 
capacities to dwell in an energetic state of emergence sustained by the system’s auto-
generative forces. 
 
Now, transferred to our production, which mechanisms were used to enforce a performative 
quality of presence? As mentioned, to get people interested I placed the project within a 
discourse − the avant-garde of Western art music − that I thought was known and of interest 
to those invited. The work tradition, in this respect, took part in those frames that situated the 
performance, collected energy forces, and gave confidence to the performers to dedicate their 
performances to the self-organising collage of Musicircus. But though the work-concept 
provided a soundboard for authorisation, the creative productivity of the designed system 
functioned in a counter-productive way against the identity generating factors of the work as 
an established institution. The simultaneity of performances and the use of time brackets 
provided this subversive direction.  
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To acquire this function, though, of cleaning the slate and to reset an attitude of openness and 
acceptance, the performers needed to have a degree of faith. They had to be ready to take on 
the disciplining factors of the system and give themselves over to what thereby emerged. The 
curator’s role was in this respect important. He took part in the authorisation of the 
production, validated it, not least by his former involvement with organising and doing 
Cagean circuses. Further, he inspired the performers, helped to focus their attention and make 
them aware of their tasks. These tasks helped to sustain the performative focus when other 
habitual schemes were destabilized and to maintain high amplitude of the auto-poietic energy 
that the live generated collage brought forth.681 Within this creative field the audience could 
wander about and, like my experience in Ludwigshafen, perform their own act of listening as 
an embodied act of exploration.  Therefore, besides being involved in the development of 
Musicircus as a system, the curator had an important functioned as a “team leader” that 
collected the forces, helped to accumulate energy and bring about a performative focus that 
could be released when the “starting gunshot” went off. 
 
B3? #($,$*
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We have several times touched on the theme of Musicircus having “no aesthetic bias”. How 
was this found in our realisation in Trondheim? Or, would it be correct to speak about “no 
aesthetic bias” with respect to our performance. Firstly, I would underscore that without doubt 
the event we staged mainly appeared as an aesthetic event that explored, or generated, a 
certain situation by artistic means. I have already mentioned that the invitational rhetoric for 
our project emphasised much more the artistic and aesthetic context than, for example, 
presenting it as a social project that would explore a social organisation by artistic means. 
Junkerman for example emphasises this last aspect in his reflection on the circus at Standford. 
The Cagean circus becomes an artistic exemplification of a utopian non-segregated urban 
togetherness that tolerates the magnitude of individual appearances though also represents an 
identification with all and everything, a kind of universalism. Everyone is part of the same 
                                                 
681 We could raise questions in this respect about the balance between reasonable challenge and feasibility. 
Because we could argue that the flow of the self-organising system would be dependent upon the participants’ 
willingness to take on the challenges (even if unfeasible). The important thing here is the attitude, not the right 
answer, or the right execution. If the performers chose to resign from these tasks, the generative force of the 
system would break down. 
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family independent of ethnicity and religion; we all have the earth as our ‘global village’.  
 
Even though we could question how accurate a description like “no aesthetic bias” would be 
of our circus, I would still underscore that we did not carry out any kind of aesthetic 
censorship. That is, as mentioned earlier, the invitations gave some suggestions of what 
participants could do but these suggestions ended up being very open, and in fact, the 
performers brought with them the program that suited them. As organisers we did not 
“control” these programs beforehand.  
 
The liberation, therefore, of “no aesthetic bias” happened mainly by creating a highly tolerant 
performative space for musical-artistic expressions.682 This liberation was found to be 
experimental, and members of the audience expressed it as a new experience, though Cagean 
circuses have been done since 1967.683  
 
Andersson published an essay called “The Provocation is dead!” just some days after our 
event.684 There he discusses in general terms the difficulty to affect anybody by contemporary 
music and art. Artistic challenges make no impression in our time; we just shrug them off and 
continue where we were. The production in Trondheim does not figure in the essay, but a 
picture from our event is used as illustration, accompanied by the following observation: 
“Folk music, rock, classical music, dance and happening were performed simultaneously in 
imperfect (?) union. But was it provocative?” 685 
 
We could reply to this observation that though Husarik informs us that the first Musicircus 
could be labelled a grand experiment that was a “challenging and provocative brand of the 
‘musical happening’”,686 it seems that the event was as much coloured by celebration and fun 
as provocation. Maybe the subversive logic of carnivals is a better comparison, which uses 
the feast’s suspension of the social world’s ordinary norms as an explorative ground for re-
orientations.687 Andersson however points to an important question: If we should keep the 
                                                 
682 My mother though that has little experience with avant-garde music found the event as creating an 
atmosphere of liberation that could inspire to create similar occasions where everybody are artists. I thought that 
to be in line with Cage’s anarchic philosophy. 
683 I think though that our Musicircus was the first in Norway. 
684 Andersson, Musikk•Kultur, 27th of May, 2006. Translated from Norwegian. 
685 Loc cit.   
686 Husarik 1983, pp. 5 and 19. 
687 See for example Attali 1985. 
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radical spirit of Musicircus and its groundbreaking ability, what would that require of a 
production today? Or is our time too numb after decades of artistic attacks and interrogations 
pushed to the extreme?  
 
B3?3= +*%$%#/
In the discussion of the process of invitation both in chapter five and this chapter, it is 
indicated that the aesthetic event cannot be detached from the reciprocal structure of a request 
that includes many prosaic elements. However, Musicircus undoubtedly stood out as an 
individual, so to speak, autonomous, event when it started at 5 o’clock on that Sunday 
afternoon in Trondheim. The starting time staged the difference: For sure we entered an 
artistic performance. The prosaic process of preparation was left behind. Now it was the 
aesthetic presence of the performance that counted. We were not anymore just within what we 
could call the spans of everyday temporal-spatial routines and unpredictability. We could, 
using Gadamer’s terminology, say that we entered festival time. I have indicated this 
difference by dividing the staging into phases one and two. Simply and concretely the 
performance was separated from the preparatory process by:  
 
1) The indication of when it started and ended signalled in announcements and program 
note. The start time was also used as the beginning of the time parts − the time 
schedules with brackets to fill with artistic activity − used by the performers. In that 
way most of the groups had a kind of “individual part” − a kind of notation − that they 
followed during the performance. 
2) The expectations invoked by announcements and program note.688  
3) The generation of a heightened aesthetic awareness − presence − by the performers’ 
focused performance.  
 
We could argue that Gadamer’s notion of art as festival and his connected concept of 
presence, presents an aesthetic notion of autonomy that is not coupled to an object, but to an 
event that stands out and breaks the ordinary routines. Like one of the definitions of ‘event’ 
presented in chapter three, this conception signals the exceptionally new, irreducible and non-
                                                 
688 Since the performance happened at the indoors street, a place for transit, there was also possible to just enter 
the performance without knowing anything about it beforehand. 
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transferable.689 
 
This concept of autonomy is not only linked to a concept of event, through Gadamer’s notion 
of art as festival supported by his conception of play,690 the participants are also dragged into 
the enactment of the festival’s autonomous time as co-players and contributors. The event 
does not stand out as an object to contemplate. It is its special presence and what is 
created/invoked in this attentive state that makes it stand out.  
 
This special experience stands out because it is transforming and life-changing for those 
involved. The autonomous time is, with respect to Gadamer, an embodied time; it is time as 
materialized and spacious, and space as temporal sites. Transferred to the presented notion of 
flesh in chapter six, it is a “thick” presence and a spacious “now” with past and future folded 
up in the enacting moment. It is a concept of autonomy that is not connected to the 
autonomous object but a time fulfilled as spatial-temporal enactment. We could in this respect 
transfer this notion of independence, and the opening for the exceptionally new, to Barad’s 
notion of intra-action and the openness that relies on the figure of answers.  
 
The event is in this respect not repeatable, but the iterations of similar strategies for enactment 
− of invoking similar presences − can be staged. Gadamer emphasises the point that “a certain 
kind of recurrence belongs to the festival.”691 The presence of festival time arises only 
through the iteration of the festival itself.692 We could read this within a frame of 
performativity, and argue that Gadamer expresses here a point close to Barad: Presence as 
embodied meaning − as discursive-material configurations of the world − are kept and passed 
on by iterative movements, by iterative enactments/re-formulations/intra-actions.  
 
Even though the embodied time of festivals appears as autonomous and it singles out an event 
by intense awareness and irreducible presence, it is not secluded from the before or after. The 
experience does not leave us. The mode of reality/existence that has been explored and acted 
upon leaves traces. In chapter four I presented Gadamer’s notion of ‘symbol’ as a token for 
remembrance and initiation for a renewed engaged meeting. Outlined staging strategies can 
                                                 
689 See pp. 89-90. 
690 See presentation in chapter four pp. 123-124. 
691 Gadamer 1986, p. 41 
692 Loc. cit. 
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be understood in a similar vein. They can be understood as an invitation for renewed 
gatherings, a place both for enlivened remembrance and actual re-formulations of a state.  The 
meeting place appears in this respect as the laboratory of “thick” presence and “deep” now, 
the site for flesh’s opening and closure. Autonomy is in this respect not aligned to the 
surviving object, but the non-determinism of creative acts − the ability to act upon one’s life 
and iterate it in a re-orientated way.  
 
B3?3> *%(%",$))
The performance in Trondheim was videotaped and I have enclosed with this document an 
edited version. Still though, as probably many have felt when confronted by such a recording, 
it is difficult to document the aesthetic quality of walking in the middle of such a circus. The 
experience of being there cannot be compared with the “flat screen” view of a videotaped 
version. To document a Musicircus and do justice to its multi-sensorial quality is very 
difficult. We could find this difficulty to be a testimony to the value of liveness and the 
irreducible aesthetic quality of presence in the Cagean circus. 
 
In Chapter Three I presented Goehr’s reading of the work-concept as an objectification of 
music into an autonomous and lasting entity. Contrary to this, the Cagean circus accentuates 
the qualities of processes that evade objectifications, the significance of conditional processes, 
the situation dependent and non-repeatable. We could say that the Cagean circus generates an 
artistic situation where it is difficult to separate out a product from the process that creates it; 
the artistic product we could say cannot be separated from the creative activity itself that is 
further linked to the intermingled contributions of members of a community. That is, we have 
an artistic situation intimately connected to a collective effort and linked to the immediate 
result of creative activity.  
 
This brought us to a performative turn of approach where the character of event is highlighted 
and attempted to be captured by other theoretic tools than those framed by a work-concept 
such as the one Goehr presents. The concept of ‘performance’ and the interconnected 
‘performativity’ is in this instance used by theoreticians like Fischer-Lichte to theorize an 
altered entry to the field of aesthetics where the quality of process and the non-ability to 
separate out a product is emphasised. The factor of liveness is here important.  
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Aesthetic character is in this respect connected to moments of execution; aesthetic 
significance is so to speak linked to a heightened awareness of the present tense of doing that 
includes the openness of play − that is, the responsive structure between participants and the 
auto-creative energy that thereby arises. However, though we in this respect are drawn to the 
experiential openness of the unknown future and the intra-active693 dynamics in the folds of 
co-agencies, this is not a secluded moment with no reasons and no consequences. The 
intensified factor of liveness, however, magnifies the precarious “slip” in the movement of 
enacting; it magnifies the double move of ‘agential cut’694 that encloses some possibilities and 
opens others, and the turn of iteration that inherits the parallel moves of conditionality and 
independence. 
 
How important was the factor of liveness for our realisation? It is in fact difficult to think 
about the aesthetic quality of a Musicircus apart from the dynamics that emerge in the real 
time of its being done. As the enclosed documentation shows, the magic of being at the spot, 
having the ability to walk around, be surprised, entranced, and enclosed by aesthetic presence 
− like an ocean to swim within − is lost in the recorded version. It is like those photographs 
taken on holidays that remind us of having been there, but cannot replace the wish to go on a 
journey.  
 
So what is it, aesthetically, that makes it so difficult to split the aesthetic character of 
Musicircus from the real time of performing? We have already touched these points, but let 
me summarize some in connection with our realisation in Trondheim. I have already 
emphasised how the staging strategies pull the attention to what emerges and so to speak 
invest our aesthetic sensitivity to the poiesis in the slippery holds of wordly formulations − on 
the edge of being and becoming, knowing and not knowing, faith and handing over. Though, 
this is a state we hardly ever can refrain from as long as we live, the performance as an artistic 
medium that can stage the real time of enactment has the ability to address this point in a 
condensed fashion and interrogate its conditions by delimiting an experimental ground. We 
could therefore argue that the aesthetic significance of Musicircus is not only its collage, but 
                                                 
693 Intra-action is presented in chapter six, pp. 266-268.   
694 See my presentation of Barad’ agential realism in chapter six. Barad describes in this respect ‘agential cut’ as 
a “specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘apparatus of observation’) enacts an 
agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object) effecting a 
separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object.’ That is, the agential cut enacts a local resolution within the 
phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, 
relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions.” (Barad 2003, p. 815.) 
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that it is generated live. 
 
Of course, from an experiential point of view this is also accentuated by the richness of 
sensuous opportunities that a live performance gives and which Musicircus allows with its 
spacious organisation: As listeners we use the whole body in the act of listening.695 The 
Cagean circus as a performative technique stages a spatio-temporal event, and the creation 
and enactment of a performative space is intimately part of what aesthetically matters. The 
sensation of moving around, the surplus situation of simultaneous performances, the sense of 
space and presence − the richness of the experience − is lost in the documentation. 
 
The Musicircus staged in Trondheim relied in this respect on the intensified factor of liveness 
as essential for the aesthetic value of the realisation. Through the precarious quality of real 
time, the audience was surrounded by an experiential richness and openness that encouraged 
an explorative attitude to the unknown of the aesthetic situation. 
 
The aspects that I have pointed to above are intimately connected to the uncertainty that the 
future represents. But the impact of the live situation is not only impressive because of that. 
The discursive traits of historical practices, material configurations passed on to new 
situations, Musicircus as a live generated collage does not act in a cultural or historical 
vacuum. We could even argue that the invitation to a community to participate and offer of 
their own resources is like an initiative to exhibit in a condensed fashion the multiplicities of 
life practices, histories, traditions, that exist in an environment. The discursive aspects do not 
loose meanings but their meanings rely so to speak in their iteration in the climate of live 
enactment; the plurality collected under one roof enacts in a condensed fashion the co-
presence of active and engaging worldlines: It is history pluralised, it is history relativized, 
but present to be and being acted upon. We are not presented the history of museums, but the 
living history of humans as a bubbling field of active embodiment in continued processes of 
distribution and reformulation. The factor of liveness does in this respect accentuate the 
contemporaneous quality of history, traditions and evolved practices, through the open 
moment of iteration that both can stabilize a solution-giving formula and turn it to other 
actional potentialities.  
 
                                                 
695 See for example my analysis of the act of listening in chapter five, pp. 213-216. 
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Fischer-Lichte accentuates the function of staged performances as a laboratory for cultural 
(re-)orientations. I am here in line with her thinking. My reading of the Cagean Musicircus 
has moved in the direction of not cutting Cage’s presence aesthetics from history, nor culture 
or discursivity. Instead the destabilizing techniques of Cage’s performative strategies have 
been seen as opening perspectives and the actional potential of reorientations. The continuous 
enactments of discursive-material practices have their open horizons, their positive 
indeterminacy.  
 
 
B3@ 		(5%$
I presented in chapter three Musicircus as an “anti-work” that radically works with the frames 
and self-understanding of Western art music. Cage wraps off the objectifying move of re-
visitable sound structures, and leaves us with the playful event that emerges, is evasive and 
highly transformative. He points to a subject field of staged processes, and art not as a sign, 
but a mode of reality to be explored and experienced.  
 
But what happens when the “anti-work” is re-done? Can we easily wrap it again in the 
conception of the hypostatized work? An imagined scenario was outlined where the 
marketing of a Musicircus would follow the template shaped by the established work concept 
and not be presented like a public arrangement at the mall.696  
 
The work-based rhetoric, as we have seen, coloured also our production. It was used in the 
presentation to attract and inform potential participants, and it was used to market the 
event.697 This is the norm. For example, in doing a Cage inspired production it would be 
regarded as disrespectful to not mention his name. As a canonized composer of the 20th 
century with a huge production of published scores, established work and composer focused 
discourses lend themselves as appropriate.   
 
This discourse also gives us the ideal of Werktreue that can be mobilised as a force generating 
interest, curiosity and commitment. I mentioned in chapter three that in accordance with this 
                                                 
696 See p. 76. 
697 Some children dressed as princesses came to our Musicircus.  I must admit that I do not actually know the 
reason for this, but perhaps some thought that the event was meant for children. If so they got something other 
than expected, though it seemed that they found the event amusing.  
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ideal it was quite plausible that we also would have some sense of obligation. Montague 
expressed an interest, aesthetically, to carry out the project in line with those he had joined 
which had been organized by Cage. In that way, our production took part in a kind of oral 
transmission.  
 
Montague therefore as curator and artistic adviser implemented experiences from earlier 
circuses and tried to evoke a Cagean spirit associated to these circuses. A kind of Werktreue 
was therefore guiding our production. Our loyalty was in this respect mostly related to 
aesthetic and artistic matters, such as the arrangement for the emergence of a heterogeneous 
and varied collage.  Conversely, if we had connected the ideal of Werktreue mainly to 
Musicircus as a kind of work where its work-character − its concept − is associated with a 
radical social questioning, then we would have emphasised other aspects to which we would 
have been obliged than those which actually were accentuated. 
 
I mentioned also in chapter three that the performers probably felt that they were contributing 
to the realisation of a performance concept − a kind of work. To realise and experience this 
concept could be part of the motivation to respond positively to a Musicircus-invitation. 
Werktreue therefore functions as a tool to create a certain explorative situation. Still, the 
question remains: What kind of ideal are we speaking of here and how does it function?  
 
This is also a question about the work. From chapter three to four, we went from music as 
objectified through a work-concept to the accentuation of the event as staged. The surviving 
moment was in this respect not a hypostasized entity to be “re-installed” in material garment, 
but resources for staging, the iterate-transformative ability of embodied states and the 
aftermath of experiences. Göran, as we have seen, looks upon Cage’s works as systems that 
do not have a teleological norm, but act as a generative motor. This approach helps to 
illuminate the aesthetic character of Cage’s poetics and an aesthetic category of presence. 
Still, as I have already demonstrated, the system of Musicircus is not developed before we 
have entered into a creative process of response and new initiatives. The historical idea of the 
Cagean circus operates as the thrown out suggestion that a creative community responded to 
in 1967. In this respect we could argue that according to an ideal of Werktreue we do not here 
have a supposed ideal, not even a text, but an open invitation, a challenge − a projective 
gesture open for responses. How do we handle this invitation?  
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Even though we might wish to handle the original idea as respectfully as possible, and make a 
production which was as authentic as possible, the deferral of the invitation structure asks for 
a creative response. Any realisation would add something and give the original initiation a 
distinct resistance. Werktreue is in this respect not only about understanding the invitation, 
but also about the answer and its attitude − what do we aim at by taking up the gauntlet? Our 
responsibilities are as much directed to the contemporary situation and ourselves as creative 
citizens of the world as to the past and an originator: What can we offer, what do we find 
appropriate? The open-endedness of the invitational structure shows the agential (re-
orientating) potential of intra-action.  
 
What is of interest is the potential in the oscillating dynamics between initiative and response. 
A production is not a simple repetition and Werktreue has not a unique ideal for which to 
strive. A work cannot be found to provide a model but we can find the initiative of an 
invitation. We could argue that to fulfil the ideal of Werktreue in this situation we have to 
take an active attitude to history. It is not about a condition that can only be transferred and 
re-installed, but a state that is created again and again though renewed enactments and  
(re-)formulations.  
 
Andersson, as mentioned, questions the ability of contemporary music and art to really move, 
transform, and provoke us. Correlated to this, I asked: If we should keep the radical spirit of 
Musicircus and its groundbreaking ability, what would that ask of a production today?  
 
We could, however, put the question a little differently. For example, we could imagine that 
musicircus had become a common strategy for organising events. Would that fact have 
levelled down the artistic potential of Musicircus? Three answers could be sketched: 1) 
Musicircus without its initial radical capacity seems irrelevant because it has outrun its 
function of breaking new ground. Partly this answer would have as its premise that a new 
production simply would be a re-installation of a prescribed design (a view that has been 
contested several times in this thesis). 2) Though the technique of musicircus has become 
more commonplace, its usefulness is not lost. Like those established practices to transport us 
to another state of mind,698 musicircus could be seen as effective in evoking certain states and 
playful situations longed for. 3) The third answer would take as its premise that Musicircus is 
                                                 
698 We could mention here everything from meditation to the arrangement of sports events and carnivals. 
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like an open invitation, or challenge, that we respond to when we decide to do a Cagean 
circus. The question of artistic potential would thereby be as much a question about the 
creative response as the original invitation.  
 
Even though ‘musicircus’ is not in danger of becoming an ordinary performance concept and 
the setup of simultaneous performances still appears as refreshing, the last answer points to 
the inevitable aspect of an active appropriation, of a creative response to an initiative. The 
question is not only if Musicircus has outrun its function, but what we find of interest and 
relevance by taking up the invitation. The Cagean circus as an event is not only the result of a 
sketchy formula. It happens because of a responsive structure of initiatives and creative 
replies. The artistic potential is as much decided by us as an original idea. 
 
Available sources indicate that the first Musicircus was designed as a single event brought 
about due to local circumstances. It was not planned far in advance, but rapidly organised, 
and it came about as a result of local issues and resources.699 From this singular arrangement, 
a performance design has arisen that takes on the character of a work, despite the ambiguities 
of the “missing” score and Cage’s restriction of his role as composer. The historical 
production could thereby be claimed to have gone from being an experimental event, re-
organising the norms of performance, to existing within the work category as a specific 
design culturally acknowledged as a repeatable structure.  
 
Nevertheless, even if we could argue that a history of re-productions has consolidated 
Musicircus, to do it we are confronted by a design concept with many open spaces, which we 
will need to fill. As a model, Musicircus has no specified authoritative text and its material 
leads us to the responsive structure of invitations, and if we try to comply with Cage’s 
aesthetic thinking and performative challenge we are as much guided to the unsettlement of 
experiential openness as the confirmation of an established identity. 
 
I have shown how our production in Trondheim was partly guided by a Werktreue and 
performed within a work discourse, but also how the event was explicitly dependent upon an 
invitational structure that transformed Cagean chance operations into a question of response. 
Who would agree to participate? What would they offer? Werktreue as pre-interpretations 
                                                 
699 See chapter two. 
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performed by we the organisers became thereby modulated by the openness of conditional 
processes. These processes were decisive for the artistic content, and we could argue that the 
event, as festival time, was to let these processes take place in a condensed fashion.  The 
activation of a mode of play without a teleological norm, but with rules for actions and an 
inspired awareness of tasks, brought about a concentration of the enacting moment as a 
spatial-temporal resonance and configuration in the intersectional zones of co-agencies that 
had its aesthetic excitement connected to the emergence of becoming, to a shared but not 
defined topography of interconnected, though independent being – a productivity of presence 
that created a surplus situation which was most effectively conveyed by the live production of 
the performance. The factor of liveness emphasising the event’s embodied-embodying-
dispersive character, the aesthetic category of presence, and the experiential openness of an 
explorative attitude were therefore important to contribute aesthetic value to the event. 
 
These aesthetic values, accentuated by a transfer from work to performance as the pivot of 
attention, were in fact enforced by the production’s closeness to a work discourse and a 
canonized history of music. Still, we could ask: Could we have approached the challenge 
differently? What is needed to be done today? Our production was put into a context that 
explored ‘open form’ as a possibility for music and a “tradition” within the avant-garde of 
that art form. I have indicated that a production could have been made that reflected an 
interest in the social experiment of simultaneous performances. Junkerman’s analysis of the 
circus at Stanford emphasises these aspects.700 We could have imagined a re-production that 
not only tried to test and provide a utopian experience of a non-segregated urban liveliness, 
but also questioned the Cagean perspective on heterogeneous simultaneity and individual 
autonomy. I showed in chapter five that it was preferred that auto-poietic drives in the fields 
of communication be restricted, in deference to a different voicing, like the ecological 
situation for human intentionality or the unforeseen chance in the unpredicted encounter.701 In 
contrast I used In between pieces for three players by Wolff as an example of a piece that 
explores the dynamics of auto-poietic feedback coils in the intimate situation of 
communication. Could we have imagined a production that mixed these modes of 
exploration? 
 
                                                 
700 See former presentation of Junkerman’s analysis under the heading “nEw / foRms of living together” in 
chapter five. 
701 See pp. 196-197, 199-200 and 209-211. 
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The Cagean circus can be seen as an eminent example of the post-modern condition of fluid 
identities, fragmented stories, highly transmissive and dispersive, and furnishing the 
possibility to “shop” for our references and develop our own unique history in the 
intersectional culture of a multi-focal world. In that respect it has not lost relevance in a time 
that has increased the speed of global communication making it possible to be online day and 
night. 
 
Though we are presented with musicircus-like phenomena on a daily basis, Cage’s approach 
to the post-modern is remarkable and rare. I remember the thought, years ago during a trail of 
commercials on the television: The seemingly Cagean exhibition of non-coordinated stories 
exhibited on closer inspection a quite contrary strategy. Each bubble of a fragment tried to 
evoke the illusion of a unified and non-contested universe that could bring about stable 
signifiers for the details of life in which, of course, the sales product was an important part. 
The aestheticism of our post-modern world reflects as much a creativity of textuality where 
matter is inscribed by signs as stressing the conjoint productivity of embodiment.  The 
striking performativity is of the Butlerean type where identity is performed by iterative 
citation, by incorporating cultural scripts in the individual’s performing repertory and 
searching thereby to express visions of his/her own essence. We could even argue that the 
work category has found a place in the beauty industry, in plastic surgery and in working out 
at the gym. 
 
In the displaced, prolonged dynamics of technologies of communication and transmission, 
Musicircus can reflect the post-modern flux of present opportunities, its interconnected 
complexity, the sense of an extended presence to be logged on at any time, yet still not cover 
up the “fleshy condition” of this state but accentuate the earthly qualities of mediated 
presence as being part of the ongoing process of (re-)configuration of individual lives.   
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